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

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THE

CHURCH QUARTERLY REVIEW

FOR

APRIL 1922 : JULY 1922

EDITED BY

MEMBERS OF THE FACULTY OF THEOLOGY

KING'S COLLEGE, LONDON

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CONTENTS:

PAGE

I. WHO ARE MEMBERS OF THE CHURCH? By the Most Rev. C. F. D'ARCY, D.D., Archbishop of Armagh . 1

II. ANGLICANISM AND MODERN PROBLEMS. By the Rev. RICHARD HANSON, B.D., Chaplain of King's College, London 11

III. THE SCIENCE OF PSYCHOLOGY. By the Rev. FRANCIS AVELING, D.Sc., D.D., Reader in Psychology, University of London, King's College 48

IV. THE PROBLEM OF PRAYER. By A. A. COCK, Professor of Education, University College, Southampton . . 67

V. A PHILOSOPHER TO HIS WIFE: PORPHYRY *AD MARCELLAM*. By the Rev. W. J. FERRAR, Cowfold Rectory, Sussex 85

VI. IMMORTALITY AND RESURRECTION. By the Rev. H. MAURICE RELTON, D.D., Lecturer in Dogmatic Theology, King's College, London, and Vicar of Isleworth . 98

VII. WORCESTER INSTITUTIONS SIX CENTURIES AGO. By the Right Rev. E. H. PEARCE, Litt.D., Bishop of Worcester 140

MEDIAEVAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO MODERN CIVILIZATION 156

SHORT NOTICES 164

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CONTENTS

	PAGE
WHO ARE MEMBERS OF THE CHURCH? By the Most Rev. C. F. D'Arcy, D.D., Archbishop of Armagh	1
ANGLICANISM AND MODERN PROBLEMS. By the Rev. Richard Hanson, B.D., Chaplain of King's College, London	11
THE SCIENCE OF PSYCHOLOGY. By the Rev. Francis Aveling, D.Sc., D.D., Reader in Psychology, University of London, King's College	48
THE PROBLEM OF PRAYER. By A. A. Cock, Professor of Education, University College, Southampton	67
A PHILOSOPHER TO HIS WIFE: PORPHYRY *AD MARCELLAM*. By the Rev. W. J. Ferrar, Cowfold Rectory, Sussex	85
IMMORTALITY AND RESURRECTION. By the Rev. H. Maurice Relton, D.D., Lecturer in Dogmatic Theology, King's College, London, and Vicar of Isleworth	98
WORCESTER INSTITUTIONS SIX CENTURIES AGO. By the Right Rev. E. H. Pearce, Litt.D., Bishop of Worcester	140
MEDIAEVAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO MODERN CIVILIZATION	156
RELIGION IN CZECHO-SLOVAKIA. By the Rev. J. B. Seaton, Principal of Cuddesdon	201
THE ORIGIN OF THE GOSPELS. By the Rev. W. Lockton, Diocesan Training College, Winchester	216
WORCESTER PRIORY AND ITS BISHOP. By the Right Rev. E. H. Pearce, Litt.D., Bishop of Worcester	240
THE NEW IDEALISM. By Miss Hilda D. Oakeley, Reader in Philosophy, University of London, King's College	259
TITHE RENT CHARGE: LEGISLATION AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS, A.D. 1888–1921. By the Rev. W. C. Tuting, D.D., Sithney Vicarage, Helston	282
LANGUAGE AND STYLE IN THE NEW TESTAMENT. By the Rev. F. P. Cheetham, Lecturer in New Testament, King's College, London	302
REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON OXFORD AND CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITIES. By the Rev. Arthur C. Headlam, D.D., Regius Professor of Divinity in the University of Oxford	322
STUDIES IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY FRANCE	352
SHORT NOTICES	164, 358
INDEX TO VOL. XCIV	391

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THE

CHURCH QUARTERLY REVIEW.

No. CLXXXVII.—*April* 1922.

Art. I.—WHO ARE MEMBERS OF THE CHURCH?

1. *Who are Members of the Church? A statement of evidence in criticism of a sentence in the Appeal to all Christian People made by the Lambeth Conference of* 1920 *which is fundamental to all the propositions of that Appeal.* By Darwell Stone, D.D., Principal of Pusey House, and F. W. Puller, M.A., of the Society of St. John the Evangelist. Pusey House Occasional Papers, No. 9. (London: Longmans, Green and Co. 1921.)

Dr. Darwell Stone and the Rev. F. W. Puller are theologians of high repute and great learning. They may perhaps be described as the most notable and the most respected leaders of thought in a large and influential section of the Church of England. They are 'Anglo-Catholics' of a very definite type. The fact that such men have thought it necessary to issue a statement in criticism of the fundamental proposition of the Lambeth *Appeal to all Christian People* must arrest the attention of all thoughtful churchmen and certainly demands the most serious consideration.

It will perhaps be of some utility in a matter of such transcendent importance, if one who took part in the discussions out of which the Appeal emerged, and who must share with the other members of the Committee a very direct responsibility for it, gives his reasons for the attitude he

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adopted, and for his complete agreement with the Lambeth pronouncement.

And here let me say that the authors of the Paper attribute to me much too large a share of authority in relation to the fundamental statement which they criticize. I am not prepared to say how exactly that statement received its final shape. Every word, every phrase, was weighed and tested by many minds. Nothing escaped the most minute examination. The result which finally emerged is, consequently, one for which all who approved it were equally responsible and in which all fully shared. Let no one imagine that there is any sentence, or even word, in the Appeal which was imposed on the Conference by any dominant group, or which was dexterously inserted while the minds of those who might object were otherwise occupied. The Conference was singularly free from everything of this nature.

The purpose of Dr. Darwell Stone and his collaborator is to overthrow the doctrine which is implied in a single sentence of the Appeal. This sentence is, in effect, a definition of membership in the Church, and is as follows: 'We acknowledge all those who believe in our Lord Jesus Christ, and have been baptized into the name of the Holy Trinity, as sharing with us membership in the universal Church of Christ which is His Body.'

This definition is rightly declared to be fundamental to the whole Appeal; and is in the opinion of its critics so erroneous that they deem it their duty to make use of every opportunity of declaring their dissent from it.

The question thus raised is undoubtedly a very serious one. If it be true that the united episcopate of the Anglican Communion have not only made an erroneous statement on a question so fundamental, but have issued an Appeal to the whole Christian world which is throughout based on error, we are indeed in a dangerous position. And, let me add, there was no element in the Appeal which commanded so much unqualified assent as this very sentence. On many other points we had wide differences of opinion and eager discussions—differences and dis-

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cussions which led to much anxious thought and questioning. But on this fundamental position we reached so complete a unity of conviction and feeling that all criticism was silenced. I think I may venture to say that it was clear to the mind of the Conference that, in adopting this position, we were taking a definite step forward, along the lines marked out by the teaching of our Lord and the principles of His kingdom. We realized fully that, though what we expressed was the belief of many individuals in the past,[1] yet it had not been presented to the world as the confessed conviction of the whole body of authority in any branch of the Catholic Church. And my belief is that it was just this fact—the fact that we were able to found our Appeal on this great conviction—which filled us with a new sense of the Divine presence and assistance. We realized that God the Holy Ghost is as truly in the Church to-day as in the first ages of Christian history.

It is not, however, with any thought that such an experience as this sets us free from the necessity of making a reasonable statement of the grounds of our conviction, that I mention it. Dr. Stone's argument must be met and must receive all the consideration that is due to his undoubted learning and great influence.

Before dealing with the arguments of the Pusey House Paper, I think it well to mention briefly the positive grounds of the statement. First, there was our recognition of certain great facts in the Christian experience of our time. We saw that much of the best work of all that is done in the name of Christ is accomplished by those who do not inherit the old Catholic order. This is especially evident in the mission-field. We believed that this work stands the test prescribed by our Lord Himself: 'By their fruits ye shall know them.' To suppose that such work as this is altogether, and in every sense, outside the Church of Christ is impossible. Further, I think it became clear to very many

[1] Hooker's doctrine of the Church is perhaps even wider. He includes all who 'call upon the name of our Lord Jesus Christ.' He adds, 'Both heresy and many other crimes which wholly sever from God, do sever from the Church of God in part only.'—*Ecclesiastical Polity*, bk. v. ch. 68.

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of us that we must regard the Church as more than a Society organized in a certain way. It is a living Organism, and therefore it inevitably breaks through any mechanized system which endeavours to confine its life within rigidly defined limits. That we discerned to be the inner history of many of the great schisms. Through its narrowness and sinfulness the visible society was quite as much responsible for these disasters as those who broke away.

We also felt that, the Church of Christ being essentially a living spiritual organism, and not a mere corporation, the argument from facts is a much more powerful one than the argument from bare logical consistency. In support of this view we could appeal to the nature of the evidence which convinced the primitive Church that the Gentiles were to be admitted: 'Can any man forbid the water, that these should not be baptized, which have received the Holy Ghost as well as we?'[1] Or again, we could quote St. Paul's justification of his commission, 'Truly the signs of an apostle were wrought among you in all patience, by signs and wonders and mighty works.'[2] Can there be any doubt that St. Paul's consciousness of the call which had come to him from Christ would never have been accepted for truth by the Church if it had not been justified by the work which he accomplished?

If, then, we believe that Christ lives and works, by the Holy Spirit, in His Church to-day as truly as in the first age, we cannot ignore the evidence of spiritual facts.

Having said so much, it is necessary to examine the arguments of our critics. First, they deal with 'the case of those who have been baptized in communion with the legitimate rulers of the historic Church, but are now excommunicated.' And here I must point out a very curious confusion in the argument. Our critics cite a great many instances of exclusion from the Society of the Church, some for heresy, others for notorious and unrepented sin. It is surely clear that in relation to the doctrine of the 'Appeal,' the excommunication of heretics is altogether

[1] Acts x 44 to 48.

[2] 2 Cor. xii 11, 12. See also Rom. xv 15 to 21, 1 Cor. ix, 2 Cor. xi 5 to end.

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irrelevant. 'Those who believe in our Lord Jesus Christ' are not heretics. Dr. Stone might surely have taken the trouble to digest the thought of the Appeal as a whole. When the fundamental principle is applied to the actual problem of bringing all Christian people into corporate unity, it is clearly recognized that there must be some standard of Faith, and the Nicene Creed is laid down as the essential symbol. No one who accepts the Nicene creed is a heretic. As to the simple souls that believe in Christ without any apprehension of the dogmatic implications of their belief, such exist in every Christian communion and none dare exclude them from the Christian covenant.

The cases of excommunication for grievous and unrepented sin are also, strictly speaking, irrelevant; because every professed Christian society, in theory or in practice, excludes such persons by its own discipline. In some Nonconformist bodies this discipline is far stricter than in the Anglican Communion. But an important question remains: Are such persons, when thus excommunicated, cast out of the Church in the strictest sense of the term? I do not think that they are. Popular language will, of course, speak of them as having been 'put out of the Church.' But I cannot agree that either the teaching or the example of our Lord so regards them. His attitude towards the 'publicans and sinners' of His time is a clear proof of this. They were members of the flock who had gone astray, but still members. Of Zacchaeus He said 'He also is a son of Abraham.'[1] Of the woman who had 'a spirit of infirmity' He said 'Ought not this woman, being a daughter of Abraham, whom Satan hath bound, lo, these eighteen years, to have been loosed from this bond on the sabbath day?'[2] The parable of the Prodigal Son gives the fullest insight into the mind of Christ on this subject. The whole point of that parable is that the sinner, no matter how far he has gone, is still a child of the great Father; for the occasion of the parable was the objection made by the strict Churchmen of the time against our Lord's receiving the outcasts of Israel, the 'publicans and sinners.'

The only passage which can be cited on the other side

[1] St. Luke xix 9. [2] St. Luke xiii 16.

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is that on which our critics have laid so much stress,[1] 'If he refuse to hear the Church, let him be unto thee as the Gentile and the publican.'

For many reasons it is unsafe to found a doctrine on this passage. Even the most conservative student must feel that a passage which, in tone and manner, stands alone among the recorded sayings of our Lord, and upon which cautious critics have found themselves compelled to throw doubt, cannot be regarded as a secure basis for a structure so important as that which Dr. Stone builds upon it. It is certainly not in accordance with the general tenor of our Lord's teaching to couple the Gentile and the publican together as equally excluded from the commonwealth of Israel. There is nothing in the gospels which, even from the contemporary Jewish point of view, sanctions such an equalizing of the 'lost sheep of the house of Israel' with the uncovenanted heathen. Even the fiery John the Baptist, in reply to the publicans who asked him 'Master, what must we do?' said 'Extort no more than that which is appointed you.' It was a simple command to renounce the sin to which their profession especially exposed them. It is indeed exactly parallel to our Lord's immediate response to the acts of reparation by which Zacchaeus proved the sincerity of his repentance. Whether therefore we attach doubt to this passage in St. Matt. xviii or not, here is ample proof that the publican was not regarded by Christ or by John the Baptist as outside the covenant of Israel. As we know from the story of the Syro-Phoenician woman, it was our Lord's rule to confine His mission, during His earthly ministry, to the children of the covenant. 'I am not sent but unto the lost sheep of the house of Israel.' For these latter He had an infinite tenderness and regard. He treated them as, in the most special way, His brothers and sisters. For the publicans also He shewed a particular tenderness. The parable of the Pharisee and the Publican is an eternal witness to the attitude of His mind when He contrasted the exclusive Churchman with the despised, sinful and sometimes penitent publican.

[1] St. Matt. xviii 17.

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Great stress is also laid by our critics on St. Paul's judgement upon the incestuous member of the Church of Corinth. This man, the Corinthians are commanded to 'put away from among yourselves.'[1] Therefore, it is argued, excommunication was a complete separation from the Church. And, further, it is urged that when, in this passage, the apostle argues that the judgement of the Church is concerned with those 'that are within,' 'whereas them that are without God judgeth,'[2] he is making excommunication the equivalent of the death penalty under the Jewish law. But our critics fail to observe that when St. Paul delivered this sinful man 'unto Satan for the destruction of the flesh,' it was with a very clear and definite purpose, 'that the spirit may be saved in the day of the Lord Jesus.' It was in fact an exercise of discipline in order to lead the sinner to repentance. It would indeed be impossible to find a passage in which the contrast between the Law and the Gospel is more perfectly indicated. If 1 Cor. v is to be interpreted in the spirit of the Jewish Law, and if all the sinners mentioned in the latter part of it are to be regarded as in the position of those whom that law put to death, there is an end of the Gospel. Was ever a man more truly 'delivered unto Satan for the destruction of the flesh' than the Prodigal Son, when he was feeding swine and perishing with hunger in the far country? Yet our Lord teaches that all the time he possessed the birth-right of Israel. He was an exile, not an alien.

Now, it is for this birth-right of the family of God that baptism stands, and though sin may deprive a man of the privileges and blessings which belong to the birth-right, it is clearly implied by our Lord's teaching and practice that the birth-right itself remains. And, all through the ages, this fact has been signified by the rule that baptism, even though irregular, must not be repeated. True it is that in times of keen controversy men did not realize the significance of the rule against re-baptism. None the less the witness of it to the great truth taught by our Lord survived.

What has been just said is quite enough, in my judgement, to justify fully the statement of the Appeal. That state-

[1] 1 Cor. v 2, 13. [2] 1 Cor. v 12.

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ment simply draws out and applies consistently the principle involved in the teaching and practice of Christ. It is necessary, however, to give some consideration to the second part of our critics' argument. In this they deal with 'the case of those validly baptized apart from such rulers (*i.e.* the rulers of the historic Church), who, having come to years of discretion, have deliberately adhered to some schismatic body.' Here again it is necessary to point out how constantly our critics confuse the situation created by heresy with that created by schism. Most of their citations have to do with the former. At the same time, it may be freely admitted that the Bishops at Lambeth had the courage to take a step in advance. They have gone beyond the position occupied by the Fathers of the early centuries, and beyond that of the Reformers. So far, our critics are right. But, the question for the Church of to-day is; Have they gone beyond the teaching and example of Christ? Surely not. It is perfectly clear from the Gospels that our Lord dealt very tenderly with those whom the strict Churchman of His time regarded as schismatics. The Samaritans were the schismatics of that time. They had set up a rival Temple. They claimed the right of covenant relationship with the God of Israel. The Jews denied that right as vigorously as Dr. Stone denies the claim of Nonconformists to be within the Church. They did it more rudely. 'Thou art a Samaritan and hast a devil,' was a characteristic utterance.[1] The Son of Sirach regards the Samaritans with lofty scorn.[2] But our Lord makes a Samaritan the hero of one of his greatest parables, bestows upon another a commendation which makes him a contrast and an example to the Jews whom He had equally blessed, reveals Himself to a sinful Samaritan woman with a fullness He seldom granted to those who came to Him from among His own people. No wonder the Jews said to Him 'Thou art a Samaritan.'

The Church of Christ is not to be rigidly bound by the precedents of the past. She is to gain ever fresh knowledge, and to win fresh victories, by applying with fresh insight

[1] St. John viii 48. [2] Ecclus. l 25–26.

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and courage the principles she draws from the teaching and example of Christ, to the needs and circumstances of every age. If she cannot do this she will perish.

The exigencies of argument have led me to follow Dr. Stone in discussing the attitude of the historic Church to schism. But I desire to make it very clear that I have no sympathy with those who employ this unpleasant term of technical theology as a fitting description of the position of the great Christian Communions whose glorious faith and splendid achievements are to-day in the very forefront of Christian enterprize. When it was my privilege to be a member of the Edinburgh Missionary Conference, nothing was so strongly impressed upon me as the unity of conviction and the clearness of aim which are given by Christian Faith, independently of ecclesiastical organization. The bond of union in that Assembly was simply the one Faith—the Faith which confesses the Divine Saviour, Incarnate, Atoning, the Hope of the world. To suppose that all that Faith and the splendid devotion to the service of Christ which spring from it are altogether outside the Church of Christ is absurd.

It is a curious reflection that Dr. Darwell Stone is narrower in his view than representative theologians of the Roman Church. For example, Milner in his *End of Religious Controversy*, quoting St. Augustine, admits that 'those who defend a false opinion, without pertinacious obstinacy, especially if they have not themselves invented it, but have derived it from their parents, and who seek the truth with anxious solicitude, being sincerely disposed to renounce their error, as soon as they discover it, such persons are not to be deemed heretics.' He adds that 'Bellarmine asserts that such Christians, in virtue of the disposition of their hearts, belong to the Catholic Church.' [1]

So again, the Rev. H. Thurston, S.J., in his article on the 'Doctrine of the Church (Roman Catholic)' in Hastings' *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, writes:

'the axiom *extra Ecclesiam nulla salus*, which seems to be as old as the time of Origen (Hom. iii. in Josue), is now, in view

[1] Letter xviii.

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of the many Christians who are known to be born and baptized without any immediate means of coming to the knowledge of the "true Church," no longer interpreted with the crude literalism that sometimes prevailed in past ages. It is now universally held that those who, without fault of their own, are not members of the body of the Church may, nevertheless, belong to its soul (*pertinent ad animam Ecclesiae*) provided they seek to know the truth, possess faith and charity, and are contrite for the sins they have committed.'

It will be seen from this interesting statement that even the most exclusive ecclesiastical corporation in the world cannot remain indifferent to the faith and service of the great multitude of Christian people who live and work outside her borders. She finds it necessary to find some means of including them within the Church of Christ. The device adopted is not a very good one, for it is really much more important to belong to the soul than to belong to the body. And, further, the necessary consequence of such a doctrine is to bring back, in another form, the old conception of the 'Invisible Church,' a conception which, while it expresses a truth, tends to make those who dwell upon it content with the divisions of Christendom.

It appears, however, that the rigid Anglo-Catholic is narrower in his view of membership of the Church than is the Roman Catholic theologian of to-day. Dr Stone denies such membership to the validly baptized who have 'deliberately adhered to some schismatic body.' Even the word 'deliberately' will not save Dr. Stone from a more than Roman exclusiveness; he leaves the sincere believer in Christ, no matter how splendid his faith or how effective his labours, if he belong to some Nonconformist body, to the uncovenanted mercies of God. Such is the result of a narrow *a priori* doctrine interpreted by a pitiless logic. Start with the conception of the Church as a Corporation possessed of a monopoly, and the whole system unfolds itself inevitably. But this is not the conception of the Church to be found in Holy Scripture, nor is it in accordance with the mind of Christ.

CHARLES F. ARMAGH.

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ART. II.—ANGLICANISM AND MODERN PROBLEMS.

1. *The Reactions between Dogma and Philosophy illustrated from the works of St. Thomas Aquinas.* Lectures delivered in London and Oxford, October–December 1916, by PHILIP H. WICKSTEED, M.A., Litt.D. The Hibbert Lectures, Second Series. (London: Williams and Norgate.)

2. *Belief in God.* By CHARLES GORE, D.D., D.C.L., LL.D., late Bishop of Oxford. (London: John Murray. 1921.)

3. *The People of God. An Inquiry into Christian Origins.* By H. F. HAMILTON, D.D. In two volumes. (Oxford: University Press. 1912.)

I

'AN Ecclesia Anglicana superesse possit?' if proposed as the subject of a 'disputatio' in these days would no doubt be answered in very various ways. The answer would necessarily depend on a careful definition of 'Ecclesia Anglicana,' and an inquiry into the precise significance of 'superesse.' But on any strict interpretation of the terms a large number of competent observers would certainly reply 'Non potest.'

It is only in a very qualified sense that lookers-on can be said truly to see most of the game, and the mere fact that a quarter of a century of sincere effort has failed to attach a man to any one party in the Church does not in itself enhance the value of his opinions. The failure to take definite sides may be a sign of moral weakness rather than of intellectual strength, and may illustrate cynicism rather than breadth of mind. But it may also be due to causes less recondite, and the writer would in the main attribute his own personal preferences (and those of many others) for sung Mattins and Anglican Chants, for precisely

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three Creeds and exactly Thirty-Nine Articles, to nothing so much as to the survival of early impressions which subsequent experience has weakened but not wholly destroyed.

Moderate Anglicanism, as it may be called, though it formed at one time a powerful numerical majority, neither sought nor attained a full party consciousness. It was not a party but a product—a product of very peculiar conditions. It deliberately chose compromise rather than consistency, and it had a deep-seated and not ill-grounded aversion from prying into principles and fingering feelings. Investigators might prove to demonstration that Anglicans were unimpeachable Catholics or avowed Protestants and might succeed in convincing minorities, but the majority, while not altogether appreciating the necessity for being either, not unreasonably concluded that they must be in some sense both. The Prayer Book, reasonably interpreted, was felt to be an adequate expression of Historic Christianity and a fitting symbol of Christian Devotion. Those who desired something more or something different were expected to seek it elsewhere. The policy of modifying the Settlement itself was not even contemplated.

Moderate Anglicanism, like Mr. Barkis, is going out with the tide, and few are found (except on sentimental grounds) to mourn its loss, and fewer still to organize its defence. It was the product of peculiar conditions, and the conditions have changed. Though a party often flourishes best as a minority, an ill-defined compromise, if it is to work at all, must command the adhesion of a majority. Seriously to question its value is *ipso facto* to destroy its efficacy, to demand its credentials is to announce its decease. It is the search for first principles which is undermining the Anglican Settlement. The often repeated charges of insularity, of self-complacency, of class-consciousness, of lukewarmness, of sterile orthodoxy, of half-hearted liberalism, of feeble Catholicism, can all be largely substantiated, but they are all largely beside the point. Anglicanism might survive these failings; it might even correct them. But traditional Anglicanism cannot undertake, and (in its present form) cannot survive, the task which current social and specu-

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lative philosophy is urging upon it, namely the thoroughgoing investigation and the clear statement of the presuppositions which underlie Christianity as a Revealed Religion. To the traditional apologetics of Christianity, modern civilization with increasing insistency has moved the previous question: the discussion of that question has caused the fluid compromise to crystallize into parties which are seeking an answer along widely divergent lines. The centre, a dwindling number, which stands for the old Anglicanism, is for the most part either silent, not understanding what has happened, or intermittently scared into insignificant speech: the wings are vocal enough, Catholic crying to Modernist through the darkness; but while each should be defining his position mainly in view of the common secular challenge, the situation is developing into an internal contest between apparently irreconcilable parties bent on mutual destruction with the result that we have only succeeded in advertizing the fact that when fundamental questions are raised, Christians have not at present even agreed to differ. It is not surprising if in these circumstances an increasing number of the wise and good of all parties are inclined to turn in the direction of Disestablishment as the most obvious way of escape from an intolerable scandal.

Disestablishment may indeed in the long run prove to be inevitable, but of all the many ways of dealing with the inevitable, the precipitation of it is perhaps the most ill-advised. Disestablishment in the near future will almost certainly be followed by disruption: it is in fact in some quarters openly advocated precisely with that end in view. But what useful principles would be illustrated thereby beyond such illumination as the exigencies of party logic can provide it is difficult to see. For while it must be admitted that the uncritical assent to the Thirty-Nine Articles which has provided the basis for Anglicanism invokes the operation of principles which are unexamined and obscure, it may well be questioned whether less uncritical obscurity attaches as yet to the principles which provide the unseen basis for the logical and practical activities of those who are most acutely

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conscious of the inadequacy of the Reformation Settlement. If this be so, the historic mission of Anglicanism remains so far unfulfilled, and its mandate unexhausted. It may very well be that the philosophy which will provide an adequate basis for Modernist reconstruction already exists: it is sufficient to remark that Modernist writers do not as yet appear to be clearly acquainted with it. It may very well be that Anglo-Catholicism will discover a basis of authority which shall enable the ship of faith to navigate a safe course between the Scylla of Erastianism and the Charybdis of Papalism: but the discovery, if made, has not hitherto been announced. In these circumstances Disestablishment would appear to be premature and disastrous.

It cannot, however, be too strongly insisted that if Anglicanism is to survive it can only be at the cost of becoming increasingly intelligent. The somewhat blind and self-satisfied inertia at the centre of the Anglican Church which has hitherto proved strong enough to endure the strain exercised by the extremities is not sufficiently elastic to take the additional strain of the present crisis. We must be willing to cultivate a sympathetic understanding which will enable us to discern that demands for the rite of Benediction and denials of the Resurrection Body are alike symptoms of a deep-seated irritation springing from a common source in a world where things have long ceased to be done decently and in order. We must be willing to refrain even from good words when they take the form of texts and rubrics. It is not really difficult to see why it is that a reference to 'the faith once for all delivered' is at the present time a question-begging source of irritation, or why it is that appeals for loyalty to the Prayer Book may on the lips of members of a Reformed Church so easily become devoid of cogency. It is much more difficult to see, but it is none the less essential to grasp, that the common conviction shared by the extremer type of Catholic and Modernist as to the existence in our civilization of a deep-seated disease demanding a radical cure is far nearer the truth than that type of Anglicanism which would still have all conducted

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'more majorum,' and which vainly seeks to charm Leviathan with the Collect appropriate to his mood.

The true analogue of the old Anglicanism should in these days consist of a highly educated body of theological and philosophical opinion, clerical and lay, exercising the function of an intelligent and sympathetic mediation, which is ever more anxious to understand than to condemn. It should form a body of opinion whose very existence served to check the indulgence in amateurish squabbles by the insistence that internecine strife should at least be preceded by a clarification of the presuppositions assumed and of the issues involved. It would be clear-sighted enough to admit the necessity for an appeal beyond Anglican formulae to first principles, and strong enough to ensure that all alike having appealed to first principles, to first principles in very truth all alike shall indeed go. It would endeavour to secure that theological positions, of whatever complexion, be defined in such light as reason and history afford, and not in the dust and turmoil of unedifying and interminable abuse.

II

Nothing so directly reveals the nature of a Church or party as its distinctive or instinctive interpretation of history; and no Church or party has ever possessed an interpretation of history more simple or more characteristic than that which has provided the background of Anglicanism. It is familiar to all. The undivided Church of the first five centuries or so commands our whole-hearted allegiance. With Augustine and with Leo we are still in the full light of day, but from the date of the dispatch of Leo's Tome the decline begins. And it is rapid. A few departing rays gild the throne of Gregory, to be succeeded, not indeed by total darkness—

> Ibant obscuri sola sub nocte per umbram
> . . . . . .
> quale per incertam lunam sub luce maligna
> est iter in silvis, . . .
> . . . et rebus nox abstulit atra colorem.

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In the history of a thousand years, vague sentimental interest, half-patronizing, half-damnatory, displaces serious interpretation. A period which witnessed perhaps the greatest, and certainly the most concentrated and sustained effort to give adequate intellectual expression to the Christian Faith in all its manifold bearings is practically ignored. The dawn—a very stormy dawn with such wandering stars as Luther and Calvin in the theological firmament—comes at last with Hooker, and the full light of day with Andrewes and with Laud.

It is not our purpose either to criticize or to appraise in detail this highly significant reconstruction. It is clearly capable of defence, or so many able men would scarcely have been found to defend it. It is so much a part of the mental outlook of many of us that we have no difficulty in holding it along with other theories with which it assorts but ill: many an Anglican has lived and died without subjecting it, *qua* historic theory, to serious criticism. But the very familiarity of the argument helps to hide from our eyes its peculiar nature and its real significance. If we care to reflect, it becomes apparent that this particular orientation of history moves between the two poles of the Oecumenical Councils and the Anglican Settlement, and that it pivots upon the Reformation. Within these limits, that is within the sphere of purely ecclesiastical debate, it has again and again in the past proved to be a highly efficient polemical weapon. It interprets and defines with admirable clarity the traditional Anglican position with reference to other Christian communities. But by founding upon the Councils it implicitly denies the necessity for independent criticism of Christian origins, and by making the Reformation the turning-point in modern history it anticipates and forecloses the future. It is, in short, an admirable weapon of moderate conservative polemic whose potency Pope and Puritan alike have perforce acknowledged in the stricken fields of theological controversy; but it is not an interpretation of events which the candid investigator of the whole field of European history would be likely to light upon to-day in the search for historic truth.

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It is no condemnation of any historical theory merely to assert that it is written for a purpose. There is more truth than many historians will either care to admit or dare to deny in the poet's words—

> die Zeiten der Vergangenheit
> Sind uns ein Buch mit sieben Siegeln;
> Was ihr den Geist der Zeiten heiszt,
> Das ist im Grund der Herren eigner Geist,
> In dem die Zeiten sich bespiegeln.

But though the nature of history precludes the attainment of absolute truth, there are relative standards by which theories may be tested; and of those standards one of the soundest is that which gives precedence to the theory which embraces the greatest number of facts in the widest sweep of the historic imagination. An Anglicanism which is anxious to understand the modern situation will be willing to make its first step in this field of historic interpretation. It will not necessarily abandon, but it will be content to sit loosely to its traditional theory, and to give an attentive ear to the very different theory which provides a common basis for Catholic protest and for Modernist revolt, and which embraces a far greater number of facts in a much wider sweep of vision. For a candid survey of the development of modern thought compels the admission that splendid isolation is as dearly bought in the speculative sphere as in that of practical politics.

Four centuries have passed since Luther posted the famous theses which announced the presence of that rift in the old civilization which has since become a yawning gulf. The English propensity of disguising disagreeable fact under the invention of legal and historic fiction, of hiding the breach by assiduously papering over the crack, will work no longer in a society which is ceasing to be insular and national, and is becoming cosmopolitan. The broadening down from precedent to precedent, the contemplation of which captivated the pious reflection of the Victorian Age, is a ludicrous misrepresentation of the facts of to-day when they were faced in all their crudity, and in all their significance for civilization as a whole. As

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we take our stand and look back across the four centuries that lie behind us, it is no steady development, no peaceful progress of enlightenment that we see; it is rather a series of catastrophic revolts against an old and stable civilization, culminating under our eyes in the emergence of a new civilization, now grown fully conscious of itself, proud and self-confident in all the independence and exuberance of youth. This at any rate is the interpretation of the past which more or less consciously operates in the mentality of the more extreme ecclesiastical parties. We shall not understand unless we realize that Catholic and Modernist are more or less clearly aware of the existence of a situation without precedent, in the face of which all compromise is trivial. Such a view consistently adopted does not see the Reformation as an end in itself, but as the beginning of a process whose end lies hidden from our gaze in the distant future. The norm which guides the modern mind is not to be found by any re-interpretation of the thought of Luther or Calvin or Hooker with the assistance of such light as modern science and modern scholarship have subsequently provided. The norm lies closer to us in time and is harder to grasp. Its meaning is to be sought in Locke and Hume, in Voltaire and Rousseau, in Kant and Goethe, as each of the great nations in turn watches over and assists at the birth of a new world.

The insularity and over-specialization of English theologians throughout the Nineteenth century hid the religious significance of the process from most English eyes, and it still remains obscure to many. Until Lord Morley did something to remove the reproach, Voltaire and Rousseau were for the majority of Englishmen little more than the precursors of the abomination of desolation who were sufficiently judged by the event. It was not understood that they had stated a problem still unsolved. The *Critique of Pure Reason* had been published for fifty years before it attracted adequate notice, and the great speculative constructions which culminated with Hegel received little sympathetic study earlier than the closing

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decades of the century. The result was disastrous. When English theology was at last brought face to face with the theory of Evolution, it was in its crude Darwinian form, and for lack of knowledge it could only be met by blank negation. Fifty painful years were needed to convert Darwin into a kind of Anglican prophet, and now that the process is completed the prophet himself is already without honour among many of his own kin. A similar *débâcle* awaits every theology which ignores metaphysics, and clings to a sectarian interpretation of history.

III

Transcendence and Immanence are becoming in our day mere party labels and terms of abuse. It is regrettable because no other terms serve to express so well that contrast between traditionalist and modernist which provides a background for modern metaphysics and a mould for historical interpretation. It must be admitted that the use of these terms often involves great confusion which is in fact unavoidable, for the terms themselves are at present impatient of accurate definition. They must therefore be regarded as descriptive terms indicating a general trend of thought, rather than as strictly defined logical concepts. But so regarded they point us more directly to the heart of our problem than any other terms at our disposal. It is well to remember that if strict definition were possible, the main problem itself would be capable of completely accurate statement and *ipso facto* be ripe for solution. The demand for strict definition involves the absurdity of supposing that a problem whose conditions are only in our day clearly emerging is already well on the way to solution. It is therefore in a very broad sense that the terms Transcendence and Immanence should be used in a general argument, but so used they are sufficiently accurate for the practical purpose of calling attention to a divergent tendency which is undeniably present in our civilization as a whole. It must be insisted that the clear recognition of this divergence even at the

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risk of over-emphasis is much needed to-day in the face of that facile repetition of reconciling formulae, to which traditional apologetics are so prone. To assert that Deism is pure transcendence, that Pantheism is pure immanence, and that Christian Theism at once expresses the truth and avoids the errors of both is only to peg out a claim. There is no saving virtue in the term Theism, though it often serves to hide the need for closer analysis by confusing the recognition of a difficulty with the discovery of a solution. All theories of transcendence which are plausible at all involve some kind and degree of immanence, just as all theories of immanence which avoid the crudest pantheism point towards transcendence of a sort. It is none the less true that the broad and illuminating distinction remains between theories which are primarily transcendent and theories which are primarily immanental. It is the contention of this article that transcendental concepts are determinative throughout the first two thousand years of the history of Western Civilization culminating in the Thirteenth century of the Christian era, and receiving their most characteristic expression in the philosophy and theology of Aquinas and in the poetry of Dante; in that interpretation of God, Man and Nature which may generally be described as Catholic. The whole epoch witnesses the establishment of a civilization on the basis of Ethical Monotheism. In the last five centuries, with increasing acceleration, a profound revolution has been effected. It is a revolution, not an orderly development, and it is still in progress. But its tendency stands revealed beyond dispute. It is best understood as a persistent attempt to substitute immanent for transcendent concepts in the whole scope and range of natural processes, of human effort, and of divine activity. In our day it has culminated in a philosophy of 'creative evolution,' whose typical artistic expression already lies to hand in the poetry of Goethe. Its theological expression is generally and vaguely described as Modernism. It is an effort to establish a civilization on a basis of Monism.

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In the historical interpretation of both Catholic and Modernist, the Thirteenth century should form the crisis of Western History, and among the thinkers of the world Thomas of Aquino should hold the central place. The increasing attraction which the Middle Ages are exercising over the minds of Anglo-Catholics as a whole is evidence of an instinct which is right in principle, however puerile it may sometimes appear to be in practice. It is in the clash between Mediaeval and Modern that the issues are clearly defined. No clear line of demarcation can be drawn at any earlier point. The development from ancient to mediaeval is too homogeneous to admit of satisfactory dichotomy; it is impossible to divide at the joints, for none seem to be there. Dogmatism on such a matter would be absurd. it is a question of historic sense which necessarily varies with the individual; but the mere consideration of dates suggests caution, and where contemporaries are conscious of no breach we may at least be on our guard against modern interpreters who build theories upon their supposed existence. The difficulty of assigning a date to mark the beginning of Mediaevalism is notorious, and it is significant. For there is here throughout a steady development of implications or recognition of accomplished fact, not the insurgence of radically new forces. The process is an evolution in the older sense of that word, a making explicit of what is already implicit: it is not epigenetic. It will probably be said that a similar difficulty as to date marks the division between the Mediaeval and the Modern world, but this appears to be true only in a superficial sense. There is in each case an abundant choice of dates, the difference is in the significance of the facts recorded. In the first case they are demonstrative, in the second they are creative. When Constantine gave predominance to the Church he was officially recognizing an accomplished fact. When Columbus discovered the New World, something utterly unexpected came into existence. The thought of the actors in 313 or 476 or 800 is backward-looking and conservative. The action of 1517 is conserva-

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tive only in word: in deed and result it is radical and subversive, containing an appeal to the foundational principles of individual conscience which is more reminiscent of Socrates and the Sophists than of the theologians. It inaugurated the first permanently successful revolt against a traditional authority which during one thousand years had been steadily evolved and during a second thousand years triumphantly operative. However we may regard 1517, 1789 is an explosion produced by a deliberate appeal to first principles, and it is noticeable that whereas the barbarians desired nothing so little as the destruction of society, the *sansculottes* and their successors desire nothing so much.

There is then considerable *prima facie* plausibility for the reconstruction indicated. It would be possible to elaborate the thesis in great detail, though ultimately like all historical interpretations its basis is subjective—'im Grund der Herren eigner Geist.' None the less if there be any truth in the theory of Creative Evolution, evidence of its working may be found in the history of the last four centuries, and no other theory so readily accounts for the insurgent character of modern civilization, in contrast with the steady developmental character of the preceding millenniums. The theory in no way implies that the new is better than the old. The problem is not so simple as that, nor need the question of progress be gratuitously begged.

It is advisable to consider in a little detail the nature of that long development which culminated in the Middle Ages, and whose most perfect and complete expression is summed up in the broadest sense that we can attach to the word Catholicism. We would maintain that there is here contained a whole development of thought, a culture epoch, whose origin can be definitely traced without breach to philosophers and prophets in the pre-Christian era. Amos and Isaiah, Plato and Aristotle, Alexander and Caesar have as rightful a place in the Mediaeval synthesis as Karl or Hildebrand: a fact of which Dante seems to have been fully conscious. The continuity is

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unbroken. There are no profound revolutions in thought, though there are a few isolated rebels: there is no sustained and effective criticism, though there are here and there a few critics. Such a consistent development demands for its explanation the operation of a dominant philosophic concept, deliberately adopted or unconsciously assumed throughout. We have already indicated that it was the concept of transcendence constantly tending to take a clearer and more consistent form as Ethical Monotheism. The spiritual, moral and political chaos amid which Amos and Isaiah preached, and amid which a few centuries later Plato and Aristotle taught, by slow gradations, with many setbacks, with some hesitation but ever more surely and definitely as the centuries proceeded, resolved itself into an ideal and practice of ordered life controlled by that idea of Transcendence which all of them had in various ways announced and maintained. Under the more or less deliberate and conscious adoption of this concept, the prophets' kingdom of God and the philosophers' ideal republic seek to attain concrete visible shape. 'Divus Julius,' 'Lex Naturalis' and 'Sancta Ecclesia' have at any rate this in common: they are all manifestations of transcendent deity seeking to impose upon the chaotic matter of human affairs something of the ideal form of a scheme eternal in the heavens. The details of the movement are complex in the extreme, the confusion of events may often force us to lose the guiding thread, but a broad survey of the philosophy, the theology, the political events of each passing century compels the conclusion that we are witnessing the development of a process which is moving towards an end already implicitly determined by the underlying presuppositions. Comment and re-interpretation, the moulding of theological speculation by philosophical theory, the influence of political theory upon ecclesiastical facts, under the control of the dominant concept of transcendence effected a selection, a blending, a modification of minor concepts, which constantly made for greater simplification and for the inclusion of more elements in the growing synthesis. As the process

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developed, the God of the prophets ceased to be distinguished from the God of Aristotle, the God of Abraham became the eternal nexus for the Platonic ideas, Aristotle and Plato were interpreted as theologians, Moses and the prophets as philosophers. This is development indeed, but it is not organic growth: what we witness is a continual re-arrangement and re-interpretation of material controlled by a dominant concept, clarification not discovery. Revelation is essentially the withdrawal of the veil which hides a transcendent Deity; it is not the insurgence of an immanent Spirit. Montanists and their kind had short shrift till well into the modern period; and mystics would have fared no better had they not for the most part wisely refrained from demanding the liberty of prophesying.

The outlines of the great synthesis which Aquinas achieved are, or should be, familiar to all who profess interest in theology. But it is only understood in its full meaning when it is seen to be the culmination of an epoch, the most complete and perfect expression of the transcendent conception of God, Man, and World that exists. Like the great poem which gives the artistic presentation of the system, it sums up the whole preceding course of Western civilization and gives final expression to that conservative element in Classicism and that traditional element in Christianity on which the old civilization was founded and built. It is as restrained as a work of Greek art, as subtle as Greek philosophy, as clear and austere as Roman Law, as impassioned as Hebrew prophecy; it interprets and transforms all these elements, baptizing them into the service of the Christian gospel. Here is a conception of the Universe four-square like the heavenly Jerusalem: a graded hierarchy of created substances, all alike expressing the purpose and conforming to the will of the one perfect and infinite substance, a system of nature subject to the orderly visitations of a system of grace, time in literal fact the reflection of eternity. It is a system of which man's earth provides the physical centre, man the ethical centre, and the God-Man the

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spiritual centre. Each man has his allotted place and his determined end and walks with heaven above his head and hell beneath his feet through the probation of time to an eternity of weal or woe.

When it is considered in its capacity of interpreting in the interest of a transcendent revelation the whole development of the past, and for each individual man the meaning of an eternal present, when its incalculable influence upon the future is taken into account, this Scholastic synthesis has some claim to be reckoned the greatest constructive achievement of the human mind. Its broad outlines are clear and simple, in its undegenerate days it never loses touch with concrete human interests, and in subtlety of exposition it is unsurpassed. In its most enduring form, in the work of Thomas, it bears the unmistakable stamp of individual genius, but it differs wholly from modern philosophies in being essentially the product of a school. Stripped of its technicalities, its broad outlines remain no longer even the work of a school but the expression of the intellectual outlook of an epoch. This synthetic and encyclopaedic method no doubt rendered the system a ready prey to the analytic methods of modern thought. But it is to be remembered that the consistency of an immanent dialectic is altogether alien to the type of thought and to the type of universe in which scholasticism was interested. Its view-point is wholly objective; and if it thereby lacks that inner consistency which is the aim of modern thought, it also escapes the danger of vitiating the whole system by one false step in the argument and thereby becoming consistently wrong.

Two characteristics of the system demand especial notice, its commonsense standpoint and its inherent dualism. Common sense and dualism, which are very largely the same thing, are an heritage of that conservative element in Classicism which controlled the whole development. They are implicit throughout, they become explicit in the systematizing scholastic clarification. Common sense is perhaps not a good word, but it is difficult to find a better. It indicates a kind of naivety of outlook,

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a willingness to take experience at its *prima facie* value free from *arrière pensée* and subjective criticism. It is a point of view which by no means precludes reflection, and very profound reflection, but it is reflection which is content to work at a certain medium level of experience and which is wholly unconscious of any impulse or any need to probe into the ultimate sources of feeling or of thought by means of subjective analysis. It is the standpoint of all of us some of the time, a life of action in society would else be impossible: and it is still the standpoint of some of us all the time, though the number of those who entirely escape the modern endeavour to plumb the depths probably grows less in each generation. It is the antithesis of all that the name of Rousseau stands for in the universe of feeling, and all that the name of Kant suggests in the universe of thought. It is not always noticed that transcendence has this character of common sense. The man who accepts the *prima facie* view as to the independent existence of a universe of things and persons most naturally assigns their origin to the operation of an external and transcendent First Cause. The man who accepts without excessive criticism the deliverances of religious experience most naturally attributes his experience to the activity of a Personal Deity.

A more technical way of expressing the same fact is to say that the transcendent view is essentially dualistic. Dualism in fact provides the whole framework for the traditional dogmatic expression of Christianity. It is the very nerve of the Scholastic System. There is the antithesis of infinite substance and finite substance, of nature and grace, of natural and supernatural, of matter and form, of potentiality and actuality, all of which are vital to the system and not only to the system. The system makes explicit what is implicit in a civilization whose foundation is laid in the speculative dualism of the Platonic-Aristotelian philosophy on the one hand, and in the religious dualism of the Hebrew prophets on the other hand, and which is itself the outcome of a synthesis of the two. The great central dogma, the focus of philosophic

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speculation and of religious aspiration, the heart and life of the whole process, the dogma of the Incarnation, the concept of the God-Man, is the very ecstasy of dualistic expression. It must be noted finally that dualism, though it may be for many minds an intellectual nuisance, is not a philosophic crime, and that common sense may yet prove to be a form of the highest wisdom.

IV

The immanent interpretation of experience which is characteristic of the modern revolt against the entire world-view of the Ancient and Mediaeval civilization can as yet only be described in vague and general terms. The difficulty of precise definition is due to at least three causes. First, the modern view has been established by a series of revolutions which have ostensibly demolished much of the scholastic structure piece-meal and the resulting confusion is extreme. Secondly, an immanent theory is in itself a far more difficult theory to seize and to express than the comparatively simple transcendent dualism. At first sight perhaps Aristotle and Aquinas may appear as difficult as Kant or Hegel, but it is in the details of the exposition not in the constructive result. Aristotle's universe is in every way a simpler universe than that of any modern philosopher. Thirdly, the immanent theory itself is only in the making, and though it is now clear that we are witnessing the attempt to build up a civilization, which shall be in every way self-contained and self-explanatory, it is by no means clear that the attempt will be successful, or what form the underlying concepts will ultimately take. These general considerations are further complicated by the existence of the personal equation, for it is undeniably true that most of us are not altogether at home in either world, and that we are all in varying degrees the product of both. It is probably not the case that the most extreme adherents of either Catholicism or Modernism, of either Transcendence or Immanence, succeed in attaining that permanent

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unification of the self which alone secures serenity of outlook and a maximum of creative output in thought or in action. It is certainly true that the majority are very far indeed from so happy a condition. It is this which makes the distinctive tragedy of modern life and sets the problem to modern Christianity.

But though the difficulty is great, it is none the less essential that theologians of all schools should endeavour to attain a more direct and sympathetic acquaintance with this modern tendency than is likely to be acquired by the consideration of personal doubts or the perusal of apologetic handbooks. The question is inevitably begged when it is regarded on the one hand as a deliberate and diabolical attack upon religion in general and Christianity in particular, or on the other hand as a heaven-sent solvent of theological dogmas. In the contest between the Papacy and the Modernists it is an interesting speculation which side was the most rash in rushing to conclusions. A similar remark applies to controversialists nearer home.

The most simple way to appreciate the contrast between the old and the new is to study the work of those creative artists who express the spirit of an age. If we read the concluding cantos of the *Paradiso* and the opening acts of *Faust* with the effort to penetrate to the underlying presuppositions, we are conscious of two wholly different interpretations of the universe. It is a difference which is most readily expressed by the statement that Dante thinks in the terms of transcendence and Goethe in terms of immanence. The contrast finds complete expression in single lines, which may be chosen almost at random. Who can miss the significance of 'L'amor che move il sole e l'altre stelle' as compared with 'Wo fass' ich dich, unendliche Natur'? But it is also apparent in the broad groundplan of the poems, and it can be traced with increasing divergence down the main stream of European literature. It is highly instructive in this connexion to consider in succession the background of Dante, Milton, Goethe, and as typically modern, Bernard Shaw. It is obvious to the most cursory reader that for the under-

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standing of Dante the framework of Hell, Purgatory and Heaven is essential. In a very vital sense the framework of the Universe *is* the poem: if the vast supernatural structure be ignored, or even relegated into a secondary place, the whole interpretation of human life is shattered. It is not that Dante is indifferent to individual character; he is in certain respects a master of psychological portraiture; but this portrayal of individual character is dominated by a supernatural environment, by the operation of a transcendent Will and Purpose, by the literal existence of an overworld below and above and beyond the scope of natural sense and feeling and reason. It would be quite untrue to say that man is dwarfed by these conceptions; but it is true to say that his activities are strictly confined by preordained ends which are clearly revealed and pre-existing conditions which he is powerless to modify. The path which man must tread is a path which leads indeed to glory ineffable, but the path is known, and it is narrow and steep and bounded by the abyss.

The work of Milton from this point of view is highly instructive, for he gives expression to that first phase of the modern revolt which is usually described as Protestantism; he illustrates perhaps unconsciously the disintegrating effect of experiential religion upon Catholic dogma. Dante's interests are primarily metaphysical, Milton's are psychological. The Protestant system is based on the inner witness of conscience to the moral law, rather than on outward obedience to external command. This may be represented as mainly a difference in emphasis, but it is certainly a difference which in the sequel has operated in modern society like a high explosive. Its first effect in the sphere of religious philosophy was to destroy the symmetry of the Catholic synthesis by forcing the doctrine of the Atonement into undue prominence, and involving the doctrine of the Trinity in a mass of unedifying ethical speculation. Protestantism humanized dogma, and in the process it humanized the conception of God. It thereby took a first step and a long step in the direction

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of immanence. The true objection to Calvin is not that his God is *in*human, but that He is in many respects all too painfully human. Indeed when once God and the individual soul are brought face to face in the forum of conscience without mediation of Church and Sacrament, the Catholic conception of transcendence appears to be inevitably and irretrievably compromised. The supernatural realities of Aquinas and Dante tend to become over-beliefs, and the true significance and explication of the universe will be determined ultimately by categories evolved from the inner drama of man-soul. The transcendent God severed from vital connexion with a metaphysical system loses the essential place among the *perambula fidei* and becomes either a postulate of the reason or an inference from inner experience. In this way Deism is an essential moment in the disintegration of Catholic dogma. It is the evanescence of the transcendent concept, destined in its Voltairean form to issue in the positivism of Comte and modern agnosticism, in the hands of Rousseau pointing forward to the immanental apologetics of Schleiermacher which are the basis of most modern reconstruction.

These general remarks receive admirable illustration from Milton's poem considered in relation to the work of Dante and Goethe. In the first place the whole interest of Milton is centred in the doctrines of the Fall and the Atonement. It is of man's first disobedience and the fruit of the forbidden tree that he sings, and it is wholly from this standpoint that he considers the character and purposes of the Deity. His conception of God is still transcendent, there is still a real supernatural framework, heaven and hell are still real places; but all this background is for Milton pictorial, not as for Dante metaphysical. It is the inner drama of man-soul cast upon a colossal screen. It is still ethical monotheism, but it is psychological not metaphysical ethics; the human conscience provides the norm, not the Divine Will. It would not have occurred to Dante that an attempt to justify the ways of God to man was desirable or even possible. For him God is the

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essential source of all justice in such sense that the claim of individual human conscience to hold the scales becomes not so much the mark of blasphemy as the height of absurdity. Such a claim would have entailed the disruption of the whole scholastic synthesis. It can hardly be denied that with Milton this disruption has in fact, though probably not in intention, taken place. For Milton has transferred all the qualities of human personality and human character to transcendent Deity with wholly disastrous results. If the counsels of God are merely the reflex of experiential dogmatics, and if the purpose of God can be adequately expressed in human dialectic, it is surely superfluous to postulate a transcendent Deity, for whatever cogency the experience and the dialectic possess is not enhanced by being duplicated in an external Mind. It is this superfluous reduplication which Milton's system reveals, thereby revealing also the inherent character of Protestantism, which in so far as it is consistently developed tends to culminate, as it is to-day actually culminating, in a purely immanental concept of deity.

The tragedy of *Faust* represents a much more advanced stage of the revolt. If Milton interprets the Reformation, Goethe is in many ways the most characteristic representative of the Revolution. The rationalism of Voltaire, the subjectivism of Rousseau, the classicism of Lessing, the idealism of Herder, all the insurgence of new forces which separate as a chasm the Nineteenth from the Seventeenth century, are united in Goethe with a speculative intellect of the first order, and the creative expression of a consummate artist. In him the main concept of Immanence, the concept of evolution, is determinative, and the dualism of Milton is overcome. The tragedy of *Faust* does indeed still present to us some shreds of the old conventional framework of the universe. There is a place called heaven and a place called hell: there is the figure of a transcendent God and there is a personal devil. But these conceptions add nothing to the interest or the understanding of the plot, for the interest is wholly that of the

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development of an individual soul. Goethe interprets the universe through the experience of a human spirit: It is an immanent problem throughout. God and devil and heaven and hell are little more than the 'ejects' of Faust's consciousness. The titanic figure of Milton's Satan has shrunk into that familiar 'Spirit of denial' known to us all: the true Almighty is not the figure on the throne in the Prologue, but the 'unendliche Natur,' 'das Werdende, das ewig wirkt und lebt,' which to-day we are learning to call Creative Evolution.

It is possible to take one further step, and Mr. Bernard Shaw has taken it. In his recent edition of the early chapters of Genesis, Mr. Shaw has found any mention of God to be superfluous. In *Back to Methuselah* we have in brilliant phantasy the sketch of a wholly immanent universe presented to our view. The 'all' that we are concerned to know is here and now: it is in the intelligent and will-full co-operation with immanent forces that human salvation is to be found. If Christian saints have enjoyed the 'contemplatio' of the transcendent God, Mr. Shaw's ancients with no less ardour and apparently with equal profit contemplate themselves. For it is wholly wrong to suppose that Mr. Shaw is not both entirely in earnest and entirely successful in presenting his point of view as essentially religious. He is as great a puritan as Milton, and he is far more truly religious than Goethe. Yet here is a work which in the very extravagance of its conceptions carries to a logical conclusion that process of revolt which we are endeavouring to trace. It is the very quintessence of immanentism: yet it conserves many of the essential values of Christianity better than some transcendent theories, and its ethics are Christian in a very marked degree. But there is no supernatural overworld or underworld, no transcendental framework: it is in the service of the Creative Energy that perfect freedom is to be won, and that fullness of life is to be enjoyed. It is in the process of living that the secret of life is to be found. What is beyond we do not know. 'It is enough that there is a beyond'—the beyond of a future that is ever

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yet to be. To this little measure have transcendent Inferno, Purgatorio, Paradiso shrunk in this so very modern world.

The artists whose work we have considered do but give general expression to the dominant thoughts of their age. It would be possible to trace this irruption of immanentism in great detail over a wide range of modern literature, and to follow its ramifications into every phase of modern thought and activity. The mere fact that music with its subjective and subtle appeal is the distinctively modern art, in contrast with the ancient and mediaeval triumphs in the objective presentation of plastic material, is significant enough. The psychological novel and the problem play provide further examples. Collectivism with its deified general will and anarchism with its deified individual will are antithetical phases of immanentism—more or less conscious and deliberate attempts to found human society on subjective experience rather than on objective law. But it is in natural science and speculative philosophy that the intention is most openly avowed and attainment in some quarters already vaunted. 'Creative Evolution' and the 'Pure Act' are master concepts which leave nothing to be desired in the general indication of a method and an aim open and unabashed. A candid survey can hardly fail to conclude that there is in all the complex phenomena of modern society a steady drift along many convergent lines towards an immanental interpretation of the universe and of human life; that this interpretation is in direct antithesis to the transcendental interpretation which is characteristic of Catholicism as expressed in the traditional formulae of the Faith and in the Scholastic System: and that this antithesis, so far from expressing a legitimate progress of development in which the old is abandoned because it has received more adequate expression in the new, really represents the results of a series of revolutionary efforts to express the whole of experience in an entirely different set of categories. Transcendence and immanence are alternative modes of interpretation neither of which in the actual situation of

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to-day is in a position to give a completely satisfactory account of itself or of the universe. The one thing certain is that the confusion is inextricable and the perplexity extreme.

V

It is in the possession of such reflections as these that the enlightened moderate Anglican will approach the problem of theology raised by the controversies of Catholic and Modernist. He will endeavour to understand the technicalities of debate in the light of the widest possible historic and philosophic background. He will seek on the one hand to recall to protagonists when necessary the profundity of the problem involved, and he will be anxious on the other hand to arouse the conservative mass of central Anglicanism to a recognition of the fact that there *is* a problem. It is perhaps on the whole this second task which is the crying need of the day. The recent correspondence in *The Times* newspaper under the heading of 'Shaken Creeds' reveals a depth of complacency in the school of traditional Anglicanism (that school which is avowedly neither Catholic nor Modernist), which is as painful as it is characteristic. It cannot be too definitely or too frequently asserted that the problem which faces Christianity to-day is a modern problem which can only be understood by those who have the patience and the sympathy to study modern civilization at first-hand in the original records of its literature. It is childish ignorance to suppose that this problem was adequately solved at some previous epoch before it could in fact be adequately stated. The situation in which we find ourselves is in the fullest sense original so far as the history of Christianity is concerned. The presuppositions which are assumed in the New Testament itself and which were in the main admitted in the current philosophy of the Christian era are to-day in question, in very serious question. Is the concept of transcendence adequate or even intelligible to the modern mind? It is no answer to

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make solemn reference to the faith once for all delivered, for the faith was unquestionably delivered in the categories of that very concept whose validity is doubted.

The only kind of defence of Christianity which in these circumstances possesses cogency is that kind of defence which the more extreme exponents of Catholicism and Modernism are each in a position to offer, though along widely divergent lines. It must be a defence which fully recognizes the radical nature of the attack, and which is prepared to develop in reply a complete philosophy of life. The Catholic apologist should endeavour to restate in view of modern difficulties the traditional transcendental basis of the orthodox theological formulae. The Modernist apologist should attempt a wholly original presentation of Christianity in terms of an immanental philosophy. An enlightened central party would frankly recognize that the future lies with one or other, or more probably both of the more extreme parties, and would endeavour to assist each by insisting that the fundamental problem be not obscured by the discussion of side-issues. If moderate Anglicans as a body could be roused to a sense of the insecurity of their own intellectual position and a corresponding admiration for the efforts of those, whether Catholic or Modernist, who, however mistaken they may be, at any rate have eyes to see and courage to act, the future of the Anglican Church might be even yet secured. It is not necessary nor even desirable that the number of avowed partizans should be increased: it is no doubt true that the most careful investigation of the problem will leave many in no position to proclaim open allegiance to either party; but there is a world of difference between a deliberate and intelligent abstention which does not preclude sympathy, and a facile and unintelligent condemnation or indifference which merely illustrates ignorance. The latter, just because it leaves the most violent partizans in open antagonism without any mediating influence, will inevitably end in disruption. The former may not only serve to tide over the present crisis, but open the way to a refounding of

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Anglicanism upon a basis which shall enable it to fulfil its historic mission under modern conditions.

For if there be truth in the interpretation of history which has been sketched in this article, it is clear that the issue between transcendence and immanence is by no means so near to a solution as we are so often assured. We are not in a position to condemn immanence as an impossible philosophic creed for the Christian in the wholesale manner which traditional Catholicism sometimes seems to demand: nor are we in a position to relegate the transcendental presentation of Christianity to the limbo of the outworn and the obsolete. What we need is the dispassionate investigation and presentation of each opposing view without fear or favour. It is only then that the vast majority of thinking men who are at present incapable of decision will be in a position to decide. We cannot say whether it will prove to be possible to develop a Catholic philosophy of life apart from papal infallibility, and wholly tenable in this modern world. We can see that the thing is in every way desirable, but with deference to Anglo-Catholics it must with firmness be said that the thing has not been done. It must also with charity be added that unless the party can rid itself of the kind of crypto-papalism which seems at the moment to be on the increase, it never will be done. Disruption will but establish one more sect in the unique enjoyment of an absurdity. Nor, on the other hand, can we say whether it will be possible to give an adequate statement of the truths of the Christian revelation in terms of immanence. We can only say that the attempt will certainly be made, and that it is eminently desirable that the attempt should be made within the bounds of the Christian Church, if the thing can by any stretch of charitable toleration be rendered possible. There is more than a suspicion of blind arrogance in that wholesale condemnation of immanental views, containing as it does an implicit condemnation of the whole course of modern civilization, to which the Church of Rome is now committed and in which many Anglicans seem anxious to join. It

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is not impossible that the weltering confusion which we call modern civilization may be a stage in the emergence of a civilization far more fundamentally Christian than Mediaevalism, and may be itself the ultimate outcome of essentially Christian forces. We are too much involved in the process to judge, but the wise man will not be hasty to prejudge. He will rather be desirous to see and anxious to help forward the clear presentation of old and new under the aegis of one communion. For he will know that it is in this way that the Catholic will most readily attain a sympathetic understanding of the problems of that modern world which he is anxious to convert, and that it is in this way that the Modernist will maintain a vital hold upon that essential Christianity which it is his business to translate whole and unimpaired into the terms of a new philosophy of life. It is easy to say that such a plan is impracticable and unheard of. It is sufficient to reply that upon the deliberate attempt to practise it depends our extrication from an entanglement which is itself without precedent, while its possibility depends upon the existence of a strong body of moderate opinion which shall insist that the attempt be honestly and courageously made.

It is not difficult to indicate the kind of moderating influence which a body of educated opinion would exercise. In the sphere of ecclesiastical politics, it would endorse the kind of action by which the Bishop of Oxford has recently checked an ebullition of party passion, which at one moment threatened to grow into a serious scandal: for it is a very scandalous thing that the travail of the modern spirit should in the sphere of theological polemics take the form of a dispute which possesses the triple disqualification of being unedifying, unimportant, and unintelligible. It would be an inestimable gain if the word heresy could be banished not only from the lips but from the minds of theologians for the remainder of the century. We must be content that relics should be worshipped and miracles doubted within the bounds of the same communion, and we must cease to interpret personal or party

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idiosyncrasies as the expression of profound or scandalous principles. It must be a very difficult thing for sincere Catholics to devote themselves with that complete devotion to the care of souls for which they are so justly celebrated when there is uncertainty as to whether the revival of some picturesque Catholic cult which is sincerely felt to be edifying, may not be the occasion for violent outcry and repressive action. It must be a very difficult thing for sincere Modernists to devote themselves to the whole-hearted pursuit of truth with a charge of heresy constantly looming. Wise administration backed by enlightened opinion should subject would-be martyr and heresiarch alike to the purifying influence of perpetual disappointment. But indifference or ignorant panic in the majority will not secure this end; for though 'A plague o' both your Houses' provides a not unnatural comment on two-thirds of current theological polemics, still 'Let both grow together until the harvest' suggests the deliberate cultivation of a wiser and more sympathetic attitude.

It is in the sphere of constructive theological speculation that the moderating influence of which we are speaking can be most directly and most beneficially exercised. As has already been indicated, it will take the form of a steady insistence upon the essential presuppositions which must underlie any permanent reconstruction whether on Catholic or Modernist lines. It will recognize the necessity for the work of both schools of thought in view of the unique complications of the modern world, and it will endeavour to restrain each within the limits of its own chosen categories. There is at the present time a tendency to a kind of illicit commerce between the categories peculiar to transcendent conceptions and those peculiar to immanent conceptions which perpetuates confusion. It must be clearly recognized that the Christian Faith has been expressed in the past in categories of cause and substance which are meaningless apart from transcendent presuppositions, and that it is the business of the Catholic apologist to inquire in what sense these

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categories can be legitimately employed in scientific theology to-day. It must be further recognized that these categories of cause, substance and the like are wholly out of place in any immanental presentation of Christianity. In other words it is not the business of either the Catholic or the Modernist to take the articles of the traditional creeds one by one and interpret them in terms void of offence to modern scientist or philosopher. The creeds as they stand form a self-consistent body of doctrine which adequately interprets the Christian revelation in the language of a transcendental philosophy. The primary problem for the theologian is that this philosophy itself, this whole atmosphere and background of transcendence, is to-day in process of dissolution. The Catholic apologist by an examination of the modern criticism of cause and substance may do something to reinstate this lost atmosphere and background. The Modernist apologist may succeed in expressing fundamental Christianity in a new atmosphere and with a different background. But neither will succeed in equating categories which are essential to the one with categories which are essential to the other. Creative Evolution cannot be equated with Transcendent Deity, nor the life force with the operation of transeunt causes, nor modern personality with the traditional conception of substance. It is the duty of the Modernist to fashion a complete restatement in which many of those traditional concepts which have seemed most vital will wholly disappear, and the values which they represented and conserved will receive quite other expression. Failure to see this is the failure to see the problem at all as it truly is. Many who would gladly call themselves Modernists and many of the more liberal defenders of Catholicism do fail to see it. The disproportionate attention given to New Testament criticism and the wholly mistaken attempts to restate or reinterpret individual articles of the creeds are among the results. It is now obvious that the interpretation of the Gospels depends entirely upon the presuppositions of the interpreter; and that no final results can be obtained by a

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purely scientific criticism, which in fact does not exist. A little reflection renders it equally obvious that to introduce modern conceptions of personality, which are the outcome of a purely immanental process, into a discussion of the terminology of the Nicene Creed or of the Chalcedonian formula, which were produced under the operation of an entirely different set of presuppositions, is as little likely to lead to useful results. The whole effort after restatement or defence along these lines is comparable to that of a man who should attempt to paint the sound of a trumpet or set himself diligently to listen for the lightning. It is in short neither an exegetical, nor a historical, nor even a purely apologetic problem which faces modern Christianity: it is a problem in metaphysics; reduced to its lowest terms it is a problem in logic.

When the whole situation is reviewed with the utmost breadth of vision and the greatest attainable depth of insight, it does not seem that there need be any essential antagonism between the Catholic and the Modernist standpoints. These two movements, if they remain true to themselves, are moving along parallel lines, which by definition will never meet. They are set to describe and interpret Christianity at different levels of experience which are mutually exclusive, and whose sole common ground is that the experience in each case is characteristically human and shared by most of us. There is no rational but only temperamental reason why the same man should not be wholly Catholic and wholly Modernist, if the true sense of Modernism be seized. There is still less ground why the man who can be wholly neither should not be in many respects both. For the most philosophical cannot in everyday experience get rid of the transcendental view of things, and it is not improbable that everyday religion will always employ transcendental concepts, even if a wholly satisfactory presentation of Christianity should one day prove to be attainable in terms of immanence. This is at any rate the situation in which many a thinking individual finds himself. It is

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the clash of incongruity between the concepts which modern thought employs, and the concepts in which the traditional faith is expressed, that drives him to adopt an immanental view of religious experience and of revelation: yet neither in practice nor as a theory is an immanental view wholly satisfactory, or in any way fitted to supplant its rival save at certain times for certain purposes. It is not then primarily a question of the inadequacy of the traditional creeds but of their exclusive adequacy. Is the Nicene statement and the Chalcedonian formula an adequate Christological statement? The answer is not difficult. If I must presuppose transcendence, and think in the terms of the Aristotelian or Platonic categories, the traditional statement is adequate. For the convinced Christian no other conclusion can be reached in the terms of this philosophy. Nor does any further development seem possible along these lines. The utmost that can be done by the use of these categories seems to have been achieved. For thoroughgoing transcendence, God and man must in the last resort be left side by side, indissolubly linked, but without interpenetration. 'Incarnatio' as traditionally defined is the one adequate concept, and it is necessarily confined to a bare assertion of fact, for the union of pre-existing infinite and finite is not capable of further rational explication.

But need transcendence be presupposed, and must any attempt to state Christianity be made in Platonic and Aristotelian categories or in categories with similar implication of transcendence? This is the real root of the controversy between Catholic and Modernist. For if a belief in the Christian verities does not necessarily entail the acceptance of any precise philosophic presuppositions, there is *ipso facto* room for an attempt to interpret Christianity in fresh categories more in line with modern thought and widely different from those of the traditional presentation. What the precise nature of the categories which are to govern this attempt would be cannot at present be determined. It is the business of Modernist reconstruction to determine them. But the only valid

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objection which the Catholic can oppose to the Modernist attempt is an objection based on the claim that the Christian revelation necessarily entails not merely a distinctive attitude to the universe in general but the adoption of a particular mode of metaphysical explication of the universe. It would be necessary for the Catholic to maintain not only that there is a distinctively Christian faith but a distinctively Christian philosophy in which alone that faith can be adequately expressed.

Whether the Anglo-Catholic theologians as a body are prepared to maintain this thesis is far from clear, for the school is not remarkable for its metaphysical acumen. There is no doubt that the contention has much *prima facie* plausibility, and it is clearly a position towards which Roman Catholic apologetics is steadily moving in its increasing insistence upon the importance of Scholasticism. It is Scholasticism which clearly faces the issue and uncompromisingly asserts both the antecedent revelation and the metaphysical proof of the Transcendent Deity as the 'preambula' for theological construction. It would undoubtedly give a substance and a system to Anglo-Catholicism which is sadly lacking, if a thorough investigation of the whole scholastic synthesis were undertaken by those Anglican theologians who are concerned to defend the traditional orthodox formulae. The enormous assumptions often so glibly enunciated would thereby be dragged into the light of day and rendered capable of rational discussion; the most hopeful line of metaphysical defence would at the same time be rendered familiar: the discussion of side issues would be more easily avoided. The futility of attempting to decide such questions as 'the fact of miracle' prior to some kind of preliminary agreement as to what is meant by 'fact,' and a clear metaphysical definition of what is meant by 'miracle' would become apparent. The secondary importance which attaches to the whole discussion with regard to 'the historic Jesus' would become clearly recognized.

It will, in any case, take some time for Anglo-Catholics to decide whether we are dealing in Christianity with

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a revealed metaphysic. The tremendous nature of the issues involved will suggest caution, for a decision in the affirmative commits orthodoxy to an irreconcilable conflict with modern civilization. The mere fact that Rome has already declared war is itself a sufficient ground for circumspection; the existence of a Catholicism which has not officially and deliberately condemned the whole metaphysical basis of modern civilization may become an incalculable benefit to society. A far greater future is presented to an Anglicanism that remains true to its own historic position than to an Anglicanism which parodies Rome. There is, to many minds, something horrible in the deliberate adoption of a position which can only end in a contest between 'Blacks' and 'Reds' which will shake civilization to its foundations and not improbably involve it in irretrievable ruin. Yet this is what the identification of Christianity with a transcendental metaphysic means in the ultimate issue under modern conditions.

Short of this complete identification with all its disastrous implications of a wholesale *a priori* condemnation of Modernism, Catholic apologetics will necessarily and rightly seek to expound and defend Transcendence as an adequate, as the most adequate, basis for the expression of Christianity. The prior existence of a transcendent Deity who creates, over-rules, inspires, redeems is an essential postulate of orthodox theology. To secure this conception in any intelligible form in face of the damaging attacks of modern metaphysic on the categories of cause and substance is one of the main difficulties which orthodox apologetics has to face. The attempt which is often made to meet Modernism on its own ground by an effort to reach the doctrine of the Incarnation from a consideration of the person and work of the historic Jesus is foredoomed to failure. Incarnation necessarily presupposes the previous revelation of a Deity to be incarnated: it is not logically permissible to argue from the consciousness, the teaching, the work of Jesus to the existence of a transcendent Deity, and then to assert the incarnation of this Deity in the person of Jesus. This

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circular argument in various forms vitiates large masses of modern apologetics. It is clearly fallacious first to determine the nature of God from the personality of Christ, and then to determine the personality of Christ from the nature of God. A very powerful argument for theism can undoubtedly be developed on these lines, but the idea of incarnation is not necessary to this type of thought nor even helpful: incarnation becomes an honorific title, not a metaphysical concept. But there is the possibility of an apologetic which leads directly to the characteristically Catholic position if the basis is laid not primarily in the person and work of Christ, but in the teaching of the Hebrew prophets. The transcendence of a personal Deity is in this way established by direct revelation, and a certain flexibility of interpretation is secured in a way that is impossible if theology is involved from the outset in metaphysical concepts. It is to be hoped that the great weight which attaches to Dr. Gore's opinion will lead to a thorough investigation of this position, which he has powerfully advocated in his most recent work. The more detailed exposition of the same argument in the work of Dr. Hamilton undoubtedly provides the best line of defence for traditional orthodoxy which at present exists. A little ingenuity might weld an interpretation of the development of thought from Amos to Aquinas, from Plato to Dante, into a body of apologetics possessing great cogency. No more useful work could be undertaken by Anglo-Catholics to-day; for a clear and reasonably complete statement of the best that can be said for traditional orthodoxy is greatly to be desired. It is quite certain that the best has not yet been said, and it is painfully obvious that many of those who are the most anxious to speak are quite incapable of saying it.

But such a statement even when forthcoming, and even though claiming complete adequacy, need not claim exclusive adequacy. The demand and necessity for the attempt to state essential Christianity in terms of Immanence will still exist. The work of the Modernist will still need to be done. It will consist in the endeavour to

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state the fundamentals of Christianity in terms with which modern philosophy not only can but must deal. It would endeavour to compel modern civilization to face the appalling inadequacy of its moral and intellectual basis, and to render it impossible for any intelligent being merely to bow religion out at the door. Its business would be to provide an interpretation of Christianity for that critical level of experience which most educated men are driven to occupy at times. Whether modern ethical reconstruction has really got beyond the profound reflection of Mr. Square, who it will be remembered declined henceforth 'to think anything virtue which doth not exactly quadrate with the unerring rule of right,' is open to doubt. Modernism would never cease relentlessly to press the doubt home. How far a genuine induction from the experience of a universe interpreted in the scientific and philosophic categories of immanence might succeed in conserving all that is essential in the Christian view of God and Nature and Man, we do not know, for the attempt has never been persistently and consistently made by an adequately equipped school of Christian philosophers. It is the business of Modernism to make the attempt.

Modernism so interpreted ceases to be the bogy of ecclesiasticism. It is only attempting to do with other materials, in view of certain existing needs, the work which Catholicism has already to some extent accomplished with its own materials in view of other needs. The Modernism which treats Catholic dogma as a *corpus vile*, from which as an outworn and inadequate thing the true rational and adequate statement of Christianity is to be distilled, is an ephemeral and spurious Modernism. The Catholicism which claims exclusive adequacy for transcendental concepts is an arrogant cult whose true sectarian character cannot be hidden by a name. An enlightened moderate Anglicanism will endeavour to assist Catholic and Modernist alike to adequacy of statement, but claims to exclusive adequacy it will deliberately resist. It will resist them in the interests of a wider Catholicism and a truer Modernism than such claims can express.

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For we are but at the beginning of an epoch. Two thousand years of historic Christianity are a small thing in the span of humanity's existence, and the few centuries of modern civilization are a smaller. We do not know to what historic Christianity and modern civilization will grow, or what will be the ultimate relation between them. But we do know that in a kind of confusion, which to us seems inextricable, they combine the noblest products of the human spirit. We shall do well if we hand on the heritage unimpaired, with the confusion rendered a little less confounded by our efforts. More than this we dare not hope, but less we dare not attempt. We shall not reach an adequate solution, but if we are willing to pay the price which all who are not content to become blind partizans must pay, we may become clearly conscious of a problem—that problem which in a thousand different forms is the tragedy of modern life.

For the true Modernist will know that the great synthesis is not for his age to achieve. However it may be with the vestiges of the ape and the tiger, there survives in all of us too much of the Inquisitor or too much of the Philosophe to enable us to see with any steadiness for long. The honest and good heart which ensures spiritual vision we may have if we will, but the strong brain which will give the vision adequate intellectual expression awaits a generation with purer eyes and cleaner hands. For a moment, it may be, we persuade ourselves that some infallible Church has spoken, or that some perfect method has finally unravelled the philosophic knot, or that triumphant analysis has at last wrung the great secret from nature's close reserve. But it is 'breve gaudium.' The intellectual instrument wavers and flags, and as the tension relaxes, the manifold structure we raised falls apart into its elements, fragmentary and grotesque. As we argue or dogmatize, the old familiar mists steal over us and we find ourselves once more in the position of one who recounts idle tales to incredulous ears.

Such a conclusion will seem to many to be cold and unattractive; so persistent a doubt is not the *métier* of

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all. In the game of life most of the honours fall to a more sensational style of player, and rightly so, for it is from the ranks of the extremists that the master builders are most likely to emerge.

Nevertheless, the moderate Anglican may reflect that though consistency is the aim, probability still when all is said continues to be the guide of life. He may reflect that while we ourselves may lament our bondage, there are many who envy our freedom. He may reflect that a Church which welcomes the little children without question and without demur, which offers its holiest and best to all who come, which with sublime audacity dares to bury the notorious sinner in sure and certain hope, is perhaps no unworthy temple for a free man's worship. So outrageous an inconsistency challenges to a deeper thought than any formula can express: it is paralleled and outdone only by the still more outrageous inconsistencies of life itself. The moderate Anglican may console himself with the reflection that the most famous of all Anglican thinkers, though he recognized that his own age did not lack master builders, who were 'incomparable,' was nevertheless content 'to be employed as an under-labourer in clearing the ground a little, and removing some of the rubbish that lies in the way to knowledge.' We must indeed admit that the master builders themselves have for the most part rendered us a poor and meagre account of those foundations on which they have laboured to erect the Palace of Truth. But it is an open secret which he who runs may read, and in which master builder and under-labourer share alike. The Palace of Truth rests on no infallible Revelation, no invincible argument, no unyielding despair. It stands broad-based upon an Unconquerable Hope.

RICHARD HANSON.

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Art. III.—THE SCIENCE OF PSYCHOLOGY.

The present paper is not in any sense a theological one, and perhaps on that account needs a word of explanation. It was, in substance, delivered as an 'Inaugural Lecture' by the writer, on taking up his appointment as Reader in Psychology at King's College; and it was intended to define some of the issues of psychology, to delimit the respective territories, and to relate the philosophy and, in the stricter sense, the science of mind. But since all the data in which the relations of science are discovered, and upon which the structure of philosophy is erected, are to be found only in experience, and since fundamental theology necessarily has its philosophical implications, there is a very real connexion between the most radical and empirical treatment of the data of experience in psychology and the most highly metaphysical constructions of—at any rate, natural—theology.

In practice, though the outlook and method of science and philosophy are admittedly different, the man of science naturally oversteps the boundaries of his science to raise and to discuss philosophical problems; and, in practice, it has always been found quite impossible to keep philosophy and theology separated in watertight compartments. Even St. Thomas Aquinas, who set out to write the *Contra Gentiles* as a philosophy—'necesse est ad naturalem rationem recurrere, cui omnes assentire coguntur, quae tamen in rebus divinis deficiens est'—is unable to keep 'revealed truth' out of his exposition; and for those for whom theology is an outgrowth of religious experience, religion and philosophy are indistinguishable. The old—and the more modern—upholders of the 'double truth' theory were obliged to sacrifice all sense of logic; and, indeed, if there be any deep and comprehensive unification of knowledge, there must certainly be one only

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coherent pattern, of which some of the threads of warp and woof are the fragmentary yet converging lines of our thought in these different 'branches' of knowledge. The reader will call to mind the brilliant work of Dr. Wicksteed, to whom both philosopher and theologian are so deeply indebted, in this connexion.

In presenting a vantage-point from which psychology as a whole may be envisaged, I have been encouraged to think that this may be of some assistance also in providing an outlook upon what perhaps I may describe as basic theology. It seems to me best not to attempt to draw conclusions or point morals, but rather to throw out certain lines of thought which may, and indeed must, be suggestive to those whose life-study is theology. For everybody has a metaphysical system of some kind, on the lines of which he interprets his own experience and arranges the practical concerns of his daily life. It may be nebulous; it may even be fatuous. But it is there. And the reactions of theology and philosophy are possibly spontaneous in our minds; but they are not therefore correct. The present paper is meant to be a sort of appeal to look to the foundations of whatever philosophical system is adopted; and in so far as it may have any value its poise must be in metaphysics. The tendency of empirical psychology is always in the direction of philosophy; and empirical psychologists end, in the long run, by becoming philosophers. But the danger is to rest content with a formulated philosophy which seems to be satisfying, and not to go back perpetually to the empirical foundations upon which it was built; to re-view and re-test them lest it should be found that the corroding eddies of the advancing tide of new discovery have turned them into sand and made the superstructure insecure.

In the history of philosophy, the problem of Body and Soul, Matter and Mind, as constituents of Man, has loomed large. The distinction indicated by the terms of the problem provides me with a convenient peg upon which to hang what I have to say. For I have no ambitious design of treating the subjects named in detail

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and in all their implications. That, it goes without saying, would be an impossible task to attempt within the limits of a single paper. I have, on the contrary, the far more modest purpose of merely attempting to state a point of view—the point of view which I conceive to be the normal, and indeed the natural one in psychology. At any rate, it is the point of view which I wish to adopt. I propose, as it were, to examine the charts and set the compass for a course or voyage, making use of the records of past navigators upon the ocean of speculation; and, at the same time, selecting such instruments of precision as modern research has perfected to aid in avoiding shipwreck and in bringing our boat back again into some safe harbour. The contrast—'Matter, Mind and Man'—well indicates the point of view to which I refer; as well as three other points of view which, in one form or another, have long been prevalent in philosophy, and have made their weight felt in the science of psychology.

There are several definitions of psychology current. In the main, and leaving out the flippant ones that sting because of the amount of caustic truth they hold, these definitions may be reduced to two. Psychology is the science of Consciousness, or Mind, or Soul: Psychology is the science of Reaction to Environment, of Conduct, or of Behaviour. The most extreme forms of these definitions limit psychology to the consideration of conscious mind alone to the exclusion of all else, on the one hand; and, on the other, to the study of such things as glandular secretions and muscular movements which are, in the last analysis, all reducible to mechanical changes which take place in matter. The two forms of definition point to two tendencies which are, the one qualitative and the other quantitative; and they have their logical issues in an exclusive spiritualism, or a no less exclusive materialism, with all the ramifications which these doctrines imply throughout the whole web of philosophical disciplines. Indeed, if we open even 'recent' textbooks of psychology, we shall find almost invariably that there is much in them which is philosophical rather than scientific. We must

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distinguish these points of view carefully—and particularly in the case of the definitions we are considering.

It has been wittily said that modern psychology looks upon man as the mechanical union between a corpse and a ghost. The tendency has been to neglect either the one or the other of these aspects—to study the corpse or to study the ghost—forgetful of the fact that never do we find a consciousness, or a mind, or a soul, hung up in the air, so to say, to be studied; and never do we find a corpse that as such is of the slightest interest to psychology or to the psychologist. There is a third method of attacking the problem; and that is to put together the conclusions reached by the two former methods, and to try to find relations between them. And that is the method of studying the mechanical (or other) union. But what I may call the 'corpse' and 'ghost' methods of treating psychology seem to me to be highly sophisticated methods. They seem to be based upon very dubious abstractions, and to be out of touch with facts.

And the facts, as I conceive them, are these.

Though it is doubtless because we are conscious, that we can be said to know anything at all, we certainly do not seem thereby to be limited in the objects of our knowing to the phenomena of consciousness (awareness) alone. The experience that enters into knowledge contains more than that. We know things; and we know ourselves, to some extent at any rate. The knowledge, and the belief, in this matter, of the most cultured man of science or philosopher is precisely of the same nature as that of the rudest boor in all the naif simplicity of his outlook of crudest realism. Moreover, I know myself, and believe myself to be, an individual:—just as I know and believe you to be separate individuals; or, for the matter of that, dogs and cats, and 'ships and sealing-wax and cabbages and kings' as individuals. I am not now concerned with the admitted fact that all these things may be formed of parts into which they may be broken up or decomposed.

Now—to confine our attention for the moment to the psychology of the human being—the individual which we

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find in Nature is what we call material in character. He is extended and ponderable. He is subject to the conditions of space and time. He is built up, physiologically, of living cells and differentiated tissues and organs, each of which functions in its appropriate system—alimentary, circulatory, nervous, and so on. He reacts as a unit whole to the physical forces which play upon him. This same individual is furthermore provided with specially differentiated sense-organs; and, in his mode of behaviour, or reaction to the various stimulations, external and internal, of his environment, he shews evident signs of psychic activities which imply consciousness. This individual we know as Man. And, *ceteris paribus*, we might apply the same line of consideration to living individuals, other than man, which exist around us.

Now, it may be objected that, in defining this outlook upon psychology, I am leaving out of account—that I am burking—the exceedingly grave problems of Epistemology, problems concerning the nature, the origin, and the value of such belief or knowledge. My answer to such a criticism would be that we must leave these problems out at this stage of our study. But to omit them here does not mean that they are in any sense 'burked.' No one is more conscious of their vital importance to philosophy than I am; but they will arise and be dealt with, no doubt, at the proper moment in the development of philosophy as a whole. And it well may be, of course, possible that we shall then find that we have to modify our preliminary positions.

But, in the mean time, we are justified in taking facts, for what they are worth, just as we find them; and in defining psychology as the science of the manifestations of life.

By 'manifestations of life,' I mean here all the manifestations which are to be found in the living individual; whether they be muscular contractions or glandular secretions; chemical, thermic or electrical changes; sensations, feelings, impulses or instincts; acts of conception, of judgement, or of will. The object of study, then, of the science of psychology is to be found in living

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beings—plant, animal, man. And the formal view-point from which this object is examined is precisely as it manifests vital actions.

Indeed, as we see, the tendency away from this (which is really a very old and not at all a new point of view) has for a long time now been countered in practice by the necessity felt to supplement the study of 'human consciousness' by the study of 'human behaviour' in its widest sense, and by the inclusion in all the curricula (of Universities and other places of learning) of the subject of Comparative Psychology, in which the animal mind and animal behaviour is studied; and into which, even observations on the reactions of plants enter.

But, after all, it does not very much matter whether we adopt a frankly metaphysical, and realist, point of view, such as I have indicated, or a positivist one: whether, that is, we regard man as a reality *in rerum natura* which manifests itself, among others, in these various ways which we agree, on the criterion of 'immanence,' to call vital; or whether we regard him as the sum-total of all those qualities which we habitually find in collocation together; and complete that collocation by means of a concept (similar to the concepts of 'force,' or 'ether,' or 'electricity,' which are employed by the physicist in his treatment of the phenomena of matter). Was not something of this kind, indeed, precisely what was meant by the founder of the positivistic philosophy, when he wished to make the study of scientific generalization one more great special study, both complementary and supplementary to the special sciences?

As I say, it does not seem to matter much which view we take for the moment, provided we agree to consider the subject-matter of psychology as consisting of individuals: —natures or substances, manifesting themselves in a variety of different ways; or collocations of such manifestations, referred to a conceptual bond which makes their regular collocation rationally possible.

I have said that this point of view which I am now taking is an old one. But it has for long been technically

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abandoned by what has been known as modern psychology; and modern psychology has until quite recently been in the main philosophical. And it is of interest to ask why this should be so.

The answer to such a question is not altogether a simple one. More than one influence has gone to the shaping of the modern views as to the meaning of psychology; and more than one factor has combined to oust the older view. Chief among these factors, no doubt, is the philosophy of that great philosophical innovator—that *enfant terrible* of philosophy—Descartes.

Psychology, as such, was not the preoccupation of Descartes, but Epistemology. His search was for a certainty which could justify itself, and thereby be reckoned as truth. And, in his search for truth and certainty, while one after another of his beliefs came crumbling to the ground on the impact of his methodic doubt, one indubitable certainty was left standing unassailable. The echo of Augustine's enthymeme—'Quod, si fallor, sum'—found new articulation in the mind of Descartes. To the 'Que scay-je?' of Montaigne, the graceful sceptic, the soldier Descartes replies 'Je pense. Je suis'; and so brings an end to an 'epoche' (ἐποχή) which he had every reason to disavow. By the very first of the principles of his *Méthode* he, Descartes the philosopher, points the way to the promised land of a Science of the Soul, the frontiers of which he was never himself to overstep.

I think; therefore I exist. Consequently, I am a something that thinks—no more than a something that thinks; something, which, so long as it goes on thinking, at any rate, exists:—'for, perhaps,' as he writes, 'it might happen that, if I were to cease thinking altogether, I should at the same time cease to exist.'

'Sum igitur precise tantum res cogitans, id est, mens, sive animus, sive intellectus, sive ratio, voces mihi prius significationis ignotae: . . . Quid igitur sum? Res cogitans. Quid est hoc? Nempe dubitans, intelligens, affirmans, negans, nolens, volens, imaginans quoque et sentiens.'

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In these words, for Descartes, the subject-matter of psychology is implied—and indeed expressed. It is the phenomena of consciousness—the phenomena of sensile, intellectual, affective and volitional acts—nothing more. For him psychology is entirely spiritualistic. And this, in the thought of Descartes, is to be set over against and contrasted with all the rest of the phenomena of Nature. Phenomena which do not fit into the scheme of consciousness are not psychical, but physical. They do not depend upon Mind or Soul, but upon Body. They are no more than modes of motion. And among these modes of motion are to be included all the operations of the body. The human body, just like any other extended thing, is a machine; and, in his own words, all the

'functions quite naturally follow in this machine from the mere arrangement of the organs, neither more nor less than the movements of a clock or other automaton from its weights and works; so that, so far as they are concerned, we need not think of any vegetative or sensitive soul in it; or of any other principle of life, or motion, than the blood and the spirits continually stirred up by the fire constantly burning in the heart:—a fire which does not differ by nature from any other fires to be found in other inanimate bodies.'

Thus was an opposition introduced by Descartes between the Soul (thinking substance) and the Body (extended substance)—an opposition which he clearly expressed when he picturesquely wrote as follows:

'. . . When the rational soul has its place in this piece of mechanism, its centre will be in the brain: and there it will stay like the waterman' [he is referring to the fountains and grottoes of 'our King's gardens'] 'who has to be in the manholes where all the pipes in the machinery meet, when he wishes to set it going or to stop it, or to change its operations in any way.'

This evident opposition between Soul and Body involved a dualism which cried aloud for resolution; and Descartes was entirely unsuccessful in his attempt to explain the matter to his correspondent and pupil, the

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Princess Elizabeth. Other attempts to resolve it are historic:—those, for example, of Malebranche, Leibnitz, Spinoza—Occasionalism, Pre-established Harmony, Pantheistic Monism. These are well-known filiations of the ultra-spiritualistic position of Descartes, emphasizing the sharp-cut distinction of mind and body, and limiting psychology to the study of conscious facts or, as they are now called, processes.

It may not be out of place here to remind my readers that for Descartes 'thought' meant thought of which we are aware. The immense strides forward which the science of psychology has made under the guidance of the Analysts and others could not consistently have had a place in his system.

But, not to digress here, more important for our present purpose is another direction taken by the post-Cartesian stream of thought—due also in a large measure to his philosophy. I refer to Idealism; which consists in the view that only Ideas (mental contents) are knowable. This position—for Descartes himself—was a logical result of his doctrine that there is no way in which the corporeal can act upon the spiritual, body upon soul, matter upon mind. Hence, all the knowledge we may have of the corporeal is that it is the occasion of thoughts or ideas. And these latter only we can know, not the inner natures of the material things which occasion them.

I need not trace in detail the succession of ideas developing from this initial position of Descartes; but I may, perhaps, remind my readers in a word of the salient points in that not unimportant ideology, so far as it bears upon our subject.

For Locke, the Father of British Psychology, empirical though it was, psychology is even more idealistic than for Descartes. We have ideas representing the qualities of bodies as sensibly known to us; and we have ideas representing the acts of the soul. These ideas we know. The realities of which they are the ideas (matter and spirit) are for us no more than concepts, in the sense in which modern science makes use of this term.

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Berkeley only takes one step in advance of this, when he calls in question the existence of 'matter,' and proves—not without logic, once the premises are granted—that only 'spirit' is capable of any existence.

And Hume, following in the same worn path, easily discovers that even the unknown substrate of the 'ideas' (soul or mind) is an unnecessary concept; and he builds up a completely idealistic psychology. Of this psychology the sole task is to examine the interrelation and the organization of what he calls 'impressions' and 'ideas'; and to discover the laws of their synthesis in their final product—the Human Mind. I have summarized, perhaps unduly. The point I wish to stress is that the germ of the most complete Idealism lay in the distinction drawn by Descartes between the Soul and the Body. Hume reached it, as we have just seen, by simply developing the thesis laid down by his predecessors. For him it was a fact, reached by way of an examination of facts; just as, for Kant, it was an hypothesis—a law governing the operations of the human mind. For the latter philosopher, whose influence in the more recent past has perhaps been greater than that of any other in the shaping of modern thought and modern views, the forms of intuition and the categories are impressed upon experience by the constitution of our very minds themselves; in such fashion that the objects of thought must forever remain outside the possibility of knowledge.

This same conclusion, inductively or deductively acquired, by synthesis or by analysis, whether it be called the idealistic scepticism of Hume or the idealistic phenomenalism of Kant, has profoundly affected the course of subsequent thought and determined to an immense extent the recent outlook upon psychology.

I propose to say a word as to another modern direction or tendency which has had its share in the making of scientific psychology; and that is the Positivism of Auguste Comte. But I anticipate this by a neat quotation from Professor Sorley's *Idea of God*, where he writes of the scepticism of Hume in England, the criticism

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of Kant in Germany, and the positivism of Comte in France, that Huxley pulled all the strings of these systems together, 'stood Godfather to the whole movement, and christened it Agnosticism.'

But yet the Idealism of which we have been speaking is in itself neither materialistic nor spiritualistic. It is indifferent—neutral. For, since mind can only know its own contents and states, and *since these are all of the same character, or consistency, or texture* (for they are all mental), there can be no sense and no meaning in speaking either of the spiritual or of the material, It seems only because we cannot easily break away from our ancient habits, nor rid ourselves of the prepossessions of Mind and of Matter, that we are inclined to look upon the point of view of Idealism, whether we profess it or whether we do not, as essentially spiritualistic.

And yet this Idealism has undergone a remarkable, and a seemingly contradictory, development. It has become Positivist, in psychology, at any rate; and it has given birth to Materialism. How, we may ask, was this possible?

Positivism, in psychology, is in part the outcome of Sensationalism—the theory that the source of all knowledge lies in sensation, and that knowledge is and remains for ever sensational. This in itself is not, of course, materialistic; though there is no place in such a theory for the 'Reflection' of Locke, or the 'Intellectual Faculty' of the older Schoolmen. Nor do I mean to imply that Sensationalism was the cause of Positivism; but, rather, that it helped to prepare the ground in which the doctrine of Positivism was grown.

For, more important by far from the genetic point of view, was the mechanistic theory of Descartes in this development. It had a twofold importance, influencing, as it did, both philosophical and scientific progress.

As to philosophy, it soon came to be argued that the Soul of Descartes was as useless to explain the movements of the Body (and as contradictory) as was the Body to explain the happening of ideas in the Soul. Why, there-

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fore, should two substances be supposed? The mechanical hypothesis does away with the necessity of such a supposition. Thus we reach a unity in thought; also, we have a more simple—and, indeed, one single—theory to account for all phenomena without distinction. Further, Descartes himself had applied the conception to the case of plants and of animals other than man. For him, the phenomena manifested by inanimate beings, plants and animals, were explained upon the same one principle—viz. that of mechanical movement. Why not take the one step further, and unify the whole of Nature by including man? The modern answer to such a question is given in the extreme form of Behaviourism.

Finally, in this positivistic conception, all Nature comes under one single principle. Sociology, the institutions of Religion, Politics, Art, Law, Literature, as the fruits of mind etc., are to be explained by psychology; this, in its turn, by physiology; this again by chemistry; and this by mechanics, or the movements of material particles in space. It is a wonderful synthetic conception, in which one principle reigns supreme. But it is a principle which many great minds have been unable to accept. It is too simple, too superficial. It does violence to the phenomena of which an account must be given. It does not explain the facts.

Yet, to all appearance, the mechanistic theory has been successful in science. The mechanical equivalence of all forms of energy, its conservation, and the like, are now almost looked upon as acquired results rather than as axioms of science. And the causes with which science is conversant are efficient causes only. This is brought out strongly in the generally accepted theory of Evolution, in which the attempt is made to give a *vis a tergo* explanation in the development of all forms of life. In the main, it is extraordinarily successful; but it does not, because it cannot, wipe out the complementary conception of Nature as teleological, or of natures as entelechies.

Nevertheless, nothing succeeds like success; and the causes of success for mechanism in the Natural Sciences

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have been legion. In every department progress has been made—that sort of progress which has conduced to comfort and material well-being. I need not pause to illustrate here what is so well known, so well understood, and so well appreciated.

The experimental verifications of the mechanical principles in the Natural Sciences, and their consequent march of progress both in theory and in application, seem to have been a reproach to psychology. Psychology lagged behind, as a philosophical discipline, in the general advance, until the positivistic conception, already so successfully applied to Nature, began to be applied also to Mind. And thus psychology became positivistic. But not, indeed, in the sense that it ceased to be a subject-matter for study at all, on the lines of Comte's judgement that 'direct observation of the mind by itself is pure illusion'; but rather in the sense that it abandoned many of the speculative problems with which it had formerly been most preoccupied, problems such as those of the nature, origin, and destiny of the Human Soul. 'All sciences in the positive stage,' wrote Comte's most distinguished disciple, Littré, 'abandon the search for the essences of things and their properties, first and final causes—i.e. what metaphysics terms the absolute.'

And, in becoming positivistic, psychology became a science.

There was, however, yet another turn of thought which led to this position. The great development of the Natural Sciences during the Nineteenth century both made for specialization and prepared the outlook for a purely scientific treatment of the data of psychology. Both points are important; but the former especially so, for it spells the reason why the science of psychology, as distinct from philosophy, should take as its peculiar province a part only of the manifestations of life of which I have already written. Specialization means treating things abstractly, breaking up a subject of study into its parts. The subject is a vast one; and it may advantageously be broken up, so that labour may be economized and

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intensive study made possible. Several of the sciences of Life were already tending to such abstract separation. Anatomy, physiology, biology, biological chemistry, could work side by side. There was a place for the scientific examination of the facts of consciousness, and for all that far vaster region of the 'mental' which consciousness implies. Like any other science, psychology grew out of a matrix in which both the general problems and the special problems of many sciences were involved; but, in neglecting the more general problems in order to attack the special ones, no one of the sciences can be said to have solved them. It remains true that, in the larger sense, psychology still is the science of the manifestations of Life.

However, a delimitation, a mapping-out of the field of study is not all that constitutes a science; and we may well ask, before passing to a brief examination of its development from this point of view, what precisely is implied in the statement that psychology became a science.

The becoming of a science—the transition from the philosophical to the scientific treatment of any given subject-matter (though speaking exactly, perhaps, the two can never be entirely isolated)—involves the use of exact observation and experimental methods. Acute enough observations had been made in psychology from very early times; but they were sporadic, and lacked system. First of all, then, the application of the Baconian methods was necessary:—a systematic application, working over the whole field. But, secondly, to apply these methods to the subject-matter of psychology is not so simple a matter as might appear. Conditions have to be secured which will allow of the production of the mental phenomena to be observed. And, to secure the appropriate conditions, a certain technique—and, often, certain carefully divided apparatus—is necessary. Simple or elaborate, apparatus and technique implies a laboratory. And, thirdly, since it is impossible to isolate the phenomenon to be observed altogether from the rest of consciousness, the application of mathematical treatment to the data is found to be indispensable.

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Methods, Workshops, Mathematics—these are the tools of psychology the science.

Finally, besides the observation of the phenomena and their classification, there remains their explanation. And here, the scientific explanation is not, and does not profess to be, the ultimate one. Scientific explanation is immediate and concerned with efficient causes:—or, rather, constant sequences, with quantitative equivalence, of antecedent and consequent. It does not take into account the formal, or material, or final causes which are of interest to philosophers. Nor does it speculate as to the ultimate natures or essences of the things with which it deals.

Nevertheless, its narrower views are correlated with the wider ones which we must ultimately take, just as its special problems are related to the more general ones of philosophy. Indeed, the distinction which I am drawing seems at root to be merely a distinction of methodology; for, though psychology has thus, in fact, become a science, psychologists have not lost interest in the larger problems. Indeed, this is true of all the special sciences and of the men of science who pursue them.

If we omit those of Herbart, the first attempts at a scientific treatment of the data of psychology are generally credited to Fechner (1801–1887), who is famous for the application of mathematical considerations to the well-known law discovered by Weber—a law in which it was attempted to summarize the relations which obtain between external stimuli and sensations. But it was Wilhelm Wundt who contributed most to, and indeed completed, the first stage in this scientific movement. At once a medical man, an anatomist, a psychologist, a logician, a metaphysician, and, in the widest sense of the term, a philosopher, Wundt was exceptionally well equipped for the task. We have seen that methods imply laboratories. Wundt founded the first laboratory for the systematic study of psychology at Leipzig in 1878. Since that time, which defines an epoch for the science, laboratories have been established and have multiplied all over the world, in Germany, France, Italy, Switzerland, Bel-

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gium, America, England, Russia, China and Japan. There is scarcely a University of any repute without one. There are no less than three in the University of London. The work done by the directors and students of these psychological laboratories has touched upon almost every field of pure psychology, as well as of its cognate subjects—sensation, thought, feeling and will; aesthetics and pedagogics; vocational, industrial and medical psychology, to mention only some. Investigations have been carried out in the laboratories with apparatus specially devised to elucidate the problems of research that have been set; and students have gone out from them into the classrooms of schools and the wards of hospitals; into factory and prison and asylum, to carry out special researches with special tests; and so to glean fresh data, useful not only for the special purposes for which they were gathered, but also for the light they are capable of casting on the more commonplace problems of psychology as well.

Interest in the sensory processes, by which at the outset the physiologists were given an orientation towards psychology, has spread to interest in the so-called 'higher processes' of judgement and choice. The method of introspection made experiment in such fields as these possible; and, indeed, opened up immense possibilities of research. The labours of the Würzburg School and of Louvain, while mainly descriptive and phenomenological, have here left their impress indelibly upon the science. The whole question of Mental Tests has been worked over with great skill and care since the time of Binet; and, by the application of the methods of correlation to the results of such tests, the most valuable information has been secured as to the constitution of the Human Mind, at any rate upon the cognitive side. On the emotional and conative side not so much, perhaps, has been accomplished; but experimental work has been begun here also; and the promises of success are not negligible. The amount of periodical literature issuing from these many laboratories is prodigious. There is a list of no less than nineteen psychological publications which appear in the

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United States alone printed on the cover of the *Psychological Review*, to say nothing of French, Italian, German and Swiss periodical publications. In this country we have the *British Journal of Psychology*, with its offshoot, the *British Journal—Medical Section*, published by the British Psychological Society. And this society has expanded so greatly during the past few years that it has now established three sections, devoted to Education, Industry, and Medicine. At the present moment it is in process of establishing a fourth section, viz. of Aesthetics. A similar phenomenon of growth and expansion is observable in other countries, which are certainly no whit behind ourselves in this respect.

And, were it but for this alone, we should have reasonable grounds for the belief that psychology, the science, will not for long lag behind, but rather outstrip, the other sciences of Nature.

But there is another reason for this belief. It has long been known that the discoveries of psychology have proved themselves to be of great use in the service of education; and this becomes increasingly apparent as further exact data are obtained. But of more recent years a tremendous impulse has been given to the science by the further discovery of its applicability to the very practical end of treating cases of mental abnormality. The researches of the various schools of psychotherapeutics have probably caught the attention of the public mainly because of the picturesque and highly coloured views which their leaders have put forward. But they have attracted the attention of psychologists also because of the indisputable real value of some of the results obtained. We are still too close to appreciate rightly, I think, the value of the theories, and their adequacy to explain the phenomena observed, in detail; but there can be no doubt that the immense vista of the Unconscious which has been opened up to us by the study of the phenomena of hypnosis and psycho-analysis cannot be cramped into any frame constructed, as the frames of psychology used to be constructed, out of the materials of

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cognitive consciousness (awareness) alone. And principles and laws have undoubtedly been brought to light which cannot be gainsaid, with which all psychologists in the future will have to reckon. I do not propose to go into this matter in any detail in the present paper It is too large and too important a subject to treat cursorily. But a point which I should wish to stress is this:—that, the discovery of the Unconscious and its processes has sounded the death-knell of psychology as the science of *mere* consciousness—that term being understood in its old connotation. No less does it seem to have tolled the passing of *mere* Behaviourism. Reaction to stimuli as instanced in behaviour may be—and indeed is—a valuable paragraph of psychology; but it is not the whole chapter, much less the book. And consciousness, though an interesting chapter, and indeed an indispensable instrument for the understanding of the whole, is no more the entire volume. To change the simile for a more poetic one:

> 'The deepest ice which ever froze
> Can only o'er the surface close.
> The living stream lies quick below,
> And flows—and cannot cease to flow.'

For there is a vast and living stream beneath the surface of awareness at any given moment; and the problems which arise in its regard in the science of psychology are of as great importance as those which have been the subject of so much investigation in the immediate past. Instinct, impulse, purposive striving towards ends not consciously realized, the immensities of feeling and emotion which colour the neutral greys of cognition with the iridescent glow of life:—these things, too, are among the problems of psychology the science. And, beyond it all, there are questions lying deeper still. What we all agree, provisionally at any rate, to call matter, or body, or brain and nervous system, must, as such, have its place in our outlook. We need not take refuge in the unnatural pessimism which looks confidently forward to the time when 'this old earth will be a slag and a cinder wandering

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round the sun without its crew of fools' to admit it. Indeed the 'slag and cinder' phase is no less a reality for us than the more organized forms of matter; for, in some respects at least, it is impossible for us to rid ourselves of that basic conception. The contrast of matter and of mind continues to obsess us. But this is philosophy; and, as I began with it, so I may end with it.

'It is an open question,' writes the historian of psychology, 'whether a psychologist can be an idealist or a realist. But, apart from collectors of detail and writers of monographs, history has failed to produce a psychologist who was not a philosopher of some kind; and it is notorious that a rejection of all metaphysics is the most metaphysical of all positions. The fruits of the sciences may be plucked by every chance comer; yet the tree that bears them must strike its roots deep or quickly wither away.'

And that is why it seems to me that, even while pursuing the scientific knowledge which can only be hoped for by exact observation and experiment, we should also keep before our minds the old anthropological point of view, the ordinary point of view, perhaps, of the unsophisticated; which is a philosophical point of view at the worst—and at the best. But we should none the less, in accepting all the manifestations of life as the phenomena to be examined, hold an open mind as to the particular philosophical conclusions we may be able to erect upon them.

FRANCIS AVELING.

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ART. IV.—THE PROBLEM OF PRAYER.

1. *Lex Credendi.* By GEORGE TYRRELL. (London: Longmans. 1907.)
2. *Concerning Prayer.* By B. H. STREETER and others. (London: Macmillan. 1916.)
3. *The Power of Prayer.* 'Walker Trust Essays.' (1920.)
4. *The Meaning of Prayer.* By C. FOSDICK. (London: The Student Christian Movement. 1916.)
5. *Hinduism and Buddhism.* By Sir C. ELIOT. (London: Arnold. 1921.)
6. *Psychological Principles.* By JAMES WARD. (London: Cambridge University Press. 1918.)
7. *The Interior Castle, or The Mansions.* By ST. TERESA (1577). Translated from the Autograph of St. Teresa by the Benedictines of Stanbrook Abbey. Revised with Notes by BENEDICT ZIMMERMAN, O.C.D. (London: T. Baker.)
8. *Sancta Sophia.* By AUGUSTIN BAKER. (Douai. 1657.)
9. *The Life of Prayer.* By MICHAEL WOOD. (London: Mowbray. 1914.)

A GLANCE at the literature that has arisen on the subject in recent years suggests a renewed interest in the theory and practice of Prayer. The volume edited by Canon Streeter and published in 1916 runs to five hundred pages, and it is found necessary to consider the whole nature and psychology of worship, various theories of the Eucharist, and the problem of Divine suffering. The valuable volume of Walker Trust essays on 'The Power of Prayer,' which was published in 1920 includes the discussion of anthropological and theosophical standpoints; Mr. Fosdick's

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popular volume published by the Student Movement provides a wealth of anecdote and other illustrative material attractive for those to whom prayer is an established and serviceable habit, while some of the later and significant writings of George Tyrrell are largely devoted to the subject, and poets so different in temperament and experience as Mrs. Meynell and Rudyard Kipling are alike constrained to make poetry the vehicle of their own considered thoughts on prayer.

It is perhaps to the adolescent (and by adolescent I mean not only those usually so designated, but also anyone who is young enough in mind and heart to be sensitive to great issues and susceptible of change in the direction of his habitual thought and practice) that prayer is most a problem; and, like all real problems to all real seekers, a problem at once irksome, baffling, compelling, and attractive. 'Prayer,' says Dr. Jevons, 'is considered simple because it is familiar, not because it *is* simple.' The problem is complex, and I can only indicate certain of its components. There is no hard and fast solution, although difficulties are sometimes better dissolved than simply solved.

I

We may begin, perhaps, with some difficulties of *form*. Should our prayers be liturgical, the compositions of other minds—to be memorized and classified, then used according to their several occasions—or should they be the free outpourings of the moment? Sincerity requires, of course, that, in the former case, we must so enter into the prayer as to make it our very own experience, intertwined with the innermost stuff of our spiritual being. But, provided this has been done, there is nothing wrong or harmful in using set prayers for our private devotions, any more than there is in reciting Wordsworth's 'Evening Voluntary' to ourselves. Moreover, just as when we memorize great poems we not only absorb the primary meaning but also impart a secondary meaning into them, so that they become pregnant with untold possibilities for our mental

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sustenance and delight, so in the case of liturgical prayers, to the primary objective meaning we add a secondary subjective meaning derived from our own particular and private needs and experiences; and this makes the whole more pregnant as a message from our very selves to the Very Self of God. Other illustration is hardly needed than the Lord's Prayer or the Collect for Purity in the Ante-Communion Service. In both of these an universal utterance is necessarily given a private intention by the user. Yet when we use certain of the more stately prayers of antiquity, and especially when we compose our own prayers or assist in the extempore prayers that are customary in non-liturgical services, there is a peculiar danger: we are inclined to heed the aesthetic import of the composition rather than its spiritual significance. Hence we talk of the 'incomparable language' of the Prayer Book or of the 'eloquence in prayer' of a given preacher. Both are a snare to our own praying, and our well-rounded period is too often an ill-grounded prayer. While, however, 'incomparable and eloquent' periods are not essential to the form of prayer, it is equally true that cases of alleged inability to pray are often cases of inability to speak or write plain English. The Lord's Prayer was in the first instance a language lesson, a composition lesson for the Apostles, and it is worth while contrasting the simplicity of the form of this first lesson in prayer with the more elaborate form of the later prayer of our Lord recorded in St. John xvii. In both, prayer is seen to combine petition, praise, and intercession, but more publicly in the one, more privately in the other.

The question of form goes, however, deeper than this. We are often unable to pray, not because our command of diction is defective, but because our discernment of the need is faulty. If our needs are inarticulate, our prayers are necessarily unuttered, inarticulated. The adolescent whose youthful interest is in football finds words leap to his tongue, he whose interest is in a quarrel with his wife commands a surprisingly effective flow of speech; so he whose need, whose real interest is in speech with God will

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not really be long troubled about form or diction. He who says he cannot pray is therefore too often one who will not pray, and he will not pray because he does not want to do so.

II

An allied difficulty is whether prayer need be vocal, internally or externally at all, or whether it may not be largely if not wholly silent. The point need not detain us long: when once the real nature of prayer is realized it will be seen that there is no real antithesis involved, that prayer is sometimes vocal, sometimes silent. Psychology shews us that individuals tend to be variously eye-minded, ear-minded, tongue-minded, or hand-(motor-)minded; some are none of these, their thinking being imageless. Most people are now one and now the other; hence prayer is sometimes spoken, sometimes only murmured on the lips, sometimes framed in the mind's eye, sometimes fashioned in the work of our hands, sometimes conceived but not imaged forth. But although silent prayer is real prayer, senseless prayer is not so. Our mental life is as much under the law of change as are material objects, and there must be a flow, an activity, a sequence of changes in the greater part of our prayerful life. Even in the prayer of quiet and the prayer of union described by St. Teresa in the *Interior Castle*, this psychological principle holds: 'A field of consciousness unaltered by change,' says Ward,[1] 'would be a blank and a contradiction.'[2]

III

A third question that arises is whether it is necessary to have prayer at all as a separate and distinguishable activity, or whether continuing instant in prayer does not

[1] *Psychological Principles*, 84.

[2] For an elaboration of this point I will refer my readers to Father Augustin Baker's *Sancta Sophia*, Treatise III, c. 1, and to the *Life and Letters of Bertrand Wilberforce*. Wordsworth's lines on Tintern Abbey are also in point here.

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rather signify a general attitude of heart and mind in all activities such that the soul is in perpetual recognition of the Divine presence? If, as is undoubtedly true, we hallow the Divine Name in the pursuit of Truth, Beauty and Goodness, is not the work of the scientist, the artist, the simple doer of good deeds, in itself sufficient and ceaseless prayer? It is very alluring to think so, and in a sense it *is* so; but Christ, Whose Life was one whole prayer, also set aside separate occasions for specific prayers. And we may reply to our adolescent, when he puts forward this easy view of prayer, that while undoubtedly the day's work brings its own exercise with it, yet as the body's well-being requires exercise of a different character from its ordinary toil, so the soul, while (as we have yet to see) it can pray in all intellectual, aesthetic and ethical work, yet likewise needs for its health specific exercise in specific prayer.[1]

IV

The next point is one that is frequently urged to-day, viz. that prayer should cover praise as well as petition. It is true that the relationship between man and God which we call prayer necessarily includes adoration, and therefore praise; moreover, we naturally prefer to give rather than to beg, nevertheless even 'the free man's worship' is that of a beggar, compared with what is God's own due. We shall have more to say on this later, meanwhile it is sufficient to affirm that petition is of the essence of prayer. This recognized, we may then further see in process of prayer process of praise also, and find confirmation in St. John xvii.

In like manner with intercessory prayer. If it is difficult for an adolescent to realize that prayer is sometimes praise, it is even more difficult for him to realize that it should be almost wholly intercession. For while he quickly relinquishes his old unreasoning faith in a special Providence peculiar to himself, purely general prayers seem abstruse and cold. Nevertheless, it is characteristic of the

[1] See also Eliot, *Hinduism and Buddhism*, vol. iii.

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adolescent to give, and to give greatly, and this enables him to realize that prayer is a way of giving and a way of sacrifice, particularly if he be taught to notice the universality of the Lord's Prayer. But he may go further, and observe that prayer is also understanding. The way of understanding is also the way of prayer. The attitude of the reverent student of Nature intent upon Truth and only Truth, and the attitude of the poet and mystic adoring the beauty of Nature, are alike akin to the prayerful attitude of him whose soul waits upon God, the Source of all Truth and the Conserver of all Beauty. It is perhaps in Wordsworth that the way of beauty, the way of understanding, and the way of prayer are most permanently at one—in the lines on *Tintern Abbey* and throughout the whole of his great autobiographical poem, *The Prelude.* A more modern illustration of the prayerful attitude in the man of science may be found in the collection of poems entitled *Philosophies* by Sir Ronald Ross. Ross went to India in 1881 and there prosecuted the researches on malaria which have made him famous among the benefactors of mankind. Some seventeen or eighteen years passed before those researches, conducted in exile and loneliness, were crowned with success: the beginning and end of the struggle are expressed in two notable poems, the one written in 1890, and the other seven years later. He begins:—

> 'In this, O Nature, yield, I pray, to me.
> I pace and pace, and think and think, and take
> The fever'd hand, and note down all I see,
> That some dim distant light may haply break.
>
> The painful faces ask, Can we not cure?
> We answer, No, not yet: we seek the laws.
> O God, reveal thro' all this thing obscure
> The unseen, small, but million-murdering cause.'

Herein is the petitioning attitude of the man of science, intent upon a high adventure for the sake of fever'd hands and painful faces. The years pass, years of toil, years of

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continuing instant in work-prayer, prayer-work. At length there comes this reply :—

'This day relenting God
Hath placed within my hand
A wondrous thing: and God
Be praised. At His command

Seeking His secret deeds
With tears and toiling breath,
I find thy cunning seeds,
O million-murdering Death.

I know this little thing
A myriad men will save.
O Death, where is thy sting?
Thy victory, O Grave?'

Again he writes :

'So tho' his home remain
Dark, and his fields untrod,
The exile has this gain,
To have found the face of God.

Confounded at the close,
Confounded standing where
No further pathway shows,
We find an angel there

To guide us. God is good:
The seeing sight is dim:
He gives us solitude
That we may be with Him.

By that we have we lose,
By what we have not, get:
And where we cannot choose
The crown of life is set.

Lo, while we ask the stars
To learn the will of God,
His answer unawares
Strikes sudden from the sod.

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Not when we wait the word
The word of God is given;
The voice of God is heard
As much from earth as Heaven;

The voice of God is heard
Not in the thunder-fit:
A still small voice is heard,
Half-heard, and that is it.'

This is surely a very perfect expression of petition, intercession, and praise in the prayer of a man of science. Mr. Anson in his Essay on Prayer as Understanding has admirably analyzed the psychological process of prayer in science. He says:

'We find that the man of science (*a*) has a confident belief that there always is a rational solution of every problem of science; (*b*) he is certain that Nature will always meet research rationally undertaken with a rational answer, and will never betray his confidence, so that he can count upon Nature to respond with unvarying uniformity to the accurate demonstrations of the intellect; (*c*) his desire to know Truth grows until the heat of that desire may be fitly described as an unceasing knocking at the door; (*d*) he is confident that the answer will come along the line of revelation to him of some rational law and by his co-operation with some rational process.'

We may, then, fitly relate the problems of prayer to those of any pursuit of knowledge or of beauty. If we may follow Sir Charles Eliot, the Hindu and the Buddhist would agree.

V

Many practical difficulties are due to what has been called the Sultanic conception of God. Where the individual conceives of God as a despotic even if distant deity, then his relationship to Him must be menial, excessively supplicating, and even bribery of all kinds may be extensively employed. Ideas such as these, which are common to pagan religions and the early stages of the great world-religions, undoubtedly linger on in the minds of individuals

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to-day. The inference is that prayer and theology go together. Sultanic theology means Sultanic prayers, and there is no other way of purifying our prayers except the way of purifying our ideas of God. It is for this reason that our prayers inevitably return to the Lord's Prayer, from which all sound theology must spring, and to which it must return. Whatever other forms of prayer may through various defects have to be abandoned or set aside awhile, this prayer alone can retain the allegiance alike of the sinner and the saint, the free man and the slave. Kipling has vividly portrayed the disastrous results upon prayer of an all too 'Natural Theology.' [1]

'My privy and well drain into each other
After the custom of Christendie. . . .
Fevers and fluxes are wasting my mother;
Why has the Lord afflicted me?
The saints are helpless for all I offer—
So are the clergy I used to fee.
Henceforward I keep my cash in my coffer,
Because the Lord has afflicted me.

Money spent on an Army or Fleet
Is homicidal lunacy. . . .
My son has been killed in the Mons retreat:
Why is the Lord afflicting me?
Why are murder, pillage and arson
And rape allowed by the Deity?
I will write to *The Times*, deriding our parson,
Because my God has afflicted me.'

When we thus discern that if we caricature the Name and Nature of God our prayers must themselves become caricatures of an ultimately repulsive order, we shall return to Him Who taught us how to pray, we shall find that in linking our utterance to His we shall, even if we cannot apprehend it, participate in a prayer which rests upon a noble and not upon an ignoble notion of God. In this way iteration ceases to be a vain repetition; it becomes a participated realization of the Lord's own prayer. Once

[1] In *The Years Between*, 1919.

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again, it is the poet who brings this home to us, and, like Kipling's poem, Mrs. Meynell's, simply entitled 'The Lord's Prayer,' was written during the war [1]:—

'There is a bolder way,
There is a wilder enterprise than this
All-human reiteration day by day.
Courage, Mankind! Restore Him what is His.

Out of His mouth were given
These phrases. O, replace them whence they came.
He, only, knows our inconceivable "Heaven,"
Our hidden "Father" and the unspoken "Name."

Our "trespasses," our "bread,"
The "will" inexorable yet implored;
The miracle words that are and are not said,
Charged with the unknown purpose of their Lord.

"Forgive," "give," "lead us not,"—
Speak them by Him, O man the unaware,
Speak by that dear tongue, though thou know not what,
Shuddering through the paradox of prayer.'

VI

Even so, however, questions as to the value of prayer and of its efficacy respecting the material world and other people are bound to arise in the minds not only of scoffers but of the devout. It is perfectly true that, ultimately, true prayer supplies its own answer to problems that are raised concerning it, and it is irrational to undergo the experience and then to say that it is inexplicable, incommunicable, amenable to no laws, susceptible of no analysis. The experience of prayer cannot, perhaps, be exhaustively analyzed, and the analysis must not in any case be identified with the experience itself. Yet if we believe that He Who is the Way and the Life is also the Truth, we must also believe that prayer is susceptible of increasingly true analysis, of increasingly full understanding. The adolescent will not be won to pray by an ostrich-like attitude to his question, 'What is the good of it?'

[1] In *A Father of Women, and Other Verses*, by Alice Meynell.

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We will begin by referring to the remarkable essay by Mr. A. C. Turner on Prayer and the World's Order[1] In a closely reasoned argument Mr. Turner shews how the distinction between the natural and the spiritual is a distinction of standpoint, not of fact. 'Any belief in God implies that all causation is spiritual in the long run,' though, as he caustically adds, 'the run may be so long as to make the belief irrelevant for practical purposes.' Rationality is necessary to spirituality if the evils of a false piety are to be avoided, and if each is to avoid its own peculiar pitfalls. Reason seeks the universal, spirit the particular; for reason 'everything is necessary in general, but nothing in particular'; for spirit (we may add) nothing is necessary in general, but everything in particular. The individual who is relatively unimportant to science is absolutely all-important to religion—the very hairs of your head are all numbered, a startling assertion of mathematical considerations in the Divine providence and economy. It is only through the individual that spiritual values are transmitted, and in prayer we seek the equation of differing values as well as the conservation and augmentation of value. Prayer is, therefore, for the particular, but what the particulars are depends upon the meaning attaching to the kingdom of Heaven. 'Half the object of prayer,' Mr. Turner finely says, 'is to learn to delight in the taxes of God.' The efficiency of prayer is to be measured qualitatively, not quantitatively, so that although it is concerned with the particular it is with the world's particulars—*i.e.* with the universal needs of mankind—rather than with specially private particulars (which may be misunderstood) that it is really concerned, the death of particular desires in order to regain the particular in the whole of the Kingdom of God. Prayer, indeed, comes more and more to be for the hallowing of the Name and for the furthering of the Kingdom. The petitionary element, therefore, according to Mr. Turner, becomes subordinate as faith increases. It would be truer, I think, to say that the *private* rather than the petitionary element becomes less important; and this is not so much as faith, but rather

[1] Essay xii. in *Concerning Prayer.*

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as love increases. With the increase of love must go decrease of self-seeking and increase of world-saving.

Mr. Turner proceeds to shew that the further antinomy between mechanism in Nature and freedom in conduct, which is so great a hindrance to prayer, can be met by realizing that love and freedom are necessary correlatives, and love alone is omnipotent. Where there is love, as St. Augustine long ago said, there is liberty and plenitude of power. 'So,' says Mr. Turner, 'the love of God is omnipotent, not as controlling and shaping the outward course of events, but because it can always in any circumstances give a perfect account of itself. It has no need to manipulate history, because it is always sufficient to meet any situation. The activity of love is self-giving: it can afford to give itself away: so omnipotence and freedom are complementary to one another.' 'To say that God is omnipotent is not to give Him an added attribute, it is equivalent to saying that love is omnipotent.' And, for us men, worship is the only possible attitude towards Divine love and 'prayer is the expansion of worship into the particular.'

Nevertheless, while considerations such as these assist us in realizing the value of prayer, and in countering criticisms such as that prayer is merely auto-suggestion and telepathic, they need, perhaps, to be expanded if we are to meet not only the question of value but also the question of validity. Value and validity are not necessarily identical. A politician's speeches may have value in catching votes, they will not always have validity in logic. Is it possible, then, to establish prayer on a still firmer basis than that of its utility, its value, however high? The problem is perhaps most tersely expressed in a well-known stanza of Rudyard Kipling's:

> 'My brother kneels, so saith Kabir,
> To stone and brass in heathen-wise,
> Yet in my brother's voice I hear
> My own unanswered agonies.
> His God is as his fates assign,
> His prayer is all the world's—and mine.'

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'Unanswered agonies:' that is the crucial problem Can we shew that the nexus of all experience is implicative of prayer, and that, if so, there are no unanswered agonies? In short, is all experience petitionary? This is the thesis I wish to maintain, and my chief warrant for it will be based on Dr. James Ward's psychology.[1]

VII

Psychology is, according to Dr. Ward, the 'science of individual experience,' and 'experience is the process of becoming expert by experiment.' Experience for any individual is always constituted of two factors, the knowing, percipient subject, and the known perceived object of presentation, a duality of Ego and non-Ego in one indivisible individual experience. The individual subject has one capacity and one power. The capacity is capacity to feel: to be susceptible of pleasure-pain, to respond to stimuli of all kinds in such a way as to retain at the centre of consciousness whatever is of interest and value to the self. But we must not identify subsequent ideas about feelings with this capacity of feeling itself. Feeling is subjective in a double sense, subjective for epistemology, subjective for psychology: capacity of feeling belongs solely in the subject; the capacity itself is never a presented object. Feeling is thus unique among psychological data in that it is wholly and purely subjective, 'subjectively subjective,' in Hamilton's phrase. The importance of this for our present purpose is very great. We cannot ground religious experience on feeling; the validity of prayer does not rest upon any sort of feeling. The subject's one power is attention, the power of distributing attention variously to different objects is the

[1] *Psychological Principles.* In what follows I am greatly indebted to Dr. Ward, but the responsibility for the application is my own. [Since writing this article Sir Charles Eliot's three volumes on Hinduism have been published. His account of the theory of meditation in Indian religion should be studied in connexion with Section VI of this article.]

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express mark of conscious experience. Attention is so far identical with consciousness itself that we hardly realize how the whole structure of our present knowledge, the whole body of what we call our experiences has been due to a ceaseless process and adjustment of attention to objects that please or displease, possess some interest for us. 'The simplest form of psychical life, therefore, involves not only a subject feeling but a subject having qualitatively distinguishable objective presentations which are the causes of its feeling.'[1] Feeling, then, is not primordial, the subject feeling feels because there is change in the continuum of presentations which produces feeling of pleasure or feeling of pain. Dr. Ward's theory of the continuum of presentations has been criticized in an acute review by Professor G. Dawes Hicks, but the criticism seems to tell in the direction of a greater realism, and is therefore the more congenial to our purpose. We may say, accordingly, that in religious experience there is not first a feeling, then an idea of dependence, then an idea of God, but first a presentation of God (howsoever interpreted), a consequent feeling, and then consequent action.

Prayer, then, as experience, is itself a process of attention upon the presentation of God. But presentations admit of variation, and are subject to a continuous process of progressive differentiation under the influence of repeated attention. Growth of experience, therefore, means growth in the progressive differentiation of presentations in the continuum, and growth in religious experience is nothing less than growth in a similar progressive differentiation of the continuum of moral, aesthetic and intellectual ideas which are implicative of God. Our religious experience, our prayers, because they are experience are always experimental; but they are progressively experimental in the sense that their object is for the religious soul more and more fully known and apprehended by attention and affection—*i.e.* by love. The validity of prayer is, therefore, none other than that of experience itself, which is self-validating, and the right orientation of prayer is the right orientation

[1] Ward, *op. cit.* 45.

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of experience, as was exemplified in the poems of Sir Ronald Ross.

Yet in order to avoid both a certain abstractness in and the criticism of the presentation-continuum already referred to, we may go further; and, noting the fact that experience is always social and always of a solidarity, we may say, with Dr. Ward, that reciprocal interaction, a *mutuum commercium*, is what characterizes experience. It is implicative not merely of two phenomena, but also of two agents. The nature of the agents is not strictly a matter for psychology; metaphysics must attempt to describe the agent finite, him whom we call a 'subject,' and theology the nature of the object-agent, Him Whom we call God. It is, however, a great gain, in any attempted metaphysic of prayer, to realize that all experience is a reciprocity between two agents, is intercourse in a society, so that finally all experience is a divine trafficking. The first object presented to the infant mind is its own body, and it grows by exploration, experiment and intercourse therewith (mediated by mother and nurse); the object presented to the religious experience is also its own body, the Beloved Community described by Royce, and described in Christian terms as the Body of Christ. Prayer, then, as integral to religious experience, is also a reciprocity of intercourse—the Object is not created by self-suggestion, but without the Object the intercourse could not be. Once again, then, the mere fact of presentation, of prayer, is its own validity.

The self or subject of experience, however, does not always advance to the higher levels of full self-consciousness. For many the self is not much more than the somatic or bodily me, for others it is this with the memory continuum and little more; for others, relatively few, the self, realized as thinking and willing as well as remembering and appetitive, is not localized, but is the increasingly autonomous master of its constitutive systems or orders of experience. This highest self-consciousness may become, perhaps implicitly is, God-consciousness, so that we may say 'Not I but God worketh in me.' Experience without an experient is unintelligible: we cannot wholly

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and logically identify I and Me, but we can say this pure *Ego* is immanent in all experience; and, further, precisely because it is necessary to all experience, while not all experience is necessary to it, we may fairly call this I transcendent as well as immanent. As my pure *Ego* is immanent throughout my individual experience, and by that very fact transcends it, so the Spirit of God is immanent in all experience, and by that very fact also transcends it. The relation between the finite individual whose pure *Ego* is both immanent in and transcendent of his experience to the Infinite Being whom we call God is not a problem for psychology to solve, perhaps not even to attempt to solve. But we get a clue to its solution in the interpretation of experience as reciprocity. If, as Lotze says, perfect personality is in God alone, yet we, broken beams of Him, have still a measure, a real measure, of independent functioning in the Divine experience, since that experience too is a reciprocity of subject-and-object in inseparable relation. It is no adjectival disgrace, no weakening of our own individuality, to say that *ultimately* there is one pure *Ego*, one pure Self, one perfect Personality in God, while, at the same time, we objects of His experience are yet subjects of our own. By saying that the subject is both immanent and transcendent of experience, we both do justice to and avoid the dangers attaching to excessive 'ecstasy,' Divine 'espousals,' 'rapture,' 'deification.' Ultimately, the subject of all experience is God, but He Who is thus the logical *prius* of experience is in a sense last in order of knowledge. As object of *our* experience we grow into knowledge of Him (and, dare we say, He grows in our knowledge?) Yet the more we know Him, the more we realize that, though the immanental object of our experience, He is yet the transcendent Subject to whom we owe adoration, worship, duty, and love.

Every item of experience, then, is some step, progressive or retrograde, in the differentiation of a presented object, the World, History, God. In every item of experience that object constitutes a challenge to us, evoking feeling, claiming attention. The challenge and the claim embark us upon

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a quest; we pursue the quest in science, in art, in daily conduct; we pursue the quest as individuals, but as individuals in larger groups: families, tribes, nations, mankind. The quest is, therefore, for the individual and for the race. Experience, then, is one long series of quests, is petitionary, is essentially prayer. The progressive quest of experience is prayer to God; the retrogressive quest of experience is prayer to devils of our own devising. We pray because we must; we pray because experience is itself petitionary prayer. But the quest brings with it conquest. Many of the steps are progressive, discoveries are made, art forms created, good acts done; all these are steps in the articulation of experience, stages in the hallowing of the Name, stages in the furthering of the Kingdom. There are thus no 'unanswered agonies.' The individual may fail to perceive the answer to his own particular petition because he has failed to put that quest in its right terms, yet the self-validating nature of experience is the guarantee that every question rightly asked will lead to a right answer. Experience at bottom is the search for light; rightly pursued, light will manifest itself.

When we have realized that from the psychological point of view all experience is petitionary, we shall no longer be contemptuous of petitionary prayer, though the terms of the petition will always be subject to scrutiny. When we have realized that experience is reciprocity between two agents, we shall no longer suppose that God will give us what is good without our asking. We must ask, we do ask, one way or another. 'He gave them their request, but sent leanness into their souls.' We cannot have peace unless we seek and pursue it; we cannot have God unless we seek and pursue Him.

Similarly, as all experience is corporate and co-operative, as the work of science requires many workers working each for each and with one another, so with all forms of prayer. The effort must be corporate, the benefit sought must be corporate, corporate the quest. We cannot help praying for others, and they for us; we pray either for their well-being, their victory for truth, or their ill-being and defeat.

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Wishing well means praying well, wishing ill means praying ill. We are all necessarily either well-wishers or ill-wishers.

We are thus under bondage to prayer, but we may make the yoke easy and light, or heavy and hard to bear. We need not choose to be interested in God, but we must be interested in something or somebody so long as we have any degree of consciousness. That interest is the form of prayer. Prayer is interest in God or interest in self; all men are interested either in others or in themselves; that is, all men pray either for others or for themselves. We may neglect God and His creatures in our prayers; if so, we shall pay the penalty of leanness in our souls. The efficiency of prayer depends upon the efficiency of attention, the validity of prayer depends only upon itself as the essential mark of all experience. Prayer ceases only when experience ceases, prayer is futile only when experience is stagnant, prayer is meaningless only when experience signifies nothing, it is *unanswered only when there is nothing to answer.* Prayer is attention directed upon God in the Universe, revealed in mankind, manifest in history, and purposive.

ALBERT A. COCK.

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ART. V.—A PHILOSOPHER TO HIS WIFE: PORPHYRY *AD MARCELLAM*.

1. *Porphyrii philosophi Platonici opuscula selecta.* Iterum recognovit AUGUSTUS NAUCK. (Lipsiae: Teubner. 1886.)
2. *Porphyre. Son rôle dans l'école néoplatonicienne. Sa Morale; sa lettre à Marcella.* By M. N. BOUILLET. Revue critique et bibliographique. (Paris. 1864.)
3. *Porphyrius (Philosopher).* Article in *Dictionary of Christian Biography.* By SAMUEL CHEETHAM. (London: John Murray. 1887.)

THE importance of Porphyry in the thought of the Third century can hardly be over-estimated. As the pupil of Plotinus he emphasized in sincere and sober love of the good the practical side of Neo-Platonism and its stress on morality; as a controversialist he entered as his master had never done into keen criticism of the Christian books and of the prevailing doctrines of the Church already nearing its goal of victory. If we possessed more of his writings, we should be better able to report on the reactions of religion on philosophy, and of philosophy on religion during this period.

The main facts of Porphyry's life are well known. Born, as his real name Melek or Malchus implies, of a Tyrian family about A.D. 232, possibly, as the historian Socrates recorded, of Christian parents, whose religion he rejected on account of their ill-treatment, he came under the influence of remarkable teachers; he seems to have known the great Origen, he studied under Longinus at Athens, and finally in 263 became the disciple of Plotinus at Rome. Falling into a melancholy state he was advised by his master to seek change of air in Sicily, which appears to have

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become his home, for Plotinus died soon after. Porphyry himself lived on till about 303.

All that remains of Porphyry's many works are the *Aphormae*, a statement of the Neoplatonic position, the *De Abstinentia*, a treatise on Vegetarianism, an Introduction to the *Categories* of Aristotle, one or two mythological pieces, the lives of Pythagoras and Plotinus, and two letters, one of which, the *Ad Marcellam*, is to be our subject in this article. But his importance as an opponent of Christianity may be estimated by the number of references to his attacks in the works of St. Jerome, Eusebius, and St. Augustine, from which it is possible to gain considerable knowledge of the able and scholarly way in which he went to work to upset the rival system which menaced the influence of philosophy. From such references we receive the impression of a singularly keen and eminently religious mind of a very modern cast. Indeed much that Porphyry attacked, which then was stubbornly defended, has been given up by most Christian thinkers. For instance, he regarded the Book of Daniel as the work of a writer in the days of Antiochus Epiphanes, he explained on modern lines the apostolic conflict related in Galatians ii, and criticized the prevailing allegorical interpretations of the Jewish law introduced by Origen. With regard to the doctrines of Christianity his philosophy led him, as Dean Inge says, to think the doctrine of the Incarnation to be 'a clumsy attempt to reunite what had been falsely dissevered.'[1] Christ is to him an inspired man, but not unique. In the *Demonstratio*, Eusebius quotes a passage from his book on *Oracles* which shews his point of view.[2] An oracle was asked, 'Is Christ a God?' and the reply was that 'He was most holy, and His soul which the Christians ignorantly worship, like the souls of others, was made immortal after death.' 'Christ then was holy,' Porphyry concludes, 'and like the holy went to Heaven. Wherefore you will say no evil about him, but pity the folly of men.' We remember the comment of St.

[1] *The Philosophy of Plotinus*, i. p. 67.

[2] Eusebius, *Demonstratio*, iii. 7.

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Augustine, 'The Neoplatonists praised Christ while they disparaged Christianity.'[1]

Plotinus had opposed the Gnostics, though silent about Christianity. Porphyry certainly allowed no Gnostic ideas to colour his view of Christ, which was essentially rationalistic. 'Like many modern thinkers he was ready to honour Christ as a man, even an inspired man, but the exclusive devotion which Christianity required, he refused to give,'[2] was the summing-up of Archdeacon Cheetham.

With regard to the specifically religious and moral ideas of Christianity and the Neoplatonism of Porphyry, we shall see, if not identity, at least great similarity.

'The real quarrel lay in their different attitudes to the old culture,' says Dean Inge. That is to say, the moral call to purity and trust was uttered in the same tone; but it was united on the one hand with a modified and temporizing reverence for ancestral and popular paganism, and on the other with a stern denial of the value of the 'Gods many and lords many' of the heathen world; with the Christian it must be 'Christ the beginning and the ending Christ.' It is because of the likenesses between the rarefied Paganism of the Neoplatonists of the Third century, and the Christianity which faced it, that personal expressions of faith from a mind like Porphyry's are so interesting.

We open then this long letter of his to his wife Marcella, containing as it does such a full flow of his most intimate convictions, with eager anticipations.

We learn from this letter that, when a middle-aged man, Porphyry had made a somewhat strange marriage. The union brought him no worldly advantage, no hope of children, and little comfort, but, for reasons that are quite obscure, considerable worry and vexation. The lady, whose name was Marcella, was the widow of a friend, and was left with five daughters and two sons, some of them quite children, some of them almost of a marriageable age. She had no fortune, and was something of an invalid. Porphyry tells us that Marcella's union with him was so

[1] *De Consensu Evang.* i. 15.

[2] *Dict. Christian Biography*, art. 'Porphyry.'

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bitterly resented by her fellow townsmen that much to his disappointment he found himself involved with his new partner in most unpleasant scandals, and even went in fear of his life. He remarks somewhat bitterly that in this tragi-comedy of Marriage, in which he had stepped on the boards to sing the Hymn of Hymen, the conventional elements of the drama were certainly all present—envy, hatred, ridicule, persecution and anger.

He says that he was induced to marry by two motives. The first was the rather strange one that he regarded marriage as a kind of propitiation of the family gods, and that he was inclined in a sort of piety to do the customary thing, just as Socrates offered sacrifice in the prison for the sake of a happy death; the second, which he styles the nobler, was the loving conviction of Marcella's bent towards true philosophy, and the desire to give the widow of his friend in her desolate condition 'a guardian of honourable character who was agreeable to her.'

After about ten months of married life, in which Marcella apparently received considerable instruction in the tenets of Neoplatonism, Porphyry had to go on some mission to Greece. 'The need of Greece called, and the Gods supported the call,' he says. Marcella was eager to accompany him, but this was quite impossible 'with such a train of daughters.' To take them would have been out of the question, and to leave them alone amid the evil of a Sicilian town an act of folly. So Porphyry had to go to Greece without his new wife, and it was during his absence that he wrote to her the letter which is known as the *Ad Marcellam*, one of those domestic scraps of ancient writing that are so valuable in giving a glimpse of a small department of the actual life of the period.

Familiar letters between relatives or friends give a far more real picture of an epoch, and are a far more accurate measure of the direction of men's thoughts, than any formal record. If we would attain a living idea of what philosophy meant to educated people a few years before Christianity was recognized by Constantine, if we would gauge the power, purity and knowledge of its

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disciples, we must not neglect a document like this. Such writings flow out naturally from the life and spirit of their time, they bear still the living impress of deep feeling, thought and devotion. Here we have a great philosopher writing to his wife, who is also his disciple. He is one who in his youth had had every opportunity of assimilating Christianity. He had known the great Origen, and had studied the Christian writings with the most critical attention. And yet in his time he became the most dangerous anti-Christian pamphleteer. It was against Porphyry 'our chief enemy' that Eusebius wrote his great apologies, the *Praeparatio* and *Demonstratio*. There was something assuredly supremely attractive in the philosophy of Plotinus, something that appealed to the very depths of the soul, that could draw a man of such earnestness and spirituality away from the magnet of the Light of the World.

As we read the *Ad Marcellam* we understand it better —the attraction of such a faith to such a mind. We realize the religious value of the teaching, that is passed from person to person mingled with intimate messages of affection, in a way in which no formal lecture or set treatise could represent it to us.

The best consolation Porphyry can give to poor deserted Marcella is that she must treasure the cool and fresh draught she has already drunk from the springs of philosophy, and not, in yearning for more, lose what she has already gained. She is to 'care for the house and keep all things secure.' The house, that is to say, of her inner soul. She must cling to philosophy, 'the only anchor that will hold.' She must, amid all the difficulties caused by the long absence of her 'soul's helper, father and husband, teacher and kinsman,' who has jettisoned the goodwill of his country for her sake, 'face trouble with reason rather than emotion.' Trouble and hardship are a discipline for those who have fallen into this lower life and would fain ascend to the Gods again.

'A life of ease is for the Gods, but for us who have fallen into Birth it is most dangerous, leading us as it were with alien

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hands into forgetfulness, destroying us in a sleep, which we enjoy shepherded by dreams which delude the soul.'

She must remember how Herakles, the Dioskouroi, Asklepios and the other sons of the gods had to toil bravely in order to attain. 'The ascent to Heaven is not for those who live a life of pleasure, but for those who have learned to bear nobly the most trying adversity.' She thinks that sundered from Porphyry she is losing the Way of Salvation, and her guide thereon as well, but it was no trivial matter when she was admitted into the mystic ranks of philosophy by sacred words; it meant that she would have to prove it all in practice. For action alone can attest belief, and every believer must so act as to be to his pupils a witness they can trust when he speaks. Thus Porphyry's real relation to her must appear not one of sense at all, but he must live in her mind's eye at the farthest remove from the body, without colour and without form, not to be handled with the hands, but only to be reached by the mind.

Passion, she must remember, in the soul is the one enemy of the soul's salvation; it is education that releases from passion; we must not consider education to be simply the acquisition of knowledge. The escape from passion! It was a lesson that used to appeal to her, one that teaching seemed to reveal to her as already written in divine letters on her heart.

'Is it not incredible that one who once believed that she had *within* her the Saviour and the saved, the destroyer and the destroyed, riches and poverty, father and husband, and the guide to the true good, should have gaped at the shadow of a guide, as though she had not the true guide within, and all riches in herself, which you destroy and lose if you descend to the flesh instead of the Saviour and the saved.'

When the shadow of the real Porphyry, his phenomenal appearance, is present with her, she is none the better off; when it is absent, none the worse. She can meet him in the purest union night and day, a union that knows no parting, if she will but climb up into her true

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self, unify her ideas, ponder over his teaching, and realize it in action,

At this point of the letter Porphyry thinks apparently it will help her best to write down the most salient points of that very teaching. The letter becomes more formal, as if he were giving in a brief space the substance and leading thoughts of lectures or sermons. He dwells first on the Indwelling of God, who is present everywhere, but His only consecrated temple is the mind, chiefly the wise man's mind. For the wise man 'adorns the temple for Him with his thoughts, rejoicing in the living Image of God pourtrayed in his spirit.' God needs not man, and the wise man God only, for none can be fair and good but he who knows beauty and goodness, which come to him from God; he is purified within by the knowledge of God and follows after righteousness impelled by God's inspiration. God sees all we do, and hears all our words. He is the cause of all the good we do: we choose the evil ourselves, He is not to blame for it. Our prayers must be worthy of Him; that is to say, we must ask what no one else could give us; if what we want depends on our working well, we must pray to have it when we have done our part, 'for the prayer of the lazy man is vain.' Neither should we ask God to give us what we do not mean to keep; for God never takes a gift away. We must wait too for God to reveal what we should pray for.

God knoweth them that are His, though they be known to few, nay, to none on earth. The spirit must follow Him, mirroring His likeness in itself; the soul must follow the spirit; and the body, so far as its grosser substance permits, must follow the soul, as a pure servant of a pure mistress. God's presence entails the purest morality; he who realizes it will rather throw a random stone than a random word, and regard a victory won by deceit as a moral defeat. Love of pleasure, love of money, love of the body make a man unjust.

'Yea, though he sacrifice hecatombs, and adorn the temples with unnumbered offerings, he is unholy, godless, and a temple-

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robber. Wherefore we should cast out one who loves his body as unholy and accurst.'

There should be no social fellowship or conversation about God with those who are not like-minded.

'It is unsafe to converse about Him with men of wrong views, whether what they say be true or false; still less with the impure; the word of God going into their ears is itself defiled. Reticence and reserve are better than random words. You will become worthy of God by saying nothing, doing nothing, and caring to know nothing unworthy of Him, and a man worthy of God would be a God.'

A mind like God's is that which honours God best, and virtue alone points the way to it. God establishes the righteous. Evil comes from the suggestions of evil daemons and makes the sinner shun God, and shut his eyes to the laws of Divine fore-knowledge and Divine punishment.

'But the wise man's soul is at one with God, it sees Him near, with Him it is always at home. If it is true that the ruler rejoices in those he rules, then God must certainly love and provide for the wise. Therein lies the wise man's blessing, that he is provided for by God. It is not his tongue that is precious to God, but his deeds; for even his silence honours God, whereas an untaught man pollutes the divine by his very prayers and sacrifices. The wise man then is the only priest, the only saint, the only one who knows how to pray.'

Without adopting unworthy conceptions of God, you must honour Him according to the national mode of worship. He claims it, not because He is in want of aught, but because of His blessed, all-loving character. It is a pious duty, for in reality to sacrifice does you no harm, just as to neglect it does you no good, seeing that it is impossible for God to be angry; He does not harm us when He is angry, but when He is unknown. Your true temple is the mind within.

'Tears and prayers do not change the mind of God, nor do sacrifices honour Him, nor a wealth of offerings adorn Him; only

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the mind within well-founded is in touch with Him . . . prepare it, and adorn it as a fit abode for God. Nor let its glory last but for a day, or be mere traditional ornament, or worse still, laughter and folly, and the home of an evil daemon.'

The assurance that God is ever-present, all-seeing, will make you fear the gaze that cannot be escaped, and even in conversation on other subjects, you will by a mental effort turn your thoughts to Him, and find a certain inspiration flow into your words; they will be bright with the light of the God of truth, and win their way more easily—for the knowledge of God makes words fewer. Forget that kindly presence, and the evil daemon enters, since the soul must be the home of either God or daemons. Then all goes to ruin. The moral life falls to pieces: the victims of ignorance in all kinds of sin try to wipe out their conscience; the Gods escape them, but they cannot escape or deceive the Gods and Justice, their attendant.

Porphyry gives next the four cardinal principles of religion. Here he is strangely Christian. He but adds 'truth' to the Pauline triad, faith, hope, and love:

'For we must believe that the only salvation lies in conversion to God, and that believing in His Unity our one aim must be to know the truth about Him, and when we know Him we must love Him that we know, and when we love Him, nourish our souls with good hopes all our life long.'

He then proceeds to distinguish three forms of law—the law of God, the law of human nature, and the law of nations. The law of nations governs international relations according to statutes laid down, it varies with dates and dynasties, but can never reach evil motives. The law of nature sets limits to the claims of the body, and is in harmony with the Divine law, that is found in the spirit of man, and tested by the result of the actions that it prompts. This Divine law cannot be transcended, and it is unchangeable. 'The spirit alone knows it, when it delves as in a mine to seek it, finds it imaged in its own depths, and draws from it food for the soul.' It follows from the Neoplatonic theory of the relations of

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body, soul and spirit, that one must first learn the law of nature, and by it rise to the Divine law, which is the basis of it. It chains and limits man's chief folly and torment —unlimited desire, which makes him like the fever-patient crave most for what would increase his evil. It is the gods who in the rule of holiness bid us abstain from food and sensual indulgence, and punish all that overstep nature's limits; they bid us care more for contentment without necessaries than for power to obtain them. The root of all misery with Porphyry as with the Stoics is either fear, or undefined and empty desire; our disobedience to nature is the measure of our ineffectiveness. Contentment on a straw pallet is surely better than tossing sleepless on a golden couch beside a priceless table; wealth can of course be heaped up by brutalizing toil, but what a wretched life results! Philosophy can cure the sick soul, and eliminate the enemy—desire: that philosophical teaching is empty which cures no human passion; just as there is no use for medicine except to cure bodily disease, so there is no use for philosophy except to cast out the passions of the soul. This and similar teaching is the message of nature's law.

The Divine law proclaims the contempt for the body and the transitoriness of the sense-life more authoritatively. It teaches that the body is no real part of us in our life here, any more than the caul which clothes the embryo in the womb, or the ear that sheathes the growing corn. They are cast away when their work is done, and so is the body. We must then realize that 'by how much our affections are set on the mortal, by so much we fashion a knowledge of ourselves out of harmony with the grandeur of our immortality.' And he continues:

'Thou that wast sent naked into the world shouldest call as one naked on Him that sent thee; for to him only that bears no alien burden does God listen, and loveth him that is pure from sin. Reckon it thy best equipment for the blessed life, that thou the captive of nature shouldest take thy captivity captive; for we were bound with the bonds which nature wove about us—belly, genitals, throat, and the other members, the

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use and pleasure to which they minister, and the fears they cause; if we but rise above their charm, and escape their crafty net, we lead our captivity captive.'

Marcella must cease to regard herself as woman. There must be neither male nor female in philosophy; the most blessed things are born of virgin soul and uncorrupt spirit; whereas what the body bears is reckoned cursed by the Gods. If parts of the body have to be cut off sometimes to save the whole, she must be ready to cut off the whole body to save the real whole—the soul.

So with a few wise suggestions about the treatment of her slaves, and taking a fair share of the work of the home, the letter ends, or rather breaks off in the middle of a sentence. It is improbable that more than the last page is lost, for the theme of instruction—our relation to God, and the attainment of union with Him by absolute asceticism—seems to have run its course, and reached its climax. Unless indeed Porphyry touched also quite different aspects of human life and social duty.

All intimate correspondence has a thrill about it. It is inevitable that we should reconstruct momentarily the shadowy writer and the vanished hand that once so eagerly turned over its pages. And this letter, for it is a letter, in spite of being a philosophical treatise as well—Marcella awaited it anxiously, and opened it joyfully. Can we imagine her feelings as she deciphered it? Was she quite as devoted to philosophy as the writer imagined? Or was she a little more of a woman than he suspected? I rather gather from one or two things Porphyry says that a suspicion of the old Eve still clung to Marcella, and that she hardly rose to the height of her philosopher's argument. For instance, it is not improbable that a sceptical smile flitted over her face, as she read the passage about 'the phenomenal and the real Porphyry.' She would no doubt have appreciated, for all her progress in philosophy, something a little warmer in expression. Though of course she could see, as well as we can to-day, the real goodness and transparent sincerity of her Casaubon visible throughout the epistle.

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We can only guess what it was to the Roman lady to whom it was written sixteen hundred years ago. Let us ask what we gather from it ourselves. First: it seems clear that the Neoplatonist had two leading ideas, when he expressed himself practically and intimately, not in the school but in the home, and these were the inwardness of God, and the necessity for extreme asceticism. The beauty and purity of that first conception of a Presence immanent in the heart of the seeker after wisdom may be judged from the passages quoted above. The grace of their simple assurance, their practical and moral value, their harmony with the highest truths of all religions, can hardly be over-estimated.

And side by side with these sublime conceptions went a thorough-going asceticism—a complete distrust of the body and all its conditions. Here was something common at that day to Christianity and philosophy, for were not the anchorites just then beginning to crowd into the desert, and the ideals of clerical celibacy becoming fixed in the Church? We must not think that Christianity threw a dark and abnormal shadow over life; it shared ascetic ideals with almost all other practical thought. It introduced no microbe of exaggerated asceticism; if asceticism became something of a disease in the state, Christianity but participated in the infection with the school of Plotinus and Porphyry. And in the harder and more rigorous sections of the letter we seem to feel, as often in Christian writings, philosophical doctrines such as the Fall of the Soul into Birth, and its Ascent back to the Gods through bodily conditions designed to entangle it, and retard its progress, somewhat hampering, fossilizing, stiffening the natural flow of the thought. 'Here is a dogma to which our ideas and practice must be accommodated,' the writer seems to say. The dogma explains something no doubt of the meaning of life's enigmas, but not nearly so much as the writer thinks, or indeed as much as he might himself evolve without it. Porphyry, even in a family letter, is firm on first principles, he sticks to his guns—but there is something doctrinaire, thin, and

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official about his theology here, that is not apparent in his doctrine of God.

Then also the letter gives us a vivid impression of the religious value of philosophy. Neoplatonism was, as Stoicism had been in all its course, a great religion battling in men against Desire and Fear. A religion only for the cultured perhaps, but still a great power, occupied in transfiguring with ideal light wide areas of life. We realize how strenuously the last descendants of Plato practised the art of the good physician, how monastically severe were their rules, how lofty their conceptions, how close and intimate their touch with the power that in them assuredly 'made for righteousness.' It was against such champions that Christianity was contending for the rule of the world; as she ran her race her opponents were not all decayed superstitions, and cults patient of men's vices, ministering to Desire and Fear themselves; but one at least was a figure as bright and pure as her own, as insistent on morality, as assured of God's presence, destined to be beaten in the race, but destined also to impart something of itself to the Conqueror.

The triumph of Christianity was no doubt delayed by Porphyry. We can understand that this was because of the excellence of the Neoplatonic teaching and life, while he guided it. We know that the Church fully recognized the importance of its antagonist. But if the march was delayed it may also be said, that through the activity of Neoplatonism it found its road prepared in the mental atmosphere, and owed much to its forerunner.

And lastly, since we know that Porphyry had a deep veneration for Christ—it is attested by Eusebius—and also that he had critically examined the New Testament, we can hardly remark the likenesses in much that he says to the teaching of Christ and St. Paul without feeling that Christian thought had to some extent influenced his ideas, and imparted a warmth to them, a spirit of piety, that it was not in the power of mere Greek speculation to supply.

W. J. FERRAR.

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ART. VI.—IMMORTALITY AND RESURRECTION.

1. *The Tragic Sense of Life in Men and in Peoples.* By MIGUEL DE UNAMUNO. Translated by J. E. CRAWFORD FLITCH. (London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd. 1921.)
2. *The Resurrection of the Flesh.* By JOHN T. DARRAGH, D.D. (London: S.P.C.K. 1921.)

And other Works.

I

THE DEAN OF ST. PAUL'S has on several occasions recently been reminding us that *the* book on the problem of immortality has yet to be written. It is now more than a quarter of a century since Salmond published his 'Christian Doctrine of Immortality' and much advance has been made in different departments of thought and research since that time. We have now to reckon not only with scientific materialism but with psychology, old and new; we have neo-vitalism and the reaction against Darwinism; we have the science of comparative religion and the psychology of religious experience; we have the fuller critical treatment of historic records in the sphere of Christian evidences, and the attacks upon the historicity and evidential value of the Gospel narratives of the Resurrection; there is, moreover, the growth of a mass of hardly digested data in connexion with psychic phenomena and the philosophico-religious movements popularized under the names of 'Theosophy,' 'Christian Science,' and 'Spiritism.' We have still with us the revolt against Protestant conceptions of the life after death; the repudiation of the old-fashioned and crudely materialistic ideas centring around the conceptions of 'Heaven' and 'Hell.' There is, moreover, to-day the quickened sense in our midst of 'communion with the Unseen,' and the revival of 'Prayers for the Dead' in our churches. There is, again, a greater eagerness for

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knowledge concerning the possibility of a future life and wistful questions concerning the state of the departed due to the appalling losses in human life, and the fact that for many, as the result of the Great War, life's pilgrimage must be henceforth a lonely one with a bereavement at the heart of it. All this has led to a desire to believe and a willingness to snatch at any 'evidence' which seems to lend countenance to what the heart most longs to be true.

Generally speaking there is a more widespread inclination towards belief in a life after death, and in the minds of men a vague idea that scientific research and advancing knowledge are tending more to give a verdict in favour of the heart's desire, and in any case have not conclusively demonstrated the impossibility of survival after bodily death.

We have to-day a growing output of books dealing with various aspects of the problem, and the time is undoubtedly ripening for something in the nature of a tentative synthesis of conflicting ideas, positive and negative, to be gleaned from the various fields of research opened up for us in biology, psychology, philosophy, and religion.

We propose in this article to review the problem in some of its aspects, and to indicate one or two directions in which a solution may be tentatively sought.

II

A perusal of Professor de Unamuno's stimulating volume shews us that he frankly despairs of finding any intellectual justification for a belief in immortality. He quotes Hume's words in the essay 'On the Immortality of the Soul' as shewing that, in the opinion of that philosopher, there is no rational proof of the soul's being immortal, and in spite of Kant's attempt, Unamuno is convinced that the sceptical affirmation of Hume holds good. There is no way, he tells us quite frankly, of proving the immortality of the soul rationally. There are, on the other hand, ways of proving rationally its mortality. Hence an incisive chapter on what he aptly describes as 'the rationalist dissolution' in which he faces the very worst that reason can urge against belief,

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exposes the feebleness of the arguments by which believers have sought to bolster up their faith in immortality, and dismisses them as mere 'advocacy and sophistry.'

'All the laboured arguments,' he says, 'in support of our hunger of immortality, which pretend to be grounded on reason or logic, are merely advocacy and sophistry.

'The property and characteristic of advocacy is, in effect, to make use of logic in the interests of a thesis that is to be defended, while, on the other hand, the strictly scientific method proceeds from the facts, the data, presented to us by reality, in order that it may arrive, or not arrive, as the case may be, at a certain conclusion. What is important is to define the problem clearly, whence it follows that progress consists not seldom in undoing what has been done. Advocacy always supposes a *petitio principii*, and its arguments are *ad probandum*. And theology that pretends to be rational is nothing but advocacy.'

Hence on these lines the breakdown of theology.

'Take,' he says, 'the *Summa Theologica* of St. Thomas, the classical monument of the theology—that is, of the advocacy—of Catholicism, and open it where you please. First comes the thesis—*utrum* . . . whether such a thing be thus or otherwise; then the objections—*ad primum sic proceditur*; next the answers to these objections—*sed contra est* . . . or *respondeo dicendum*. . . . Pure advocacy! And underlying many, perhaps most, of its arguments you will find a logical fallacy which may be expressed *more scholastico* by this syllogism: I do not understand this fact save by giving it this explanation; it is thus that I must understand it, therefore this must be its explanation. The alternative being that I am left without any understanding of it at all. True science teaches, above all, to doubt and to be ignorant; advocacy neither doubts nor believes that it does not know. It requires a solution.' [1]

There can then be no compromise between reason and faith. We are not to believe in order to understand.

'Science as a substitute for religion and reason as a substitute for faith have always fallen to pieces. Science will be able to satisfy, and in fact does satisfy in an increasing measure, our

[1] Pp. 91–2, 92–3.

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increasing logical or intellectual needs, our desire to know and understand the truth; but science does not satisfy the needs of our heart and of our will, and far from satisfying our hunger for immortality it contradicts it. Rational truth and life stand in opposition to one another. And is it possible that there is any other truth than rational truth?'[1]

What is the conclusion to which Professor de Unamuno would drive us? Let us answer the question in his own words:—

'It must remain established, therefore, that reason—human reason—within its limits, not only does not prove rationally that the soul is immortal or that the human consciousness shall preserve its indestructibility through the tracts of time to come, but that it proves rather—within its limits, I repeat—that the individual consciousness cannot persist after the death of the physical organism upon which it depends. And these limits, within which I say that human reason proves this, are the limits of rationality, of what is known by demonstration. Beyond these limits is the irrational, which, whether it be called the super-rational or the infra-rational or the contra-rational, is all the same thing. Beyond these limits is the absurd of Tertullian, the impossible of the *certum est, quia impossibile est.* And this absurd can only base itself upon the most absolute uncertainty. The rational dissolution ends in dissolving reason itself; it ends in the most absolute scepticism, in the phenomenalism of Hume or in the doctrine of absolute contingencies of Stuart Mill, the most consistent of the positivists. The supreme triumph of reason, the analytical—that is, the destructive and dissolvent—faculty, is to cast doubt upon its own validity. . . . Absolute relativism, which is neither more nor less than scepticism, in the modern sense of the term, is the supreme triumph of the reasoning reason.'[2]

It is not then a case of *Credo ut intelligam* but *Credo quia absurdum*! The efforts to rationalize our beliefs, however well-intentioned, are futile. The reasonableness of Christianity is a vain quest. Hence 'Scepticism, uncertainty—the position to which reason, by practising its analysis upon itself, upon its own validity, at last arrives—is the

[1] P. 103.

[2] Pp. 103–4, 105.

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foundation upon which the heart's despair must build up its hope.'[1] So the ex-Rector of the University of Salamanca introduces us to the 'tragic sense of life,' due to the strife between enemy truths. Salvador de Madariaga tells us in his introductory essay to this English translation of 'Del Sentimiento Trágico de la Vida,' that 'this strife between enemy truths, the truth thought and the truth felt, or, as he himself puts it, between veracity and sincerity, is Unamuno's *raison d'être.*'

'Thus Unamuno leads us to his inner deadlock: his reason can rise no higher than scepticism, and, unable to become vital, dies sterile; his faith, exacting anti-rational affirmations and unable therefore to be apprehended by the logical mind, remains incommunicable. From the bottom of this abyss Unamuno builds up his theory of life. . . . It is on the survival of his will to live, after all the onslaughts of his critical intellect, that he finds the basis for his belief—or rather for his effort to believe. Self-compassion leads to self-love, and this self-love, founded as it is on a universal conflict, widens into love of all that lives and therefore wants to survive. So, by an act of love, springing from our own hunger for immortality, we are led to give a conscience to the Universe—that is, to create God. Such is the process by which Unamuno, from the transcendental pessimism of his inner contradiction, extracts an everyday optimism founded on love.'[2]

We have outlined Unamuno's position at sufficient length to enable it to be seen that he is thoroughgoing in his anti-intellectualist attitude, and that for him the way of the will and the emotions, the response not of intellect but of the whole life in a living experience, is the way to apprehend the reality we seek. Unamuno is himself the living embodiment of that hunger for immortality which he conceives to be the characteristic of the normal man. Personal immortality is for him the *summum bonum.* For this he lives, and all else is subsidiary. From it, and presumably only because of it, comes belief in God. As we read our author we are caught away by his fiery rhetoric, his passionate affirmations, his full-blooded enthusiasm.

[1] P. 106. [2] P. xvii.

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Here is the ' will to believe ' with a vengeance. Here also the ' will to be immortal,' and if *willing* can secure the end so ardently desired, Unamuno himself deserves to get it.

Nevertheless, in spite of all the fierce indictment against reason, we in the West at any rate cannot so easily rule out intellectual consideration of the problem. Granted that the starting-point is the man of flesh and bone, very much in earnest with a ' furious hunger of being ' and ' an appetite for divinity,' unable to conceive himself as non-existing, yet tormented by a thousand reasons urged by science against the possibility of life outliving its material accompaniment and the scientific demonstration that the withdrawal of the oxygen supply to the brain means in a few seconds the cessation of consciousness—why is it necessary to repudiate reason in the effort to preserve the desire to live? Are the conclusions of materialistic science so decisive as to leave no room for faith? Here surely the latest results of scientific investigation will help us to escape in some measure from the black pessimism with which Unamuno regards the arguments of physiologists and psychologists. This is a point to which we will return at a later stage, but for the moment we press our previous question—Must we be irrational of necessity in order to believe? Unamuno may be right in his contention that Spain has its message for the Western world, and Quixotism as he conceives it may yet teach us all a lesson, but ' West is West,' and he will never persuade the English-speaking peoples with their practical outlook upon life and their fund of common sense and native suspicion of mystics true or false, to abandon the path of sane reason in the search after ultimate reality. To do so is at once to put a premium upon superstition and to pander to credulity in its worst form. Even if there be no way of proving the immortality of the soul rationally, that is no reason why we should refuse to be guided by the little light, dim though it may be, which reason offers. The fact is that there is no purely intuitional and no purely rational activity in human experience. The activity all through is that of the whole complex personality in which now the intuitive and now the rational

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element may predominate. Faith's leap surely comes at the end of the intellectual quest where reason halts, and it is not necessary at the commencement of the journey to repudiate reason in order to find room for faith as our guide. In any case we turn our backs upon reason at our own peril, and the risk is too great.

The questions we have to ask in these days rather are these :—

(i) Are the arguments which are put forward on physiological and psychological grounds against belief in the survival of the soul after bodily death, in any sense conclusive ?

(ii) Are we in a stronger position to-day to rebut scientific materialism than was the case, say, in the days of Darwin, Huxley, and the Nineteenth-century scientific revolution ?

We venture to think that there is much in present tendencies in thought and scientific research to warrant an affirmative answer to the second question, and a negative answer to the first.

III

Mr. Balfour has reminded us that we know far too much nowadays about matter to be materialists, and from biology itself comes a message frankly repudiating the scientific materialism of the Nineteenth century. We are familiar enough with the arguments of materialistic psychology on the relation of mind to brain, soul to body ; but do they afford a conclusive refutation of immortality ? It may be true that so far as any evidence we have or can ever have is concerned, the death of the body is the end also of the soul. Destroy the brain and the mind goes too. We may admit that in spite of the claims put forward as the result of the investigations of psychical phenomena, we have not at present and may never possess conclusive demonstration of the survival of the soul after bodily death. We are not bound, however, to conclude that consciousness is an epiphenomenon of cerebral activity, an accompaniment of the physical and chemical changes which occur in the

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brain. No such conclusive and inevitable deduction need follow, and in fact there are other hypotheses which are equally legitimate, which point to no such conclusion, and in favour of which much more can be said in this Twentieth century than was possible a hundred, fifty, or even ten years ago.

Psycho-physical materialism would reduce consciousness to a by-product of physiological processes, and there will always be people for whom this explanation is satisfactory; but an idealistic interpretation of matter in terms of mind, rather than mind in terms of matter, is at least as legitimate, and Bergson's psychological treatment of the problem in 'Matter and Memory' leaves room for the hypothesis that the life-principle which uses the brain as a kind of motor organ may quite reasonably be conceived to be prior to the matter through which it functions. In this case the disintegration of the brain means simply the breakdown of the instrument, not the extinction of the life; and, however intimately mind and brain may seem to us to be united and indissolubly one, there is no conclusive *a priori* reason against mind surviving the loss of its instrument—the brain mechanism—and manufacturing for itself another instrument for use in the new environment in which presumably it may find itself after 'death.' The proof that it succeeds in doing so is yet to seek, unless we are prepared to rely upon such 'evidence' as the spiritists offer, and the extremely hazardous 'conclusions by analogy' drawn from 'telepathy.' But he would be a bold man to-day who would affirm that such an hypothesis was ruled out by the known facts, and that progress to-day in physiological and psychological investigation was leading to a gradual verification of the mechanistic theory of life. On the contrary we are able to quote no less an authority than Dr. J. S. Haldane for the opposite conclusion. 'The phenomena of life are of such a nature that no physical or chemical explanation of them is remotely conceivable.' And again:

'the idea of life is nearer to reality than the ideas of matter and energy, and therefore the presupposition of ideal biology is that inorganic can ultimately be resolved into organic phenomena,

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and that the physical world is thus only the appearance of a deeper reality which is as yet hidden from our distinct vision and can only be seen dimly with the eye of scientific faith.'[1]

The 'tragic sense of life' then, arising from despair at reason's assaults upon all we hold by instinct as most precious and vital, is more likely to be relieved than further accentuated by the progress of scientific investigation in physiology and psychology so far as these seek to throw light upon the problem of Immortality. In this case we think that Professor de Unamuno will have been found to have been too pessimistic in his conclusions regarding the verdict of science against his cherished belief, and too hasty in his repudiation of reason as refuting conclusively what on other grounds he has come to believe as vital to his very life, viz. its survival.

The conclusive proof from materialism, then, is wanting. Scientific investigation returns an open verdict. We are free to endeavour to reach an assurance of immortality by other avenues of approach if such are available.

Strictly speaking, science is incapable of giving any decisive verdict upon the question. Its method is purely descriptive, and its function is to supply from its comparatively restricted fields of research data for the study of the problem. It remains for philosophy and theology to discuss the deeper and more fundamental questions which arise from a consideration of the ultimate meaning and purpose of human life. A scientific description of nature, animate and inanimate, is one thing; an interpretation of its meaning is another. To such an interpretation reason must bring all its resources and strive to extend the concept of intelligibility to the whole. But a failure to exhibit rationality in every department may be due to the fact that reason has its limits. Its lamp may guide us along the way up to a certain point—the limits of rationality. Beyond these limits we may have to yield ourselves to another guide in the quest after the discovery of ultimate reality. A con-

[1] *Mechanism, Life and Personality*, pp. 64 and 104–105, second ed.

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clusive intellectual proof of the existence of the Author of nature may be lacking, but reason itself may urge us to infer His Presence as the adequate cause of such rationality as scientific investigation has revealed to us in nature. If, where reason halts, faith takes its leap into the Beyond —outside the limits of rationality—such a leap is taken at the dictation of reason itself, and in this sense whilst we must describe it as irrational it need not be in the bad sense of that term. It may be that the supreme justification for faith's activity is to be found in instinctive reason which urges us to go beyond itself in the endeavour to discover the hidden country beyond its own confines. Faith's convictions may not be reached along scientific lines, but, none the less, they may be the true key to the interpretation of much which scientific investigation has revealed to us in the way of suggestions of a purpose and end, the presence of an unseen but very potent factor in the processes of nature itself.

Some such conclusion is suggested to us in the summing up of his survey of 'The System of Animate Nature,' by Dr. J. A. Thomson,[1] when he tells us that we cannot reach any religious truth or conviction along scientific lines, but that a careful scientific description of animate nature is not in his opinion inconsistent with a spiritual—*i.e.* a religious or philosophical—interpretation.

'Although some will not agree (he says), we hold it to be historically true that just as there is a science that knows Nature, so there is a religion that knows God; and throughout our studies we have not concealed our conviction that it is unprofitable to pit against one another these two distinct ways of working towards truth. For they are not antithetic but complementary. Perhaps it would be well if the devotees of science were more aware of its limitations, perhaps it would be well if the religious who have the vision of God knew a little more about His works, but what must be sought after by both is a position from which haply there may be seen the unity of Huxley's science and Wordsworth's vision. The results of science must, we think, be taken up as "harmonious elements in a system of

[1] *Gifford Lectures*, 1915–16.

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truth wider than themselves; a system in whose wider light their ultimate significance for life, and for the meaning of life, would become manifest" (Blewett, 1907, p. 52).'[1]

Science then affords no conclusive evidence against belief in immortality; on the contrary a careful study of the great steps in organic evolution and the ascent of man urges us to infer that the whole process must be in some sense purposive and for larger and vaster issues than are suggested by the limitations imposed upon finite spirits in a terrestrial existence.

'The process of evolution from invisible Biococci to Mankind has a magnificence which cannot be exaggerated. It has been a process in which the time required has been of no consideration, in which there has been neither rest nor haste, in which by-paths shew as much finish as the highways, in which broad foundations have been laid so that the superstructure has been secure, in which, in spite of the disappearance of masterpieces, there has been a conservation of big gains. It has had its outcome in personalities who have discerned its magnificent sweep, who are seeking to understand its factors, who are learning some of its lessons, who cannot cease trying to interpret it.'

There will, however, be no interpretation from the intellectual standpoint so conclusive as to leave no room for reasonable doubt. Certainty concerning a future life cannot be given us either by scientific investigation or philosophical inference. The utmost we may expect from these sources is encouragement to belief, and this we think is more clearly forthcoming in the Twentieth century as the result of further advances in knowledge than was the case a generation ago. We reach then this position: (i) science and philosophy, whilst in some ways urging reason to conclude in favour of a future life, fail to give us intellectual certitude and conclusive demonstration; (ii) that ultimately we are driven beyond the limits of the rational, and by faith must grope in the dim regions beyond these limits in our search for the truth we seek; (iii) such a step by faith beyond

[1] J. A. Thomson, *op. cit.* vol. ii p. 650.

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the limits of rationality is itself justified by reason, and in this sense is eminently reasonable. The question then is whether simple faith brings us nearer to the truth than the intellectual quest. Are there other roads open where intellect fails us?

Professor de Unamuno would contend strongly that there are. We agree that the way of faith is such a road, but we see no reason for a repudiation of intellect as the necessary condition of faith's activity. It is more probably true to say, that the real protest should be aimed against a false and exaggerated intellectualism which reaches its conclusions by living in a world of pure abstractions of its own making, and rigidly excluding from its domain a mass of data which our emotional and volitional life affords towards the solution of the problem. We need not, in fact, abandon ourselves to superstition and credulity when we seek to possess a reasoned faith. The truth is that if we exalt the intellectual activity as the sole and only criterion of judgement and rule out other criteria—the aesthetic and the moral—as purely relative and subjective, we are lost in the barren wastes of a false intellectualism. On the other hand, if we bring to bear upon the problem *the resources of our whole personality* in all its manifold activities, in response to the environment in which we find ourselves, we shall in all probability feel ourselves in closer touch with ultimate reality than would be the case if we sought to find it along the road of intellect only. In life itself, rather than in intellectual contemplation of it, the key to its secret is to be found. In a lived experience in which faith is active shall we know the truth in and through experience of it. It is in actual living that we feel by instinct that we shall continue to live. It is the feeling of our own personality that makes it so hard to conceive of ourselves as non-existent. Life, more life and fuller, is what instinct teaches us to crave for, as of the very essence of what we call our 'I.' And this need is learned not so much by intellectual reflection upon life as by the experience of living itself. Life precedes reason, and Unamuno would bid us reverse the order of Descartes' dictum. Not *Cogito ergo sum* but, as he

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says, 'the truth is *sum, ergo cogito*—I am, therefore I think, although not everything that is thinks.'

'Is not consciousness of thinking (he says) above all consciousness of being? Is pure thought possible, without consciousness of self, without personality? Can there exist pure knowledge without feeling, without that species of materiality which feeling lends to it? Do we not perhaps feel thought, and do we not feel ourselves in the act of knowing and willing? Could not the man in the stove have said: "I feel, therefore I am"? or "I will, therefore I am"? And to feel oneself, is it not perhaps to feel oneself imperishable? To will oneself, is it not to wish oneself eternal—that is to say, not to wish to die? What the sorrowful Jew of Amsterdam called the essence of the thing, the effort that it makes to persist indefinitely in its own being, self-love, the longing for immortality, is it not perhaps the primal and fundamental condition of all reflective or human knowledge? And is it not therefore the true base, the real starting-point, of all philosophy, although the philosophers, perverted by intellectualism, may not recognize it?'[1]

If then we are to discover our starting-point for a belief in a future life within experience itself, the longing not to die, the hunger for personal immortality, the effort whereby we tend to persist indefinitely in our own being which Spinoza suggested is our very essence, how much more true it is to say that in our lived experiences in the higher levels of life we shall naturally expect to find fuller and deeper intimations of immortality. In the aesthetic appreciation of the Beautiful, the moral grandeur of the True, and the appeal which the Good makes to the highest in us, with its binding obligation acknowledged by the human conscience—in these deeper levels of human experience we discover the confirmation of that 'urge to fuller life' which life itself teaches us is the reason for our belief in a life to come. But above all the intimations to immortality from such experiences of life in its varied activities, there is the profound sense of GOD reached in religious experience. And this is the deepest and the surest foundation upon which we can build up our faith in Eternal Life. Here we part

[1] Pp. 35–36.

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company with Unamuno. His belief in God, so far as we can gather from the book before us, is the outcome of his belief in his own immortality. Is this true to religious experience? Must we not reverse the order and say that it is belief in God which alone justifies our hope of personal immortality, and in fact which alone gives to such a personal immortality that fulness and richness of ethical and spiritual content which we associate with the idea of Eternal Life as we claim to know it in religious experience?

We must be very careful, in fact, not to draw a false conclusion from our 'hunger for immortality.' The existence of the hunger is no guarantee of its satisfaction. That we may have to starve is an equally legitimate inference. The most we can say about our instinct for a fuller and richer life, and the need for a satisfaction of those depths in human personality which the world fails to fill, is that we have in their presence a revelation of what we are made for, and what we ought to become. In this sense they are a proof that we are greater than we know, and they point us to the beyond, and reveal to us our hidden powers of a higher becoming. They are not, however, a proof that we shall be or must be immortal. The argument from feelings and desires which is sometimes put forward as a justification for a belief in their ultimate necessary satisfaction must be used with caution if it is to be used at all. When then Unamuno in a fine chapter on 'Love, Suffering, Pity and Personality,' builds up his concept of God from our own felt needs, we must protest that the conclusion is by no means legitimate. Consider, for example, the implications of the following passage:—

'When pity, love, reveals to us the whole universe striving to gain, to preserve, and to enlarge its consciousness, striving more and more to saturate itself with consciousness, feeling the pain of the discords which are produced within it, pity reveals to us the likeness of the whole universe with ourselves; it reveals to us that it is human, and it leads us to discover our Father in it, of whose flesh we are flesh; love leads us to personalize the whole of which we form a part. To say that God is eternally producing things is fundamentally the same as saying that things are

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eternally producing God. And the belief in a personal and spiritual God is based on the belief in our own personality and spirituality. Because we feel ourselves to be consciousness, we feel God to be consciousness—that is to say, a person; and because we desire ardently that our consciousness shall live and be independently of the body, we believe that the divine person lives and exists independently of the universe, that his state of consciousness is *ad extra.*

'No doubt logicians will come forward and confront us with the evident rational difficulties which this involves; but we have already stated that, although presented under logical forms, the content of all this is not strictly rational. Every rational conception of God is in itself contradictory. Faith in God is born of love for God—we believe that God exists by force of wishing that He may exist, and it is born also, perhaps, of God's love for us. Reason does not prove to us that God exists, but neither does it prove that He cannot exist.' [1]

Now is this true to religious experience? As a matter of history we know that the content of the world to come has been largely determined by man's conception of God, and the belief in immortality has grown with the development of the religious consciousness. We do not create GOD in order to justify our instinct for immortality. We believe in eternal life because of our experience of God in prayer and communion. If we trace the history of the development of the belief in immortality amongst the Jews, we see at once that it was the experience of God and the joy of communion which justified the belief in the perdurance of the personal life after death. The living relationship between the pious Israelite and his God brought the conviction that a spiritual bond thus established could not be severed by death. The starting-point is never our love for God, but God's love for us. We begin with our discovery of God's Presence, but that discovery is itself only made possible by a prior activity of God Himself in making His Presence known amongst men. The need for God is one thing. It is the creation of God Himself, and due to His own activity in revealing Himself to men. Our need for Him is not the first nor the essential element in the birth

[1] Pp. 149–150.

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of faith in a life eternal. His revelation of Himself to the human soul is the primary factor, and because of the experience of fellowship and communion resulting from this, there arises within us the conviction that death is not the last word, and that because our living relationship to a living and loving God is precious not only to us but to Him, He will not acquiesce in our being blotted out of the Book of Life.

Professor de Unamuno is not unmindful of this aspect of the problem but he does not emphasize it, we venture to think, in the way it should be emphasized in view of its importance as of the very nerve of the deepest religious experience, not least in the Christian consciousness of eternal life in Christ Jesus.

'It is the furious longing to give finality to the Universe,' Unamuno says, 'to make it conscious and personal, that has brought us to believe in God, to wish that God may exist, to create God, in a word. To create Him, yes! This saying ought not to scandalize even the most devout theist. For to believe in God is, in a certain sense, to create Him, although He first creates us. It is He who in us is continually creating Himself.' [1]

Christian experience would quietly answer that far from our having created GOD in order to save the Universe from nothingness, and far from our needing Him in order to save consciousness, on the contrary, we love Him because He first loved us, and the supreme proof of His existence is to be sought if anywhere in His own self-disclosure. It is because in Him we live and move and have our being that we discover Him in human life. He is there before us. His mercies and His grace prevent as well as follow us.

Unamuno is on firmer ground when he tells us in a later chapter that,

'the attributes of the living God, of the Father of Christ, must be deduced from His historical revelation in the Gospel and in the conscience of every Christian believer, and not from metaphysical reasonings which lead only to the Nothing-God of Scotus

[1] P. 154.

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Erigena, to the rational or pantheistic God, to the atheist God—in short, to the de-personalized Divinity.' [1]

Granted that the way of love and suffering, rather than the way of reason, is the one to tread in our search after the living God, it is not true to say that we cannot first know Him in order that afterwards we may love Him; that we must begin by loving Him, longing for Him, hungering after Him, *before* knowing Him. On the contrary the verdict of Catholic experience is that His Presence and activity in our human life precedes and is itself the condition and cause of such striving as we are capable of in our search. He awakens in us the hunger for Himself which He alone can satisfy. Such is the verdict of Christian experience. Hence to believe in God is not to long for His existence, and to act as if He existed. It is to know by discovery that He *is*, and to realize in experience the revelation of Himself which He makes. Such a discovery in such an experience carries with it its own evidence of reality. From it we deduce the content of Eternal Life. In it we find the only really satisfying evidence we can ever have that death is not God's last word for us.

This brings us to another section of our subject, viz. what Professor de Unamuno aptly describes as the Mythology of the Beyond.

IV

When we face the question—What may we expect the other side of death?—it is clear that our answers must to a large extent, and some would say must be wholly, a matter of pure speculation and conjecture. If our life here is lived under the limitations of time and space, it is contended that all attempts at pictorial imagery and representation of the life beyond the grave are inevitably conceived under categories of thought which compel us to express in terms of extension a reality which presumably is not capable of so being expressed. What the conditions of life under supra-terrestrial conditions may be, we can never know this

[1] P. 167.

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side of the grave, and all our efforts to conceive of such a life are fatally infected by our inability to express them in any other terms than those under which we are compelled to think here, viz. in the thought-forms of our finite life. Hence the 'prudent agnostic parsimony,' with which Unamuno charges what he calls 'Protestantism' and which he thinks would bid us embrace the pure and naked faith in an eternal life without trying to represent it to ourselves. We should say that the need for a cautious and reverent agnosticism concerning the secret things of the Lord our God was an article enjoined upon us by Scripture itself, and that men will be well-advised to learn from the silence of revealed truth concerning the conditions of our life hereafter to avoid an over-eager prying curiosity concerning things at present hidden from us, which presumably we could not understand even if they were revealed to us. Least of all dare we venture to be over-dogmatic concerning the conditions of a mode of life which we imagine the blessed dead in paradise, or for that matter, the lost souls in hell, are living. Take again the vexed question of the resurrection-body. Clearly here dogmatism from whatever source—be it from over-confident rationalism or over-credulous superstition—is above all things else to be avoided. Until we know for certain whether the 'future life' is to be lived *in* space or independently of it, it is, to say the least of it, hazardous to define with any precision the nature and constitution, the properties and characteristics, of the 'glorious body' with which we believe that we shall be 'clothed upon.' Professor de Unamuno, however, has little patience with this attitude of reverent caution for which we are contending.

'Yes,' he says, 'the prudent, the rational, and, some will say, the pious, attitude, is not to seek to penetrate into mysteries that are hidden from our knowledge, not to insist upon shaping a plastic representation of eternal glory, such as that of the *Divina Commedia*. True faith, true Christian piety, we shall be told, consists in resting upon the confidence that God, by the grace of Christ, will, in some way or another, make us live in Him, in His Son; that, as our destiny is in His almighty hands,

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we should surrender ourselves to Him, in the full assurance that He will do with us what is best for the ultimate end of life, of spirit and of the universe. Such is the teaching that has traversed many centuries, and was notably prominent in the period between Luther and Kant.' [1]

And on the whole, we should add, with beneficial results. For what is the alternative? We are inundated to-day with books of various kinds in which the writers seek to reveal to us in minute detail the whole topography of the Beyond. And the more carefully we examine such pictures the more convinced we are that the writers are simply endeavouring to represent the future life in terms of the present, and to transfer to the Unknown Country the characteristic features of our mundane existence here.

True, as Unamuno reminds us, we cannot rule out speculation nor forbid men to attempt to imagine to themselves what eternal life may be, but at least we may warn them of the pitfalls into which they must inevitably stumble, and the dangers to which a crudely materialistic representation of the life after death is exposed. If eternal life is a prolongation of our present temporal life, and endlessness of days is to be offered to us as a substitute for spiritual richness and intensity of life in GOD, the finest spirits here will shrink from the prospect and prefer annihilation to the 'heaven' of the spiritists' 'revelation.' It may be true, as Unamuno says, that,

'to this same necessity, the real necessity of forming to ourselves a concrete representation of what this other life may be, must in great part be referred the indestructible vitality of doctrines such as those of spiritualism, metempsychosis, the transmigration of souls from star to star, and the like; doctrines which, as often as they are pronounced to be defeated and dead, are found to have come to life again, clothed in some more or less new form. And it is merely supine to be content to ignore them and not to seek to discover their permanent and living essence. Man will never willingly abandon his attempt to form a concrete representation of the other life.' [2]

[1] P. 223. [2] P. 223.

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All this, we repeat, may be true, but the remedy is not to encourage such speculations, but to seek to point out their inevitable limitations and purely conjectural character, whilst at the same time drawing attention to the essential elements in the problem, if we are ever to know here the real content of the Hereafter.

Are there, then, any guiding lines of thought suggested in religious experience which enable us in some sense to know, however imperfectly, here, the kind of life we are destined to live the other side of the grave? We think that there are, and that we are not left wholly in the dark in our search. All that is needed is a clearer apprehension of the true direction in which we must look if we are to appreciate to any extent the real nature of eternal life. We must seek it in the realm not of material well-being, not in the endless prolongation of life as such, but in the sphere of ethical and spiritual values. Life in heaven or life in hell must be interpreted in terms of a living relationship of the human soul with God. Our Eternal Life is bound up with Him, and whilst endless life without Him is conceivable, yet it can only be 'eternal death.'

Scientific investigation and philosophical speculation, as we have seen, leave the problem open. We have no conclusive evidence that we shall not survive bodily death. On the contrary, although the prediction of the late F. W. H. Myers, to the effect that this Twentieth century would witness a belief on the part of all reasonable men in the Resurrection of Christ as the result of the 'new evidence' furnished by experimental psychology and the investigation of psychic phenomena, has not been fulfilled, yet we can say that the negative attitude of Tyndall and Huxley has in our own time yielded to a growing appreciation of the 'survival value' of the spiritual over the material. Therefore a belief in our survival after bodily death is at least a reasonable hypothesis, though lacking conclusive demonstration.

Granted then, for the sake of argument, that death is the gate of life; that physical death is not nature's last word; that rather life is the law of nature and death a natural

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means to more life; that we die in order to live; the question still remains—What are the conditions for a *continued* life after death? What, in other words, are the essentials for *eternal* life?

It by no means follows, because we are great enough in the scale of being to survive the shock of physical death and to persist through so great a change, that therefore we shall live for ever. What of the butterfly which survives the grub and chrysalis stages? Does it therefore live for ever? Must we say that eternal life is ours by right, inherent in our very constitution? Is the gift of life inalienable? Because we live must we therefore continue to live through all change; on beyond the great sundering of mind and body; through change and more change in a never-ending existence after death?

Clearly we are driven to face the question: What exactly is the content of eternal life, and to what extent is it bound up inevitably with GOD and our relationship to Him?

Many will recall in this connexion Professor Drummond's treatment of the problem in his 'Natural Law in the Spiritual World.' What precisely is Death, and what are the conditions of Life? Professor Drummond took Herbert Spencer's definition:—'Perfect correspondence would be perfect life. Were there no changes in the environment but such as the organism had adapted changes to meet, and were it never to fail in the efficiency with which it met them, there would be eternal existence and eternal knowledge.'

Life then is 'the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations,' and death must be a failure, partial or complete, of adjustment to environment.

If this be true of physical life, it is surely suggestive of the conditions of life in the supra-terrestrial world. As Professor Drummond points out, the higher in the scale of being we go, the more the need for wider correspondence. Thus the tree lives in its correspondence with a very narrow environment, the soil about its stem, the sunlight and the air in contact with its leaves. But, by this very condition, there are whole worlds for ever shut out from it, and to

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which it is 'dead.' The animal world has a wider range and has access therefore to higher worlds. But a hundred things beyond the range of tree, insect, and animal are studied by man. The tree in correspondence with a narrow area of environment is to that extent alive; to all beyond, to the all but infinite area beyond, it is dead. Wider still is the range of insect and bird, but theirs is a relatively small world compared to ours. The inevitable question arises:—What is man's true environment, and is he in perfect correspondence with every part of it? If so, and if he has the power of continuance in correspondence, he has the power of endless life. Now, there is in man the spirit open to the influence of the spiritual world. By virtue of his creation as a child of God, he has access to a spiritual environment, and his growth and development as a spiritual being is conditioned by his correspondence or failure in correspondence to this environment.

Thus the extent and depth of his communion with the Highest is the extent of the abundance of true life which he may possess. Thus we are driven back to the Biblical conception of Eternal Life which is through and through ethical and spiritual, not material. Life in GOD: communion with GOD: a vital correspondence between the spirit of man and the Father of spirits: these are the essential conditions of Eternal Life which is Life indeed.

Death in the physical and in the spiritual world must be irresponsiveness to environment: a failure in the 'continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations.' So Professor Drummond presses the analogy of natural law in the spiritual world and suggests the possibility of *spiritual death.*

We have ample warrant in the Bible for such a conception. Spiritual death may be begun here and be partial, with the possibility at long last of finality.

'To be carnally minded is death,' 'the wages of sin is death.' 'Dead in trespasses and sins.' All through, the emphasis in Holy Writ rests not upon the concept of physical death, which is but a stage in a process, a necessary incident in a developing life: the stress lies upon the ethical

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and spiritual reality of which physical death and physical life are but symbols and suggestions. The death unto sin and the new birth unto righteousness, these are the vital realities—the all-important spiritual phenomena, about which we must be concerned in the problem of man's eternal welfare.

Thus the all-important question is the *quality* of life: its durability is a qualitative not a quantitative question. The life which can survive the death of the body and be powerful enough to remain alive and exempt from the death of the soul—the spiritual life which is deathless, this side and the other side of the grave—must be a life which is in perfect adjustment to its true environment, GOD and the supernatural. The perfect life over which death has no power has been revealed and is known to us in the life of Him who said 'I am the Resurrection and the Life: he that believeth in Me, though he were dead, yet shall he live, and whosoever liveth and believeth in Me shall never die.' Eternal life is thus seen to consist in a relationship—ethical and spiritual—between man and his Maker; communion with God is the essential condition of its health and its continuance.

What then may we expect the other side of Death? Obviously there are two possible states:—Spiritual Life and Spiritual Death: Heaven and Hell. Between these two extremes there may be all kinds of intermediate states, partial life and partial death, just as here there are many stages between perfect health and physical death: there are diseases from which we recover, and diseases to which we finally succumb, after long illness. Here also there are diseases of the soul: lives now being lived in the flesh and not in the spirit—lives therefore gradually falling out of correspondence with GOD. To the extent to which the highest in us is in communion with its true environment, to that extent we have Life indeed, and our failure to live in vital communion with God is our spiritual death.

Now we have seen that the tree can be alive and yet at the same time dead to all the higher levels of life. This suggests the conception of the true nature of Hell. We

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may and probably shall survive bodily death, but this may mean simply our introduction to an existence which, real so far as it goes, is yet (judged by the higher levels to which the spirit of man was meant to attain), because of its failure to reach these levels—a life without God, *i.e.* Hell. It means a life from which God has gradually faded out, a life therefore which is arrested in its true growth and which has sunk to a lower level. It is the narrow stunted life of the tree, natural for the tree but unnatural for a being capable of a wider range of life than the tree can ever enjoy.

Much of our failure to conceive of the conditions of such a life arises from our lack of imagination. Yet there is sufficient in Scripture to enable us to gauge more or less accurately what such a life can be and will be. We are, for example, assured over and over again that the life centred upon earthly things and refusing the higher is a life of vanity, emptiness. That the things of sense are perishable: that earthly treasures are liable to decay: open to the ravages of time like the moth-eaten garment or the rusty material. Over all the pleasures of the world—the lust of the eye: the lust of the palate—there is written the word 'Vanity.'

Conceive then a life which still desires these things, and yet has come at long last to a knowledge of their emptiness, think of being compelled to pursue the things of sense, and being forced none the less to discover that they can yield no contentment. Hell would be spiritual loss, the missing of reality and a compulsory sojourn in a self-chosen world of unreality.

It would be difficult to find a book which drives this ominous lesson home more forcibly than one published first in 1884 and which since then has run into we do not know how many editions. Its English title is 'Letters from Hell' and the author has given us a vivid and dramatic picture of the life of unreality in all its hideous suggestiveness. We are shewn the power of the natural man by rejecting God to make for himself a world in which he himself is the reality—a world of outer darkness where there is no deliverance

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from self. Passage after passage drives this awful lesson home. Let us quote :—

'I begin to understand the moving-springs of hell. It is insatiate desire on the one hand and remorse on the other. I had almost said sorrow ; but that is too sweet a grace, admitting of sorrow for sin, for opportunity wasted, and that is unknown here ; it is a dull flinty grief, a mere wailing for pain. The punishment of hell is twofold, but after all it is the self-same retribution. Some are driven continuously to brood over the same evil passions they indulged in on earth, satisfaction alone being absent ; or with horror and loathing are obliged again and again to commit in the spirit the self-same crimes that polluted their days in the flesh. The miser forever is dreaming of riches, the voluptuary of uncleanness, the glutton of feasting, the murderer of his bloody deed. Others, on the contrary, are pursuing the very things they neglected on earth ; they know it is hopeless, but pursue them they must. Thus men of unjust dealing are anxiously trying to right the wrong, the unmerciful to do deeds of charity, the unnatural parent to live for her children, the suicide to prolong his days. . . .

'This then is the law of hell: we are not tormented—we torment ourselves. Yet remember that in dying everything depends on whether we lived in the faith of the Son of God, who gave His life that men might be saved. Our sins have that dread importance in as far as they testify that we did not believe. Do you marvel that I speak of God ? Ah me, He is still our God ! And we know that there is a Son of God who came into the world to save sinners, who loved them unto death, even the death of the Cross. But we know nothing of the way of salvation ; everything is forgotten—the very name of the Saviour. We consume ourselves in terrible efforts to remember, were it but the faintest remnant of saving knowledge, but alas it is vain—not even His name ! Could we remember that name, call it back to our hearts, I doubt not—I doubt not—even we might be saved. But it is gone—it is too late ! too late !

'It is incredible how much I have forgotten ; indeed, I might say, I have forgotten everything except myself. Yes, that is it. I have not forgotten self ; on the contrary, whatever of the past concerns my person and my life has followed me hither with a minuteness of detail as strange as it is painful. But the clothes of self, as it were—the things I once possessed by knowledge, by intellectual acquirement,—they have vanished together with the gifts of mammon and the vanities of the flesh.

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You will not be surprised then that the feeling of nakedness is so terribly present with me.

'I have brought nothing hither but myself. And what comprises this self but a burning remorse which can never be stilled; a greed of desire which can never be satisfied; an unquenchable longing for things left behind; innumerable recollections of sins great and small, causing insufferable anguish, all being equally bitter, equally fraught with vainest regret! This is the picture of myself, O God,—of myself in hell.'

The significance of such a descriptive passage will not be missed. The gradual fading out of the life of God so that in the end it becomes impossible even to remember His very Name. There is a pathetic description in one of the letters of the man's effort to recall the Lord's Prayer when he never succeeds in getting beyond the first two words, 'Our Father'—the rest he has entirely forgotten. Note again the power of the dwellers in Hell to possess anything for the asking.

'You must know' (he tells us) 'that each wretched being here is moved by an irresistible impulse to imitate his life on earth, to continue what in sinful folly he worked in that life. And, strange to say, as I have already hinted, we can all obtain here what we like; one need but think of anything and there it is. Passion and wrongful desires rule here as they do in the world, only the more horrible, being void of substance. In the world they are clothed—clothed in a semblance of beauty even; lawless and pernicious though they are, they at least own the garment of nature. But here they are mere skeletons, unclothed of the flesh, an insult to nature, continuing in the evil bent of former habit, yet incapable of aught but shewing their miserable nakedness. For the imaginings of hell are hollow and empty, void of truth and reality, bereft of all means of satisfaction. And yet the very punishment of hell consists in this, that we are driven to conform to this maddening unreality, this death-breathing nothingness. No matter how deeply conscious we are of the vanity of our doings—no matter how we loathe them—they have come to be our masters; we are driven, helplessly driven, to be for ever trying to be what we were on earth.'

Now the suggestions contained in these passages are in profound accord with the untiring Biblical warnings as to the essential unreality of the things of sense in comparison with the things of the spirit: we can never say that

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we were not warned of the relative value of the material and spiritual: of the need to lay up for ourselves treasures in Heaven where neither rust nor moth doth corrupt, and where thieves do not break through nor steal. If then, in spite of this, we still persist in centring our thoughts and affections on things below, not on things above, we shall reap our just reward: we shall have all we have asked for; all we have striven after: no desire of the flesh will be denied us but with it will be also the full realization of its essential worthlessness. We shall know fully the significance of the lesson we refused to learn, *viz.* that for a being endowed with the potentiality for GOD—a life without GOD is the great loss for which nothing else can compensate. We may gain the whole world if we wish, but in doing so we shall lose our own souls. The possession of all the world can give will be ours, but with the knowledge that over it all must be written the one word 'Vanity'—Emptiness viewed from the standpoint of the spirit of man made in the image of God. To us is given the fearful responsibility of choice—the choice between conscious acceptance of the highest or conscious acquiescence in the lower. We are great enough to choose our own damnation: strong enough to take a leap out of the Hand of Eternal Love into the abyss of Self and all it entails: isolation—self-centred egoism, and the drying-up of the springs of affection: the atrophy of the spiritual instincts: the inevitable cessation of the hunger of the soul. Having rejected God we shall in time cease to feel the need for Him. His world fades from us. We become dead to it, though fully alive in a lower level of life. We may define Hell as a Natural Life lived in a Supernatural Environment. Heaven will be a Supernatural Life lived in Supernatural surroundings. Hell must be spiritual numbness, and in Hell they must build many altars to an Unknown God. Hence the profound significance of the Biblical teaching:—

'The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness unto him; neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned.'[1]

[1] St. John, iii 5.

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Hence also the vital need for the spiritual birth and the spiritual growth as a condition of entrance into and continuance in the Kingdom of God.

'Except a man be born anew, he cannot see the Kingdom of God.' 'Except a man be born of water and the Spirit, he cannot enter into the Kingdom of God.' 'As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself, except it abide in the vine; so neither can ye, except ye abide in Me. . . . He that abideth in Me, and I in him, the same beareth much fruit: for apart from Me ye can do nothing. If a man abide not in Me, he is cast forth as a branch, and is withered; and they gather them and cast them into the fire, and they are burned.'[1]

It thus becomes increasingly clear that Eternal Life and the 'New Birth' are intimately connected. Through the regeneration of the natural man, we enter into a new world, a life on a higher level, governed and shaped by a spiritual principle, a creative activity of the Holy Spirit for a definite purpose that Christ may be formed in us. We are taken possession of by the Christ-Life. Left to ourselves the utmost that can result is a growth from the natural to the natural. It would seem that the climax of the natural is the moral. Beyond that Nature cannot raise us. If we are to attain to the spiritual we must be born anew. 'That which is born of the flesh is flesh: that which is born of the spirit is spirit.' Thus the religious life transcends the moral, and this because it takes its rise from a Life-Principle descending upon us from above. Is this to draw a rigid distinction between morality and religion? In a sense, 'Yes.' 'Spirituality,' it has been said, 'is morally beautiful —but the morally beautiful need not be spiritual.' Moral beauty is the product of the natural man: spiritual beauty of the spiritual man. The spiritual life is not the result of any spontaneous generation from the natural. This whole line of thought again is well worked out by Professor Drummond in the book to which we have previously referred. There is in the human a capacity for the Divine, but no natural law by which all that is human must

[1] St. John, xv 4–6.

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necessarily and automatically arrive in due course to God-likeness. We may miss our Divine destiny and fail of God's purpose towards us. It is too lightly assumed that the Fatherhood of God necessitates the Divine sonship of men. In the sphere of the spiritual, kinship is not a matter of physical parentage but conditional upon the active participation in the Divine Life and the maintenance of moral and spiritual relationship. It is within the power of the sons of men to repudiate the Father in Heaven. Sonship may be rejected. 'As many as received Him, to them gave He power to become the Sons of God.' Our Eternal Life—the very essence of which is fellowship with GOD—is something to be achieved, a task awaiting us; and in the gaining of the prize of so high a calling we must bend all our energies, be prepared in absolute obedience to be conformed, to be converted, to be fashioned anew, to yield ourselves to His control, to bring every thought, every desire, every natural gift and disposition to the obedience of Christ. The Kingship of Jesus over those who are being saved must be absolute. Not by any natural evolutionary process, not by education, culture, intellectual or aesthetic, are we to achieve for ourselves an entrance into the Kingdom of the Spirit. Self-determination, the will to live, the will to achieve, are not in place. Nicodemus with all his natural gifts and graces, with all his intellectual qualifications as a religious teacher, with all his social status and moral refinement, must, nevertheless, be born anew, and is bidden not to marvel at the necessity since the 'New Birth' is from above, not a natural evolution from beneath. It does not spring from the earth but descends upon men—this Kingdom of GOD—this life on a higher level—this fellowship with GOD in Christ—it is a Divine operation through and through. It is a Birth not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of GOD. It is an Experience, and those who possess it are worlds apart from the outside critics of the religious life.

It is, in short, experience of Eternal Life in time and space. It is, moreover, the ground of our belief in its continuance beyond the grave, and our justification for asserting that here and now we do know to a limited extent,

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and in some slight measure, what is the content of that Eternal Life in GOD which we look forward to as the consummation of our being.

Endless life without God is conceivable. Eternal Life in God is a fuller, richer, deeper reality, and religious experience has no hesitation in fixing upon this as the true meaning and value of immortality for the finite soul. This much at least we can claim to know from Scripture teaching and Divine Revelation. We are not then abandoning ourselves to hopeless speculation when we affirm that our conception of the Life to come is based upon solid grounds in a living experience here of Eternal Life, and we are right to argue from the known to the unknown, from the imperfect to the perfect. Heaven may transcend all our finite efforts to picture it. But we shall not be hopelessly astray when we insist here on interpreting it in terms of the highest ethical and spiritual values we know. It may transcend these values. It certainly will not fall below them.

So we insist upon the religious value of the Christian doctrine of Eternal Life and maintain that in this is to be found a sure guide in the search after the content of life in the world to come.

Even if spiritism were to produce conclusive evidence of our survival of bodily death, it would bring with it no religious consolation. Would a life without God be in itself in the least desirable if prolonged indefinitely? The very tedium of it would appal us in time and make us long for extinction. If our hunger for immortality is not at bottom a hunger for God, we were better without it. The needs of the human spirit are such as to demand for their satisfaction nothing less than GOD Himself. Christianity is true to the needs of human life when it offers to us Life in GOD as the content of Eternal Life, which we can accept or reject as we will. Spiritism if it leaves out God condemns itself as an inadequate substitute.

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We reach then this position, that if we are ever to gain any indication this side of the grave as to the kind of life we

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may expect the other side of death, we must concentrate our whole attention upon the ethical and spiritual implications of the life we are now living. Much of our speculation, we admit, is necessarily mythological, but we have given reasons for suggesting that there are certain factors in human character and certain attitudes of mind and heart in relation to the Divine which are sure guides in helping us to form some conception here of what Eternal Life must be. We have seen, moreover, that our conclusions are based upon Scriptural teaching and have in fact the warrant of Christ's own words. Nothing is more striking in this connexion than His whole attitude towards the current Eschatology of His time. He breathed into it His own Spirit, and in His hands it underwent a complete transformation. He purged it of a crude materialism, and He left us with a 'transmuted eschatology,' spiritual and ethical through and through.

With this in mind, let us now face the crucial problem of Personal Immortality.

If Eternal Life for us is Life in GOD and its essence consists in a lived relationship between us as finite created spirits and Him as the Father of spirits, it is clear that our future can be no absorption into the Infinite.

We must in this connexion take creation seriously with all that it involves. It means for the Christian his belief that God's self-limitation has made possible our existence as beings with a derived but none the less comparatively independent and permanent life over against His, so that our experience is not His. He can, by sympathy, enter into our experience and in this sense share it. We are precluded from regarding Him as an All-inclusive Spirit who lives in us, and experiences through us. The Christian Personal God is no Stoic *Anima Mundi* in any pantheistic sense. Far from this being the case the act of creation has given us a measure of apartness from Him. This means that ultimately GOD is not ourselves: we are not temporary or even permanent phases of the Divine Being. We are real in some sense in our own right as the result of His self-limitation, and therefore we can say that GOD is

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not all that is real. The total Reality is GOD *plus* the totality of created life from the amoeba upwards. He has willed that in finite spirits there shall exist realities who are not Himself nor mere aspects of His life. Thus, and thus alone, can there exist between Him and us relationships and a basis for communion and intercourse such as we dare to believe is the design of a God of Love in our creation.

Such communion, moreover, is the end and achievement of our true being. For it we were made, in it we truly live, and with its continuance in ever-increasing richness is bound up our enjoyment of life indeed. Such communion will derive its content from what He is and what we are capable of becoming. The love of such a God will not rest content with a response from us less than the highest, and His tireless activity is, we believe, being directed to no less an end than the creating and fashioning anew of us, His finite creatures, into true sonship. We are to become the sons of God. The content, then, of Eternal Life, begun here and continued hereafter, is a growing assimilation to an Ideal, revealed in Him. Likeness by sharing His Life is our End.

If, as we believe, the Life of GOD is a Life of Holy Love, it must ever be giving, ever communicating, ever reproducing. His purpose is to make us like Himself, and His whole activity in a sinful world is soteriological, and bent upon redemptive purposes. The method and scope of our Redemption are seen in the Life and Work of Christ whereby are made possible a regeneration and a re-creation of sinful men after His likeness.

Our eternal life in Him, then, can be nothing other than His in its essential content. It must be therefore a life of intense activity in self-donation for ethical and spiritual ends.

Such a life, of necessity, means that the Hereafter is a society—a brotherhood, a community. It is, then, for the individual no state of static bliss; no sublime self-satisfaction or hedonistic self-gratification, but a life of service to God and man. It is to be personal through and through, and at the same time social. Our relationship to Him in

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communion and prayer is not to mean our isolation from human companionship and human relationship. In Him we are to be united one to another. Heaven is to be a Perfect Society. Our true happiness and blessedness will consist in the happiness and blessedness of us all. We shall not lack the opportunity of losing our life to find it at a higher level.

We must banish finally from our thought of GOD what has well been described as[1] 'the translation into metaphysic of the spirit of the world, of the axiom that the supreme privilege of greatness is self-centred bliss, exemption from service, burden-bearing and sacrifice'—a conception which misses the Divine secret of God, what, to the Christian mind, is the 'topmost ineffablest crown' of His Glory—self-sacrificing Love. A Christian Philosophy is truest to human experience when it bids men find greatness in self-surrender, lordship in being the servant of all and the saviour of all, and points them for the discovery of the open secret of the universe and the heart of Reality, 'to see the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of a crucified Jesus.'

Eternal Life in the light of the foregoing considerations becomes for us not an idea but a fact of experience. Its content is not a matter for speculation but a life which can be to some extent tasted and tested here in time and space. We reach it not by projecting into the far future an imaginary existence after death but by an inward experience before death. Were Heaven a mere idea in our own minds or the result of an exercise of the imagination, it is obvious that our belief in it could be shaken by the first proof that life out of the body cannot be life in any sense as we know it in time and space. Its content must be utterly different, and no mental picture we try to form of it can correspond in any conceivable sense to the Reality. Translate it, however, into terms of life, ethical and spiritual in relationship to God and men, and it becomes obvious that the life that is

[1] Robert Law, *The Tests of Life*, 3rd ed. p. 103. (A truly valuable contribution to the Christian teaching concerning Eternal Life.)

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to be is not so utterly unlike the life we know as to render the future for us in kind different from what it is. The difference is one of degree only. We experience here imperfectly a communion of soul with soul, soul with God, such as is to be enjoyed in ever-increasing fulness and richness in a Blessed Hereafter.

If we still persist in thinking of Heaven as a place, then the question must be faced :—

'Where is this heaven that you talk about? Is it about your head? is it beneath your feet? Do you seriously think that if you were to go millions of miles in any quarter of the compass you would find it? Is it anywhere in all space? and if not, *what* is its *where*? Is there another world besides the whole world?

'. . . The world to come disappears in a moment like a phantom; the reign of the apparition is over, and a dream is dispelled: it is the unbelieving counterpart of conversion; a man awakens in conversion to the reality of the invisible world; here he awakens to its nonentity.'[1]

It is true that metaphysics can never give us the certainty we desire, nor can Christianity itself demonstrate beyond the possibility of doubt the existence of a life after death.

'It summons man to wait and gird himself to a long trial, before the final experiment; to a lifelong repose in an expectation; to an argument which never concludes; and to an act of interpretation which never stops. But is the interpretation a blind guess in consequence?'

We should say that experience of ethical and spiritual Reality as we know it here bids us trust in the survival value of Values as the deepest and the purest things we know in personal lives. If their End is to perish, we know nothing which better deserves to live.

'When anything beautiful in human character takes its departure from the world, what is the first ejaculation of the human heart but one for its immortality? Can it perish—the priceless treasure of this personal life? The survivor says No: such being must go on being.'[2]

[1] Mozley, *University Sermons*, 'Eternal Life,' p. 57.
[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 80–81.

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Instinct shares with experience the faith that values are ultimate reality—*i.e.* GOD Himself; and where they are found inhering in any personal finite life, they link that life to the Eternal and Abiding.

In pleading thus for the meaning and value of finite individuality and its infinite worth in relationship to God, we do so in the teeth of certain tendencies in ancient and modern philosophical thought which go far to depersonalize the ultimately Real in seeking to define GOD in terms of the Absolute and Immortality in terms of the racial soul. Christianity, however, holds fast to Christ's own teaching and life in relationship to human souls. We do not fall into the crass individualism which seeks to define God as a Spirit amongst spirits, or to regard the finite real as a windowless monad, impervious to all outside itself. We define GOD not as a Whole made up of parts, but the Ground of finite spirits and their living Unity. The human soul has no absolute independent existence, but it certainly has such a measure of independence as to conserve its value in the sight of its Maker, and secure for it the possibility of a permanent relationship to Himself.

The problem for the Christian is not to define the part in relation to the Whole, or the relative in reference to the Absolute. The question is lifted into the realm of personality, and the problem dealt with as a relationship between God and Man, here and hereafter.

Our belief in personal Immortality stands or falls with our belief in the Divine Love, and our conviction that in religious experience we are in living, vital communion with One who is not less than the highest we know, *viz.* personal.

A characteristic feature of the treatment of Immortality throughout the whole of Professor de Unamuno's book is this insistence upon personal immortality. Anything short of it, he regards with supreme contempt.

'All this talk of a man surviving in his children, or in his works, or in the universal consciousness, is but vague verbiage which satisfies only those who suffer from affective stupidity, and who, for the rest, may be persons of a certain cerebral distinction. For it is possible to possess great talent, or what we

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call great talent, and yet to be stupid as regards the feelings and even morally imbecile.' [1]

Our author is well aware of the charge of egoism which can be levelled against this insistence upon *personal* survival, yet he glories in the thought. The idea of the survival value of values apart from us to whom they are values, is abhorrent to him.

'And they come seeking to deceive us with a deceit of deceits, telling us that nothing is lost, that everything is transformed, shifts and changes, that not the least particle of matter is annihilated, not the least impulse of energy is lost, and there are some who pretend to console us with this! Futile consolation! It is not my matter or my energy that is the cause of my disquiet, for they are not mine if I myself am not mine—that is, if I am not eternal. No, my longing is not to be submerged in the vast All, in an infinite and eternal Matter or Energy, or in God; not to be possessed by God, but to possess Him, to become myself God, yet without ceasing to be I myself, I who am now speaking to you. Tricks of monism avail us nothing; we crave the substance and not the shadow of immortality.' [2]

This is strongly and vividly put, but it gives us an insight into the issues at stake.

Is the future life to be so utterly different from anything we know as to make it a matter of supreme indifference whether *we* survive as such, or continue lost in some larger and vaster life? Bound up with this question is the whole issue as regards the problem of the Resurrection Body.

Listen to Unamuno, the man of flesh and blood, on the question:

'Materialism, you say? Materialism? Without doubt; but either our spirit is likewise some kind of matter or it is nothing. I dread the idea of having to tear myself away from my flesh; I dread still more the idea of having to tear myself away from everything sensible and material, from all substance. Yes, perhaps this merits the name of materialism; and if I grapple myself to God with all my powers and all my senses, it is that He may carry me in His arms beyond death, looking into these eyes of mine with the light of His heaven, when the light

[1] P. 16 [2] Pp. 46 7.

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of earth is dimming in them for ever. Self-illusion? Talk not to me of illusion—let me live!'[1]

Contrast a passage like this with Plato's *Phaedo*. Recall to mind the last hours of Socrates. Think of his cold-blooded indifference in parting from his wife and child. Clearly for him the world to which he is going is so utterly unlike the one he is leaving that human ties and mundane pursuits can find no counterpart there.

The man of flesh and blood is to put off the body, and with it all sensation, all we associate with life *in the flesh*. The immortality of the soul is the one and only concept before the Greek Socrates. The modern Spanish author whom we are considering makes us feel that there is something eternal possibly in flesh and blood. Life for him is so intimately bound up with the senses, that a *disembodied* existence feels by contrast cold and repellent. Is it the warmth of the Southern clime that speaks to us here in the language of Spain, and the hot African blood which bids men *feel* life in this way? Is it, in other words, a question, merely, of temperament? Be that as it may, there is no doubt but that in the history of speculation on this problem there is traceable a clear divergence between the belief in the 'immortality of the soul' and the belief in the 'Resurrection of the Body.' The two phrases stand for two concepts having little in common and sharply antithetical.

To which belief is the Christian committed?

The publication of Dr. Darragh's work on 'The Resurrection of the Flesh' is opportune in that we have what we are told is perhaps the fullest study yet published of this important subject and an attempt made to give the whole of the evidence. The author claims to have brought together for the first time a complete review of Christian methods of explaining the doctrine to contemporary Christians during eighteen hundred years, and the result of such an examination of the evidence proves in his opinion that the Church teaching on the subject has been clearly spiritual and opposed to any crudely materialistic interpretation of the resurrection of the flesh. Dr. Darragh dwells

[1] P. 47.

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at length upon the dangers of a false materialism and a false spiritualism, and claims that 'identity between the present and the future body is the essential feature of the doctrine, and vital to its moral force.' How such identity is maintained, from the moment of conception through all the vicissitudes of life until death, is itself a mystery, but no one doubts the fact. This vital identity does not arise from identity of physical elements. We are bidden to seek for such light as is available in our endeavours to penetrate to the heart of the mystery by studying the Resurrection Body of Jesus Christ and His Sacramental Presence in the Eucharist.

'No one, not even the simplest,' says Dr. Darragh, 'can entertain physical ideas about the future resurrection of the dead, nor of the Resurrection of our Lord to which men's future resurrection is to conform, who is accustomed to approach the Altar in awe and reverence and love to feed on the Risen Body of His Lord, actually and really present there for him to receive.'

So we have the appeal from one mystery to another—the mystery of the Sacramental Presence of the Risen Body illuminates the mystery of the resurrection when He 'shall fashion anew the body of our humiliation that it may be conformed to the body of His glory.'

We do not propose to enter into the merits of this particular question. We gladly welcome the publication of such a work as Dr. Darragh has given us, revealing as it does much research and painstaking effort in the collection of evidence for the defence and illumination of one article of the Christian Creed. In view of the statement of Augustine that 'No article of the Christian faith has met with such vehement, persistent and contentious opposition as the resurrection of the flesh,' we must expect that in our own day controversy will centre around it and the old battles be renewed. What we want to do is to grasp the real issues at stake, and a reading of Dr. Darragh's work will enable us to see clearly the difference between a belief in the survival of the soul after death and the Christian teaching concerning the resurrection of the whole man. The Resurrection of the Flesh means the resurrection of the complete humanity; 'flesh' in Scriptural usage meaning

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human nature, humanity in its completeness, including the soul as well as the body.

The whole point of the Christian teaching is that Eternal Life for the believer results from a New Birth and issues finally in a redemption of the whole man in Christ Jesus. It is not a question of the immortality of the natural life or of the survival of any one part of it, but a resurrection of the whole man and a redemption and transfiguration of the whole personality issuing in a *blessed* immortality which is Eternal Life in the sense in which we have defined it as a life begun here and to be lived in ever increasing fulness and richness of experience of God and of our fellow Christians in Christ Jesus, the Head of the Body.

So Dr. Darragh points out that

'the immortality of the soul is not once put forward by itself in the Bible. The reason for this is very simple and very obvious. God had provided some better thing for us. Not a ghost survival, but a reconstitution of the complete being, was what He had in store for us, to be made known in due time. He made it known by giving us an example of it in the Resurrection of His Son Jesus Christ.'

Bound up with this belief is the whole doctrine of the Incarnation and God's redemptive purpose for men. A denial of it paves the way for some form of Manichaeism, for a revival of the old pagan dualism and the doctrine of the intrinsic evilness of matter.

So the doctrine of the Creed, Dr. Darragh tells us,[1] involves two great issues:

(1) the identity that subsists between the risen body and the body of this life, between the spiritual body and the natural body; and (2) the vast change that passes over the natural body in the process or act of becoming the spiritual body.

'The tendency in the West has been' (he says) 'to emphasize the first, at times to the slurring over of the second. The East spoke more readily in terms of change. Either, if challenged, would unhesitatingly have confessed both the identity and the change. Whether the stress laid on the identity by Western

[1] *Op. cit.* pp. 68–9.

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preachers and theologians was the cause or the result of Manichaean opposition may be debated. The present writer has gained the impression that Christian writers and speakers of the West were driven to lay stress on the identity of the risen with the earthly body by the strong undercurrent in the popular mind of Manichaean prejudice against the resurrection of the body, and particularly by the readiness of some (after the example of the Paulicians, and not of them only) to recite the Creed and use its phrases in an esoteric sense of their own, whilst rejecting the natural and historic meaning of the words.'

Granted then that in the history of doctrine it is possible to find theologians who have interpreted the clause of the Creed in a grossly materialistic sense, and that the Scriptural teaching does not commit us to any such crude conception, but that rather the Church's teaching has been in the direction of a spiritual interpretation, the real question is not so much how we are to interpret this particular clause but do we believe in the resurrection of the body at all?

Clearly a belief in the immortality of the soul only is not the Church's teaching. The doctrine of the resurrection of the whole man involves an attitude towards the things of the flesh and the bodily life which is essentially derived from the teaching of the Incarnation with its hallowing of matter and its benediction upon all that pertains to our bodily life.

'A heavy toll awaits any forgetfulness of God's truth. God by raising His Incarnate Son not in spirit only but in Body also, in complete Humanity, has made known the glorious future for which the human body is destined. Alas for the man who profanes his body or the bodies of others! Unless he repents in dust and ashes, it were better for that man if he had never been born.'[1]

The Christian conception of Eternal Life then is bound up with the belief in the whole circle of Christian doctrine concerning the Person and Work of Christ, His Incarnation and His Sacrificial Death, His Victory through the Cross and triumphant Resurrection, the consequent Gift of New Life to men through the Holy Spirit, His transforming power

[1] Pp. 263–4.

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and Redemptive work in human life, and the belief that in Him men are being changed from glory into glory. The Christian Resurrection is no mere survival of bodily death, no resuscitation of a dead corpse. It is something begun here and carried to a glorious conclusion through and beyond death. It is concerned not less with the redemption of the body from corruption than with the soul. The work of Christ, that is, pertains to the whole of human nature, and His salvation of the whole man makes for the Christian a *blessed* immortality in which personal intercourse with the Living God and in Him one with another is the essential element.

The question as to what conceivable part the 'body' can play in a supra-terrestrial life is met by the suggestion that the sundering of body from soul at death is unnatural and abnormal. The true personality is a unity of both, and that unity must be preserved as necessary constituent of a true personality whether here or hereafter. Here we function through a material organism as a vehicle of self-expression and self-manifestation. There presumably we must also function and must need an organism of some kind for the same purpose. The spiritual body will be a perfect medium there for the functioning of a developing spiritual life, even as here the material body is an imperfect organ, at times more a hindrance than a help, in the struggle of the human personality for self-expression and upward striving. If only one part of us is to survive, and that is to be merged in the All or Over Soul, there will be no need of 'bodies' to distinguish us one from another and no need of organs for self-manifestation; but if we are to live in a Society and continue in those human relationships which are of the very essence of our true life, then we can see at least one use for a spiritual body as a means of differentiation, and a medium for communication one with another. *Form* of some sort we must have, and it may quite well be there that

> 'Eternal Form shall still divide
> Th' Eternal Soul from all beside,
> And I shall know him when we meet.'

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When then the demand is made by the human heart for the preservation there of all we have loved long since and lost awhile, we are really asking for a continuance of those human ties, love and friendship, sanctified, deepened and enriched, purged of imperfection due to human frailty and sin, in a larger and better world. Instead of the colourless existence of a disembodied spirit, we have the promise in Christian teaching of something corresponding to the life we know here through the senses. Our end is not a Nirvana of annihilated desire but the fruition of all we have caught a dim apprehension of through desire here. Ultimately it is a difference between no life and full life. If in human love and intercourse here we have learned through the senses to taste of a deeper sweetness in communion, soul with soul, heart with heart, and in the companionship of a shared experience to live life at its deeper levels, then the future holds for us not the final abolition but the final fruition of these things, the presence of which in life here has made it desirable, and which account for that hunger after more life and fuller which men feel and which they believe that God Himself created in them in order finally to satisfy it.

Whilst then it is true that 'flesh and blood' cannot inherit the Kingdom of God, and that in Heaven they neither marry nor are given in marriage, this need not be interpreted as meaning the final obliteration of such things but the purging from them of all that pertains to our existence in a terrestrial sphere in order that we may enjoy them in a purified and transfigured form in the supra-terrestrial realm.

We are persuaded that if the deeper implications of the doctrine of the Resurrection are more fully grasped, and the contrast between it and the belief in the immortality of the soul be more carefully considered, the value of the Christian conception will be more clearly revealed, and if we are to argue from Christ's Resurrection to our resurrection in Christ, then the significance of the teaching involved in the Church's belief in the Resurrection of the Flesh as opposed to rival theories will be more fully appreciated and more firmly adhered to.

H. Maurice Relton.

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ART. VII.—WORCESTER INSTITUTIONS SIX CENTURIES AGO.

1. *The Register of the Diocese of Worcester during the Vacancy of the See.* Edited for the Worcestershire Historical Society by J. W. WILLIS BUND. (Oxford: James Parker and Co. 1895.)

2. *The Liber Albus of the Priory of Worcester.* Edited for the same Society by JAMES MAURICE WILSON, D.D. (London: Mitchell, Hughes, and Clarke. 1919.)

3. *Registrum Sacrum Anglicanum.* By WILLIAM STUBBS, Bishop of Oxford. Second Edition. (Clarendon Press. 1897.)

IT will be assumed that a large fraction of an Episcopal Register of the Fourteenth century is devoted to the admission and institution by the Bishop of clerks to benefices. In that of Bishop Cobham, of which some account has already been given, every surviving folio up to 36*b* contains such entries. The central portion of the volume is devoted to ordinations and other matters. But the recording of these institutions is resumed at f. 100, and they are to be found on each remaining folio up to 124. In other words, from first to last this was a large part of his routine. He began it in London in November 1317,[1] sixteen months before he started his residence in the diocese, and his last institution took place at Hartlebury on August 17, 1327,[2] ten days before his death.

Now, it is clear that the Register in this respect is by no means complete. We need go no farther than the entry last named to realize it; for it records the collation, admission and institution of Mag. Nicholas de Cobeham, probably a relation, to the rectory of Bishop's Cleeve, the benefice being vacant by the death of Mag. John de Wynchelsea;

[1] Register, f. 1*b*. [2] F. 124.

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whereas the only occupant recognized by the Register is another undoubted kinsman, Robert de Valoignes, who had been instituted on the presentation of the Crown (no doubt at the Bishop's instigation) on August 25, 1320,[1] the benefice having fallen to the King's nomination during the vacancy in the see. Again, at Michaelmas, 1325, the Bishop gave leave to Nicholas de Marleberghe, rector of Woodchester, to pursue the "studium generale" for a year,[2] having ordained him as rector to the subdiaconate at Michaelmas 1322,[3] whereas the Register leaves us to suppose that David de Lacoke was still in possession of this benefice.[4] But the wonder is that the discrepancies are not more numerous. Suppose, for instance, that the King, as often happened, sends the Bishop a summons to proceed to distant parts on State affairs; the Bishop issues a commission [5] to his trusted officials to act for him in his absence. Take the case of his northern ambassage in the early part of 1321. Before he left Hartlebury he divided to his chief functionaries the portion of responsibility that fell to them. John de Bradewas was to receive and act upon the royal briefs that might arrive during his absence, and Nicholas de Gore was to admit and institute clerks and issue mandates for their induction to benefices.[6] The Bishop was back in Hartlebury at the beginning of May, and it is impossible to suppose that the institution by the Bishop at Northallerton of a priest to the cure of Belbroughton was the only function of the kind which occurred during that period. The commissary probably kept his own record; but it has not survived. The original numbering of the folios, and an apparent period of inaction in each case, lead us to suppose that folios 29 and 32 are lost, and with them a number of institutions, licences to study, letters dimissory and the like.

Nevertheless, this part of the Register sheds some not

[1] F. 22; cf. *Cal. Pat. Rolls*, 1317–21, pp. 352, 515.
[2] F. 107*b*. [3] F. 89*b*. [4] F. 21.
[5] The number of such commissions is small by comparison with Orleton's.
[6] F. 24.

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uninteresting light on the pastoral conditions of the time. The diocese as then constituted consisted of nineteen deaneries, seven in Worcestershire, two in Warwickshire, and ten in Gloucestershire. The lists of benefices in the 'Taxatio' are not easy to enumerate, but I make out that the total is just under four hundred, which includes chapelries and also some prebends. During Bishop Cobham's ten years there were 318 institutions, which seems a very large number when placed beside the total of benefices.

And, of course, such a figure is only possible because of the great speed with which benefices were vacated and filled, and vacated again to be filled again. At least 48 of the benefices to which Cobham instituted were voided again during his short time, and eight of them were voided twice over. A few cases will shew how lightly men went in and out of these cures of souls. When he came to the diocese, the Bishop found the rectory of Naunton-Beauchamp in the possession of Simon de Arnyngworthe, but on May 18, 1320, this Simon and another, Simon de Evesham, rector of Stowe St. Edward's, or Stow-on-the-Wold, appeared before him at Fladbury and exchanged their benefices[1]; so Naunton-Beauchamp received another rector. But on November 9, less than six months later, Simon de Evesham resigned, having doubtless obtained a more desirable cure; and by November 14 Mag. James de Boys[2] had reached the Bishop's mansion in London with William de la Zouche's presentation of him to Naunton-Beauchamp, and was there instituted. We may assume that James de Boys lasted four years, though he is not mentioned again; but on February 23, 1325,[3] there is a fresh institution to Naunton-Beauchamp, and there is another patron, for the King presented Edmund de Lenche, and did so 'racione custodie terre et heredis domini Gwydonis de Bello Campo' (Earl of Warwick). Edmund de Lenche departed this life on the Friday before the Feast of the Purification, 1326,[4] and on February 24 the same royal patron presented John de Gynewelle, the fifth

[1] F. 20*b*. [2] F. 23. [3] F. 36*b*. [4] F. 109*b*.

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rector with whom Cobham had been concerned in six years —an extreme case, perhaps, but representative of what was going on elsewhere.

Thus, before Cobham had reached Worcestershire at all, it fell to him by lapse of time to nominate to the neighbouring cure of Broughton Hacket, and he sent a commission on January 19, 1318, to John de Bradewas, his official, to collate John, brother of one Richard the Barber,[1] who was then plying his trade, or some other, in the Roman Court at Avignon; but the barber's brother was not long content with Broughton Hacket, and another appointment was completed by another official on December 26 of the same year.[2] Sapperton in Gloucestershire was in the patronage of William de Insula, whose name passes in the course of this Register into William de Lyle. Here there was an exchange on June 11, 1319,[3] which brought in one John de Doudeswell. By December 30, 1322,[4] either there has been a vacancy or John de Doudeswell exchanges again under the name of John Hamond, and is succeeded at Sapperton by Henry de Astone. On February 8, 1325,[5] the benefice was again void, though the reason is not stated, and on February 28 it was given to Thomas, son of Henry le Clerk, of Sherbourne.

It will be gathered that the system of exchanging benefices was a large element in the seeming restlessness of parochial life. I find that Bishop Cobham gave his consent to over fifty such exchanges in the course of his decade. In theory it is by no means an ill-advised policy; many to-day desire greater frequency in changes of incumbency, and, if some central authority were in a position to arrange such a 'general post,' there might be an end to some of the stagnation that is now inevitable. But we cannot flatter ourselves that any such motives were at work in these cases. The Bishop's part in the matter was not to say: 'You, A, would be happier at B, and the rector of B would do better where you are'; his functions were limited to inquiring, or to giving someone else a commission to

[1] F. 8*b*. [2] F. 12. [3] F. 15.
[4] F. 31. [5] F. 36*b*.

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inquire, whether there were 'causae legitimae' for such an exchange[1]; and if one of the parties was outside the diocese the Bishop might not get any personal knowledge of him at all; for the said party could easily send a proctor to receive institution on his behalf.

Here, for instance, is a typical case which happens to be entered with some detail.[2] On September 17, 1319,[3] the proctor of William de Estamaco appeared at the Bishop's manor of Bredon in order to take, on William's behalf,[4] the oath of canonical obedience to the diocesan in respect of his institution to the church of Stratford-on-Avon; it is added that the institution had taken place on the strength of a commission to the Bishop of Lincoln; for William had been Archdeacon of Lincoln,[5] and was exchanging his archdeaconry for the church of Stratford. But on October 27,[6] barely six weeks later, the Bishop, having in the meantime moved on to Kempsey, was waited upon by two proctors, one for William and one for Mag. Robert de Stretford, rector of Overbury, who resigned the benefices of their respective clients 'in sacras manus eiusdem patris'; so William de Estamaco became parson of Overbury and Robert de Stretford parson of Stratford-on-Avon, perhaps out of a desire on the latter's part to return to his native town.[7] But William was a man of lightning changes. For in eight weeks more, or thereabouts,

[1] *E.g.* to the Bishop of Chichester, f. 23*b*.
[2] *Cf.* also ff. 40, 41.
[3] F. 16*b*.
[4] 'In anima domini sui.'
[5] Le Neve, *Fasti*.
[6] F. 17.
[7] But perhaps not out of a desire to stay there. On October 11, 1328, he was 'provided' by the Pope to the canonry of Lincoln vacant by the death of Robert de Baldock, the King's Chancellor, being already possessed of prebends at Wells, Tettenhall, etc., not to speak of a 'provision' to a prebend of London (*Cal. Pap. Reg.* ii 283). This is apparently the authority on which Hennessey (*Repertorium Londinense*, p. 45) appoints him (October 11, 1328) to the prebend of Portpool in St. Paul's Cathedral; but it is more evident that he received the prebend of Mora on October 10, 1336, vacating it on consecration to the See of Chichester, November 30, 1337 (Stubbs, *Reg. Sac. Angl.* p. 74).

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came a letter[1] from John de Dalderby, Bishop of Lincoln, to our Bishop; it must have been one of the last that Dalderby wrote, for he died on January 5, 1320[2]; it sets forth that John called Geraud, rector of the church of Nettleham in that diocese, and William de Estmaco, rector of Overbury in the diocese of Worcester, propose to exchange benefices for lawful reasons, and that the Bishop of Worcester has authority hereby, if he approves the reasons for the exchange, to institute William to the benefice of Nettleham. We also have a formal announcement[3] from Bishop Cobham to John called Geraud, 'of Stretforde,' that the exchange is approved, and that he is hereby canonically instituted; the scribe writes William's name as Estaniaco, of which we have thus three versions already.[4] To complete the story, we again have the appearance of two proctors before our Bishop—it is not said where, but in all probability he came to Hartlebury after an Advent ordination in Worcester—on December 31, 1319, in whose persons William becomes rector of Nettleham and John rector of Overbury. Thus between the middle of September and the New Year William de Estamaco has held in succession an archdeaconry and three benefices. It may be added that the income of Stratford-on-Avon appears to have been 23*l.* 6*s.* 8*d.*, of Overbury 16*l.*, and of Nettleham 8*l.*,[5] so that the haste was apparently not inspired by mere greed.

Yet it was part of a system whereof this William is only a common instance, and by which emoluments were piled upon emoluments. There is more about him in the Papal Letters,[6] where he appears now as de Estanayaco and now as de Estenaye, a form which makes me wish that I could connect him with John Estney, who was

[1] F. 18. [2] Stubbs, *Registrum Sac. Angl.* (ed. 1897) p. 69.

[3] F. 43, no date.

[4] There is a fourth 'Estanyaco' on f. 40.

[5] *I.e.* the rectorial portion; a much larger sum went to the Chapter of Lincoln (*Taxatio*, 56*b*).

[6] *Cal. Pap. Reg. Letters*, ii 45 [I owe this and some other references to my friend, Professor Jenkins].

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professed at Westminster more than a hundred years later and became abbot in 1474.[1] In 1308, being then subdeacon, he had held one benefice in Sussex and another in the diocese of St. David's, and was minded, or perhaps was not really minded, to resign the latter, when his uncle, the lord Odo de Grandison—John of that name, afterwards Bishop of Exeter, trod the first rung of the ladder as prebendary of York in 1309—obtained for the hesitating William a dispensation from the Pope enabling him to retain his said benefice together with the archdeaconry of Lincoln and his canonries of Wells and elsewhere, and a licence to remain in his existing order of the ministry for five years. The uncle appeared again three years later,[2] and secured an indult that his archidiaconal functions might be performed by deputy. Indeed, the ruling passion was strong in death. For, about a year before Bishop Cobham passed away, William died in the midst of a similar transaction. He had held, *inter alia multa*, the prebend of Corringham in Lincoln Cathedral, which is now annexed to the vicarage of Gainsborough, and he was in process of making an exchange with the provostship of Lausanne. William de Bonovillario had been inducted to his share of the spoils when William de Estamaco went the way of all flesh; so the surviving William resigned his hardly won prebend.[3] The distance between Lausanne and Lincoln was after all considerable. But the Provost of Lausanne is no concern of ours; our business is to illustrate the inevitableness of these proctors in the place of the actual presentees. It is quite likely that the Bishop may have met this temporary rector of Overbury in the papal hall at Avignon; it is fairly certain that he never greeted him in Worcestershire. Nor can it be pretended that in getting rid of William de Estamaco and obtaining John de Stratford as rector in his place the parish was greatly advantaged, for John also was more concerned with affairs of state than with one of the loveliest villages of our vale.

[1] Cf. *Monks of Westminster*, p. 148.
[2] Avignon, *Kal. Maii*, 1311; *Cal. Pap. Reg. Letters*, ii p. 86.
[3] *Ibid.* p. 253; 4 *Kal. Aug.* 1326.

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Six months after his induction he received letters of protection because he was going overseas with Edward II in the train of his kinsman, John de Stratford, who had become Archdeacon of Lincoln and who rose to be Archbishop of Canterbury.[1] But at least he was not continually out of the country; for on January 1, 1323, the prior and chapter of the cathedral church appointed him as one of their proctors in Convocation.[2] It is also significant that he received priest's orders at Advent 1320 from the Archbishop of Canterbury by letters dimissory from the Bishop of Worcester, at whose hands he had received the subdiaconate and the diaconate during that same year,[3] which again sounds as if central affairs would not be denied, in spite of the amenities of Overbury.

But the speed at which men could change their cures was scarcely greater than that with which vacancies were often filled. The heart of a modern Chapter knows its own bitterness when benefices simply will not be supplied with suitable men. But think of the time when the vicarage of Grimley with the chapelry of Hallow became void on the fourth of the Nones of April by the death of one Symon. His surname is not given here, but it was de Stoke,[4] and he had been instituted to the benefice on the presentation of the Prior and Convent of Worcester in February 1290 by Bishop Giffard.[5] So he was an old man by now, and may have been at death's door for some time. It is even conceivable that some relative—for Thomas de Stoke succeeded him—was watching the last flicker of his life. Even so, it was an expeditious energy which made it possible for the Prior and Convent to hear that the vicar deceased on April 2, to choose his successor, and to have the

[1] *Cal. Pat. Rolls*, 1317–21, p. 352.

[2] Worcester, *Liber Albus* (ed. Wilson, p. 74), f. 107*b*. It is necessary to distinguish him from Brother John de Stratford, a monk of Worcester, who was proctor for the subprior and Chapter in the proceedings which followed Cobham's decease; *cf.* Register, Archbishop Reynolds, f. 206.

[3] *Ibid.* f. 184; Register, Cobham, ff. 51, 58.

[4] Nash, *Worcestershire*, i. p. 476.

[5] Register, Giffard (ed. J. W. Willis Bund), pt. iii. p. 338.

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documents ready, and to get their presentee instituted at Hartlebury within three days.[1] Nor were the Prior and Convent alone in their promptness; for the Precentor, acting in his own behalf, was equally ready with an Amurath to succeed an Amurath. It was in his right to present to the church of St. Michael, Worcester, (now the Diocesan Registry), which fell vacant on Palm Sunday, April 5, 1327, by the death of Robert de Whytecherche, whom Cobham had instituted on December 21, 1321.[2] Holy Week does not seem to us a very easy time for filling vacancies, but the Precentor has chosen his man, John Crumpe of Worcester, and John Crumpe has at any rate received the first tonsure, and the benefice is too small in value to be worth taxing; so there is no need to delay, and on Holy Thursday at Hartlebury the outworn Bishop admits a successor to the clerk who died on Sunday.[3]

Of course there are instances of delay as well, especially in cases where the annual value is equally small. The Chapelry of Oddingley was one such. It had had as its chaplain one William Fryday, but he had 'entered religion,' and so had vacated his small cure, which remained for four years without a pastor. The lord Roger de Mortimer had succeeded his uncle, also Roger, as patron, and in the fall of 1326 he found a presbyter, Waryn de Lenche, to succeed. But the Bishop was at his manor of Hillingdon[4] on the

[1] F. 112. [2] F. 27*b*. [3] F. 120.

[4] In a previous article (*Church Quarterly Review*, January 1922, p. 251) I was misled into a reference to 'the Bishop of Hereford's house at Hillingdon.' The clerk has copied into the Register (f. 116*b*) an interesting letter from Cobham to Adam de Orleton, Bishop of Hereford, in which he explains that he cannot present himself to the Queen because 'stamus in domo vestra de Hillingd' sanitatis graciam expectantes.' The 'vestra,' which is unmistakable, is probably a copying error for 'nostra'; for the Bishop of Hereford is not known to have had a *pied à terre* at Hillingdon, whereas in 1284 Bishop Giffard (Reg. f. 201*b*; ed. Willis Bund, p. 227) held an ordination in his chapel at Hillingdon, and in 1290 Pope Nicholas IV confirmed the action of the Bishop of London in appropriating the church of Hillingdon to the uses of the Bishop of Worcester and his successors, on the ground

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way to his last sojourn in London; so a proctor rode thither to receive institution on Waryn's behalf, and on November 24, 1326, Oddingley had a chaplain once more, with a responsibility for making out of his slender resources an annual payment to St. Helen, Worcester.[1]

But it must not be assumed that a benefice filled meant the residence thereafter of the parson. Bishop Cobham was the creature of his times, and the times favoured an elaborate and legalized system of absences for various reasons. It was reasonable, for instance, that John Weryn, rector of Upton-on-Severn, should ask and obtain leave to be away from January 4, 1323, till Midsummer, because he had recently come into an estate in Essex and must needs go and see it.[2] There are also two cases of leave to go on pilgrimage.[3] Great people, too, have a traditional right to ask for the presence of this or that incumbent at their side with leave to be 'in obsequiis' and to have freedom from parochial responsibility. Roger of Cambridge, rector of Avening, is wanted by the King[4]; Walter Beuer, rector of Hanbury, near Wich, by Edmund of Woodstock, Earl of Kent, the King's brother[5]; John de Geldeford, rector of Holy Trinity, Gloucester, by the Princess Mary, the King's daughter.[6] The rector of Upper Slaughter is on the staff of the Bishop of Salisbury [Roger Mortival][7]; Mag. John de Oreletone, brother of Cobham's friend, Adam de Orleton, Bishop of Hereford, receives letters dimissory for all Holy Orders and leave of absence from his benefice of Titherington in Gloucestershire, for such time as he may spend in the personal service of that prelate,[8] who also had the help of Walter Carles, rector of Broadway, afterwards an executor of his will. Great nobles must be

that they had no residence in London (f. 396*b*; ed. Willis Bund, p. 468); which reason does not apply to Cobham, whose London house was 'extra Barram Templi' (f. 103*b*) and 'in parochia Sancte Marie atte Stronde' (f. 65*b*).

[1] F. 117. [2] F. 31. [3] Ff. 14, 35.
[4] F. 26*b*. [5] F. 34*b*. [6] F. 15*b*. [7] F. 15.
[8] Ff. 20, 7*b*; cf. *Reg.* A. de Orleton, xlvii n.; also *Cal. Pap. Reg.* ii 160.

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equally considered in this matter, such as Thomas of Brotherton, Earl of Norfolk, Marshal of England, and the King's half-brother, who requires the attendance of William de Muskam, rector of Uley [1]; and Hugh le Despenser, Earl of Winchester, obtains the same request for Mag. Richard de Uphauene, rector of Tanworth; while the Lady Aliva Burnel, who presented Adam de Wycheford to the benefice of Wick Rissington in January 1323,[2] can have him in her train for a year from September 1323,[3] and for yet another year from June 18, 1326 [4]; inasmuch as the said Adam obtained the Bishop's licence to 'study' for a year on September 14, 1323,[5] the time spent by him in his benefice was short enough.

Cobham, indeed, was in no position, had he so desired, to protest against such petitions, nor did he abstain, if need were, from making them himself. When the See of Coventry and Lichfield was vacant in 1322, he wrote to Philip de Turville, the administrator, asking that a certain Mag. R. de S. might be regarded as a person necessary to the Hartlebury establishment and so be excused from residence in his cure of Burton [6]; and in his later illness, when his very favourite clerk, Richard de Luffenham, had obtained the benefice of Tikingcote in the diocese of Lincoln, Cobham writes to Henry Burghersh, full of the good clerk's praises as one 'qui diu cognouit et gessit secretissima domus nostre,' and pleads, 'iuxta Cantuariensis provincie consuetudinem laudabiliter approbatam,' that his due residence on his cure may be dispensed with.[7]

Yet it is well to realize to what lengths this system of 'leaves' might run, even under so conscientious a Bishop. The most common form was to give a 'licencia studendi' for such and such a period 'vbicunque viget studium generale,' sometimes adding that the permission was re-

[1] F. 18*b*. His ordination as acolyte (December 17, 1317) is entered in Archbishop Reynolds' Register, f. 174.

[2] F. 31. [3] F. 36. [4] F. 113*b*.

[5] F. 33. [6] F. 74*b*.

[7] F. 114*b*. He resigned it in 1331 on his appointment to the archdeaconry of Sarum (*Cal. Pap. Reg. Letters*, ii 326).

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stricted to England and nearly always limiting it by words such as 'in forma constitucionis' or 'prouiso quod etc.'; sometimes it included a dispensation from taking further Holy Orders for the present; sometimes the clerk received leave to put his benefice out to farm, while he pursued his studies. But the effect was a wide system of non-residence, and there is an entire absence of any sign that the student was tested as to whether he had gone honestly in search of the 'studium generale,' or had idled away the time.

Anyhow Thomas de Cobham was granting these 'leaves' fairly continuously from the time of his arrival in England after consecration[1] till within a short time of his death,[2] though the number decreased somewhat as the years went on. I make out that there were 93 cases in which he gave licences for one year's study, 37 for two years, 11 for three years, and 5 in which no limit of time was mentioned.[3] In one case, that of John de Stauntone, rector of Buckland near Broadway, the period rose to 'per quinquennium.'[4] Even the parishes in which the Bishop might be expected specially to desire continuous residence at the rectory found their incumbent spirited away on academic pursuits. Thus during his stay at his Hampton manor in 1320, the Bishop grants a year's licence to Mag. Walter de Mortone, the rector.[5] Similarly, while he was residing at Hartlebury in February 1324, he lets Dom. William [de Lugwardin], the rector, go off to study till Michaelmas,[6] and on October 26, 1325, grants him a licence for a year's study in England.[7]

Indeed, it is difficult to enter into the feelings of a 'good clerk' become a Bishop, who is instituting a parson to a 'cura animarum' and who knows that presently, it may be to-day, it may be six months hence, the parson will come and urge that his education must be proceeded with at

[1] F. 1*b*: November 25, 1317.

[2] F. 120*b*: Hartlebury, March 27, 1327.

[3] It seems that during the same period Adam de Orleton (*Register* [ed. Bannister], p. 390ff) gave only some 67 dispensations for absence; but he was much absent himself.

[4] F. 35*b*. [5] F. 20. [6] F. 34*b*. [7] F. 107*b*.

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some distance from his benefice and quite beyond reach of the Bishop's fatherly eye. Take the case of the Gloucestershire parish of Rockhampton, which became vacant by the resignation on February 17, 1325, of John Loueringe of Northleach and received on March 11 a new rector in the person of one Laurence Jordan, of Windsor, who was presented by Hugh le Despenser, the younger, and who sent a proctor from the diocese of Winchester to receive institution for him.[1] One wonders if Cobham ran over in his mind the story of that benefice as he had known it in his short time. On June 13, 1318, when Cobham was still wandering in other dioceses, and was for the moment at Chisleborough in the diocese of Sarum, an exchange took place by which Henry de Astone, till then of the chapelry of Withington, became rector of Rockhampton.[2] The benefice again fell vacant on April 6, 1319, a few weeks after Cobham's first arrival in these parts as Bishop. How the vacancy was caused the Register does not say: perhaps Henry de Astone was dead, but on April 25[3] the Bishop admitted John Louerynge, of Northleach, clerk, on the presentation of John Giffard, and ordained him subdeacon on June 2 in Bromsgrove Church.[4] It is possible to believe that the new rector went to his parish, and tried to care for his people; but on January 3, 1321, he applied for and received a dispensation to 'study' for one year, being then described as 'Magister,'[5] and on September 11 in the same year, before the other period had elapsed, 'Magister John de Nortleche' was given a further twelve months' licence with the addition of a permission to put his benefice out to farm.[6] The same 'leave' was renewed on September 29, 1322,[7] and again (a few days late) on October 3, 1323[8]; and it may be that for some few months thereafter the rector resumed acquaintance with his flock. But on February 17, 1325, he resigned; and on March 11, as already stated, Laurence Jordan of Windsor was admitted to long-suffering Rockhampton, the younger le Despenser being now seised of the advowson formerly belonging to

[1] F. 100. [2] F. 8*b*. [3] F. 14*b*. [4] F. 49.
[5] F. 24. [6] F. 26*b*. [7] F. 30*b*. [8] F. 33*b*.

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John Giffard. It made little difference, for Laurence was granted a two years' dispensation that same day.[1]

And this is not an exceptional case. On March 24, 1318, in London, Cobham admitted John de Beaurepeyr to the church of Wolverton and on the same day granted him a year's leave for study in England and letters dimissory for the subdiaconate,[2] and he repeated the permission on February 1, 1319, together with letters dimissory for all Holy Orders.[3] On November 4, 1319, William de Prestbury, acolyte, pursued the Bishop to York with his presentation by the Abbess and Convent of Caen to the church of Minchinhampton,[4] and as soon as the institution was complete Cobham granted him a licence for a year's study, with no condition save that he must appear personally at an episcopal visitation, if one should fall within the time. It is fair to William de Prestbury to say that he must have made use of the letters dimissory which were granted to him at the same time; for, having been an acolyte at his institution in November, he received priest's orders from the Bishop at Hampton in the following March[5]; but he atoned for this by obtaining another year's dispensation for study on October 14, 1323.[6] Similarly on October 20, 1318,[7] there was an exchange which brought to Willersey a certain Mag. Ralph de Wyteleye, till then rector of St. Mary before the Abbey-gate of Gloucester. In the following February the Abbot and Convent of Evesham presented to Willersey Roger de Cherltone, and next day this Roger was given leave to study for a year.[8] But this did not prevent him from being instituted in the ensuing June to the church of 'Borugtone' or 'Burghtone' (no patron is mentioned and identification is difficult), nor from receiving on July 20 a dispensation for a period of three years' devotion to the 'studium generale.'[9]

[1] F. 100. [2] F. 6*b*. [3] F. 12*b*.
[4] F. 10*b*. [5] F. 56. [6] F. 33*b*.
[7] F. 10*b*. The Register assigns the patronage of Willersey to the Gloucester Convent instead of to the abbey of Evesham.
[8] F. 13. [9] F. 15*b*.

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Yet all the time the Church was endeavouring, as now, to emphasize the abiding character of the relation between the parson and his cure. Unhappily the system of permitting institutions and inductions to be conferred vicariously through proctors often dulled the edge of any personal keenness. Thus a certain clerk of the diocese of Lincoln, Mag. Ralph de Horncastre, a capable practitioner at the Papal Court, obtained in 1318 the Pope's provision[1] to a church in the patronage of the Abbot and Convent of Westminster. But the executor of the provision, Mag. Richard de Plimstoke, or Plumstoke, canon of Lincoln, received (along with the Bishop of Worcester and his kinsman the Precentor of York) a mandate to secure for his client the church of Beverston which was in the gift of St. Peter, Gloucester.[2] Cobham is at Little Billing in the county of Northampton, and the Precentor of York, his kinsman, Robert de Valoignes, is with him. A notary public named Thomas, son of William de Sculthorpe, produces the papal bull, and there and then the Bishop performs the institution. But Mag. Ralph, the person most concerned, was not present and lost any personal touch with the act of his diocesan. On August 1, 1318, in the churchyard of Beverston in the presence of John de Bradewas (the Bishop of Worcester's commissary and on this occasion 'subexecutor et subdelegatus' of the papal bull), John de Bloyon, another commissary, Thomas de Sculthorpe the notary, and the parishioners, Mag. Robert de Luffenham on Ralph de Horncastre's behalf made petition to John de Bradewas that his absent client should be there and then inducted into corporal possession of Beverston, its rights and its appurtenances, and its rectory-manse, according to the manner and form of the apostolic letters there exhibited; and at the church door Master John aforesaid complied with this request. He handed to the proctor the keys of the closed church door, and when the door was opened gave the proctor the bell-ropes, which

[1] F. 59.

[2] Adam de Eglesfeld had been compelled to resign because he was a pluralist! (*Cal. Pap. Reg. Letters*, ii 172).

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he pulled. The proctor then heard Mass in the church the same day and received offerings and also, after Mass, the oaths of fidelity and obedience, which were taken by the presbyters and clerks ministering at that time in the church. There followed an exhortation from John de Bradewas to all the parishioners that under the pains and censures specified in the apostolic letters they should pay their dues to the rector and render him careful obedience as such, and the parishioners made their promise and owned themselves bound to deal honestly with him in issues, tithes, first-fruits, funeral offerings, and the like. Thereupon the subexecutor, the proctor, and a number of the parishioners proceeded to the rectory-manse, where Master John handed over the keys of the gates and doors in token of the same peaceful possession.

The man most concerned no doubt received the precise notarial account of all these things which for some reason consumes four pages of the Register[1]; but his personal attendance would have served better to tighten the bond between himself and his people.[2]

ERNEST WORCESTER.

[1] Ff. 59–60*b*.

[2] It may be admitted that this natural demand for personal association could hardly be satisfied by one who was 'provided' to a canonry of St. John, Howden, 1329, to one of Hereford, 1331, and to one of Southwell, 1332, and retained all of them along with Beverston (*Cal. Pap. Reg. Letters*, ii 300, 354, 374).

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MEDIAEVAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO MODERN CIVILIZATION.

Mediaeval Contributions to Modern Civilization. A Series of Lectures delivered at King's College, University of London. Edited by F. J. C. HEARNSHAW, M.A., LL.D., Professor of Mediaeval History in the University of London. With a Preface by ERNEST BARKER, M.A., Principal of King's College. (London: George G. Harrap and Co. Ltd. 1921.) 10*s.* 6*d.* net.

THE lectures printed in this volume were delivered in the autumn term of 1920, as part of the general scheme of public lectures at King's College, London. The course was planned by Professor Hearnshaw; seven of the lectures were delivered by members of the staff of King's College, three by members of the staff of University College and of Bedford College. It can be fairly claimed, therefore, to quote from the introduction which the Principal of King's College has contributed, that the lectures 'bear testimony to the vitality of historical study in London.' The volume provides a competent survey of the social and intellectual activities of the period usually described as mediaeval; and the general reader who is seeking for guidance in this difficult sphere of investigation, and who is anxious to know the latest methods and results will find what he needs, attractively and, on the whole, adequately presented. In a series of lectures, necessarily restricted in number and scope, there must of course be selection, but it is to be regretted that room was not found for an adequate treatment of the scholastic philosophy, a subject of vital moment for the understanding of the period, and a subject moreover likely to be of increasing significance for our own time.

In considering a work such as this, the special mention of individual contributions is likely to express little more than the personal interests and predilections of the reader, while anything of the nature of detailed criticism would be impertinent from any who are not recognized experts in the various subjects treated. With this proviso it may be permitted to remark that the general survey of the period contributed by the editor,

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Professor Hearnshaw, is a masterpiece of lucid compression. To present a survey of the political development of the period from A.D. 500 to A.D. 1500, which omits no salient feature in the space of forty pages, might well be deemed an impossible feat, were it not here a *fait accompli*. Professor Jenkins' treatment of Mediaeval Religion will be the envy and despair of many readers. We are introduced to the vast wealth of raw material, whose lucid ordering and interpretation must precede the formation of the finished historical judgement: and the impression grows upon the reader, not only that he now knows very little, but that he is never likely to know very much. It is an impression which has the kathartic power inevitably associated with tragedy, not a little wholesome for many would-be exponents of mediaevalism. Dr. Singer's able account of Mediaeval Science is greatly enhanced by the accurate and interesting diagrams which he provides, the study of which enables the student to understand how the framework of the universe appeared to the mediaeval man. Sir Israel Gollancz writes, with his usual ease and distinction, on 'The Middle Ages in the Lineage of English Poetry'; and Professor Adamson writes on 'Education' with all the knowledge and enthusiasm of an expert.

The only serious criticism that this very competent and attractive survey provokes is a criticism of design and method, rather than of content and detail. It is pertinent to ask whether the plan of parcelling off a number of centuries, attaching a label thereto, and then proceeding to inquire what 'contributions' this period made to 'modern civilization,' is the best, or even a tolerably good way of presenting the subject. It is probably true that we are as unable adequately to appreciate societies (whether past or present), as we are certainly unable to appreciate individuals by asking in the first place for what (if anything) we have to thank them. There is, in the present instance, a twofold objection to this line of approach. In the first place, it is not unlikely to mislead the popular audience or the casual reader, as to the true nature and function of history; and, in the second place, it imposes a deplorable restraint upon the contributor, unless, like some of the contributors to this volume, he boldly ignores his mandate. It is only necessary to recollect, for example, that the Ptolemaic system which controlled the mediaeval interpretation of the universe was neither originated in the Middle Ages nor 'contributed' to modern civilization, in order to realize the kind

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of *impasse* which presents itself if the design of this volume is consistently adhered to. Few, indeed, are they who are able to wear their fetters with the ease, and conceal them with the grace of Professor Jenkins.

The point is not so overstrained and hypercritical as may appear at first sight. To insist upon the 'contribution' of the mediaeval to the modern world as the fundamental category of interpretation in an exhaustive survey of mediaevalism, is to stand committed at the outset to a philosophy of history which, though characteristic of the Nineteenth century, cannot be adopted to-day without previous justification. It is to adopt (by implication) the point of view that Western Civilization is a progressive evolution, a broadening down of precedents, an ordered development in which each age contributes to the next its highest and best for appropriation and assimilation; it allows no essential significance to contrasts, to insurgent antipathies, to hostile reactions. Yet, if the history of the modern world be, as Lord Acton taught, a history of revolution, then to adopt this standpoint and method at the outset is to obscure the issue. It is at any rate arguable that the relation between mediaeval and modern has been one of mutual repulsion and antithesis rather than of mutual attraction and peaceful borrowing. The all-important question then becomes, not 'What do we owe to the Middle Ages?' but 'How have we come to be so radically divergent from mediaeval aims and interests?' Under the title of this volume this question cannot legitimately even be raised.

There is evidence that the editor himself feels that the plan adopted needs some justification. He quotes, with very proper approval, the dictum of Lord Morley: 'I do not in the least want to know what happened in the past, except as it enables me to see my way more clearly through that which is happening to-day.' It is, says Professor Hearnshaw, the test of present utility. It would be difficult to take exception to this dictum in its most obvious interpretation. Lord Morley seems to be expressing (in very different phraseology, it is true) the contention which is a constant refrain of Croce, the contention namely that history which deserves that name must have a vital contact with the mind of the historian, and is, in fact, the elucidation of meaning controlled by interest. But an elucidation is not necessarily a 'contribution' in the sense adopted by Professor Hearnshaw. One period may illustrate another rather by contrast than by contribution (unless by contribution

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is meant merely contribution to the intellectual interpretation and understanding), and it may well be maintained that it is primarily by contrast and not by contribution that the Middle Age elucidates modern civilization. Yet this elucidation is obscured and indeed precluded by a method which culminates in an enumeration of 'contributions' such as that given by Professor Hearnshaw at the end of his lecture. It would take far too long to consider in detail the nine 'contributions' which he summarizes. But even granting that his summary is reasonably adequate and correct (a somewhat generous concession, in view of the fact that the first contribution mentioned is 'the truth that the things of the Spirit are of supreme importance' —hardly a mediaeval discovery, one thought!), it would still be possible to maintain that an enumeration of this kind in no way 'enables us to see our way more clearly through that which is happening to-day.' It would seem, indeed, that the method adopted fails to carry out the spirit of Lord Morley's dictum in its most intelligible sense.

A reference to the article on 'Mediaeval Society' provides an even clearer illustration of the point under discussion. Miss Hilda Johnstone is a recognized expert in this field. Those who are anxious for instruction will always read with attention and profit anything that she writes, and all the more because it is sure to be presented in a particularly clear and attractive style. But in the present instance we may surmize that she has told us, not what she herself would have wished to tell us, but what she has felt compelled to tell us, under the constraint of the subject-title. What she *does* tell us, in the main, is that there are evidences of the feminist movement to be discerned in mediaeval times, as witnessed, for example, by the activities of a daughter of Edward I, and by the fact that there were women doctors at Salerno. But there is surely something wrong here, whether we examine the matter under the concept 'Mediaeval' or under the concept 'Contributions.' For a very superficial acquaintance with the records of the past disposes of any suggestion that feminine restlessness of this kind originated in the centuries between A.D. 500 and A.D. 1500 Did not Hypatia lecture in the classical schools, and at an even more remote epoch was not Deborah a mother in Israel? And what of evidence to be culled from the pages of Euripides and Aristophanes? And though we may be quite sure that Miss Johnstone does not seriously ask us to believe that Miss Sylvia Pankhurst (shall we say?) is, if all were known, a Mediaeval

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contribution to Modern Civilization, yet she does come within measurable distance of suggesting this as an inevitable deduction from her argument.

Not only does the perusal of this stimulating volume raise doubts as to the ultimate value of the concept 'Contribution' as applied in this connexion. It raises still more fundamental doubts as to the ultimate value of the concept 'Mediaeval.' It has been noted already that contributors again and again discover themselves, or may be discovered, to be describing movements and phenomena which cannot by any reasonable stretch of the term be described as mediaeval either in origin or conception. Miss Johnstone's new women are one example; Professor Hearnshaw's spiritual religion is another; the Ptolemaic system provides yet a third. But this increasing doubt whether the term 'Mediaeval' may not at some future epoch be banished from serious history and confined to examination syllabuses, is illuminated by a flood of light when, with characteristic intrepidity, Professor Wildon Carr claims that Paul the Apostle is the author of Mediaevalism. This is the most original conception in the book, but it seems upon consideration to dispose of the 'Mediaeval' as effectually as much else in the book disposes of the 'Contributions.' It is a notable evidence of Professor Wildon Carr's intellectual penetration, that he sees and demonstrates quite clearly that if the Middle Ages are to justify the claim to be a distinct epoch of culture, self-contained and *sui generis*, then there must be implicitly or explicitly a philosophic concept in which its peculiar character finds expression. This concept, Dr. Wildon Carr argues, is the concept of history: it is distinct from the ancient concept of static being on the one hand, and from the modern concept of immanent becoming on the other. It is due ultimately to St. Paul, and is the expression of the Christian idea of revelation in and through the facts of history—of the Christian idea of Incarnation, in short. All who are familiar with the works of Dr. Wildon Carr will be prepared for the charm and persuasiveness with which he works out his thesis, but it is very doubtful whether the clear-cut distinction between Ancient and Mediaeval concepts for which he contends can be maintained. On the one hand, the idea of revelation through history is not ultimately Pauline, but is inherited by him from the Jewish prophets, and is therefore operative over the whole of the historic Ancient and Mediaeval periods. On the other hand, the idea itself is quite consonant with the Ancient philo-

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sophic static concept of ' time as the moving image of eternity.' It is a mistake to suppose that the modern idea of ' progressive revelation ' has very much in common with the prophetic and Jewish idea of revelation in history. We venture to maintain that the cultural epoch originating from the classic Greek philosophers and the monotheistic Jewish religion is fundamentally a unity. It proceeds as an unbroken evolution to its culmination in the work of Aquinas and Dante. Mediaeval Society, as the Principal of King's College has maintained, is the most complete practical application of the ideas of Plato's Republic that the world has seen. The dominant note of the whole Ancient-Mediaeval development is the working out in theory and practice of the conception of Ethical Monotheism.

The rhythm of this orderly evolution has been broken. It is the fate (or the delight) of the modern thinker to be perpetually contemplating a catastrophe. Monotheism has given place to Monism, Ethics to Economics, the Transcendent Comedy to an Immanent Tragedy. The past which most of all needs elucidation is not the past which we have assimilated and can appraise, but the past which, as Bergson would say, we drag behind us unawares. It is a weakness in the method of this book that it inevitably conceals the yawning chasm above which the superstructure of modern civilization is precariously erected.

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CORRESPONDENCE.

To the Editor.

THE CHURCH QUARTERLY REVIEW.

SIR—In the January number of the CHURCH QUARTERLY REVIEW, and in an article entitled 'The Modernist Christology,' contributed by the Regius Professor of Divinity in the University of Oxford, there appears an attack upon the English Church Union which is as injurious in its character as it is fundamentally untrue.

There is a distinct implication on pages 201 and 202 to the effect that the English Church Union is in some way responsible for the 'violent newspaper controversy' and the 'unrestrained and unintelligent attacks' which were made in the secular press upon the readers of the papers given at the Conference of Modern Churchmen held at Cambridge in August of last year and published in a number of the *Modern Churchman* (Vol. XI., Nos. 5 and 6).

On behalf of the President and Council of the Union I am directed to inform you that the English Church Union was in no way responsible either directly or indirectly for the misrepresentations which were undoubtedly made in very much the same manner and in very different places.

I trust that you, Sir, will accept on behalf of the English Church Union this unqualified denial of the truth of the accusation. It is impossible that anything of the kind should have been done without my knowledge, and I desire personally to concur in the denial of the truth of the allegations.

The action which the English Church Union has taken in the matter has been quite deliberate, open, and public. The Union organized one meeting in Birmingham on the eve of the Church Congress, at which the speakers were Bishop Gore, Canon Lacey and the Rev. G. C. Rawlinson:—a second meeting at Sion College on November 23rd last, at which the speakers were the Rev. Canon Darwell Stone, D.D., Mr. C. A. Buckmaster, and the Rev. A. E. Cornibeer, Vicar of St. John's, Newcastle-on-Tyne—and finally the Union has been instrumental in taking a perfectly dignified and constitutional line in the presentation of a Petition to the Houses of Convocation in both Provinces of Canterbury

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and York, praying on substantial grounds that a Synodical judgment may be passed upon teaching which appears to be contradictory of the faith, set forth in that volume of the ***Modern Churchman***, to which I have already referred,

ARNOLD PINCHARD,
Secretary of the English Church Union.

31 Russell Square, London, W.C. 1.
February 22nd 1922.

NOTE BY DR. HEADLAM.

I AM glad that the English Church Union both recognizes the harmful character of the attacks which were made upon the Cambridge Conference and also repudiates any connexion with them. I must point out that in my article I did not state that the English Church Union was directly responsible for the attacks, but what I accused was a party of persons connected with that society. I had quite good grounds to go upon in two previous cases. On one occasion I discovered that attacks, not in public, were being made on the CHURCH QUARTERLY REVIEW, and that they had their origin in persons connected with the English Church Union. I am glad therefore that the Secretary of the English Church Union should be able to say definitely that the English Church Union has no connexion either directly or indirectly with the misrepresentations which have in this case been made, and I hope that it may use its influence in the future to prevent that type of religious controversy.

ARTHUR C. HEADLAM.

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SHORT NOTICES.

Biblical Studies.

The Lost Apocrypha of the Old Testament: their Titles and Fragments. Collected, translated and discussed, by M. R. James, Litt.D., Provost of Eton College. (London: S.P.C.K. 1920.) 5*s.* 6*d.* net.

The editors of this invaluable series have done a great service to scholarship by the inclusion of this handbook, and by securing Dr. James to write it. It consists of a description and discussion of all the Apocryphal books ascribed to Old Testament worthies, which are not extant in any complete form. The sources are two-fold: the lists in the Stichometry of Nicephorus, the Pseudo-Athanasian Synopsis, the Sixty Books, and the Latin Gelasian Decree (the first and second of these are identical in the section which concerns us); and quotations, explicit or supposed, in the Fathers. The number of the Apocryphal Books will surprise even the well-informed student; 'it was the recognized method of pushing a particular set of doctrines to produce a writing under some venerable name, in which the special tenets were openly or covertly advocated.' And we can only admire respectfully the learning and research entailed in the collection and interpretation of the often very obscure references to all this literature. Dr. James interprets his task in no narrow spirit and includes interesting examinations of such points as theories of pre-existence (*apropos* of Origen and *the Prayer of Joseph*), descriptions of the personal appearance of Antichrist (under *the Apocalypse of Elias*), and tortures in Hell where the punishment is made to fit the crime. It is interesting to note that those who have eaten on fast days are fed on gall. Fragments of the books, quotations and relevant passages from the Fathers are usually given and translated in full, and there is a good index. A further index of passages discussed would have been useful. Altogether it is a real 'mine of information' for the student—a little book such as can only be written by one who has spent years of labour on his subject.

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The Apocalypse of John. Studies in Introduction with a Critical and Exegetical Commentary. By IBSON T. BECKWITH, Ph.D., D.D. (New York: The Macmillan Co. 1919.) 21s. net.

The Revelation of John. By A. S. PEAKE, M.A., D.D. (London: the Holborn Press.) 6s. net.

A COMMENTARY on the last book of the Bible which begins with an extended discussion of the first is obviously open to the Horatian criticism. And in fact nearly 200 pages of Dr. Beckwith's book are devoted to a sketch of eschatological doctrine in the Bible generally and the Apocalyptic literature, including a considerable examination of the Messianic hope in the Gospels. This section might have been published as a separate volume and would serve as a useful handbook. A further 200 pages are given to problems of Introduction connected more directly with the Apocalypse itself, the rest of the book comprising the commentary proper.

Dr. Beckwith shews himself well-acquainted with the relevant literature and his judgement is usually sound without being strikingly original. He represents a moderate critical position accepting, though with hesitation, the Apostolic authorship. His discussion of the 'two Johns' is full and excellent, though some will feel that he does not do justice to the converging lines of evidence for the existence of the 'Presbyter,' or at least to there having been something in the original facts which gave rise to the hesitation in the Second century about identifying the author of the Fourth Gospel unambiguously with the Apostle, the son of Zebedee. A note on p. 362 contains the interesting confession that his 'earlier conviction of the impossibility of maintaining the unity of authorship [*i.e.* of the Fourth Gospel and the Apocalypse] has been much weakened by a study of the book prolonged through many years.' It will of course be realized that in saying this the writer did not have access to Dr. Charles' elaborate analysis of the grammar and diction of the two books, a problem which he does not discuss very fully.

Dr. Beckwith accepts also the unity of the Apocalypse, though allowing for the incorporation of earlier material, *e.g.*, in chapters vii and xii. He is at his best in his clear distinction in such cases between the meaning of the original source and the meaning which must have been attached to it by the author of the Apocalypse when he incorporated it into his own book. At the same time the fact that he is dealing with older, and perhaps

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traditional, material does tie him down to a form of representation which he would not have adopted had he been entirely independent. This is indeed one of the fundamental points to be borne in mind when we have succeeded in tracing Apocalyptic, or other, ideas to a previous source. On the other hand the discovery of such an origin neither invalidates nor confirms the truth of the teaching. In his interpretation of the book Dr. Beckwith always moves on sound lines. Not only does he reject any dallying with 'Futurist' methods, and insist strongly on the principle that its visions can only be understood in close relation to the ideas and circumstances of the age which produced them, but he is also equally firm against artificial methods of allegorizing, *e.g.* with the woman and the child of chapter xii, and the Millennium. At the same time he brings out the underlying spiritual application which we have a right to draw for ourselves once we have done justice to the primary intention of the author.

The method of the Commentary is to preface each section with a general exegesis of its meaning and leading ideas; this is followed by the usual detailed notes, verse by verse, and by small-print discussions of critical views, containing full references to recent writers, and by textual notes. This method inevitably leads to a good deal of repetition, and Dr. Beckwith lacks the secret of the pregnant and vivid phrase which makes a commentary live. In fact the style is distinctly pedestrian, and while it may be doubted whether the claim made that the book will appeal to the 'unprofessional reader' will be justified, it will certainly be a mine of information for the student.

On page 362 '1 and 2 John' is a misprint for '2 and 3 John.'

Dr. Peake's book contains the nineteenth Hartley Lecture and is cast in lecture form. It divides into two parts, the first dealing with problems of introduction, the second with a discussion of the main topics of the Apocalypse, taken section by section. It is not a verse by verse commentary, and a good deal is omitted which would rightly be looked for in a commentary proper. For that very reason it may reach a wider public. It is marked by the learning and sanity we expect from Dr. Peake. There are copious references to the literature of the subject, perhaps rather too predominantly German literature, and the history of interpretation is fully considered. Generally speaking Dr. Peake accepts the ordinary critical positions, though often with some hesitation, *e.g.*, as to the Domitianic date. 'That the Revelation was not written by the Apostle John nor by the

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author of the Fourth Gospel and that it is not pseudonymous are results which can claim a high probability. But beyond this it is difficult to go with any assurance' (p. 68). The number of the Beast he regards as representing *Nero Caesar* in Hebrew, with a background of earlier mythical interpretation.

He is no less emphatic than Dr. Beckwith as to the right methods for interpreting the book; it would be indeed a gain if his strictures on uncritical methods, such as those which find references to the Great War, could ever find their way to the quarters where they are most needed. None the less it is useful for the student to know how best to deal with those who take such views. No less cogent are his arguments against Dr. Milligan's purely 'spiritual' interpretation, which regards the Apocalypse as dealing only with great principles of the warfare with evil and not with specific events, present or future to the writer. We must realize that he shared to the full the view of the universe current in his day, a Ptolemaic view, with a flat earth and a solid sky above it; in it a doorway by which one might enter heaven into the presence of God and the four and twenty elders. There was the Temple with the Ark and the hidden manna, the altar with the souls of the martyrs, and 'the multitudinous angels.' Hell and the abyss are equally vivid and near (p. 180), and the Apocalyptist's descriptions were often intended far more literally than we with our modern science like to think.

There is a full index, a feature which is most important in a book arranged on this plan, and the price is very reasonable under present conditions. It should be added that Dr. Peake's book, like Dr. Beckwith's, was written before the appearance of Dr. Charles' monumental work, though he has been able to avail himself of some of the preliminary studies which were published earlier.

Doctrine and Development.

Apostel und Jünger. A Critical and Historical Investigation of the Beginning of Christianity. By Roland Schütz. (Giessen. 1921.) 20 marks.

This book makes an attempt to reveal the true origin of the Christian religion, which has been obscured hitherto by the legendary account of the foundation of the Church by the Apostles in Jerusalem, which is given in the opening chapters of the Acts.

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The facts as the writer is now able to represent them to us are as follows: The Jesus of history was a Prophet whose whole aim was to bring men of all nations to a confidence in the Father-God by means of a Preaching such as has been powerfully described to us in Harnack's *What is Christianity?* The preaching and healing to which Jesus devoted Himself, and for which He commissioned His disciples, was carried on in Galilee and the ten cities of the Hellenized Decapolis, and in adjacent regions. It was seed sown that must have had a harvest: it must have left a considerable number of disciples, who after the tragedy in Jerusalem formed themselves into brotherhoods devoted to the memory of the Master. These disciples were Hellenized Jews and recruits from heathenism who welcomed the Gospel of freedom from the Jewish Law, which Jesus had proclaimed. From them in due time St. Paul derived the impulse which sent him on his wider mission to the Gentiles. That we have no historical account of them is due to the influence of an early document, now embodied in the Acts, which attributed the first beginnings of Christianity to the Apostles in Jerusalem. The exquisite picture drawn of the Brotherhood which kept in touch with the Temple services, and was regarded with kindly eyes at the start by the Jewish authorities—the Apostles-document, as our author calls it—was accepted by the writer of the Acts and drove all other accounts out of the field. In the Acts it is combined with the Disciples-document, which begins at the sixth chapter with the story of St. Stephen and gives us some information as to the wider Christianity which was the true representative of the teaching of Jesus. The two documents are used side by side throughout the Acts, and it is not difficult to distinguish between them if we carefully watch the use of the words Apostle and Disciple respectively, and if we observe the passages in which stress is laid on the gift of the Holy Ghost which was regarded in the former document as a peculiar mark of the Apostolic function.

We must refer our readers to the book itself for the proofs which are elaborately given of this new exposition of the Christian origins. As these early Disciples knew nothing of Baptism and other Church ordinances, they represent a form of the Christian religion which is free from all later complications of an ecclesiastical nature. The writer expresses in pathetic terms the hope that in Germany, where the apparent loss of all things is throwing men back on the need of religion, this call to go back to the pure sources of the Gospel will prove to be a word in season. He

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believes that it is in the true line of development from German mysticism and from Luther's insistence on the inner character of religion, and is therefore specially suited to the mentality of the German people.

To the English mind speculations of this kind make no appeal. The treatment of the documents appears capricious, and the resulting theory carries no conviction. We are more attracted by the American philosopher, the late Professor Royce, who set himself the same task of discovering how Christianity really began and found to his own amazement that it began with a fellowship, 'the Beloved Society,' as he called it; and who recognized that it made its way not as a Preaching but as a Corporate Life. The Epistles of St. Paul shewed him this, and the Acts of the Apostles told a story which bore it out; and he shrewdly observed that the sayings of the Sermon on the Mount ceased to be paradoxical when they were interpreted as precepts to be fulfilled within the circle of the Beloved Society.

Dr. Schütz is a devoted pupil of Harnack, and seeks to carry his master's principles to what he conceives to be their legitimate issues. But he harks back to the old Tübingen School, and is hardly likely to receive his master's approbation.

The Spiritual Gifts. By the Reverend J. R. PRIDIE, M.A., Vicar of Ham, Surrey, sometime Chaplain of Clare College, Cambridge. (London: R. Scott. 1921.) Price 5s.

THIS book stands in striking contrast with the German treatise which we have just noticed. It is an excellent representative of the mind of the scholarly English churchman, as he approaches the same problem of the dominating characteristics of the earliest form of Christianity. The writer is aware of the more or less assured results of the critical study of the New Testament, but for his purpose he is satisfied to take the documents as he finds them, and interrogate them closely. He desires to study the Charismata, or special endowments, of the Church of Christ as the New Testament as it stands represents them to us. He has an instinctive feeling that this presentation of them will carry conviction, and that the proof of its truth will be found to lie in the help which it affords us in dealing with pressing problems of the present hour. He has taken a wide survey of the surroundings of his subject, giving us a wisely restrained account of the development of man's knowledge of the supernatural forces, whether good or evil, by which his life is aided or hindered, and

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he has timely words of wisdom also in regard to the most modern expositions of these forces, especially in relation to the healing of disease. Animism, demonology, angelology, 'the evil spirits' of the Gospel history, the 'principalities and powers' of St. Paul's Epistles—these are all dealt with, not indeed at great length, but with a sure touch which is the evidence of a wide study. The problem of evil personalities in the spiritual world, to which the Gospels and Epistles bear the plainest witness, is carefully and reverently handled, and the view that Our Lord in speaking of such evil personalities was not merely accommodating Himself to the ignorant presuppositions of His hearers is convincingly upheld.

The writer's main thesis is that the Gifts of the Holy Spirit are the endowment of the Church as a whole, and that individuals exercise them only in virtue of their relationship to the Church. It is the Body of Christ, which was endued with the power of the Holy Ghost, in order that as Christ's representative it might carry forward the work of helping and healing both soul and body, which Christ had Himself begun. The writer has an attractive style which seizes and retains the attention of his reader: his scholarship and his sobriety combine to produce conviction; and we believe that his work will prove of great value to those who are seeking for help at the present time in regard to such matters as healing by suggestion and its relation to the spiritual healing in the highest sense which more properly concerns the Christian Church.

The Transformation of Early Christianity from an Eschatological to a Socialized Movement. By L. P. EDWARDS, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Sociology in St. Stephen's College, Menasha, Wisconsin. (Wisconsin: The Collegiate Press. George Banta Publishing Co. 1919.)

THE object of this brochure is to trace the gradual disappearance of eschatological or 'chiliastic' beliefs from Christianity, the bearing of the change on political and economic theory, and its relation to modern psychology. The treatment, while open to obvious criticisms, is distinctly original, and full of suggestions. Chiliasm was 'a psychic equivalent for patriotism' (we move throughout in an atmosphere of psychoses, replexed complexes, and the like), and was strongest in nationalist centres such as Phrygia, Egypt and North Africa. Its disappearance ran

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parallel to the growth of a new attitude to the world, economic development, and private property. The divergence between theory and practice in the matter of loans and interest is well brought out. The process by which Chiliasm finally became heretical is chiefly associated with St. Augustine and there are some interesting remarks on his method. He is 'careful to keep all the symbols, catchwords and paraphernalia of Chiliasm.' He does not allegorize them but succeeds in emptying them of their content, referring the first resurrection, the Kingdom of Heaven, and the 1000 years, to the present reign of the Church. By postponing the end to at least A.D. 1000 he draws the sting of the expectation. 'His argument which overthrew an ancient, famous and widespread doctrine of primitive Christianity contains hardly a line of either refutation or condemnation. It is perhaps the finest example in Christian literature of the "positive apologetic."'[1]

As a whole, 'the change was actual and objective rather than formal and theoretical. It profoundly influenced the practical lives of Christians, but it produced no alteration whatever in the creeds of the Church.'

As has already been said there are obvious points of criticism. The study is the work of one who seems to be an amateur in Biblical and theological studies, and it is specially weak in its treatment of the New Testament. The place of eschatology is very much exaggerated; nothing is said of the changed point of view found in the later Pauline epistles and the Fourth Gospel. Christ in the Sermon on the Mount is represented as denying the legitimacy of private property altogether; no mention is made of the Pastoral Epistles in the discussion of the New Testament attitude towards property. The last chapter takes various sociological principles suggested by modern writers as the key to the development of society ('Economic Determinism,' 'Conspicuous Honorific Consumption' (!), and other horrible phrases) and shews how each one of them may be shewn to apply to the subject under investigation. It does not seem to occur to Dr. Edwards that they cannot all be true. The method reminds one of that of debating societies, not uncommon, we believe, in America, by which the speaker is prepared to defend any thesis at five minutes' notice.

It must be added that there is an appalling number of misprints and misspellings, sometimes two or three on one page;

[1] P. 17.

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Lytra (for Lystra), livlihhod, diliberately, Trojan (for Trajan), sees for seems, and repentence are examples taken at random from successive paragraphs (pp. 52, 53). It is really inexcusable that a Professor and a Collegiate press should have sent out a book in such a state.

The British-Israel Fallacy. By L. E. P. ERITH, M.A., Vice-Principal of Lichfield Theological College. (A. R. Mowbray.) 1*s.* 6*d.*

A BOOK on this subject was unfortunately much needed. It is amazing how this 'extraordinary delusion that we of the English race are really Hebrews in disguise' can be believed by anyone. Yet most of us have met with people for whom it is not only true, but almost *the* Gospel. There are certain circles, particularly in the Evangelical school, in which any theory, no matter how absurd in itself, is likely to obtain credence, provided only it professes to base itself on a literal interpretation of the words of Scripture. Such theories may be, doubtless are, of various degrees of probability, but certainly the wildest and most improbable of all is that which Mr. Erith has made the subject of this book. One of the extravagances of the Anabaptists was styled in the *Articles* of 1552 'a Jewish dotage.' British-Israelism may well be called the same now.

To argue, in the proper sense of the word, against such a theory is not an easy task, for any discussion requires some common ground between the opponents on which the argument may proceed. In arguing against British-Israelites one has to face opponents who base their conclusions on the most perverse and unnatural exegesis of Scripture, coupled with a belief in its verbal inerrancy; who display a complete ignorance of the most elementary ideas of philology, and who have the most distorted views of history. Mr. Erith has, we take it, intended to write for those who are not British-Israelites. If so, his work may be pronounced a successful attempt to shew the folly of the 'delusion.' If his object was the conversion of British-Israelites to saner views, the last of the three chapters (On some principles of Old Testament study) of which the book consists is a mistake. Mr. Erith's 'principles' on this point would be to a British-Israelite anathema; the author would be to him an unbeliever. In fact, even as an antidote against the adoption of British-Israelism, we should have preferred the book to have

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ended with Chapter II. Anyone who is at all likely to be bitten by the fallacy under consideration would surely be alarmed by some of the 'principles' in Chapter III. Such weaker brethren must learn to walk before they can run. Indeed anyone who (without a previous knowledge of the questions at issue) looked up the 'popular' works mentioned in the chapter referred to, would find himself in considerable difficulties. He is sent, for example, to the two one-volume Commentaries, edited by Dummelow and Peake, as 'both handy and reliable.' He will perhaps be at a loss to discover how these can both be 'reliable' when they differ on some essential principles. If he takes up Mr. Redlich's *Introduction to O.T. Study*, he will not find himself on exactly the same critical ground as in *The New Lessons Explained* to which he is also referred.

Chapter II—a review of the principal British-Israel arguments—is admirable. Several pages are very properly devoted to an exposure of the 'Historical Proof' alleged from Josephus and the Apocalypse of Ezra (4 Esdras). Josephus merely says that the ten tribes were 'beyond Euphrates still.' This is garbled by British-Israelites so as to include the required part of Europe by taking 'beyond Euphrates' to mean beyond the line formed by the course of the Euphrates prolonged in that direction. The British-Israel attitude to the Ezra-Apocalypse is perhaps the strangest thing in the whole business. Not only is the book apocryphal, but it is, on any ordinary literary grounds, the weakest part of the Apocrypha. *A priori* it would have seemed likely that those who have such a high regard for the text of Scripture would refuse all evidence from the Apocrypha, yet here we have the curious fact that such persons are ready to include, when it suits their purpose, evidence from a book which is not reckoned as Scripture even by the Church of Rome. British-Israel writers in referring to their favourite passage from this book do not hesitate to write of it as from the pen of Ezra—the prophet Ezra as he is generally termed by them. This is simply throwing dust in their readers' eyes. The book has no more connexion with Ezra than it has with Methuselah. If pseudographic literature is to be brought in at all, why not appeal to the *Letter of Aristeas*, which is a useful historical document, even if not genuine? It 'knows nothing' of lost tribes, but says that six from each tribe were sent from Jerusalem to Alexandria to translate the Law for Philadelphus.

Mr. Erith deals next with the misinterpretations of the biblical passages which are the stock in trade of the British-

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Israel advocate. He has very little difficulty in shewing that, on rational principles of interpretation, they have as much to say to the English as to the Chinese. He uses strong words and speaks of a 'farrago of nonsense,' and a 'precious piece of balderdash,' etc. These words do not help his argument, but are excusable from a man accustomed to read sane literature when confronted with writers who 'prove' that King George V. is descended from David through a daughter of Zedekiah who was married to an Irish chieftain; who gravely claim that Balaam prophesied of the Royal Arms of England when he mentioned the lion and the unicorn (Num. xxiii, A.V.); who see no absurdity, philological or other, in supposing that 'Saxons' is the equivalent of 'Isaac's sons,' or that 'British' means 'man of the covenant,' because in Hebrew *berith* means covenant, and *ish* means man.

It is in Chapter II that Mr. Erith deals his hardest and most useful knocks. As things are, he has done a piece of necessary work. There was nothing else, so far as we know, before this brief pamphlet which summed up in a popular form the objections against this 'delusion.' It is for this reason that it was said above that the book might well have ended with Chapter II. The arguments contained in it are valid, whatever views on biblical criticism a person may hold. Those who move in critical circles are not likely to be affected by British-Israel fallacies. The knowledge of how these should be met is needed rather by others whose views on Old Testament matters in general are far removed from the 'principles' of Chapter III.

Historic Theories of Atonement. With Comments. By ROBERT MACKINTOSH, D.D. (Hodder and Stoughton. 1920.) 7*s.* 6*d.* net.

IF Dr. Mackintosh enjoyed giving the lectures out of which this book has grown, a like experience awaits any reader whose mind can respond to alert and vigorous criticism of past and present soteriologies. Of Dr. Mackintosh it may be said, perhaps more truly than of any other recent writer on the Atonement, that he is *nullius addictus iurare in verba magistri.* Not that he is vague in his presuppositions; he is convinced that sin deserves punishment, and that the moral necessity for atonement stands in no sort of opposition to a God in whom not only, in Dale's phrase, law is alive but love is supreme. But his characteristic

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attitude in respect of the successive theologies is one of decided aloofness. The Greek theory of redemption through the Incarnation, completed through the sacraments, approximates to 'nature-magic.' The Catholicism of the West undermined the ethics of atonement by the way in which it handled the ideas of satisfaction and merit. Anselm shewed real moral and religious greatness, and yet distinguished between the glory of God and the good of man in such a way as to leave the science of theology and the faith of a Christian heart in ruins. The Protestant penal scheme leads logically to the conclusion that God is essentially just, but only contingently loving. On the other hand, 'it is to be feared that Moberly's teaching has had disastrous influence in undermining belief in justice, human or divine,' which is only one of the severe comments which Dr. Mackintosh makes upon *Atonement and Personality*. Dr. Mackintosh's own construction of a theory is, as he calls it, tentative. Perhaps the emphasis lies most clearly upon the need for combining the thoughts of atonement as grounded in a moral necessity which springs from the fact that God is the loving Father who cannot but seek by whatever costly moral means to redeem His sinful children, and of atonement as the presupposition of true moral life in man. Dr. Rashdall's Bampton Lectures did not appear in time for Dr. Mackintosh to do more than refer to them in his preface as 'very learned and very unsatisfying.'

Christian Apologetics of the Second Century in their Relation to Modern Thought. By PHILIP CARRINGTON, B.A. (Cantab.), M.A. (Nov. Zel.). (S.P.C.K. 1921.) *7s. 6d.* net.

IT is in some ways to be regretted that the subject of the Hulsean Prize Essay for 1917 was not restricted to the first half of the title. There is room for a new book on the Apologists themselves, which should combine an adequate statement of the main facts with regard to them with a fuller summary than is usually given of the main lines of their arguments, and a selection of more important passages. It is assumed that because their works have been translated they are generally known and studied as they should be if the student is to understand the Second century: it is forgotten that even a fascinating study like Dr. Armitage Robinson's edition of the *Apology of Aristeides* has been allowed to go out of print, and is quite

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beyond the reach of ordinary theological students. We cannot but hope that even in 'a bookless land'—it is a melancholy but, as we have reason to know, a not untruthful representation of one of the great Dominions—Mr. Carrington may be encouraged to undertake a less ambitious but very useful piece of work for which he seems to have laid the foundation. In the book before us his work has been unduly restricted on this side by the necessity of introducing modern parallels and contrasts of somewhat unequal merit. This seems patent, whether he is speaking of 'the modern doctrine of the Sovereign State, the form in which we uphold to-day the doctrine of the divine right of kings,' or attempting theological restatement: 'We see Him as the ultimate result of a long line of evolution, where lawgiver, prophet, and apocalyptist combine to produce the perfect Son of Man. As modern historical analysis lays it bare to us, we see a complete historical progress from Mount Sinai to Mount Calvary'; or discussing the life of the Church in the first two and in the Eighteenth and beginning of the Nineteenth centuries. It may be characteristic of modern Cambridge to hold that 'undoubtedly the most commanding intellectual figure in England to-day is that of George Bernard Shaw,' and it will no doubt be gratifying to Mr. Shaw, who has been regarded elsewhere as a picturesque survival of the Victorian era. But we hope that it is not equally characteristic to hold that 'an artist's devotion to beauty' is 'a purely physical sensation.' And Mr. Carrington will find that he has a good many of his own historical judgements to reconsider when he comes to study the history of the period of 'a hundred years ago,' of which he speaks with a sublimity very near the border line.

Mr. Carrington's picture of the life of the early Church would be corrected in some details of drawing by a closer examination of the actual evidence for 'communal living,' numbers, extension, etc. His view of 'modern' science and philosophy seems often closer to the age of Matthew Arnold. But his genuine enthusiasm carries the reader along, and he will not be sorry for the time spent in reading the book, however much he may disagree with the writer's view of the Church of our own day. There are lapses in style or proof-reading on pages 20, 27, 117, 136, 137.

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Practical and Devotional Theology.

A Wonderful Morning. An Interpretation of Easter. By J. H. Snowden. (New York: Macmillan Company. 1921.) 9*s.* net.

Two years ago Mr. Snowden wrote *A Wonderful Night*, in which he gave us the results of a study of the records of the Nativity —a little book of considerable dogmatic and spiritual value on the Incarnation. His present interpretation of Easter, on the fact and significance of the Resurrection of our Lord, is a worthy sequel. We are sometimes a little too conscious that Mr. Snowden is indulging in rather flowery language, but on the whole when he sets forth the evidence of the New Testament narrative, he allows the simple facts to speak for themselves, and as usual they produce in our mind a stronger conviction of the truth of the Resurrection, as we go over the story again. After some introductory matter on the antecedents of the wonderful morning, attention is drawn to the significance of the empty tomb, and the details of the appearances of the risen Lord which afford varied illustrations of the nature of His risen body. The credibility of the witnesses in the Gospels and Epistles is discussed, as well as the corroborating evidence derived from the establishment and history of the Church, and from the harmony of the Resurrection with the chief aspects of the person of Christ. A strong point is made of the inadequacy of the theories and explanations by which the most gifted opponents of the Gospel have sought to explain its testimony away, and in conclusion the Resurrection of Christ is regarded as a proof of His Godhead, an essential part of redemption, and the assurance of immortality. More might well have been said on the miracle recorded in the last chapter of St. John, and the significance of our Lord's appearances to St. Stephen and to St. John in Patmos ought to have been emphasized. By a slip, Ananias is called Barnabas on p. 92. The book is nicely got up, with an illustration of the appearance to St. Mary Magdalene as a frontispiece, and what are called 'decorations' of initial capitals and the like. The price is high, but we have not seen a better recent Easter gift book, either for a clergyman or for any devout believer who knows that we cannot abandon the fact of the Resurrection and at the same time retain its value, as some seem to think possible to-day.

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Peace and Happiness. By the Right Reverend H. L. PAGET, D.D., Lord Bishop of Chester. (Longmans. 1922.) 3*s.* 6*d.* net.

AT the request of the Bishop of London, Dr. Paget again undertook to write a book for spiritual reading in Lent. He has chosen for his subject the stately phrases of the prayer for the High Court of Parliament, which has taught us to pray, since the days of Laud, that 'peace and happiness, truth and justice, religion and piety may be established among us for all generations.' The fine old words, which describe so well the best elements of the religious English character, are taken for reflections, suitable indeed for any other time as much as for Lent, in the conviction that we to-day need 'a plain, strong, simple, coherent faith,' that 'can hold men in close and practical fellowship,' that 'reckons with the actual facts of human life, and covers the whole area of human work and effort, speaking to men in their own language.' The Bishop speaks on the words of his text as one who knows the mind of modern Englishmen, and as helping them to take their part in the manifestation of the sons of God, to which his concluding chapter points them, and as believing what the Bishop of London says in his introduction, that 'the future of the world depends upon these words becoming a reality not only in our own present lives, but in the lives of nations.' In commending the book for its excellent sentiments we must say that we have observed here and there a trace of slipshod English, as though the work had to be done under the pressure of many other duties, and had to be 'knocked off' hastily, with little time for correction.

Joyful through Hope. By the Ven. E. E. HOLMES, B.D. (Mowbray. 1921.) 5*s.* net.

THESE eighteen addresses were unwritten, but have been reproduced in book form from a shorthand report for a newspaper. The Archdeacon of London says that they seem to him cold and formal now that they appear written down. They do not seem so to us, and the title of the book is a very fair description of the note which sounds through each address. The Archdeacon has a way of his own which commends itself to a large circle of admirers. He is fond of confining himself to one idea. He takes it and sets it up, and, as it were, walks round it, and looks at it from many points of view. He keeps on repeating

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the words in which he first describes it, as he heaps up illustrations of it from history and experience in all directions. At the close, which comes curiously soon, for the addresses are sometimes very short, he has sustained the interest of his hearers all the time by the vivacity and variety of his illustrative matter, and leaves them in the presence of his leading idea, with a feeling that they cannot escape from it if they would. And in truth they have no desire to do so. In pursuing his idea Mr. Holmes will take tribute from all, and will brook no denial. He will have a Burne-Jones picture for a frontispiece, and quote the hymns of East and West. The poetry of Sophocles and Homer, the art of Michael Angelo and Turner, the episodes of the conversion of the Saxons, St. Francis and St. Benedict, things political, social, liturgical, financial, legal, are used in turn to press the central thought of an address upon the hearers. The addresses are not expository, are not remarkable for elucidation of the continuous arguments of great passages of Scripture. They do not ever remind us of St. Chrysostom or St. Augustine, of Bishop Andrewes or of Dr. Liddon. Their excellence is the peculiar excellence of the personality of the preacher, as we suppose the excellence of all good sermons is. And their merit comes upon us through many and abundant channels. Now the subject is 'the Madonna of the Scriptures,' or 'the Ages of the human Life of our Lord,' or 'the Holy Ghost the Comforter,' or 'the Gloria Patri'; and then 'A French Crucifix,' or 'St. Paul's Girdle,' or 'The beauty of doctrine,' or 'The triumph of good'; and then, again, such unusual topics as 'The value of the anonymous' or 'The value of being talked about.' But whatever the subject, there is a freshness of treatment and a facile use of illustration which deserve more than the passing attention of the preachers of sermons.

A Catholic Primer. Being a Short Explanation of the Catholic Faith. By the Reverend Canon J. O. Coop, D.S.O., M.A. (Mowbray. 1922.) 1s. net.

A short, simple and definite explanation of the Faith, based upon the Apostles' Creed, such as Canon Coop has provided in this small book, is more needed by many adults than we often may think. The instruction is cast into the form of question and answer, which may help those for whom it is intended. The purpose is so excellent and the root of the matter so sound that we forbear to criticize, as we might, some colloquial phrases,

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both in questions and answers. The matter indeed lacks some of the precision of the Catechisms issued by the Society of Saint John the Evangelist. And we are bound to mention that the Wise Men found the Lord Jesus, according to St. Matthew's narrative, not in the manger, but in the house.

The Christ and His Gospel. Being a Concise Review of the Soul in its Passage through Time. By W. T. WILSON, M.A., M.D. (Routledge. 1922.)

DR. WILSON regards this book as an outline, a brief review, an epitome of the teaching of a larger work, to which he frequently refers, on *The eternal Soul.* Unfortunately, he does not divide it into chapters, provides neither table of contents nor index, and merely repeats the title as the heading of each page. And this is a case in which the ordinary mortal sorely needs such help, especially if it be true, as Dr. Wilson observes, that 'no man on earth, prior to reading *The eternal Soul*, knows anything definite about St. John's Gospel.' Dr. Wilson himself is uniquely privileged. One morning about seventeen years ago, whilst engaged upon a certain inspired compilation, the spirit in attendance supervizing his composition (to be explained elsewhere) remarked to him, 'To-morrow at this time a powerful and learned angel will visit you for the purpose of imparting valuable information relative to the Bible.' In response the good Doctor bowed his head and said mentally 'Very well.' Under the guidance of the angelic visitor Dr. Wilson tells us much that we did not know before, that the soul of man is eternal without beginning and without end, precisely as God is eternal, that St. John's Gospel was compiled subject to conditions precisely similar to those by which Dr. Wilson's son, a young man eighteen years of age, wrote *The Human Soul Revealed*, that the mistakes of St. Paul more than once need correction, that our Lord's trial before Pilate lasted until mid-afternoon, that His death was purely exemplary and its hitherto recognized sacrificial nature disappears, that the term 'the Word' is used in St. John's Gospel 'merely as a blind,' that 'the very thought of reunion with His Father was almost too much even for the Christ,' that 'He could not restrain Himself any longer,' that His resurrection occurred simultaneously with His death, and was quite distinct from His rising again the third day, that His rising again the third day means the temporary re-creation of Christ's material body for definite purposes, and was applicable

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to Him only, and so on. From these samples we know what we have to expect in Dr. Wilson's larger works, and so the purpose of his 'epitome' is achieved. We suspend final judgement till we have read the more ample disclosure of the revelation which we are told is necessarily of a somewhat complicated nature, and deals largely with abstruse spiritual facts. But at present we are not convinced that every student of St. John's Gospel hitherto has been wrong, or that Dr. Wilson's explanation of the presence of matter in space, and of the life of the soul in a human body, has more elements of truth in it than the famous *dicta* of St. Ignatius: 'I come from God, I belong to God, I shall go to God.' However, we speak with an open mind.

Christian Marriage at the Cross-Roads. By the Rev. Canon W. C. E. Newbolt, M.A. (Skeffington.) 2*s.* 6*d.* net.

Sound instruction on marriage, regarded as a sacred state and as a Christian ordinance, is given in these five chapters, which contain the substance of sermons preached at St. Paul's in 1920. In speaking of marriage as the divinely provided foundation of family and social life, Canon Newbolt does not forget to plead for a better recognition of other bulwarks of genuine religion, such as the observance of Sunday, the devotional reading of the Bible, and the honourable competition of men and women in good works. First among the enemies of holy marriage Canon Newbolt places the agitators for divorce. He examines the evidence of the New Testament very carefully, and his view is that our Lord sanctioned judicial separation in the case of the woman's fornication, but did not sanction divorce. That many reasons urged for divorce nowadays are admittedly outside the range of Christ's permission is not a matter of argument but of fact, and it is the repudiation of Christ's authority, when it is thought desirable, with which we have to deal. The second enemy of marriage of which these addresses take grave note is the prevailing looseness of sexual morality, and the breaking down of modesty and self-restraint. The relaxation of the Church's laws of affinity is a precise illustration of this tendency. It is necessary to state frequently and clearly that the Church regards relationship by marriage, that is by affinity, as of exactly the same importance as relationship by blood, that is by kin, and also that in Church law those who are related within three steps of kindred or affinity may not marry. Perhaps those who urge the lawfulness of the re-marriage of the

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'innocent party' have not always given sufficient attention to the difficulty that if a marriage can be regarded as dissolved, then the guilty party is released from the bond as much as the innocent party. After a particularly valuable chapter on the causes for which matrimony was ordained, and on the significance of the mutual promises of the man and the woman in the Form for the Solemnization of Matrimony, Canon Newbolt concludes with considerations on the care of children, and on the eternal permanency of worthy love. This last point suggests some consideration of the question of second marriages, on which Canon Newbolt does not dwell. The weight of the Gospel teaching on which he so justly insists in its bearing on the whole subject of marriage forces us to say that however excellent an address may be given to a newly married couple, there is nothing as yet devised by the wit of man worthy to supplant the summary of the teaching of Holy Scripture which is printed as an Exhortation at the close of the Marriage Service in the Book of Common Prayer.

Church Services and Music.

The Diocesan Service Book: authorized for use in the Diocese of Oxford. (London: Mowbray and Co. 1920.) 10s. 6*d*.

This book has already been for a year in use, and this review should have been written earlier. But the fact that it was not, is the best possible testimony to the value of the book, for the reviewer was so constantly referring to it as a book to use that he forgot meanwhile that it was also a book to review. By now the Diocese of Oxford has found its value, and probably other dioceses are not a little covetous. For these diocesan books are becoming a really valuable contribution to liturgical development; beginning with the small and rather ugly older Services issued by the S.P.C.K. they have now developed, notably in this instance and in the sister book of Salisbury, into comprehensive and stately service books. They have not only a present value but offer an opportunity for most useful experiments and tentative efforts towards the rites that are to be in the future.

From the Organ Loft. By Alfred H. Allen. (Oxford. 1921.)

This is a small pamphlet, containing a somewhat strongly worded statement on the subject of church music, with a fore-

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word by Sir Henry Hadow. We are in general agreement with the line taken by the author, and heartily wish that his principles were more widely observed. We welcome also his suggestions of Choir and Organ Recitals, and congratulate him sincerely on the admirable character of his suggested programmes. We cannot, however, help feeling that it is extremely difficult to make people believe that music really matters, and we are inclined to think that the stronger the language used, the less conviction it carries. The average churchgoer does not and cannot believe that, provided he likes the music, it can make any difference what it is. We hope that there are very few persons who could find any shadow of defence for the treatment of the passage from Wesley's *Wilderness*, on page 8; but we greatly fear that much of the rest of the pamphlet would be unpersuasive. Further, the author recommends Plain Song for the Psalms, and of course there is a great deal to be said for it. We would, however, recommend him to look at an article on the Use of Plain Song, by Mr. Underhill of Birmingham, in *The Commonwealth* two or three months ago. In this article Mr. Underhill, although he would apparently admit all that Mr. Allen says in his pamphlet, regards Plain Song as one of the surest methods of emptying a church. Whether the British churchgoer is right, or not, in theory, we are inclined to think that Mr. Underhill has described the situation rightly.

Easy Plainsong Settings of the Holy Communion Service, with Organ Accompaniments. By E. G. P. WYATT and W. H. FERGUSON. (Mowbray. 1922.) 3s. 6*d*. net.

THE above work contains a series of settings of the people's part. The organ accompaniments are simple and suited to the Plainsong. In churches where Plainsong is used, we think that these settings would be of great value, and we warmly commend them.

PHILOSOPHY.

Studies in Christian Philosophy. Being the Boyle Lectures 1920, by W. R. MATTHEWS, B.D., Dean of King's College, London; Professor of the Philosophy of Religion. (Macmillan. 1921.) 10s. 6*d*. net.

PROFESSOR MATTHEWS' Boyle Lectures for 1920, now published as *Studies in Christian Philosophy*, deserve a cordial welcome from all who value in a theologian an independent judgement

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and a candid temper applied to the free and reverent discussion of the theoretical foundations of a Christian's faith in God. They are distinguished by their insistence on the importance of the intellectual element in theology. This leads the author to some sensible criticism of the tendency to underrate it which finds expression alike in Ritschlianism and in the mysticism for which Ritschl had so strong an antipathy. He even goes the length of endorsing the view of Signor Croce that there is no inherent or ultimate distinction between Religion and Philosophy. Here he appears to me to go too far. While agreeing that 'all religion implies a view of the world, and every specific religion is connected with, and depends upon, a characteristic conception of the universe' (p. 35), I should say that such a conception is an integral part of the religion, but not the whole of it. Nor does Prof. Matthews really think that it is the whole of it; for he observes with truth that Croce deals 'with the religious consciousness as if there were no such things as worship and the experience of redemption' (p. 23). But if Croce is mistaken in so dealing with the religious consciousness, he is wrong in his treatment of it as an inferior stage of Philosophy; and if worship (to take this only) is something which will survive —and Prof. Matthews would doubtless hold that it will—all philosophical criticism of the world-views now associated with it, then Philosophy cannot absorb Religion. The remark (p. 24) that 'the question whether religion is to be absorbed in philosophy or philosophy in religion ceases to have any importance and may be left to the lexicographers of a remote future to decide,' indicates a somewhat inadequate appreciation of the problem at issue. Indeed, despite the attention which Professor Matthews has paid to Croce, he never quite comes to grips with that philosopher's objection to Christianity, and in general to all theism whose God is not merely immanent, namely that history is deprived of all real significance if what is attained in and through it is supposed to be from the first completely realized in God. We all nowadays accept development or evolution as a ruling idea in our thought about the world; but the difficulty of reconciling this idea, when taken seriously, with theism is greater than Professor Matthews seems always to realize. So again, apart from the special theories of Croce, the difficulty arising for theism from the 'immanent teleology' of life is perhaps inadequately felt; and one may doubt whether the analogy between the objections to the naturalistic treatment of goodness and those to the natural-

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istic treatment of truth is quite so close as is suggested on p. 122. But in the final chapter on the 'Idea of Creation' we have a part, at any rate, of the problem raised by Croce attacked, though without further reference to him; and it is noteworthy that Professor Matthews has definitely affirmed his conviction that 'Creation is not negligible even from the point of view of God; it is not a mere reflection of the divine nature which may appear and disappear without making the smallest difference to the Creator' (p. 204), and that the world 'is no finished work, nor ever will be,' so that 'for the whole there is no beginning and no end' (p. 228). Such views are not indeed without precedent. It is to be remembered that St. Thomas held that belief in the eternity of the world, although inadmissible in view of the express statements of Scripture, was not incompatible with what, apart from revelation, could be known of God. But much time-honoured language must be discarded, or at least emptied of real significance, if Professor Matthews' doctrine of creation is accepted. That he has brought it so emphatically forward is sufficient to shew that any occasional failure to appreciate the magnitude of difficulties raised for theology by changes in our outlook and sympathy from those of our fathers is not due to lack of intellectual courage on his part. This would also be proved by his frank admission (p. 40) that he 'would not be prepared to say that historical proof of the complete inhistoricity of the Gospels would destroy the Christian religion'—though he does not, we take it, himself hold such a proof to have been, or to be likely to be, produced.

Those who appreciate the sincerity, open-mindedness and freedom from bondage to traditional formulas, whether theological or philosophical, which distinguish this volume will look forward with pleasant anticipation to the two succeeding courses of Boyle Lectures, promised by Professor Matthews in his preface, which are to deal with Revelation and Incarnation; and this all the more that the author gives us hopes that he will devote a part of these to the consideration of some of those questions which he has in this first series raised but not fully discussed.

The name of the distinguished author of *The Crown of Hinduism* is given both on p. 47 and in the Index as J. R. Farquhar; it should be *J. N.*

C. C. J. W.

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Church Law.

The Book of Church Law. By John Henry Blunt, D.D., revised by G. Edwardes Jones. Eleventh edition. (Longmans. 1921.) 14*s.* net.

The fact that this book, originally published in 1872, has reached an eleventh edition is sufficient proof that it has been found useful. In judging it, it is important to bear in mind its object, as described by Lord Phillimore in his interesting preface. It is intended to be 'a practical guide for incumbents of parishes, both in their position as priests of the Catholic Church, and also as office-bearers in a Church established by law and receiving privileges from and having duties and responsibilities to the State, and for parochial Church officers also in their double capacity.' In other words it is a book for laymen (in the legal sense) and not for lawyers. As a law book simply, we are not sure that Dale's *Clergyman's Legal Handbook* is not better; but it is a very dry manual, and Blunt deals with the historical and antiquarian aspects of the subject in a way to which Dale does not pretend. The remarkable success with which a great mass of detailed legal information is conveyed in a form by no means unreadable is, no doubt, primarily due to the co-operation in the original publication of Dr. Blunt, a learned parish priest, with Lord Phillimore. Lord Phillimore himself edited the fourth, fifth and sixth editions, besides helping in the first three; the later ones have been in the capable hands of Mr. Edwardes Jones. The book is now thoroughly up to date, and in this respect Dale, which has not been re-edited since 1898, cannot compete with it. In the appendix the Canons of 1603 are printed in full, together with several Acts of Parliament relating to the Church, including the Church of England Assembly (Powers) Act 1919 (the 'Enabling Act') and the Constitution of the National Assembly of the Church to which that Act gives the sanction of law. Perhaps the selection of Acts might be improved, but the inclusion of the Canons and the Constitution with the Enabling Act in one handy volume is very convenient. We may notice, as an example of information in this book not readily to be found elsewhere, the clear account of the meaning of the term 'conventional district' at pages 370 and 371. We believe that the other current books on Church law may be searched in vain on this point. On the whole, we have no doubt that the clergy will continue to find this the law book which suits their requirements best.

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Marriage in Church, Chapel and Register Office. By ARTHUR S. MAY. (Longmans. 1920.) 2*s.* 6*d.* net.

MR. MAY is Surrogate of Ecclesiastical Courts in Doctors' Commons, and he has been impressed in the course of his official duties by the gross ignorance of many people as to the law of marriage. This little book of eighty pages is intended to furnish a remedy. It is excellently written, and anyone who masters its contents will certainly know as much about the English Law of Marriage as the ordinary citizen needs to know. Mr. May gives no references, and his book would be of little use to anyone, lawyer or otherwise, who may have to advise others on questions of the law of marriage. His object has been different, to enlighten the public by a short readable account of the subject; and this he has attained. In one or two cases his desire to be brief has perhaps made him forget the ignorance of those for whom he writes. For example he says (p. 6): 'Marriage is necessary to create the degree of affinity which makes a subsequent marriage unlawful on the ground of affinity, but illegitimate kinship is a bar to marriage.' This is perfectly accurate, but we doubt whether readers such as Mr. May has in mind would understand it. They would be helped by a word of explanation of the words 'affinity' and 'kinship.' On p. 51 it seems to be implied (though it is not stated) that the Ecclesiastical Commissioners have no authority to settle fees except for ancient parishes. Mr. May is no doubt aware that their jurisdiction extends to all parishes, and that they have recently announced their willingness to exercise it even as to 'new parishes,' for which the diocesan chancellors have concurrent powers. The perusal of Mr. May's book makes us wish that he would edit Hammick's *Law of Marriage*, an excellent law-book, the last edition of which was published in 1887, and is very difficult to procure; a new edition, such as Mr. May is qualified to produce, would be of great value.

BIOGRAPHY.

Life of Bishop Percival. By WILLIAM TEMPLE, Bishop of Manchester. (Macmillan. 1921.) 18*s.* net.

THE Bishop of Manchester is heartily to be congratulated upon the success of this biography. It is no easy task for any man to write with sufficient detachment of one whom he has known from his earliest years, and who filled in turn a succession of

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great posts as headmaster, head of a college, and bishop. Those posts are all of them in their measure of a public character, and the man who holds them can scarcely hope, if he be one of any force or determination, to be exempt from the kind of criticism which is most difficult to those who stand in close relation to him. John Percival had many qualities in the judgement of his contemporaries which might have led to real greatness. That they did so probably none of the younger generation, to which the Bishop of Manchester belongs, would feel able to say. Partly this was due to the fact that the defects of those qualities, if we may use an ambiguous but not unintelligible phrase, impressed themselves so strongly upon those who differed from him; partly also there must be taken into account a certain narrowness of outlook, and real even if unconscious intolerance of temper, which made it impossible for Bishop Percival to recognize either that those who differed from him were not necessarily obdurate reactionaries or luke-warm Christians, or that he himself, in the advocacy of causes which he had closely at heart, was not infrequently led into the use of language which in the eyes of others was as extravagant as it was sometimes painfully unjust.

Yet the picture which is here presented with no little sympathy and skill is one which may well appeal alike to those who knew Bishop Percival, and to others whose impression of him will be derived solely from what Dr. Temple has written. That Percival was a great schoolmaster will be readily admitted by many who neither follow his methods nor, on the whole, agree with his views. He was a man of great courage and absolutely dogged pertinacity, whether at Clifton or at Rugby or at Trinity College, Oxford. His latest successor at Rugby wrote to him from Wellington on his retirement in 1917:

> 'Often and often when I have come to the ugly corners which sometimes face all headmasters I have got courage from thinking of the fearless way in which you would have faced such a situation. I am proud that I began my work under you at Rugby, and continued it at Clifton, where your spirit can never die. There is change ahead of English schools, and I hope we shall have the wisdom to meet it and that all the headmasters in England—and there are many—who have caught some inspiration from you will hand it on to the next generation.'

It is a fine tribute, and not undeserved, to a man whom an old pupil who has since achieved distinction, though his views on most subjects are certainly not such as Percival would have approved, describes as one of the few men he has ever known

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that were really great. But the qualities which make a great schoolmaster are not always, nor even often, those which make it easy for a man to deal with tact and success with those no longer *in statu pupillari*, or over whom he may be called to exercise pastoral care. In his administration at Trinity, as Dr. Temple points out, there was a conflict of ideals. 'Not for his own sake, but for the sake of the undergraduates and their future service of the nation, he desired to make life in a college a great deal more like life in a school than it now is.' It is perhaps scarcely surprising that the result was not altogether satisfactory, though the measure of failure may easily be exaggerated. If some undergraduates resented being fined a sovereign for wearing a straw hat on a Sunday afternoon in the College garden, others recognized that, as Bishop Gore has said of his sermons in College Chapel, 'a great, strong, righteous will was expressing itself among us with profound astonishment at our being content to be such fools as we were.' It is related of a celebrated ecclesiastical dignitary that he expressed his determination to allow nothing to be detracted from the rights and privileges of his office, while his colleagues complained that he seemed desirous of leaving them no rights at all. So much depends upon the point of view. And in his relations with the senior members of the College, a strangely varied and even a little incongruous body, as many remember them, Percival too seemed sometimes at any rate to forget that the Fellows of Trinity are not the President's assistant masters.

It required courage to send to Hereford, of all dioceses, in 1895, a Chief Pastor of whom the diocese knew in relation to matters which touched them most nearly, that he was an advocate of the disestablishment and disendowment of the Welsh Church, that he thought that the Church's education policy was wrong, and even (though this they did not know) based on a conception of the Church which he held to be false, and that he was by conviction a political partisan. That they came to love him, as many did who detested his principles and disliked his appointments, is a testimony to an element of the sunshine of real kindliness, which made itself felt as well as the ruggedness of the rock. By many Bishop Percival will be remembered for his services in connexion with the furtherance of the movement for University Extension, and his genuine desire for Christian reunion. It was characteristic of him that this desire should be coupled on an occasion where his action had been criticized with the statement that, 'as for the suggestion that I am hampering

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rather than helping forward the spirit of unity, I think we bishops are too much inclined to fear that any individual action which is progressive may be likely to rouse opposition among those who are bound fast in the bonds of ecclesiastical tradition,' and that he could write on the following day (May 5, 1911), after this meeting of Convocation: 'the Bishop of Winchester found he had rather a hard task to reconcile what he and his friends call their intense desire for Christian union with their refusal to do anything or countenance any effective steps to bring it nearer.' There also was the man; and he never could understand why people were pained by the things that he allowed himself to say, even if a sense of humour sometimes prevented them from being angry.

PERIODICALS.

The Journal of Theological Studies (Vol. XXIII. No. 90. January 1922. Milford). J. Bessières (ed. C. H. Turner): 'La Tradition manuscrite de la correspondance de S. Basile,' IV. B. W. Bacon: 'Marcion, Papias, and "the Elders."' F. H. Colson: 'Notes on Justin Martyr, *Apology* I.' R. A. Aytoun: 'The Servant of the Lord in the Targums.' M. R. James: 'Robert Grosseteste on the Psalms' (MS. Eton Coll. 8). F. C. Burkitt: 'Ubertino da Casale and a Variant Reading' (St. Matt. xxvii 49). J. H. Baxter: 'On a Place in St. Augustine's *Rule*' (*Ep.* 211, 4). F. C. Burkitt: '"The Solution of the Synoptic Problem"' (Reviews Mr. Robinson Smith). F. W. Buckler: 'Two Instances of Khil'at in the Bible' (2 Kings v, St. Matt. xxii 1–22). I. Abrahams: 'Strack *Einleitung in Talmud u. Midras.*' F. R. Tennant: 'W. L. Davidson *Recent Theistic Discussion.*' P. Gardner-Smith: 'Mellone *The N.T. and Modern Life*'; 'Cadoux *The Guidance of Jesus for To-day*'; 'W. McDonald *Ethical Aspects of the Social Question*'; 'Vossier *The Christian Mind*'; '*The Beginnings of the Divine Society.*' A. Souter: 'G. Kruger *Die Christliche lateinische Litteratur von Augustinus bis Gregor d. Gr.*' ('by far the best guide to Latin Literature A.D. 400–600'); 'Jaeger *Gregorii Nysseni Opera*, I'; 'Gabarron *Arnobe* et *Le Latin d'Arnobe*'; 'Linderbauer *S. Benedicti Regula Monachorum.*' B. G. Brown: 'Deanesly *The Lollard Bible.*' L. Patterson: 'Cumont *Mithra ou Sarapis Pantokrator.*' F. C. Burkitt: 'Conybeare *Russian Dissenters.*' E. W. Brooks: 'Furlani *Sei Scritti antitriteistici.*'

The Journal of Religion (Vol. II. Nos. 1–2. January–March 1922. Chicago University Press). G. W. Coleman: 'The Contribution of the Open Forum to Democracy in Religion.' C. H. Moehlmann: 'What are the Fundamentals of Christianity?' W. C. Keirstead: 'The Leadership of the Ministry in Industrial and Social Life.' J. M. P. Smith: 'Law and Ritual in the Psalms.' S. S. Cohon: 'The Mission of Reform Judaism.' K. Saunders: 'Glimpses of the Religious Life of New Japan.' D. C. Macintosh: 'Alexander *Space, Time and Deity*' (5 pp.). J. M. P. Smith: 'Driver-Gray *Job.*' E. F. Scott: 'Bacon *Jesus and Paul.*' G. B. Smith: 'What shall Protestantism do with Modernism?' March. J. H. Tufts: 'Religion's Place in securing a Better World Order.' G. Cross: 'The Stake of Protestantism in the Christian Union Movement.' P. Hutchinson: 'Christian Division—A Prior Claim.' S. W. Dyde: 'Church Union in Canada—from a Presbyterian Standpoint.'

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H. W. Willoughby: 'The Next Step in N.T. Study.' A. E. Haydon: 'The Significance of the Mystic's Experience.' G. B. Smith: 'The Reconstruction of Religious Loyalty.' H. F. Rall: 'Matthews-Smith *A Dictionary of Religion and Ethics.*' C. R. Bowen: '*The Westminster Version of the Sacred Scriptures.*' J. W. Buckbeam: 'Von Hügel *Essays and Addresses on the Philosophy of Religion.*' O. S. Davis: 'C. D. Williams *The Prophetic Ministry for To-day.*'

The Princeton Theological Review (Vol. XX. No. 1. January 1922. Princeton University Press). C. W. Hodge: 'The Significance of the Reformed Theology To-day.' S. G. Craig: 'The Christian Way of Life and the Supernatural.' H. C. Sheldon: 'The Psychology of Religion interrogated.' R. D. Wilson: '"Daniel not quoted."' D. J. Burrell: 'The Lost Chord.' W. A. Holliday: 'Brainerd, Edwards, and Martyn.' J. G. Machen: 'Liberalism or Christianity?' J. Fox: 'The Shorter Bible.' W. B. Greene, jr.: 'Randall *The New Light on Immortality.*' J. G. Machen: 'Burton *Galatians*' (6 pp.). C. E. Macartney: 'Jacks *From Authority to Freedom.*' H. W. Smith: 'Quiller-Couch *On the Art of Reading.*' D. S. Gage: 'H. G. Wells *Outline of History*' (8 pp.).

The Pilgrim (Vol. II. No. 2. January 1922. Longmans). F. E. Pollard: 'The Meaning of Disarmament.' M. D. Stocks: 'The Children of the Economic Man.' W. C. Buncher: 'The Political Philosophy of the Hebrew Prophets.' A. E. J. Rawlinson: 'The Historical Grounds of Christian Belief.' J. M. Wilson: 'The Principle of Modernism and the Doctrine of the Incarnation.' F. R. Barry: 'Christianity and the New Psychology.' D. A. Edwards: 'Christian Experience and the Catholic Church.' Bishop of Manchester: 'Faith and Authority.' 'Von Hügel *Essays and Addresses.*' 'G. B. Shaw *Back to Methuselah.*' 'Bevan *Hellenism and Christianity.*' 'Haldane *The Reign of Relativity.*' 'Russell *The Analysis of Mind.*' 'Darragh *The Resurrection of the Flesh.*' 'G. C. Field *Moral Theory.*' 'R. M. Jones *Later Periods of Quakerism.*' 'Stone and Puller *Who are Members of the Church?*' 'Rathenau *In Days to Come.*' 'Brailsford *The Russian Workers' Republic.*'

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The International Review of Missions (Vol. XI. No. 41. January 1922. Edinburgh House, Eaton Gate, S.W. 1). A. L. Warnshuis: 'The Missionary Significance of the last Ten Years. I. In China.' F. Lenwood: 'The International Missionary Council at Lake Mohonk, October 1921.' J. R. Mott: 'International Missionary Co-operation.' H. S. Coffin: 'The Gate of the Temple which is called Beautiful.' E. W. Smith: 'The Sublimation of Bantu Life and Thought.' Right Rev. H. Pakenham-Walsh: 'Divine Healing. A Record of Missionary Study and Experience.' W. A. Brown: 'The Ten Years' Index of the Review. A Retrospect.' N. Macnicol: 'Pratt *The Religious Consciousness.*' A. W. Wilkie: 'Fuller *A Vanished Dynasty: Ashanti.*' A. Werner: 'Torrend *Specimens of Bantu Folklore.*' C. Sorabji: 'Das *Life and Letters of Toru Dutt.*' F. M. North: '*An Introduction to Missionary Service.*' 'Ten Years' Selected International Missionary Bibliography, 1912–22.'

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Books Received.

The more important will be noticed in Articles and Short Notices as space permits.

Biblical Studies.

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Ball, C. J.—*The Book of Job.* A Revised Text and Version. Preface by C. F. Burney. Pp. viii + 479. (Clarendon Press.) 25*s.* net.

Couchoud, Paul-Louis.—*L'Apocalypse.* Traduction du Poème avec une Introduction. Pp. 137. (Paris: Editions Bossard, 43, Rue Madame.) 21 *francs.*

Firminger, W. K.—*The Epistles of St. Paul the Apostle to the Colossians and to Philemon.* Pp. xxviii + 355. (S.P.C.K.) 7*s.* 6*d.* net.

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MERCER, S. A. B.—*Life and Growth of Israel.* (Milwaukee, Wis.: Morehouse Publishing Co.) Pp. xv + 170.

SELLIN, E. D.—*Das Zwölfprophetenbuch, übersetzt und erklärt* A.D. 1852. Pp. x + 567. (Leipzig: A. Deichertsche Verlagsbuchhandlung. Dr. Scholl.)

SMITH, J. M. POWIS.—*The Religion of the Psalms.* Pp. x + 170. (University of Chicago Press.) $1.75 net.

SMITH, ROBINSON.—*The Solution of the Synoptic Problem.* Pp. viii + 299. (Watt and Co.) 10*s.* net.

THACKERAY, H. ST. JOHN.—*The Septuagint and Jewish Worship. A Study in Origins.* Schweich Lectures 1920. Pp. 143. (Oxford University Press.) 6*s.* net.

WILLIAMS, A. L.—*Tractate Berakoth.* Translations from the Hebrew, with Introduction and Notes. Pp. xxvi + 96. (S.P.C.K.) 6*s.* net.

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CONTENTS:

PAGE

I. RELIGION IN CZECHO-SLOVAKIA. By the Rev. J. B. SEATON, Principal of Cuddesdon 201

II. THE ORIGIN OF THE GOSPELS. By the Rev. W. LOCKTON, Diocesan Training College, Winchester . . 216

III. WORCESTER PRIORY AND ITS BISHOP. By the Right Rev. E. H. PEARCE, Litt.D., Bishop of Worcester. 240

IV. THE NEW IDEALISM. By Miss HILDA D. OAKELEY, Reader in Philosophy, University of London, King's College 259

V. TITHE RENT CHARGE: LEGISLATION AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS, A.D. 1888-1921. By the Rev. W. C. TUTING, D.D., Sithney Vicarage, Helston . . 282

VI. LANGUAGE AND STYLE IN THE NEW TESTAMENT. By the Rev. F. P. CHEETHAM, Lecturer in New Testament, King's College, London 302

VII. REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON OXFORD AND CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITIES. By the Rev. ARTHUR C. HEADLAM, D.D., Regius Professor of Divinity in the University of Oxford 322

STUDIES IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY FRANCE . 352

SHORT NOTICES 358

INDEX TO VOLUME XCIV. 391

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THE

CHURCH QUARTERLY REVIEW.

No. CLXXXVIII.—*July* 1922.

Art. I.—RELIGION IN CZECHO-SLOVAKIA.

1. *A History of the Papacy from the Great Schism to the Sack of Rome.* By M. Creighton, D.D., Oxon. and Cam., Lord Bishop of London. New Edition in six volumes. Vols. I—III. (London: Longmans, Green and Co. 1897.)
2. *Bohemia.* By the Count Lützov. 'Everyman's Library.' (London: J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd. 1920.)
3. *Independent Bohemia.* By V. Nosek. (London: J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd. 1918.)
4. *Encyclopaedia Britannica.* New Volumes. Vol. I. Art. 'Czecho-Slovakia.' (Cambridge University Press. 1922.)

Czecho-Slovakia is perhaps the most interesting country in Europe to-day, and yet the average Englishman is hardly acquainted with its place on the map, much less with its past history, its present importance, and its future possibilities. It stands in the very centre of Europe, a solid wedge of Slav life thrust into the midst of the German peoples. It represents the furthest thrust westward of the Slav immigration from the Seventh century until to-day. It is only a new country in the sense that it has a new name and a new constitution. Its modern history begins with the proclamation of independence on October 28, 1918, at the time when the Austrian Empire burst into fragments. But its history goes back into the distant past when before 1620 most of its constituent parts enjoyed an independent life,

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and nobody can understand the present history and ideals of the Czecho-Slovak nation unless he has some knowledge of its past. The reassertion of Czech independence is one of the most astonishing examples of time's revenges. The country is roughly of the size of England and Wales, and is composed of Bohemia, the predominant partner, Moravia, with a portion of Silesia, and Slovakia, with Sub-Carpathian Russia. Slovakia had been part of the Hungarian Kingdom by conquest, but the Slovaks are kinsmen of the Czechs; the difference in their language is only dialectical, and two days after the declaration of Czech independence in 1918, the Slovak National Council solemnly affirmed that in blood, language, and civilization the Slovak people formed part of the Czecho-Slovak nation. According to the census of 1921, the population of the whole country is 13,595,816; Bohemia, 6,664,932; Moravia, 2,660,737; Silesia, 670,937; Slovakia, 2,993,479; and Sub-Carpathian Russia or Russinia, 605,731. It will be seen that practically half the population inhabits Bohemia, the workshop of the former Austrian Empire; for eighty per cent. of the industries of the Austrian Empire were in Bohemia. The distribution of races in the country is as follows:—Czech, 7 millions; Slovaks, 2¼ millions; Germans, 3¼ millions; Ruthenians, 500,000; Magyars, 500,000. There is therefore a large German minority, mainly in the north and west of Bohemia, along the Saxon and Bavarian borders. But it should be remembered that there are many Czechs incorporated in surrounding countries, 500,000 in Austria, 450,000 in Hungary, 200,000 in Jugoslavia and Roumania, as well as 800,000 in the United States. The Czech revival gathered force in the early part of the Nineteenth century, as a result of the liberal policy of Joseph II, the son of Maria Theresa. In his reign the publication of a newspaper in the national language was permitted and editions of ancient Bohemian works and translations from foreign languages into the national language began to be published; the Bohemian Society of Sciences was founded, and professorships of the Czech language were established at Vienna and subsequently at Prague. The result was the Czech national Renaissance.

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It was in its origin a literary and artistic revival. But naturally new political ideals began to animate the Czech people, who recovered the national consciousness so long suppressed by the Hapsburg autocracy. At least their hope and aim was that the old Bohemian kingdom should be recognized with the same privileges as the Kingdom of Hungary within the Empire, and that the Emperor Francis Joseph would consent to be crowned as King of Bohemia. But these hopes were always doomed to disappointment, and the repressive policy of Austria-Hungary continued. When the Great War broke out, Czech sympathies were with the Allied cause, and, though the fact was generally unknown in this country, there was lodged throughout the war in the very heart of the Central Empires a nation opposed in spirit and will to the Austro-German policy, and so far as it was possible, actively engaged in thwarting it. The Czech soldiers, amongst the best troops of the Austrian Empire, were reluctant to fight, particularly against their Slav kinsmen of Russia and Serbia, and in fact, out of 600,000, 360,000 actually surrendered rather than go into battle against their own flesh and blood. The story of the Czech Legion in Russia was one of the romances of the Great War, and the recognition in 1918 by Great Britain and the United States of the Czecho-Slovaks as an allied nation and the Czecho-Slovak National Council, which had been formed mainly by President Masaryk, Dr. Stefanik and Dr. Benes, as the trustee of the future Czecho-Slovak Government, was the herald of the approaching dissolution of the Austrian Empire. The Independence of the Czecho-Slovak Republic was proclaimed on October 28, 1918, the Austrian garrison being disarmed and the revolution accomplished without bloodshed or violence. Truly ' history is very rigid in its demands, very austere in its verdict. Its determined issues may be suspended, delayed, modified, adapted ; but finally they must make their way. They must arrive. The past has taken pledges of the future, and these cannot be forsworn.'

But this article is concerned with religious rather than political issues, although in the history of Bohemia there has

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been always a close interaction between the two. For, in the later Middle Ages in Bohemia arose 'the first great national movement towards a new religious system.' A century before Luther, Bohemia was the head and front of a strong reforming movement, which defied the Papacy successfully for two hundred years. It was an ill day for the official Church when Jan Hus was burnt at Constance in 1415. The event went deep into the soul of the Bohemian nation, and has never been forgotten. The nation revolted from Rome; and the Papacy took up the sword. Again and again Crusades were enlisted against offending Bohemia, and again and again the chivalry of the Papal armies was shattered by the determined opposition of the Bohemian people. The tragedy was that the emblem of man's redemption was degraded to be the badge of a foreign enemy's wrath, and is still so associated in many minds. The great reforming Councils of the Fifteenth century did little to heal the wounds of the Church, and the only effective protest against the scandals, which the Councils hoped to cure, was in the Kingdom of Bohemia. To quote Dr. Creighton, 'By its violent proceedings against Bohemia the Papacy only intensified, by concentrating, the opposition which it strove to overcome, and Bohemia was the abiding memorial, before the eyes of Europe, of the Papal degradation.' It is a chapter of history little known outside Bohemia, this two hundred years' defiance of the Papal supremacy, its battle for spiritual liberty and the rights of conscience, its successful demand for the restoration of the chalice to the laity, sealed by the Compacts exacted by the more conservative of the reformers from the central power of Rome. At the end of the Sixteenth century it is reckoned that ninety per cent. of the Bohemian nation had renounced obedience to Rome. At the beginning of 1918, ninety per cent. were reckoned to be under the Roman obedience. What had happened to bring about this reversal? The answer is simple. The house of Hapsburg had come to rule. The battle of the White Mountain in 1620 sealed the religious and political fate of Bohemia for the next three hundred years. Ferdinand II of the Hapsburg house was a faithful

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son of the Roman Church, and the re-establishment of the Roman Church was the matter nearest to his heart. Never in history has a persecution appeared to be so completely successful; nothing but absolute submission to the See of Rome was tolerated within the kingdom; thirty thousand families left the country; the old Bohemian nobility and the 'Bohemian brethren' disappeared; the Bible was completely suppressed and most of the ancient national literature of Bohemia was burnt. An exception was made only in favour of the serfs, who were needed for the cultivation of the land. 'It was stated that by means of imprisonment and corporal punishment they could be forced to become at least nominal Romanists, and that in the course of time, they, or at least their children, would become true members of the Roman Church.' The devastation was completed by the Thirty Years' war. The population of Bohemia, which at the beginning of that war had exceeded 3,000,000, at the end had dwindled to 800,000, and they were mainly serfs. It was on this remnant that the Romanism of the Counter-Reformation was forced. There was no other alternative, and the policy of 'thoroughness' was apparently successful. It was not until 1781 that any other form of religious faith was tolerated in Bohemia, when Joseph II permitted the establishment of churches organized either on the Swiss (Helvetic) or the Augsburg Confession, that is of the Reformed or the Lutheran Church. Such was the effect of the twin despotism of the Hapsburgs and the Roman See upon the religious life of Bohemia.

It will be easily understood that the dissolution of the Austrian Empire in 1918 reacted on the religious conditions of the new Republic. Rome was concerned for the salvation of Austria and the house of Hapsburg. Whilst the war lasted, the higher clergy of the Church had done their best to assist in the suppression of the national sentiment in the schools and among the rank and file of the clergy. A Club of Reforming Clergy was dissolved. Their appeals to the Czech people to sacrifice their lives for the sacred person of the Emperor produced an unpleasant effect. The establishment of the Republic and the overthrow of the Imperial

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autocracy released a spirit of revolt from the spiritual autocracy of the Papacy. Statistics are notoriously awkward things to handle. The complete details of the 1921 census are not yet published. The article on Czecho-Slovakia in the recently published additional volume of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* estimates that since the foundation of the Republic one million persons had abandoned the Roman obedience. That is probably a very conservative estimate; an estimate commonly given, and probably nearer the truth, puts the figure at two millions. But the figures are sufficiently striking for those districts about which there is official information. Thus, in Greater Prague, *i.e.* Prague and its suburbs, the census of 1910 shewed that out of 616,631 inhabitants, 571,276 registered themselves as Roman Catholic, 12,210 as members of Evangelical Churches, 29,107 as Jews, and 4038 as members of other religious bodies. In 1921, out of a population of 676,657, Roman Catholics numbered 395,118, Czecho-Slovak Church 85,960, Czech Brethren (*i.e.* Evangelical Churches) 27,481, Jews 31,751, Russian Church 3296, Greek Church 1217, Old Catholics 437, and No Confession 127,297. An analysis of these figures shews that whereas in 1910 in Greater Prague 926 out of every 1000 persons were registered as Roman Catholics, in 1921 the figure had sunk to 584 out of every 1000. In the two other districts of the country for which official figures were available in February of this year, Pardubice and Kralove Hradec, there was also a striking defection from the Roman Catholic Church. The official figures indicating the religious distribution among the children attending the elementary schools in Prague reveal also a very considerable drift. At the end of 1918, 96.25 per cent. of school children belonged to the Roman Catholic Church, and were receiving instruction accordingly; at the end of March 1921, 70.88 per cent. was the figure, from which it appears that the number of registered Roman Catholic children had dropped in the Prague elementary schools in three years by 25.37 per cent. During 1921 there was a great deal of anti-Roman Catholic propaganda, which doubtless had the effect still further of weakening allegiance

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to that Church. It is claimed by Roman Catholic writers that a great many have returned to their former allegiance, and it may be partly true. But the fact of a considerable drift cannot be denied, and without doubt it is serious enough to have roused the activities of the Roman Catholic Church to counter it in every possible way, by organization, political and otherwise. The situation is being very carefully watched, and nothing is allowed to appear in any English newspaper or journal about these things, without an immediate answer in the Roman Catholic press. It would appear as if the Roman authorities were very anxious to assure the world that all was well. But in fact, Bohemia again, as it was before, is a very serious cause of anxiety to the Roman Curia. The Roman Church is working very hard to stem the tide. Its general policy since the war has been to appear as the friend of the new democracies, and in the various European countries it has organized the 'People's Party' as a solid influence in politics. So it is in Czecho-Slovakia. There are a large number of parties represented in the Parliament, so many that it is difficult for any party to form a Government. In these circumstances it is easy enough for a small party to control the situation, and, as a fact, the present Government can only continue, so long as it is supported by the so-called 'People's Party.' Hence it is not likely that the measure of Church disestablishment which was declared as inevitable after the Revolution will prove to be a very serious affair. Doubtless, there has been also a reaction of a better kind upon the Roman Catholic Church, and it may be true, as Fr. Leslie Walker said in an issue of *The Tablet* last autumn, that in the last three years of the new democracy the 'Catholic' Church had done more than in the 300 years of the Hapsburg dominion, when there was nobody to oppose it. Of that, the writer of this article has not the necessary material for judgement. But, if it be true, the admission is to be welcomed. What is true, in any case, is that, particularly in Bohemia, there has been a very large defection from the Roman Catholic Church, of which the cause is perfectly intelligible, that there are towns and villages where the majority of the people have

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abandoned their former allegiance and that very many will never return to it. This article is not written from a propagandist standpoint, but simply to convey information about a problem which should arouse concern in anyone who cares about the cause of the Christian faith in Europe.

What has happened to those who have abandoned the Roman obedience? An answer to the question will serve to disentangle the various elements in the present religious situation.

1. A very large number are standing outside any definite religious confession. It would be wrong to call them 'Freethinkers,' because of the associations of the term, as commonly used. They are not joining the associations of 'Freethinkers.' They are not irreligious. But they are perplexed; they have reacted from the exact dogmas of the Church as represented by the Roman Communion; they are not unchristian, but they do not know where they stand. To this class many of the 'intelligentsia' belong. Many seek for a Christian interpretation of life, and in international relationships, political life, industrial and social questions they strive for the application of Christian principles as the only hope. But they are uncertain about the Christian faith as it has been generally understood. Doubtless they would be inclined to say that the modern world requires a wholly new reconstruction of faith. The Czech mind is philosophic, rationalizing, but not irreligious.

2. Probably the best and most enlightened religious spirit is to be found in the comparatively small Protestant Church of the country, which has received into its ranks a considerable number of converts from the Roman Church. Since the war ended, the two Protestant Churches of Bohemia and Moravia, *viz.* the Reformed and the Lutheran, have united in the Church of the Czech Brethren. This church considers itself to be the true spiritual descendant of the Society of Bohemian Brethren, or the original Unitas Fratrum, and numbers about 200,000 members. The Lutheran Church of Slovakia is not yet in organic unity with it. It is presbyterian in organization, ordination being administered by the Senior of the Church. Its dogmatic

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formularies are the Confession of Komensky (Commenius), and the Catechism of the Unitas Fratrum. The Apostles' Creed is used at baptism and communion. It is not united with the present Unitas Fratrum or 'the Moravian Church,' as it is generally known in England, whose headquarters are at Herrnhut in Saxony. The latter was the product of the German pietistic movement. Proposals were made to its leaders that they should unite with the Czech Brethren, but refused on the ground that the 'Unitas Fratrum' had a wider basis than the Czech Brethren, which represented only a national religious movement. Since the war, the Czech Brethren have established a theological faculty in connexion with the University of Prague, where they have a very efficient staff of professors, and where curiously enough there is a larger number of students than in the Roman Catholic seminary. So far as it is possible to judge, this is the only body which is capable of giving instruction about the Bible according to the standards of modern scholarship. The standpoint is that of moderate English criticism. Several of its professors have been trained in Scotland. This is a fact of great importance, as the Bible is being very widely circulated in Bohemia and the Czech lands. Indeed the sale of Bibles is proceeding with great rapidity, and the writer was assured by the central agent, who has a wide experience in many countries, that the circulation of the Scriptures is financially more than self-supporting by reason of the great demand. It is certain that the appeal of Holy Scripture recovered after three centuries' comparative ignorance of it will produce profound results on the religious life of the country. For the people are hearing and reading it again in their mother tongue, and the simple words of the Gospel are as rivers of water to thirsting souls. The writer of this article was received on two recent visits with great friendliness by the leaders of the Czech Brethren. They are moved by the appeal to Christian unity which went forth from Lambeth. As with other Evangelical Churches of the Continent, it appears as if they cannot stand fast in their old position. They are receiving a large number of members from the Roman Catholic Church, and they are

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conscious that the needs of the latter will require the development of a higher standard of worship in the public services of the Church.

It should be mentioned that the American Methodist Episcopal Church is founding a Bible Training School in Prague. This Church, with its great financial resources, has done a very great work of relief in Czecho-Slovakia as elsewhere with admirable efficiency. But it appears also to be contemplating the establishment of a branch of its own religious organization, which is not so welcome, especially in view of the lately recovered organic union of the Evangelical Churches in Bohemia and Moravia.

3. The more immediately interesting and problematical movement has been the rise of the Czecho-Slovak Church. It is a movement in the direction of a national Church, Catholic in creed and structure, independent of the Roman See; an attempt for national religious self-expression within the historic life of the Catholic Church. It is an heroic venture which requires respectful and sympathetic attention. Unfortunately little is known of it in this country, and the facts are distorted and obscured by a very active Roman propaganda, which busily misrepresents the English Church in Czecho-Slovakia and spares no effort to keep the facts from the knowledge of the English public.

The main facts are as follows. Immediately after the establishment of the Republic in October 1918, the dissolved Reforming Club (Jednota) of Clergy belonging to the Roman Catholic Church again came together and formulated a programme of reforms, which was presented by a special deputation to the Vatican. The chief points were:

1. A democratic constitution for the Church in Czecho-Slovakia, *i.e.* self-government by which the parish clergy and bishops should be chosen in Church representative assemblies.
2. The use of the national language in the services of the Church.
3. An independent Patriarchate for Czecho-Slovakia, within the Roman Church.
4. Compulsory celibacy for the clergy to be abandoned.

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The last point is an easy mark for controversialists. In fact, to those who know the real facts of the case, it represented a demand for a higher state of morality. The demands were refused. As a result, a number of priests founded another association for pressing the reforms, and in January 1920 determined to renounce allegiance to Rome and to found the Czecho-Slovak Church. They proclaimed that they would continue for the present in the doctrine and liturgy of the Roman Church, reserving all changes until their council of priests and laymen should meet, only abandoning belief in the supremacy and infallibility of the Pope. The Roman Mass was translated into Czech, with the addition of proper services in commemoration of national saints and sacred days. A central council was formed for carrying forward the work of reform and for framing a constitution. In June 1921 three priests were elected by the votes of the parishes to be bishops in the new Church. Negotiations were initiated with the Serbian Church with the result that union with the Serbian Church was proclaimed in the autumn of the same year, and one of the elected priests, Dr. Pavlik, was consecrated on September 20, 1921, at Belgrade by the Patriarch of Jugoslavia, assisted by other Serbian bishops and Archbishop Antony of Kiev, as the first bishop of the Czecho-Slovak Church. The other two priests have not yet been consecrated, certain objections having been raised to their election, which have not yet been resolved. As a condition of union with the Serbian Church, the Czecho-Slovak Church formally accepted the dogmas of the Eastern Orthodox Church, and the first seven Oecumenical Councils and the sacraments of the Eastern Church. The Church is intended to be autonomous as soon as three bishops have been consecrated. The constitution of the Czecho-Slovak Church has been recognized by the Government. It includes provision for the organization of the Church in dioceses and parishes, each with its proper council, and for a Central Council. One is inevitably reminded of the Enabling Act and the resulting measures and organization in our own Church. But the difficulties of the new church are immense. It is no light thing, as the

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history of the English Reformation shews, to break away from a highly organized system with an ancient tradition and to launch out into the deep at this particular moment in history when everything is in flux. And no one can predict the ultimate issue. The present writer has had the opportunity of interviews with many Czechs, both inside and outside the Church, and with detached onlookers among politicians and University professors, and finds it difficult to arrive at any positive conclusion, except that the present situation is temporary and provisional. The numbers of the Church are very variously estimated, and the census figures are not yet completely available. It is easy to exaggerate, and the Roman Propaganda is concerned to minimize. However it is safe to say that the number cannot be less than half a million, and is probably more. For the moment active Propaganda work has ceased, and the Church is engaged in driving in its stakes, for which all its energy is required. It could not at present provide for any large increase in adherents. The last information obtained by the writer last February was that the Church had 130 priests and 400 school teachers. Examples of the spread of the Church are that in one town of 10,000 people, only 700 remain Roman Catholic, in another of 1200 only 24. There is no doubt that the movement has carried with it a great many people; and it seemed to be generally allowed that the religious elements in it are gaining over the nationalistic. But, as might be supposed, there are cross-currents running strongly: there is the call of the blood which unites many in sentiment to the East; in Moravia particularly the names of Cyril and Methodius are names to conjure with; on the other hand, the culture of Bohemia is Western and not Eastern, and the spirit of progress is the spirit of the new Republic. Here is a clash, and there are parties in the Church; they are not all saying the same thing, as Rome contrives to do, at any rate in public; and unedifying controversy has been carried on in the daily newspapers by the leaders. These things have to work themselves out. Meanwhile the Church is engaged in organization, in finance, in the problem of training its future

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clergy, in drawing up its formularies, in ordering its services, in revising its standards. Was there ever such a difficult time as this for a new national Church to come into being, to remain Catholic and yet to assimilate the best fruits of progress? Is there any Church in Christendom which is able to understand the situation and to help save the Church of England, whose experience has been the same?

It is urgent that the Czecho-Slovak Church should become fully organized and autonomous as soon as possible. It has a contribution of its own to make to the future of Christendom. But this cannot be done until it is structurally complete. The Reformation of the Church in England was effected without any violent break with the past because the Catholic organization of the Church remained, and the necessary doctrinal and disciplinary changes were made within the system of the Church. 'In Germany, Luther had to create a Church system *de novo*, and that while the Lutheran doctrine was in a state of flux.'[1] The Czecho-Slovak Church is concerned with the delicate work of fixing its Church organization and revising its doctrinal standards at the same time. And there is grave danger, until its organization has been completed by the full constitution of its episcopate. It remains to be seen whether it can produce leaders who are adequate to the task. The whole position therefore remains at the moment provisional. Some will doubtless return to the Roman allegiance, some will doubtless pass into the communion of the Czech Brethren. But at least in the Czecho-Slovak Church is a gallant attempt to establish a Church which will be Catholic in character and progressive in spirit. It is a movement of the soul of a people towards a more adequate religious self-expression. It is fraught with considerable potentialities towards Christian reunion. It has produced something of a reformation within the Roman Catholic Church in the country, and it might prove to be a bridge between the English and Eastern Churches through a people who are Slav in blood, but Western in culture and progressive in temper.

Several visits to the Continent since the war ended have

[1] Aubrey Moore, *History of the Reformation*, p. 320.

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convinced the writer that there is no duty more incumbent upon the Church of England, whilst the whole condition of religion in Europe is in a fluid state, than that the Church of England should have adequate representation at various strategic points in Europe at present unprovided for, not for the sake of making converts to the Anglican Communion, but to represent the general position of the English Church. There are signs, not only in Czecho-Slovakia, but in Germany, Holland and elsewhere that there are many religious people who are looking for a middle way between the hardness of the Roman system and the coldness of large blocks of Protestantism. A wise statesmanship would select the centres and the men who would be fitted for the work. In Prague, perhaps the most important centre of all, there is no resident English chaplain. The ancient Church of St. Martin's, which before the war was placed at the disposal of the English Church, was offered again by the Republican Government, but at the time our British ministry returned answer that there was no use for it. It has now passed into the hands of the American Methodist Episcopal Church, which conducts well-attended undenominational services there. But this cannot be accepted as a sufficient substitute for the worship of the English Church, or as an adequate representation of English-speaking Christianity. Our English flock, untended throughout the war, needs shepherding by more than occasional visits, but more than that, a wise and sympathetic English priest could do much to further the cause of Christian reunion by the establishment of friendly relations with the various religious bodies of the country. There is an eagerness for help, if the help is offered without patronage or any attitude of superiority, or without interference in other people's affairs; and there is a desire for information about the standpoint and position of the English Church. A very good work might be done in the general cause of the Christian religion if visits from representative English theologians could be arranged. There is no country at present where religion is such a living issue, and where an audience can so easily be found for those who have something to say. If

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Czech theological students could be received in England for some part of their training, there would be a happy result. Meanwhile this paper has been written on the basis of such information as has been available in the hope of rousing interest in the religious problems of a country with which England is linked by many historical associations alike in past and present.

J. B. SEATON.

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ART. II.—THE ORIGIN OF THE GOSPELS.

1. *The Corrections of St. Mark adopted by St. Matthew and St. Luke.* By E. A. ABBOTT. (London: A. and C. Black. 1901.)
2. *The Study of the Gospels.* By J. ARMITAGE ROBINSON. Third Impression. (London: Longmans, Green and Co. 1903.)
3. *The Gospels as Historical Documents.* Parts I, II, and III. By V. H. STANTON. (Cambridge University Press. 1903–21.)
4. *The Gospel History and its Transmission.* By F. C. BURKITT. Second Edition. (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark. 1907.)
5. *The Sayings of Jesus.* By A. HARNACK. Translated by J. R. WILKINSON. (London: Williams and Norgate. 1908.)
6. *Horae Synopticae.* By Sir JOHN C. HAWKINS. Second Edition. (Oxford: at the University Press. 1909.)
7. *The Beginnings of Gospel Story.* By B. W. BACON. (London: Henry Frowde. 1909.)
8. *Oxford Studies in the Synoptic Problem.* Edited by W. SANDAY. (Oxford: at the University Press. 1911.)
9. *Introduction to the Literature of the New Testament.* By J. MOFFATT. Third Edition. (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark. 1918.)

And many other Books and Articles.

WE have been told recently that the great literary achievement of the last fifty years of New Testament scholarship has been the discovery and general solution of the Synoptic Problem.[1] Similar statements abound. Practically all the

[1] Foakes Jackson and Kirsopp Lake, *The Beginnings of Christianity*, vol. i p. vii.

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critics, conservative and advanced, agree that St. Mark is the earliest gospel, and generally that the first and third gospels have another source in common, usually called Q, which according to an increasing number of critics lies behind St. Mark also. The priority of St. Mark to St. Matthew and St. Luke, we are informed, no longer requires to be proved.[1] And certainly among all the numerous books and essays dealing with the matter it is very difficult to find one which makes even the slightest attempt to prove it. Apart from calling attention to the fact that St. Mark is the shortest gospel and that its subject-matter and to some extent its order are found also in St. Matthew and St. Luke, which agree likewise in many other passages not given in St. Mark,—very insufficient as the basis of so great a conclusion—the theory is quietly assumed.

The first question to be asked about any such hypothesis is, 'Does it explain the facts?' If we give the matter anything more than the most superficial examination we are surely obliged to answer 'No'; and it is in no small degree because this answer is so obviously true that it has been necessary to write so many volumes upon it, with countless subsidiary hypotheses attempting to explain, or explain away, the numerous points where the primary hypothesis is useless or worse, and indeed contradicts the facts. In particular it entirely fails to explain why so frequently St. Matthew and St. Luke agree against St. Mark. Quite apart from the longer passages which are the foundation of Q, there appear to be no fewer than some 680 points,—over 680 really, if we include minor transpositions of words,—on which the first and third gospels agree against the second. As St. Mark's gospel now consists of 661 verses this means an average of rather more than one to a verse, and when we remember what a large part of St. Mark is not represented in both St. Luke and St. Matthew, for the triple tradition the average is much higher. It is seldom indeed that we find more than two or three verses without such agreement against St. Mark, and sometimes there are as many as six

[1] Moffatt, *Introduction to the Literature of the New Testament*, p. 180.

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in a verse. Taking the very first chapter of St. Mark we find a passage in verses 40–42 where St. Luke and St. Matthew agree exactly for as many as 18 words in the Greek, though St. Mark differs widely, by omission, addition, transposition, or substitution, on no fewer than 8 points,[1] quite inexplicable surely on the hypothesis that St. Mark is the basis of the other two.

Perhaps we may illustrate the subject better if we take a particular passage of some length in detail, for example, the incident of the storm on the lake,[2] which will hardly be claimed as forming part of Q, as this source is usually explained. We notice that neither St. Matthew nor St. Luke gives the note of time found in St. Mark, 'when even was come.' These two evangelists also agree in the Greek as well as in the English on the initial conjunction, 'now' instead of 'and,' and on the tense of the verb, St. Mark alone having the historic present. Neither St. Matthew nor St. Luke speaks of Jesus 'leaving the multitude,' St. Mark records that 'they take him with them,' while the other gospels say that he 'entered' the boat. Only St. Mark says 'even as he was.' St. Mark has 'in the boat,' but St. Luke and St. Matthew 'into a boat,' two points of agreement against the Second Gospel in as many words. St. Luke and St. Matthew alone speak of 'his disciples,' and use the personal pronouns, 'himself,' 'him,' in connexion with our Lord's entering the boat. St. Mark alone mentions that 'other boats were with him.' St. Mark has the historic present 'there ariseth,' instead of 'there came down,' 'there arose' of St. Luke and St. Matthew. St. Luke and St. Matthew record that the storm came 'on the lake,' 'in the sea,' St. Mark having nothing to correspond. St. Mark alone, however, gives the details 'in the stern,' 'on the cushion.' St. Luke and St. Matthew agree in stating that 'they came to him.' St. Mark has the present 'they awake him,' but in St. Luke and St. Matthew we find they 'awoke him.' St. Luke and St. Matthew have the participle 'saying' instead of St. Mark's 'and say unto him.' St. Mark has

[1] See Bacon, *The Beginnings of Gospel Story*, p. 20.

[2] St. Mark iv 35–41; St. Matth. viii 18–27; St. Luke viii 22–25.

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'Carest thou not that we perish?'; but St. Luke and St. Matthew 'we perish.' St. Luke and St. Matthew state that He rebuked 'the sea,' and 'the raging of the water,' as well as the wind, where St. Mark has 'and said unto the sea.' The next verse in St. Luke and St. Matthew begins in the Greek with a different conjunction from that used by St. Mark. St. Luke and St. Matthew state that they 'marvelled,' but St. Mark that they 'feared exceedingly.' St. Luke and St. Matthew have the participle 'saying,' but St. Mark the finite verb 'said.' In St. Luke and St. Matthew we find 'winds,' but in St. Mark 'wind'; likewise in St. Luke and St. Matthew the verb 'obey' is plural, but in St. Mark singular. There are indeed no fewer than 24 points in four verses of St. Luke where St. Luke agrees with St. Matthew against St. Mark. The same thing also is true in varying degrees for any passage found in all the gospels. Clearly to suppose that St. Luke and St. Matthew are based on St. Mark, or even on St. Mark and Q, is quite inadequate as an explanation of these facts, for it is very unlikely that two independent revisers of St. Mark would agree on so many alterations in so few verses, unless they used a different recension of the gospel from that which now exists. It was to explain similar agreement of St. Luke and St. Matthew where St. Mark has no parallel that the hypothetical Q was invented, originally as a source additional to St. Mark, and then, as this did not explain everything, the hypothesis was enlarged, and it was assumed that St. Mark also was indebted to Q. If we are to explain all the facts we must suppose Q to have contained practically the whole of St. Mark, and therefore it must have been a complete gospel like St. Luke or St. Matthew; and, if so, the only reason for assuming the separate existence of such a source as Q has vanished. To assume the existence of two editions of St. Mark as well as of Q seems to involve a quite needless multiplication of sources.

Now let us consider the chief of the alleged primary sources, the gospel according to St. Mark, in quite another way, taking as an example chapter xiii., which contains the eschatological discourse, and let us compare it section

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by section with what we find in St. Luke. Verses 1–9 correspond to St. Luke xxi 5–13, verse 11 corresponds to St. Luke xii 11-12, verses 12–14 to St. Luke xxi 16–21, verses 15–16 to St. Luke xvii 31, verses 17–19 to St. Luke xxi 22–23, verse 21 to St. Luke xvii 21, verses 24–26 to St. Luke xxi 25–27, verses 28–31 to St. Luke xxi 29–33, verse 33 to St. Luke xxi 36, verse 34 to St. Luke xix 12-13. Verses 10, 20, 22, 23, 27, 32, have no counterpart in St. Luke. We see that the passages found in St. Mark in one chapter appear in St. Luke in four chapters, and in ten distinct places, each with a suitable context. How can we account for this if St. Luke is derived from St. Mark? Which is the more probable, that St. Luke took chapter xiii of St. Mark, divided it into fifteen sections, and, omitting five of them, put the rest together in ten distinct places in four different chapters, and invented for each a highly suitable context, of which there is no suggestion in St. Mark, or that St. Mark took ten passages of St. Luke, ignoring their context, and with suitable editorial additions put them together in a new arrangement to make a connected discourse on the Last Things after the manner of a contemporary Jewish apocalypse? From a literary point of view the former seems quite inconceivable, and yet if St. Luke is based on St. Mark we must suppose the same sort of thing to have been done, not here only, but in many passages of St. Mark. That St. Mark is based on St. Luke seems much more probable. If, however, it be thought that the evidence points to Q rather than St. Luke as the source of St. Mark in chapter xiii, we shall be obliged on similar grounds to conclude that there are few sections of St. Mark which are not based upon it, and the result will be little different, for the source must have been a complete gospel and one which had much in common with St. Luke. The assumption of two editions of St. Mark makes not the slightest difference to the argument.

We will now turn to the corresponding chapter of St. Matthew, chapter xxiv. We notice that it contains practically the whole of St. Mark xiii, except verse 11 and (in part) 12, and the short parable at the end (v. 34), which as in St. Luke appears in a longer form in another place (St.

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Matthew xxv 14 ff.). Though not of primary importance for our present purpose we may note, too, that St. Mark xiii 9–13, a non-eschatological passage, is repeated in a fuller text elsewhere in St. Matthew in chapter x, so that we have a doublet. Not only does St. Matthew xxiv contain practically all St. Mark xiii, but it draws further upon St. Luke xvii, from which in part we have seen reason to believe St. Mark xiii to be derived. Verses 26, 27 correspond to St. Luke xvii 23, 24, and are a continuation of the quotation from St. Luke already found in St. Mark. Verse 28 corresponds to St. Luke xvii 37, verses 37–39 to St. Luke xvii 26, 27, 30, and verses 40, 41, to St. Luke xvii 34, 35, again continuing the quotation from St. Luke practically where St. Mark left off. If literary criticism is of any value whatever for bringing out the origin of documents, St. Mark xiii and St. Matthew xxiv can only be explained on the hypothesis that St. Mark xiii is a mosaic of various passages of St. Luke, or of a source practically identical with it, whether it be Q or not, and, further, that St. Matthew xxiv incorporates St. Mark xiii, and adds more sections from St. Luke or the same source.

We have considered only one chapter of St. Mark, but the same result follows from a consideration of several others. Our conclusion must be that St. Mark is based on St. Luke, and St. Matthew on St. Mark and St. Luke, in much the same way that in the realm of textual criticism the 'Western' text is derived from the 'Neutral,' and the 'Antiochian' or 'Syrian' is a combination of the two.

A consideration of the vocabulary of the passages common to St. Luke and St. Matthew tends to confirm this conclusion. Even Harnack [1] and Hawkins [2] admit that such linguistic evidence as is afforded by vocabulary and style for the existence of Q is wanting. There appear however to be fifty-seven words found in St. Matthew only in passages common to that gospel and St. Luke, but not in St. Mark, which are clearly Lucan, being found elsewhere in St. Luke with varying frequency. There are sixty-two words in these common sections which appear more frequently in

[1] *The Sayings of Jesus*, p. 146, *cf.* pp. 162–3.
[2] *Horae Synopticae*, p. 113.

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St. Luke than in St. Matthew. There are sixty-four words peculiar to sections common to both St. Luke and St. Matthew, eight of them, a point of special importance, being in a Marcan context. There are thirty-two found elsewhere as often in St. Matthew as in St. Luke, and ninety found more frequently in St. Matthew, forty-five of them appearing nowhere else in St. Luke, though seventeen of these are in Acts. About twenty-seven of the ninety ought perhaps to be included in other lists, for they are due to St. Matthew's tendency to repeat words in the same context, or to reproduce a favourite saying over and over again in other contexts. If we may neglect these we find that there are 119 words in the sections common to St. Luke and St. Matthew only which may be said on the evidence of the gospels alone to be Lucan, and only 63 Matthaean, or ninety if we include the twenty-seven. The ratio of Lucan to Matthaean words, apart from the evidence of Acts, is thus about two to one, or four to three. The vocabulary of the non-Marcan sections of St. Matthew, we may say then without hesitation, is distinctly Lucan, and much more in agreement with what we find in St. Luke than in the rest of St. Matthew. The eight words which are found only once in St. Luke and St. Matthew in corresponding sections, which, apart from a few words, appear likewise in St. Mark, are also very strong evidence of a non-Marcan, and therefore apparently Lucan, source in St. Matthew, the existence of Q as a second source at each of these points being surely impossible.

The order of writing of the Synoptic Gospels we conclude then was St. Luke, St. Mark, St. Matthew, and we could illustrate over and over again the development of thought to be found in this sequence. Consider a verse in the so-called 'Little Apocalypse,' which according to the Mark-Q theory affords the chief evidence for a late date for St. Luke, after the fall of Jerusalem, a conclusion not altogether easy to avoid if we allow the priority of St. Mark, though as a matter of fact there is nothing in this chapter of St. Luke which may not be paralleled in the prophets. St. Luke has: 'But when ye see Jerusalem compassed with armies, then know that her desolation is at hand' (xxi 20). St.

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Mark according to his usual method makes it an exact quotation, and sees a coming fulfilment of a particular prophecy: 'But when ye see the abomination of desolation standing where he ought not (let him that readeth understand) . . .' (xiii 14). St. Matthew makes it still more definite, and carries the interpretation further: 'When therefore ye see the abomination of desolation which was spoken of by Daniel the prophet, standing in the holy place (let him that readeth understand) . . .' (xxiv 15). It is particularly interesting to trace out the development of thought in the different versions of the eschatological discourse as given in the three gospels.

Or we might take verses of importance in considering the literary evidence for the Virgin Birth. St. Luke, having explained the mode of our Lord's birth in chapters i and ii, can give the question of the people of Nazareth as it would naturally be put: 'Is not this Joseph's son?' (iv 22). St. Mark, who omits the Birth narrative, has thought it desirable to alter the text, though the questioners would hardly be likely to know anything of the Virgin Birth, and we read: 'Is not this the carpenter, the son of Mary?' (vi 3). St. Matthew, who also gives us an account of the Virgin Birth, follows his usual practice and combines the two accounts, and can say: 'Is not this the carpenter's son? Is not his mother called Mary?' (xiii 55).

Another illustration may be found in the story of our Lord's temptation. St. Luke says our Lord 'returned from the Jordan, and was led by the Spirit in the wilderness during forty days, being tempted of the devil' (iv 1), the temptation to turn stones into bread taking place when the forty days were completed. Then he led Him up, probably as St. Matthew says 'unto a high mountain' (iv 8) 'and shewed him all the kingdoms of the world in a moment of time' (iv 5). Then 'he led him to Jerusalem and set him on the pinnacle of the temple' (iv 9). We have thus three temptations, all at the beginning of our Lord's career, but not all in the wilderness, the second on high ground, possibly that round Nazareth, where could be seen the varied traffic between Egypt, Mesopotamia and the East, and the third

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at Jerusalem. Then we read 'When the devil had completed every temptation he departed from him for a season' (iv 13), the next recorded temptation being in Gethsemane (xxii 39–46, where the Western verses are surely quite Lucan).

According to St. Mark 'he was in the wilderness forty days tempted of Satan, and he was with the wild beasts, and the angels ministered unto him' (i 13). The narrative is based on St. Luke, and the angelic ministry is transferred from Gethsemane to the temptation in the wilderness. It is a temptation to do nothing in particular, in itself a sign of a secondary text; nothing is said of any temptation on the mountain or at Jerusalem.

St. Matthew according to his wont combines the narratives of St. Luke and St. Mark, and it is he who introduces all the difficulties into the story by inserting the temptations at Jerusalem and on the mountain before the conclusion of St. Mark's description of the temptation in the wilderness, as though these also took place immediately after the forty days. He concludes: 'Then the devil leaveth him [from St. Luke], and behold angels came and ministered unto him' [from St. Mark] (iv 11).

It is, of course, commonly assumed that St. Matthew and St. Luke both use Q as well as St. Mark at this point, but there is no need to assume two sources here rather than elsewhere, and if St. Matthew and St. Luke are both based independently on St. Mark it is curious that they should agree in omitting all reference to the wild beasts, while St. Luke omits the reference to the ministry of the angels, although it is the sort of incident of which he is particularly fond, both in the gospel and Acts.

If St. Luke's is the earliest gospel, whence did he derive his information? In his introduction he says many had taken in hand to draw up a narrative concerning the matters delivered by those who from the beginning were eyewitnesses and ministers of the word, and that he himself having traced the course of all things accurately from the first, wrote that Theophilus might know the certainty concerning the things in which he had received oral instruction. Quite distinctly he does not say, as the St. Mark-Q hypothesis requires, that

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he used one or more of the earlier attempts at a narrative. The facts had been delivered to him, he says, by those who had been eyewitnesses and ministers of the word, and the things he writes down are those on which he, like Theophilus, had been instructed by word of mouth. Who were the eyewitnesses from the beginning and ministers of the word from whom he gained his information? If we examine the gospel the two most prominent figures are undoubtedly St. Peter and St. John. It is St. Peter and St. John who are sent into Jerusalem to prepare the passover (xxii 8); the other gospels give no names. We are reminded of the repeated mention of the two in the Acts: 'Peter and John were going up into the temple' (iii 1). 'He held Peter and John' (iii 11). 'They beheld the boldness of Peter and John' (iv 13), etc. We are sometimes told, as by Harnack, that in Acts John is a lay figure who does nothing, and that his name must be a later insertion in the narrative.[1] Rather may we not see in John the eyewitness and minister of the word from whom the story was to a large extent derived? We notice that it is Peter and John and James (not James and John) who are present at the raising of Jairus' daughter (viii 51), and likewise Peter and John and James at the Transfiguration (ix 28), as also in the list of apostles in Acts (i 13). It is in this gospel that we find the story of James and John wishing to call down fire from heaven upon the Samaritan village (ix 54), though their special name 'Boanerges,' 'the sons of thunder' (St. Mark iii 17), which might be regarded as complimentary, is not mentioned. It is John we notice who forbade the man casting out devils in our Lord's name (St. Luke ix 49), though this incident is recorded also in St. Mark (ix 38). In St. Luke the request that the two sons of Zebedee might sit one on the right and the other on the left in the kingdom is not recorded, possibly as being an incident they would fain forget in after years, and as casting a reflexion on them, or, if St. Matthew's version is the more correct, on their mother (St. Mark x 35 ff., St. Matth. xx 20 ff.). Reserve of exactly the opposite kind is perhaps responsible for the omission of Salome's name

[1] *The Acts of the Apostles*, pp. 124, 214.

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from the list of women who ministered to our Lord of their substance (viii 2, 3, *cf.* St. Mark xv 40, St. Matt. xxvii 56). If we may assume for a moment the accuracy of the traditional interpretation of the statement in the Fourth Gospel, from whom would the Birth narratives be more likely to be derived than from that disciple who after the crucifixion took the Mother of our Lord to his own home (St. John xix 27)? St. Luke's is the gospel of the love of God, of womanhood, and of salvation for all, on many points shewing kinship with the Fourth Gospel, both in substance and detail. St. Luke's Passion narrative alone agrees with that in St. John, and even the vocabularies of the two gospels, as has often been noticed, have much in common.[1] We can best explain St. Luke's gospel if we regard it as a record of the oral teaching of St. Peter and St. John, and particularly of St. John, from whom also he derived much of the earlier part of his narrative in Acts. There is no need, of course, to deny that the writer gained much information, or corroboration of information, from other sources, from eye-witnesses and ministers of the word, as he himself explains, among them perhaps the holy women who ministered to our Lord, and in particular for incidents dealing with Herod, Joanna, the wife of Chuza, Herod's steward (viii 3), though Manaen, Herod's foster-brother (Acts xiii 1), is another possible source of such information.

How then shall we explain St. Mark's gospel? Tradition, which may be traced to Papias,[2] says it is the gospel of St. Peter's interpreter, who has set down his teaching. We have in it another and more conventional account of St. Peter's call (i 16–18), such as he is likely to have given himself. It is Simon who follows our Lord into a desert place when He is praying (i 36). We note the references to 'the boat,' Simon's boat apparently according to St. Luke (v 3), and 'the house,' presumably Simon's house at Capernaum (i 29). Peter's objection (St. Luke viii 45), when our Lord asked who touched Him in the crowd, becomes that of the disciples (v 31). It is Peter who rebukes Him when

[1] Moffatt, *Introduction*, pp. 534 ff.

[2] Eusebius, *Ecclesiastical History*, iii, 39.

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He foretold His passion after His great confession (viii 32, 33). It is Peter who draws attention to the withered fig tree (xi 21). It is Peter with other apostles who asks Him privately when the Temple shall be thrown down (xiii 3). The passage 'Simon, Simon, behold Satan hath desired to have you' (St. Luke xxii 31) with its promise to Peter is omitted, but we find Peter's vehement protest 'If I must die with thee, I will not deny thee' (xiv 31), which adds point to the weakness shewn in his denial. It is Peter and James and John who accompany our Lord to Gethsemane (xiv 33), not simply 'the disciples' as in St. Luke (xxii 39). It is Peter He reproves, 'Simon, sleepest thou?' (xiv 37), not the disciples (St. Luke xxii 45). It is presumably from Peter who was there that we get the account of the search for witnesses in the high priest's palace (xiv 55, 56). Even his thoughts are recorded, 'When he thought thereon, he wept' (xiv 72). The message of the angel at the sepulchre is, 'Go, tell his disciples and Peter' (xvi 7). We notice, too, that it is in this gospel that we find the explanation, 'making all meats clean' (vii 19), appended to the discourse of our Lord to which apparently appeal was made in Peter's vision at Joppa, where he was reminded of what God had cleansed (Acts x 15). The gospel is the gospel of Peter's connexion with Jesus, even incidents derogatory to the apostle being recorded, and he comes into the story in a way entirely without parallel in St. Luke, prominent as he is there. Particularly in the details not found in St. Luke we can recognize the presence of an eyewitness, who could have been no one but St. Peter. The traditional view of the gospel is surely not contrary to the evidence. It is a record of the things mentioned by Peter in his teaching, the different applications of the same words and phrases from what we find in St. Luke, being apparently due to changes to be expected in oral teaching, but much less likely in an editor's revision of a document. Though based on St. Luke, if our contention is true, it is St. Luke to a large extent rewritten so as to bring out St. Peter's view of things and the substance of his teaching, and augmented, particularly by the section vi 45—viii 26, the specially Johannine teaching

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being omitted. We may note too a new emphasis on eschatology and the kingdom of God according to current Jewish thought.

We turn now to the First Gospel. This too is Petrine, not only because it incorporates almost the whole of St. Mark, but even more particularly in the passages which are peculiar. There is an insistence on the new name of Peter. At his call Jesus saw 'Simon, who is called Peter' (iv 18), not simply 'Simon' as in St. Mark (i 16). Jesus comes into 'Peter's house' (viii 14), not simply the 'house of Simon and Andrew' (St. Mark i 29). Of the apostles 'the first' is 'Simon who is called Peter' (x 2). This gospel alone gives the incident of Peter walking on the water (xiv 28–31). It is Peter, not 'the disciples,' as in St. Mark (vii 17), who asks the meaning of the saying about that which defiles a man (xv 15). It is in this gospel that we read of the great promise to Peter of the power of binding and loosing, and of the keys of the kingdom of heaven (xvi 17–19). In this gospel we find the incident of Peter and the half shekel (xvii 24–27). It is Peter also who asks, in this gospel only, 'How oft shall my brother sin against me?' (xviii 21). In this gospel we find our Lord's speech to the disciple who drew his sword in Gethsemane (xxvi 52–54), and he, the Fourth Gospel tells us, was Peter (xviii 10). We cannot avoid the conclusion that this gospel is even more strongly Petrine than St. Mark's, and there is a decided tendency to emphasize incidents which reflect credit on the apostle. It is St. Mark revised and augmented by comparison with St. Luke, with additions from other sources, the intention of doing honour to Peter being almost everywhere apparent. Again we notice words and phrases repeated in the same general context but with a different application from what we find in St. Luke or St. Mark, the obvious suggestion being that the alterations are due to oral transmission, not the conscious changes of the editor of a source. The development of Christology and the tendency to omit details which might be regarded as inconsistent with the divinity of Jesus are also probably to be ascribed to some extent to the same cause, not altogether as the

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deliberate alterations of the evangelist. They are the sort of modifications which would naturally arise in the course of oral teaching, but would be much less likely in using a written source.

Apart from its strongly Jewish tone and the further appropriation of current ideas on eschatology, there are two features in particular worthy of note in this gospel, the five great discourses or collections of sayings, and the series of Old Testament prophecies. The five discourses must have been compiled by someone, a Christian rabbi, who knew both St. Mark and St. Luke, for they contain elements of each not found in the other. They are composed for the most part of sayings of the Lord recorded in St. Luke, and sometimes elsewhere in St. Matthew also, but they include at least two or three of John the Baptist (xxiii 33, vii 19 = St. Luke iii 7, 9), and in the Sermon on the Mount we get sayings, drawn apparently from the Old Testament (*e.g.* v. 5, 8 = Ps. xxxvii 11, xxiv 3, 4), which are Christ-like rather than Christ's, inserted presumably to make up the requisite number according to a numerical scheme. Probably the discourses were drawn up with a view to catechetical needs, and were intended to be summaries of Christian teaching on various subjects rather than always Christ's own words. Certainly no hearer of the Lord could have imagined that they were uttered exactly as they stand in their present context. The gospel is compiled on a numerical plan: threes, fives, sevens, tens, fourteens abound, just such as a rabbi would delight to employ, partly perhaps as a help to memory, partly because of the mystic significance of particular numbers. Especially we note the ten prophecies,[1] introduced by some such formula as 'that it might be fulfilled which was spoken by the Lord through the prophet' (i 22). The text of these is not that of the Septuagint, but apparently an original translation from the Hebrew. The number ten suggests the same influence which is apparent in so many places in the book, and they must be part of the same body of teaching, though the prophecy of ii 6, not included in the numerical scheme,

[1] i 22, ii 15, ii 17, ii 23, ii 14, viii 17, xii 17, xiii 35, xxi 4, xxvii 9.

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seems to shew that the list was not originally compiled merely with this intention. The three fourteens of the genealogy lead up to the first prophecy, and again we recognize the same influence, which is presumably that of the compiler of the gospel, not of the collector of the prophetic texts.

By whom were the gospels written, and when? The Jewish tone of the First Gospel is undeniable, and we are commonly told it is Palestinian; but will the statement bear examination? 'This saying was spread abroad among the Jews, and continueth until this day' (xxviii 15) was hardly intended for Palestinian readers, nor perhaps the note 'Wherefore that field was called the field of blood, unto this day' (xxvii 8). No Palestinian would say that 'late on the Sabbath day . . . it began to dawn toward the first day of the week' (xxviii 1). The expression 'a Canaanitish woman' (xv 22) is from the Old Testament, and had long been out of date, and would not be likely to be used by any Palestinian. 'Capernaum which is by the sea' (iv 13) is an unnecessary description for a Palestinian. 'A city called Nazareth' (ii 23), 'the high priest, who was called Caiaphas' (xxvi 3), 'a place called Gethsemane' (xxvi 36), shew an unfamiliarity hardly expected in a book intended for Jews of Palestine. Though natural enough for St. Luke when writing to Theophilus, the explanation of the Sadducees as those 'which say that there is no resurrection' (xxii 23), would be unnatural in a book written for Palestinians by a Palestinian. A Palestinian too would know that properly speaking no part of Judea is beyond Jordan (xix 1), though, as the text is doubtful, a separate place may be intended as in iv 25 and in St. Mark x 1. It seems clear from these points that though the gospel is so Jewish in tone it was written in its present form by a Jew of the Dispersion, yet one who, as we have seen, was well acquainted with the teaching of St. Peter.

We may now approach the question of date. It is commonly agreed that the epistles to the Thessalonians shew acquaintance with the sayings of Jesus, with what must have been practically a gospel. St. Paul indeed claims

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that his eschatological teaching is based on a 'word of the Lord' (1 Thess. iv 15), and the dependence is by no means limited to that subject. Among the many passages which remind us of the sayings in the gospels we note 'God who calleth you into his own kingdom and glory' (1 Thess. ii 12). In St. Matthew we read 'the kingdom of heaven is likened unto a certain king, which made a marriage feast for his son, and sent forth his servants to call them that were bidden' (xxii 2, 3). In St. Luke's parable of the great supper (xiv 16–24) there is no mention of the king calling to his kingdom. We read again: 'The Jews, who both killed the Lord Jesus and the prophets . . . to fill up their sins alway' (1 Thess. ii 14–16). In St. Matthew we read: 'Ye are the sons of them that slew the prophets. Fill ye up then the measure of your fathers' (xxiii 31, 32). The idea of filling up the measure of sin is entirely absent from St. Luke (xi 48). We read again: 'The Lord himself shall descend from heaven with a shout, with the voice of the archangel and with the trump of God . . . Then we that are alive . . . shall together with them be caught up in the clouds, to meet the Lord in the air' (1 Thess. iv 16, 17). St. Matthew says 'They shall see the Son of Man coming in the clouds of heaven with power and great glory. And he shall send forth his angels with a great sound of a trumpet, and they shall gather together his elect' (xxiv 30, 31), and 'Go ye forth to meet him' (xxv 6). Though, it may be urged, St. Paul gives here only ordinary eschatological details, he claims to be basing his teaching on 'a word of the Lord,' and it is only in St. Matthew that we are told the Lord will come from 'heaven,' that there is mention of a 'voice' or 'sound' (in the usual text), and of a 'trumpet.' Also in St. Matthew alone do we read of the 'meeting.' When we consider all the various points of agreement between 1 Thessalonians and the gospels, and then in particular those with St. Matthew, and note that the agreement extends even to the alterations made by this evangelist in the text of St. Mark and St. Luke, we can hardly resist the conclusion that it must have been the First Gospel itself which was before the apostle when he wrote, and not some other collection of sayings.

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1 Thessalonians was written while St. Paul was at Corinth, and this has now been fixed quite definitely by the finding of an inscription at Delphi which gives the date of the proconsulship of Gallio, 51 or 52.[1] While at Corinth therefore, if our argument be correct, the apostle was quite familiar with the First Gospel. We remember that it was at Corinth that Paul met that important non-Palestinian Jew Aquila, lately come from Italy (Acts xviii 2). A Jew from Italy would be just the person who might be expected to hold St. Peter's view of the gospel, and to lay still further emphasis upon such Jewish and Petrine features as are present in St. Mark. We know something of Aquila's power as an evangelist. Did he write a gospel? If so, we see also a possible explanation of the Petrine party in Corinth, a city which apparently St. Peter had never visited. The tone of the First Gospel is as different from that of St. Paul's teaching as we should expect the outlook of Aquila and Priscilla to be different from that of the apostle.

At Ephesus a little later we first meet with another great Jew, Apollos of Alexandria, mighty in the scriptures, who taught accurately the things concerning the Lord, proving from the scriptures that the Christ was Jesus (Acts xviii 24–28). If in this place as elsewhere (St. Luke xxii 37, xxiv 27, 44) St. Luke means by 'the things concerning the Lord,' Old Testament prophecies, perhaps we may see here too a reference to the Logia incorporated in the First Gospel, which however accurately known would be but a very imperfect summary of 'the way of the Lord.' Apollos was a disciple of John the Baptist, and we remember that another occasion when we met with the disciples of John was at the house of Matthew the publican (St. Matt. ix 14), and not unnaturally, perhaps, for we are told many publicans came to John to be baptized (St. Luke iii 12). Papias says that St. Matthew composed the Logia in the Hebrew language and everyone interpreted them as he was able.[2] Logia in the sense of Old Testament sayings, not according to the Septuagint version, but in an original translation, are cer-

[1] Hastings, *Dictionary of the Apostolic Church*, vol. i pp. 26–7, 275–6.

[2] Eusebius, *Eccl. Hist.* iii 39.

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tainly to be found in the First Gospel, and though there can be no proof, if they are his, it would afford an explanation why this gospel bears the name of St. Matthew. As found in the First Gospel they are hardly derived directly from St. Matthew, but if our argument is correct, through Peter and Aquila. If they were used by Apollos, they were apparently well known, for St. Luke and presumably Aquila and Priscilla recognized his teaching as accurate, though not complete.

If we might regard Matthew, or Levi, the son of Alphaeus (St. Mark ii 14), as the brother of James the son of Alphaeus (St. Luke vi 15), and these with Joses and Judas and Simon (St. Mark vi 3) as brethren of the Lord and sons of Mary, wife of Clopas (St. Mark xv 40, St. John xix 25), the Virgin's sister-in-law, we might find an explanation of the Birth narratives in St. Matthew; but these identifications must necessarily be uncertain.

If St. Matthew's gospel, so called, was written at Corinth in the year 50 or 51, what date can we assign to St. Mark? Papias says: 'Mark, who was Peter's interpreter, wrote down accurately though not in order all that he recollected (or, mentioned) of what Christ had said or done.'[1] Apart from the council of Jerusalem the last time we hear of St. Peter in Acts was when he left the house of St. Mark's mother in Jerusalem, and went to another place (xii 17), ultimately, according to a tradition which has much in its favour, to Rome. His connexion with St. Peter must have been before this. There is no suggestion that he wrote down the apostle's teaching from day to day. We have seen reason to think that he used St. Luke's account as the foundation of his narrative, cutting out what he did not remember as part of St. Peter's teaching, and altering it to agree with what he mentioned, and also, it must be admitted, introducing colloquialisms and crudities of style, and even inaccuracies (i 2, ii 26), possibly reproducing to some extent St. Peter's somewhat unscholarly Greek. The Mark-Q hypothesis assumes, contrary to Papias, that the Second Gospel gives the actual sequence of events, but examination shews that

[1] Eusebius, *Eccl. Hist.* iii 39.

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on many points it is a quite secondary text, and that it is St. Luke who has set forth his narrative in order, as indeed he claims to do to the best of his ability. How much more natural for example are the incidents in the visit to Nazareth when put, as St. Luke puts it, at the very beginning of the ministry! How much more natural is St. Luke's account of the trial before the high priest! St. Mark has joined it on immediately to St. Peter's account of the search for witnesses in the courtyard (xiv 55, 56), and the story is confused. When and where would the need arise for St. Mark to write down St. Peter's version of the gospel story? Not at any time it would seem in Jerusalem, for there there must have been many better qualified, and themselves eye-witnesses of many of the events. St. Mark however is intimately connected with Antioch as well as with Jerusalem. To Antioch Paul and Barnabas returned after the distribution of alms in connexion with the famine, and took with them, presumably for his first visit, John whose surname was Mark (Acts xii 25). To Antioch we are told men of Cyrene had fled after the martyrdom of Stephen (Acts xi 19), and there he would find Simeon called Niger, probably an African, and Lucius of Cyrene (xiii 1). Is it possible to identify Simeon called Niger with Simon of Cyrene, who bare the cross of Jesus (St. Luke xxiii 26)? St. Mark at any rate thinks it worth while to add to St. Luke's description that he was the father of Alexander and Rufus (xv 21), people evidently well known to the church in the place for which the gospel was intended, which was certainly not Jerusalem. St. Mark's is a gospel for Gentiles, though there is a strong Jewish element in it, as in the emphasis on the kingdom. We remember the explanation of ordinary Jewish customs about purification (vii 3, 4). There is no internal evidence connecting it with Rome as is commonly supposed, and not even any very convincing external evidence. It was written after it was realized that it was in accordance with Jesus' own teaching that converts were made among the Gentiles (xiii 10). Antioch during St. Mark's stay in that city immediately after the council of Jerusalem (Acts xv 37), about the year 49, seems to fit all the facts.

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In spite of the difference of opinion between St. Paul and the evangelist at this period (Acts xv 37–39), it would seem that the apostle took a copy of St. Mark's gospel with him on his second missionary journey, presumably as containing the memoirs of Peter, for he seems to refer to it in 1 Thessalonians (iv 12 = St. Mk. iv 11; v 13 = St. Mk. ix 50). That Aquila and Priscilla gained their knowledge of the Second Gospel from St. Peter seems impossible, for he would have no need of such a secondary and even inaccurate record of his own teaching. Rather we may suppose that they learned of it first from St. Paul, and knowing the teaching of St. Peter at first hand could appreciate both its value and its inaccuracies, and that the First Gospel was written to take its place. The Second Gospel would thus naturally drop into the background, and of this we have evidence in its history for centuries, and particularly in the loss of its last leaf.

What now must be the date of St. Luke's gospel? If it contains the teaching of St. John the writer must have had some connexion with him in Jerusalem in quite early days. The last we hear of John is when he went with Peter to confirm Philip's converts in Samaria at the beginning of the persecution which arose about Stephen (Acts viii 14). As this source of information then ceases the writer seems to have been separated from St. John, and so probably to have left Jerusalem soon afterwards. Men of Cyprus and Cyrene fled to Antioch (Acts xi 19, 20), and we find there, as we have noticed, Barnabas of Cyprus and Lucius of Cyrene (Acts xiii 1). The writer of Acts is specially interested in Cyrene (Acts ii 10, vi 9, xi 20, xiii 1) and Antioch, though Cyrene is not the scene of any incident in the narrative, and even in his gospel he records that Simon was a Cyrenian (xxiii 26). Is it possible to identify Luke the evangelist and Lucius of Cyrene? Sir William Ramsay has shewn from inscriptions a fact which used to be denied, that Lucas and Lucius are forms of the same name.[1] This gospel, too, apparently was written at Antioch, and nominally for

[1] *The Bearing of Recent Discovery on the Trustworthiness of the New Testament*, pp. 370–84.

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Theophilus, though clearly not for him alone. Who was Theophilus? The one person so strangely on any other assumption not mentioned in Acts is Titus. Is it possible that Titus and Theophilus should be identified? There is reason to believe, though the argument cannot be set out fully here, that Titus was the brother of Gaius (2 Cor. viii 18, *cf.* 22), St. Paul's companion and one of the treasurers for Macedonia in the matter of the collection for the saints at Jerusalem (Acts xix 29, 2 Cor. viii 18, 19), who is to be identified with Silvanus, a Roman citizen (Acts xvi 19, 37, 38), belonging to the Roman outpost of Claudio-Derbe (Acts xx 4), and apparently of high social or official position. If Titus is the 'most excellent Theophilus' (St. Luke i 3), the 'We' sections in Acts, as in the opening words of the gospel (i 1, 2), would include a reference not to St. Luke only, but to both St. Luke and Theophilus or Titus, beginning on the return journey from his home at Derbe (Acts xiv 22), and continued in all places where according to the epistles Titus and Luke were present together, and the fact could not be kept out of the story. Whether this be the case or not, however, the most suitable date for the gospel as we know it would appear to be about the year 48, on the return to Antioch before the council of Jerusalem, though it is possible that parts of it had been written down at an earlier date. The style of Acts, we notice, is not quite identical with that of the gospel, and this is not altogether to be explained as a result of the use of different sources. It agrees exactly with the supposition that the Acts was not written until some 14 years or so later.

We may now just glance at the problems raised by St. John's gospel. If St. Luke's is the earliest of the three Synoptic gospels and the ultimate source of the others, many of the difficulties with regard to the Fourth Gospel disappear. The preliminary teaching of Jesus recorded at the beginning of St. John agrees exactly with what is suggested in St. Luke; otherwise the prompt obedience of the apostles to the call of Jesus is inconceivable. The Jerusalem ministry is the only possible explanation of such a passage as that beginning 'O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, which killeth

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the prophets' (St. Luke xiii 34), and our Lord's words as He wept over the city (St. Luke xix 41–44). The cleansing of the Temple is much more natural at our Lord's first visit to Jerusalem, as recorded in St. John (ii 13–17). Some of the teaching which according to the Synoptists is said to have occurred in Holy Week, and the hostility of the Pharisees, are much more like what we should expect at an earlier period. St. Luke has arranged his material so as to make our Lord's ministry practically one long journey to Jerusalem, and apparently he has grouped all his Jerusalem material together. St. Mark and St. Matthew have followed him in this, and indeed have added to the confusion of the chronology by grouping together still more incidents as taking place at Jerusalem, St. Mark even attempting to provide a time-table for the last week. Such an incident as the raising of Lazarus, which we are told cannot have taken place because there is no room for it in St. Mark's narrative,[1] can easily be fitted into the scheme of our Lord's life when once it is realized that the account given in the Second Gospel is at best only a narrative at second or third hand, and that the evangelist has frequently misunderstood his sources, so far as the sequence of events is concerned. St. Luke but vaguely dates his Jerusalem material, 'one of the days' (xx 1), in itself almost a proof that he is not using the precisely dated narrative of St. Mark, and he does not date the Crucifixion, and what he says is not incompatible with what we read in the Fourth Gospel, that the Passover was still to come (xviii 28). It is agreed that it was written by a Jew of Palestine, who was also, it is generally held, not uninfluenced by Greek or Alexandrian philosophy. Why should not the author be John, the son of Zebedee, the son of a well-to-do fisherman (St. Mark i 20)? Like St. Paul he was known unto the high priest (xviii 16, *cf.* Acts ix 1), and like him, and possibly his nephew (Acts xxii 3, xxiii 16), may have been educated in Jerusalem at the feet of doctors of the Sanhedrim, and thus brought into close touch with those in the highest ecclesiastical positions, as indeed often happens with students in theological colleges in England

[1] Burkitt, *The Gospel History and its Transmission*, p. 223.

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to-day. If, according to the contention of this article, the source of Acts iv 13 is St. John himself, it would be Peter only, the spokesman, and not his companion, who could rightly be called an 'unlearned and ignorant man,' though St. John would naturally not wish to except himself from the judgement of the high priest and his colleagues on St. Peter's speech, which had called forth their opinion. Gamaliel and other rabbis are said to have been students of Greek literature and philosophy, and certainly there is no convincing argument that such learning as is presupposed in the author of the Fourth Gospel could not have belonged to one of their pupils in his old age. The only argument against the Johannine authorship of any necessary cogency, which indeed, if true, appears entirely to contradict the possibility, is to be found in the statement attributed to Papias in the epitome, contained in a Seventh or Eighth century manuscript, of the history of Philip of Sidé (Fifth century), where we read 'Papias in the second book says that John the divine and James his brother were killed by the Jews.'[1] It is commonly assumed, as by George the Sinner (Ninth century), according to one manuscript,[2] that he is referring to the second book of Papias' *Oracles*, but the reference is properly to the second book of Eusebius' *History*,[3] from which the chronicler has taken most of his information, frequently very inaccurately, and there we read, not that John and James his brother, but that James, the Lord's brother, was slain by the Jews. The only real evidence put forward for John's early martyrdom thus disappears, and with it the only necessarily cogent objection to the Johannine authorship. The Apocalypse is hardly by the writer of the Gospel, and like other apocalypses is apparently pseudonymous. It seems to belong to the school which produced St. Matthew, with which it has very striking points of agreement. There is nothing to contradict the traditional date, and that the gospel was written at the end of the Apostle's long life, late in the First century, at Ephesus.

[1] *Texte und Untersuchungen*, vol. ii p. 170 (1888).
[2] Chapman, *John the Presbyter and the Fourth Gospel*, p. 100.
[3] ii 23.

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If the chief argument of this article is in any degree correct, many modern problems assume a different aspect. The eschatological question disappears, for it is in the siege of Jerusalem that St. Luke sees the imminent Parousia; the chronology of the Fourth Gospel is confirmed; and on various points the order is found to be more historically correct than what we are told in the Synoptic Gospels. We find that the story of the Virgin Birth belongs to the earliest Christian tradition and must have been known to St. Mark and St. Paul. We get independent testimony of the truth of the traditional doctrine of the Atonement, and that our Lord Himself said that He gave His life a ransom for many (St. Mark x 45, St. Matt. xx 28). Further, the tradition of our Lord's appearances in Jerusalem after His Resurrection is proved to be primary, not that of His appearance only in Galilee, if this ever existed. Many other results might be mentioned, but enough has been said to shew the far-reaching effects of the hypothesis put forward, if true.

W. LOCKTON.

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ART. III.—WORCESTER PRIORY AND ITS BISHOP.

1. *The Register of the Diocese of Worcester during the Vacancy of the See.* Edited for the Worcestershire Historical Society by J. W. WILLIS BUND. (Oxford: James Parker and Co. 1895.)
2. *The Liber Albus of the Priory of Worcester.* Edited for the same Society by JAMES MAURICE WILSON, D.D. (London: Mitchell, Hughes, and Clarke. 1919.)
3. *Registrum Sacrum Anglicanum.* By WILLIAM STUBBS, Bishop of Oxford. Second Edition. (Clarendon Press. 1897.)

THE relations of a mediaeval Bishop to the convent of his cathedral church were not, perhaps, so close as those which link his successor of to-day with the convent's successors, the dean and chapter. The latter in an ever increasing degree claim their part in the life and activities of the diocese, but the prior and his monks dwelt apart. They were not, of course, 'exempt' from episcopal jurisdiction; on the contrary, the bishop could and did intervene with effect, if occasion required; while they could greatly add to his discomfort and his difficulties if they were deliberately unfriendly or suspicious. But constantly they needed his protection, especially at a time of unsettled conditions such as the reign of Edward II, and their constitution placed them largely at his mercy, especially in the case of a vacancy in the headship of the house.

It will be seen in the course of our story that Cobham, the 'good clerk' [Bishop of Worcester, 1317–27], remained on terms of general amity with the prior and his fellow-monks, and there is something meritorious in such concord when the circumstances of the see of Worcester are taken into account. It is true that the actual factors in

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the present case were not so full of peril to godly union and concord as they were in the case of his successor in the see. For, when Cobham passed to his rest on August 27, 1327, Edward III granted to the convent four days later a *congé d'élire*, and they proceeded to choose Wulstan de Bransford, their prior. The election received royal confirmation on September 8; the temporalities were restored to the elect on October 8; the Archbishop [W. Reynolds] was bidden to proceed to the consecration, but hesitated to obey, and died (November 16) in the midst of his hesitation. Till now, everything had seemed to progress favourably for the prior.[1] But it was only seeming. Within a few days of the election the King had heard rumour that the Pope had 'reserved' Worcester; so on September 6 he wrote to the Pope from Nottingham,[2] reporting Wulstan's election and the Archbishop's confirmation of it, and urging that the Pope should withdraw his 'reservation.' But this and the concurrent letters to the Cardinals had no effect. Adam de Orleton was translated from Hereford to Worcester by papal bull, dated at Avignon, September 28, 1327.

Consider, then, the infinite possibilities of friction between a Bishop thus empowered and a prior thus disappointed. Somehow they must try to live and work together. But relief to the tension came from the 'pernicious scrupulosity' of the monks in the convent. The prior returned quietly to his priorship again, but his brethren conceived doubts of their position towards him and of his towards them. How did his election and confirmation to the episcopate modify their duty with respect to him? Could a man who had been thus appointed to a bishopric be any longer regarded as a prior? Adam de Orleton hears of this and will have none of it. The prior has behaved nicely to him in a delicate situation and he will support the prior. So from Kempsey he writes to the monks on November 10, 1330, to quiet these scruples once and for all.[3]

[1] Cf. *Reg. A. de Orleton* (ed. Bannister), p. xlii f.; *Reg. Worc. Sede Vacante* (ed. Bund) pt. III p. ix.

[2] Rymer, *Foedera*, iv 308.

[3] *Liber Albus*, f. 137*b*; Wilson, *Worcester Liber Albus*, p. 234 f.

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Thomas de Cobham's entry into office was relieved of the particular risks of friction which such a situation involved. It appears that he had reached London after his Avignonese consecration at any rate by September 22, for on that day is dated the earliest document in his register,[1] a fatherly letter to William de Thorntoft, the rather contentious vicar of Dodderhill. A few days later, October 5, John de Wyke, prior of Worcester, passed away. He was buried on October 10, and ten days later the convent met for the purpose of an election.[2] Their message to the Bishop that they had decided to proceed *per viam compromissi—i.e.* by requesting a selecting committee (of eight) to put before the Bishop seven names, from which he was to choose one—found his lordship moving about in the diocese of Rochester, first in the church of St. Mary's Hospital, Strood, and then at the parish church of Dartford. Cobham, we may suppose, had as yet no personal knowledge of the monks of Worcester, and as a conscientious man he needed time and information in order to make a wise choice. So there was a further adjournment of the decision till his return to London, and even then public affairs lay heavily upon him; wherefore he entrusted the examination of the candidates' claims to his relative, James de Cobham, doctor of decrees, and Canon of Wells, and he did this in the church of St. Dunstan (no doubt St. Dunstan in the West, hard by his mansion outside Temple Bar). Finally on November 23, 1317,[3] the Bishop wrote to the convent from London to announce that the decision was in favour of Brother Wulstan de Bransford; and at the same time he sent a mandate for the new prior's induction to the official of the archdeaconry of Worcester.[4]

Here, then, was a sound basis for friendly relations with the head of the house. Any one of the other six might have been chosen; but Wulstan would remember with gratitude

[1] It is not inserted till f. 53*b*.

[2] For a full account of the proceedings, *see Liber Albus*, f. 83*b*; also ed. Wilson (S.P.C.K.) p. 162.

[3] Register f. 1*b*; *Liber Albus*, f. 84*b*.

[4] The latter office was vacant at the time.

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that the lot fell upon him, and by December 2 he had been duly inducted and installed.[1]

Even so, there were possibilities of discord, only to be avoided by careful considerateness on both sides. First, the Bishop could exercise a large discretion as to the *personnel* of the convent. The prior must submit to him the names, ages, and qualifications of those who desire to be professed, and at the time of Bransford's appointment there are four awaiting approval.[2] An easy-going diocesan might well reply that he was prepared to trust the prior's judgement, but Cobham avoids that weakness; his faithful commissary, John de Bradewas, is well known to the chapter; so the examination is entrusted to him, and he passes the novices, except that one must wait a while, till he is older. Similarly there is a commission,[3] dated at 'Hampol,' September 13, 1318, authorizing the prior and John de Bloyon, the other episcopal commissary,[4] to act together in examining two clerks who desire to be professed, it being necessary, says the good Bishop, only to admit 'those who can advance before God and man alike in work and in example.'[5] Sometimes, when the Bishop was farther away, he would settle the matter by entrusting the reception of those who had completed their year on probation to the prior alone; Cobham did so from York on November 17, 1318,[6] and the letter was duly entered in the great chartulary of the house. But, even so, his action was strictly in accordance with the rule; he was merely asking the prior to act on the Bishop's behalf in a matter which was really within the Bishop's responsibility[7]; it is for him to be sure that the men admitted to Benedictine houses within his diocese are meet and fit for the secluded life which they have chosen.

But, having shewn confidence in his prior as regards

[1] *Liber Albus*, f. 84*b*. [2] *Ibid.* [3] Register, f. 9*b*.

[4] Bloyon was well known to the convent, for he had done legal service to it since 1307; cf. *Lib. Alb.* f. 103*b*.

[5] Per hos qui coram deo et hominibus proficere possunt opere pariter et exemplo.

[6] F. 11 = *Lib. Alb.* f. 88*b*.

[7] 'Iuxta ordinis vestri canonica instituta'; f. 28.

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the admission of his own monks, the Bishop could naturally take the further step of using him to examine into the fitness of postulants for admission to nunneries. There were the nuns of the Cistercian priory of St. Mary Magdalene at Whistones, spoken of to this day as White Ladies Aston.[1] In April 1318, when the Bishop is still on some public service at Leicester, these poor ladies of St. Bernard of Clairvaux have some recruits waiting to be professed; one is called Margery de la Berewe[2]; in the following August, his lordship being in London,[3] there are two more, Agnes de Monyngtone[4] and Margaret de Eueros; and in each case he feels he can entrust to the prior that task of testing their fitness, which he himself would have performed had he been near enough.

His confidence in the convent was prepared to extend itself to matters that were diocesan and pastoral, not merely monastic. They could assist him in the godly discipline of penitents, of course under due restrictions. So, in December 1319 he issued his commission[5] to Prior Wulstan, to Brother Henry,[6] the subprior, and to Brother John de Astone,[7] in which he confides to all of them the task of acting for him in all matters which concern the office of penitentiary until such time as he sees fit to revoke his action. Of course, there were certain cases which a

[1] Cf. *Vict. Co. Hist.* ii p. 154 ff.

[2] Reg. f. 7. [3] F. 9*b*.

[4] Bishop Bransford admitted her as prioress in 1349; *cf.* his Reg. ii. f. 156.

[5] F. 18; not recorded in *Lib. Alb.*

[6] This must, I think, be Henry de Antiochia, the only other Henry in the convent at that time (Worcester, *Lib. Alb.* [ed. Wilson, S.P.C.K.] p. 162 f.) being the subsacrist Henry Fouke, quite a junior, though one of the seven nominated to Cobham for the priorship. Henry of Antioch was almoner in 1292 (Reg. Giffard, ff. 352*b*, 353; ed. Bund, p. 412). The death of Gilbert de Madeley, subprior at the time of Cobham's appointment to the see, is thus dated between October 1317 and December 1319. It is clear from *Lib. Alb.* f. 141, that Henry Fouke was subprior in 1339.

[7] He was twice placed among seven monks nominated to Giffard for the priorship, 1296 and 1301 (Reg. Giffard, ff. 404, 468*b*).

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Bishop was rightly accustomed to reserve for his own decision, and these he particularly excepts.

Somewhat similar to this are the instances in which justice must be done to a clerk-convict. The investigation of these cases was, in fact, often only too formal and perfunctory; but it is a pleasant sign of good relations between a Bishop and his Chapter when he selects a member of the latter to undertake such an inquiry. The natural people to turn to for this work were his own personal and commensal clerks; but there was an obvious convenience from the point of view of public opinion in adding an outside party to the tribunal. We may take the case of a clerk called Ralph le Locsmith (or even Loxksmyth), a Shrewsbury man, who was accused of theft and robbery. He was taken before the King's justices and convicted; thereafter he was committed to the episcopal gaol, where he spent a considerable period.[1] Then he made suit to the Bishop to have his innocence established by purgation. The first step was to ascertain what the police to-day would call his 'record.' Had he been notoriously given to ill practices before the present accusation was laid against him? This is a simple question of fact, which the Bishop can ascertain through his official. Proclamation can be made in the places where the accused has resided and is known. But as regards a judicial estimate of the rights and wrongs of the present charge, it is as well to have the assistance of a clerk of known integrity, but not attached to the Bishop's household. Well and good: there is Richard de Bromwyco, the precentor of the cathedral; he is a man of position and a doctor of divinity, the second in seniority[2] of the seven monks submitted to the Bishop for the priorship, when his lordship chose the junior, Wulstan de Bransford. Let him be added to Master Adam of Sandwich, the Archdeacon, and to Master John de Renham, the Bishop's clerk, and let the three be responsible for the process of the purgation.[3]

[1] 'Per non modica tempora'; f. 19.

[2] Wilson, *Worcester Liber Albus* (S.P.C.K.), pp. 162, 164.

[3] *Reg.* f. 55; for some reason this entry is made far later than the decision.

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So in the cathedral on the next law-day after the octave of Trinity, 1320, the three set their respective seals to a statement[1] that, having had the assistance of various learned lawyers, they find the said Ralph to be innocent and without blame in the matter, and their decree is that he is restored to his former good fame. This was in June, and in the following October the precentor became prior of Abergavenny.[2]

At some time in the following year the poor Bishop was again troubled with a similar case. The accused clerk was one John, son of John Lucas, of Gloucester, and the crime was said to have been committed in the house of Edward le Tauerner in that city. The clerk was maliciously accused, attacked, seized, and imprisoned, and at length brought before no less a person than the Lord Henry Spigurnel, who, as we know, had his ups and downs as a justice. Finally the Bishop had him in charge. In this case the inquiry into the antecedents is entrusted to the dean of Gloucester[3]; but for the purposes of the clerk's purgation the Bishop calls in the sub-prior of the cathedral[4] (his name is not given) and Master Robert of Worcester, doctor of civil law. This Master Robert was afterwards the legal adviser of the prior and convent.[5] They gave him an annual pension of five marks; and he was a quite otherworldly lawyer, for on the day after this promise to pay he remitted to his masters two marks out of the five. In the present case his judgement was no less merciful, and Cobham could announce to the son of John Lucas that the two commissaries find him innocent. Let us hope that he was so. In any case the Bishop gave him a document which would save him from being afraid to speak with his enemies in the gate.[6]

Of course, quite independently of these good personal

[1] F. 21. [2] *Lib. Alb.* f. 98. [3] F. 66.
[4] F. 68*b*. [5] Sept. 1325; *Lib. Alb.* f. 124.
[6] 'Verum quod propter hoc posses aliquamdiu fame nota saltem de facto respergi presentes literas nostras tibi duximus indulgendas quibus contra latrancium morsus tutus et premunitus existas et quas in testimonium tue innocencie ualeas demonstrare.'

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relations, the Bishop was ready to defend the cathedral from violence in an age when violence was only too rife. In December 1318, before he had come to the diocese at all, and when he was at the moment busy in Cambridge, there had been bloodshed in the cloister through a laymen's brawl.[1] So Prior Wulstan received the Bishop's authority to have the service of reconciliation performed by any Bishop enjoying the favour of the Holy See and having the right to exercise his office. In this case the harm was done, and Cobham could only make spiritual amends for it. But, so far as stern words could do it, he was not less anxious to prevent harm happening, though it must be admitted that already we have reached a period when the stern words of the Church's leaders were much less deterrent than they had once been. In 1321,[2] says a monition by the Bishop to all 'prelates,' rectors, and vicars of the diocese, it was notorious that certain sons of wickedness ('we only wish we knew the rascals' names'), not hesitating to indulge in the robbery and sacrilege of the houses of God in the land, had gone the length of breaking into the cathedral, 'which is our spouse, the venerable mother and mistress of our entire diocese.'[3] Their quarry was the shrine of that most famous confessor, the blessed Oswald. They dared to destroy the entire results of the devotion of the faithful and of all who had made pilgrimage thither, and who had enriched it with gifts offered in the fear of God, in loyalty to the faith, and in hope of redemption. The robbers came by night and carried off brooches and other valuable things, placed there in proof of miracles wrought by God in the saint's lifetime and since his death in places far and near. They had broken through the shrine's enclosure and torn off its covering. The villains were given fifteen days to

[1] F. 11*b*. 'Quod sanguinis effusione est per quosdam seculares violenta manuum inieccione est [*sic*] pollutum.' It is to be hoped that he does not mean secular *clergy*.

[2] F. 63*b*.; the entry is not dated, but appears to belong to the early part of that year.

[3] 'Sponsam nostram que totius nostre dioceseos est mater venerabilis et magistra.'

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confess and to restore their ill-gotten gains to the prior or the subprior; anyone with any knowledge or suspicion that would lead to their detection was given the same period in which to inform the authorities; failing this, the sentence of greater excommunication was to follow. Apparently such an outrage was not so unusual that the monition (which, indeed, was not addressed to the convent) need be entered in the *Liber Albus*,[1] and no further light can be thrown upon it. If the second monition, which follows immediately[2] and which deals in general terms with robbing the cathedral, refers to the same event, it appears to belong to the autumn of 1321; for it is dated from Alvechurch, which the Bishop visited in October and in November.[3]

A year later—the record[4] is entered between an ordination list of March 27 and one of April 10, 1322—Cobham once more called in Brother H., the subprior, with whom he now joined Brother R.,[5] the sacrist of the cathedral, and laid upon the two of them the task of publishing sentences of greater excommunication and ascertaining the names of malefactors who thus attacked the rights and possessions of the Church. In this case the choice of commissaries does not imply that the cathedral was the actual victim in whose behalf the Bishop's sympathies were aroused. He chose them, he says, because they were always on the spot[6]; but he addressed them in a style of more than ordinary sententiousness, as if he would have them serious, because the times required it. Our holy mother the Church, he says, feels deeply the troubles of her children, and has various remedies ready to cure their various ills. But in proportion as she does so, she finds that she has some degenerate sons who deliberately disregard their own salvation; the insipid savour of temporal things has spoiled their taste; the blind ambition of the world has darkened their eyes; they take bitter for sweet and sweet for bitter; they disregard the

[1] For other instances of the same century, see *Vict. Co. Hist. Worcs.* ii p. 106. [2] F. 63*b*. [3] F. 27, 27*b*.
[4] F. 75*b*. [5] Ranulph de Cathrop, S.T.P.
[6] 'Qui in nostra Cathedrali Ecclesia quasi continue residetis.'

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disease which attacks the soul, itself ever so much more important than the whole body; they are constantly taking precautions of all kinds to nullify the remedies of mother Church; and the result is that they add to the grievousness of her diseases. That is why the ancient fathers decided that those who rob churches of their rights and violate their liberties should be *ipso facto* placed under sentence of greater excommunication. One wonders if the subprior and the sacrist, *coniunctim* or *divisim*, had the opportunity of passing on these impressive sentiments to any of the actual victims, and whether the once-dreaded sentence retained much of its earlier effect. But clearly Cobham felt that this sacrist was a man to be trusted, just as he had asked the sacrist's predecessor of 1319[1] to associate himself with the episcopal official—no doubt, John de Bloyon—in defending the prior and canons of St. Sepulchre at Warwick in some unspecified injuries which they were suffering, and which were the subject of an apostolic mandate.

Or again, the prior and convent of Worcester were the patrons of a chantry called the hospital of Wiche,[2] and it had happened to them to be in litigation with one Adam called Banard, who was in possession of this hospital and chantry, but appeared to have deserted it, so that there was risk of its falling into the hands of unlawful possessors. The Bishop (May 29, 1319) instructed Mag. John de Bloyon to appear for him in the suit. This 'so-called hospital of Wiche' is evidently St. Mary's, as to which the little that is known may be found in the *Victoria County History*.[3] But it is possible that the name Banard given above may serve to locate the actual building, or at least some of the property with which it was endowed. For in the same History[4] there is a rendering of a statement of the boundaries of the borough of Droitwich in 1456, which leads the investigator down the east side of the town from Dodderhill

[1] Roger de Herwintone.

[2] F. 54*b*; 'que wlgariter hospitale de Wich' nuncupatur.'

[3] *Worcestershire*, ii 179 f.

[4] *Ibid.* iii 79; the reference given is De Banco, 35 Hen. VI, No. 784, m. 304.

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parsonage, along the south, and then, as he finds himself turning up again, with the western coast on his left, bids him leave a croft on the north side of a lane called Le Thorny Lane stretching towards a meadow called Banardesmore. Here there is a sechet in Banardesmore under Spitalcroft and a culverhouse to the north of it, and it seems likely that the conjunction of 'Banarde' and 'Spital' (which is of course hospital abbreviated) may fix the locale of the foundation somewhere on the northern outskirts of the town, not far from the Salwarpe. Whatever may have been the nature of the dispute with Adam called Banard, there is no sign of an appointment of a successor till 1326, when on October 7 the *Liber Albus* [1] records that the prior and convent presented to Bishop Cobham one John of Gloucester, presbyter, to be by him instituted to the wardenship of the hospital of St. Mary, but the receipt of the document is not chronicled in the Bishop's register, which has no further reference to the hospital. This is not intended to throw doubt on the statement in the *Liber Albus*. Cobham may have been at Hartlebury on October 7; he was certainly there on September 25,[2] for on that day he instituted a rector to Belbroughton; but he left for Hillingdon soon afterwards, and the presentations made to him during his stay there for health and in London on public business were few enough, but the record was kept up, and the absence of the entry now before us is significant. The *Victoria County History* [3] says that in 1328 Bishop Orlton commissioned the archdeacon of Gloucester to appoint a warden, and assumes that John of Gloucester abovementioned was the man then appointed.

Cobham, it would seem, was a rare visitor to Worcester city, though his absences from the diocese, when once he got to it, were few. In the early part of 1319 he was at Kempsey, and it is hardly conceivable that during a stay there of about three weeks [4] he failed to ride in, if it were only to see

[1] F. 129; this was of course not known to the *V.C.H.* writer.
[2] F. 116.
[3] Referring to *Reg. Orlton*, f. 17*b*
[4] He was there on 5 April (f. 14) and on 27 April (f. 14*b*).

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what manner of stones and what buildings were there. But for more formal purposes he took his time. November brought him to his manor of Wyke Episcopi, and from there, on the 8th, he wrote to the prior and chapter a 'littera visitacionis,'[1] in which he announced his intention of paying them the tribute of a formal inspection. The holy Church of God, he says, was in the beginning a garden of delights; it was cleared of all noxious plants and weeds; there were no brambles to pierce the feet of wayfarers, no brakes to retard those who walk over them, no nettles to consume the roses near them, no tree that failed of its fruit, no tares to choke the wheat. Our church of Worcester is no mean tree of this garden; like a part that is accordant with its whole, like a prudent branch, like a tree bringing forth fruit in its season. But the Bishop was afraid that the sower of tares was at work, spreading greed, taking every day new shapes. The holy plant was getting wrinkled and spotted; it was falling from its early perfection; there was even a growth of thorns in its field.[2] The office of visitation is a means canonically sanctioned for uprooting faults, for implanting virtues, for removing offences, and for establishing fair fame. You and your college are, as it were, the head of our diocese, and with the head we will begin. Pray, appear before us, all of you, the brethren now absent included, on Monday the morrow of St. Katharine the Virgin, and following days, if need be. The Bishop does not tell us what particular 'aliquid spinosum' he found in the convent's garden when he arrived with his clerks on November 26; nor does the *Liber Albus* insert the letter of visitation nor make any reference to its consequences. The convent during 1319 appears to have been more exercised in its mind by the prospect of the visitation ordained by the General Chapter of the Order,[3] but this was over and done with before the autumn, and we must be content to assume that both passed off without serious fault-finding. It was certainly Cobham's custom

[1] F. 41*b*, 42.

[2] 'Ita quod aliquid sit exortum in tali prato spinosum.'

[3] *Liber Albus*, f. 92*b*, 93.

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to insert the results in his register if they seemed to be important.

But there were two offices in the convent, both connected importantly with the mother Church, to which it was in the Bishop's right to nominate, and the right would be a prolific source of trouble if all were not going well. One was the custody of the great shrine which pilgrims made rich with their offerings, and the post was vacant early in Cobham's episcopate. On January 30, 1318, he issued a commission[1] to the prior to choose one of his monks as warden of the shrine. Nothing could seem more considerate, and the commission[2] was duly noted in *Liber Albus*, with the addition that it was one of two 'custodes' who was being chosen. It is possible, but not quite clear, that an appointment was made, but on December 5 the Bishop, being then in Cambridge, wrote[3] thus to J. [de Bloyon], his official: 'It has been the custom for our predecessors to appoint the warden of the shrines of St. Oswald and St. Wulstan in the cathedral church; and we have done the like. We therefore command you to appoint on our behalf to this office Dom. Nicholas de Bradefeld, monk of the cathedral, whom we have ascertained to be suited for it, and to secure for him the free exercise of his responsibilities.' But a marginal note in another hand in the register calls attention to the fact that the Bishop made the appointment apart from and contrary to the wishes of the prior and convent.[4] Such an appointment was quite natural, as half the offerings at the shrine were part of the spiritualities, and during a vacancy in the see the prior would lay claim to them as the recognized administrator.[5] Walter Reynolds had exercised the same right without protest, but the marginal note makes it clear

[1] F. 4*b*.

[2] *Liber Albus*, f. 86*b*; it was more than a 'request'; 'commisit . . . ut eligeret.'

[3] F. 11*b*.

[4] 'Nota quod Episcopus Wygornienis ordinavit custodem feretrorum beatorum Oswaldi et Wolstani preter et contra voluntatem Prioris et Conuentus Wygorniensis.'

[5] Cf. *Liber Albus*, f. 12*d* (? 1302).

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that Cobham experienced some resistance to his claim, and it is even conceivable that the note was inserted by a monk on the convent's behalf after his death; for the registers passed into the prior's hands, *sede vacante*.[1]

But it was not Cobham's way to be grasping with regard to these offerings, and he liked his action to be on record. Twice in his register[2] he entered a letter which he wrote to the sacrist, Roger de Herwintone, from Wyke Episcopi on November 18, 1319. He gratefully recognized, he said, the zeal which the sacrist had shewn and was still shewing towards the 'opus,' that is, the constructive or fabric work of the monastery. He was therefore willing to lend the sacrist all the money due to the Bishop up to the moment from the offerings made at the shrine and head of St. Wulstan, and all that should come in from now up to the quinzaine of Easter next; but the loan must be repaid to the Bishop without delay at Pentecost then ensuing. It may have been a considerable sum, for nearly a year and a half's arrears would be due to him in November 1319, and, anyhow, the 'accommodation' may have helped the sacrist to deal with an uncomfortable overdraft.

The office of sacrist was the second in the convent to which the Bishop had the right of appointment, and his consent was necessary before a sacrist so appointed could be released from his functions. In the previous episcopate, that of Walter Reynolds, the King's Chancellor, who was promoted to Canterbury, this right appears to have been disputed by the convent, and was maintained by the Bishop after successful litigation.[3] It is difficult to suppose that the prior really expected any other result; indeed he appears to have urged his lawyers 'to keep the matter secret unless success is certain.' Bishop Giffard's control over and use of the sacrist had been, characteristically enough, so complete as to make the man seem like a diocesan officer; and the prior of that day pleaded that certain

[1] Cf. *Liber Albus*, f. 62 (Wilson, No. 614).

[2] F. 17*b*; 43.

[3] *Liber Albus* (Worc. Hist. Soc.), ed. Wilson, p. xxvi f.; see also f. 35*b*–36*b*.

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statutes enacted by the General Chapter of the Benedictine Order were being thus contravened; to which the masterful Giffard replied, in effect, so much the worse for the statutes[1]; let the sacrist do as he is told. But if this attitude of Giffard's was unreasonable, there was no disputing his right to release and appoint sacrists, and he exercised it several times in his long reign.[2] Similarly, Bishop Simon de Montacute found that his right was not, indeed, being disputed, but it was being nullified, because the convent, desiring to get rid of an existing sacrist, appointed him cellarer; but the Bishop told them that, while he would allow the two offices to be held together for a time, he intended to retain the sacrist as sacrist, so that he might continue his useful attentions to the fabric of the church, and they must find another cellarer.[3]

Cobham had no such disagreements. It is true that he found a monk, Robert de Cliftone, holding the same two offices of sacrist and cellarer,[4] and one of his early acts was to release Robert from the sacrist-ship and appoint Roger de Herwyntone in his place.[5] It was no case of the convent thinking lightly of the sacrist; they had appointed Robert de Cliftone as their proctor in the Parliament of 1311[6]; but it is possible that he held the cellarer's responsibilities in higher esteem than the sacrist's; for in the list of the monks present at the nomination for the priorship in 1317,[7] Robert is called cellarer and no sacrist is mentioned. So we are left to think of Cobham and Roger de Herwintone co-operating in the work of reconstructing 'the two eastern bays' of the nave,[8] until the time came when the Bishop began to feel that the work was too much for Roger's

[1] Register, Godfrey Giffard (Worc. Hist. Soc.), ed. Willis Bund, p. xxxv, 96.

[2] Register, Godfrey Giffard, ff. 106*b*, 284*b*, 315*b*.

[3] *Liber Albus*, f. 158*b*, 162*b*; and ed. Wilson (S.P.C.K.), pp. 271, 277.

[4] This appears not from the register, but from *Liber Albus*, f. 86*b*.

[5] Register, f. 9*b*; the date is September 13, 1318.

[6] *Liber Albus*, f. 50. [7] *Ibid.* f. 83.

[8] J. M. Wilson, Introd. *Liber Albus* (Worc. Hist. Soc.), p. xxvii.

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strength or too engrossing for his soul. To judge from its place in the register,[1] the entry belongs to 1321, but it is not dated, and the *Liber Albus* is unconscious of the incident. But it is evident that the Bishop decided to make a change and that he made it on his own responsibility, relieving Roger and substituting Ranulph de Cathrop, S.T.P., a learned monk who was considerably senior to Roger, and who had lately been lent as lecturer to the abbey of Ramsey, with somewhat acrimonious consequences.[2] It seems quite possible that the definite claims set forth in Cobham's letter to the prior were too damaging for entry in the convent's chartulary, and it may be well to reproduce the document here:

'Thomas &c. Priori et Conuentui ecclesie nostre cathedralis Wygornie salutem &c. Quia fratrem Rogerum de Herwintone ab officio sacristarie in predicta ecclesia nostra ut liberius deo et sibi vacare ualeat in futurum duxerimus absoluendum ac fratrem Ranulphum de Cathrope commonachum vestrum sacre pagine professorem in temporalibus et spiritualibus circumspectum ecclesie nostre prefecerimus in sacristam administracionem eidem omnium ad dictum sacristarie officium qualitercunque spectancium committendo donec de dicto officio aliud duxerimus ordinandum vobis mandamus in virtute obediencie firmiter iniungentes quod eundem fratrem Ranulphum officium huius libere exercere ac de pertinencibus ad illud disponere permittentes Claues et omnia alia ad dictum officium spectancia quoquo modo absque mora eidem liberari faciatis. Dat' &c.'

It is impossible for language to say more clearly either that the Bishop was doing what he had a right to do or that in due course he intended to do so again, if necessity arose; and we may assume that, if necessity had arisen in Cobham's time, his register would have informed us of his action.

At the same time, if it were held by the convent that the sacrist was over-reaching himself in respect of his special relations to the Bishop, then the latter must look carefully into any such contention. I wish I knew what lies behind

[1] F. 70. [2] Cf. *Liber Albus*, ff. 91, 91*b*.

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a commission[1] given in December 1318 by Cobham to Master J. [de Bloyon], in which the following case is stated for opinion and appropriate action:—if it belongs to the sacrist to bury nobles in our church of Worcester without consent of the prior and convent, does it belong to him by custom or by lawful right?

Cobham's relations with the cathedral were kindly even in death. In the middle of the register[2] there are given some extracts from his will written on a parchment of which the 'verso' is used for some deeds belonging to 1325. He left a silver-gilt vessel to hang above the high altar, and a sum of £20 (between £300 and £400 of our money) to the fabric of the church of Worcester, and it is pleasant to think that the learned Ranulph de Cathrope thus had the wherewithal to pay for plenty of material and many weeks' wages. The other gift to the church is specified in these words: 'let the fine mitre which was given to me by the Archbishop of Canterbury [Walter Reynolds] remain to the church of Worcester for ever.' Note that he does not introduce this clause of his will with the customary 'item lego,' but so shapes it as to say that the church may keep what it already has in its custody; and thereby hangs a tale which is to some extent unfolded in the *Liber Albus*. We begin with a letter[3] from Walter Reynolds in London to the prior. He describes himself as 'Wygorniensis electus confirmatus,' and the transcript which Canon Wilson has kindly made for me gives the date as August 27, *i.e.* 1308; for Reynolds was consecrated on October 13 in that year, the see having been vacant since September 17, 1307, when Gainsborough died.[4] Reynolds tells the prior that among the vestments sent to him for his chapel he cannot find the comely mitre which the convent inherited from Godfrey Giffard, and he asks that it may be sent forward with all speed in order that it may receive any alterations and repairs that are needed to fit it for the Bishop's use. He undertakes to be responsible for its safe custody. Eleven years pass. Cobham has succeeded Reynolds, promoted to Canterbury, but Giffard's

[1] F. 11*b*. [2] F. 45. [3] *Lib. Alb.* f. 32.
[4] Stubbs, *Regist. Sac. Anglicanum* (ed. 1897), pp. 69, 70.

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mitre has been promoted to Canterbury too, and on February 26, 1319, Cobham tells the prior[1] that he has made repeated requests to the Archbishop that Giffard's legacy may return to Giffard's diocese. At last he has prevailed—to some extent; for the Archbishop has now sent him 'a noble and lovely mitre' for the use of the Bishop of Worcester and his successors, to replace the alleged Giffard mitre,[2] which was much less costly and valuable. The Archbishop wants a receipt under the convent seal, acknowledging that the new mitre has been duly delivered, and he wants it within a month; in other words, he wants an admission that he is no longer responsible for restoring the Giffard mitre, which he clearly is. The *Liber Albus* adds the prior's reply to the Bishop, which is not dated but was probably speedy. You appear, says the prior in effect and with due reverence, to have received a *quid pro quo*, but, except at grave risk to our church, we cannot give up his Grace's bond; the times are too critical. Then the great question slumbers for three years and at the end of August 1322 the Archbishop again writes[3] to the prior from Wingham. He describes the beauty and value of the mitre which he sent to Cobham[4]; says that it is now, as he understands, in the custody of the cathedral; and again demands his bond. But Prior Wulstan sticks to his guns. His Grace must excuse their caution in not returning him his bond, for though they have made repeated requests to the Bishop to hand over the mitre, the only answer they can get from his lordship is that the mitre is in the cathedral; yet they have never seen it nor handled it and cannot get at it. Was the mitre, I wonder, all the time in the custody of the sacrist? Anyhow here is our good Bishop telling the convent in his last will and testament that they have the mitre given him by the Archbishop and that they can keep it; and Walter

[1] *Lib. Alb.* f. 93*b*.

[2] 'que dicebatur fuisse quondam bone memorie domini G. Giffard.'

[3] *Lib. Alb.* f. 106*b*.

[4] 'Auro gemmis et lapidibus preciosis non sine magnis sumptibus longe preciosiorem fieri faceremus.'

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Reynolds is self-convicted of purloining a treasure which, whatever its intrinsic worth, was regarded as the historic appanage of the see of Worcester.

The rest of Cobham's bequests were concerned with his tomb and its surroundings. Chasuble, alb, amice, an heraldic frontal, a great missal, silver candle-sticks, silver cruets, an image of the Virgin given to him by the abbot of St. Augustine's, Bristol,—all these he bequeathed to the altar where his body would be buried. And no man knoweth his sepulchre to this day.

ERNEST WORCESTER.

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ART. IV.—THE NEW IDEALISM.

The Theory of Mind as Pure Act. By GIOVANNI GENTILE, Professor in the University of Rome. Translated from the Third Edition, with an Introduction by H. WILDON CARR, Professor in the University of London. (London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd. 1922.)

THE work of Giovanni Gentile will make a strong appeal to those who seek in philosophy a metaphysic of the spiritual life. There are respects in which it appears to go further than any previous attempt, even that of the friend to whom Professor Gentile dedicates this book, Signor Benedetto Croce, to burn away in thought the last obstructions to the conception of the universe as mind, and to interpret the course of human history as a process of the One Spirit. It claims moreover in this interpretation to give a higher value to the experience of the practical life, and a more ultimate meaning to the moral ideal than is allowed in other modern forms of idealism. Such claims demand earnest consideration, and predispose the reader to the effort required to enter into the inmost thought of this philosophy.

In his illuminating Introduction to his translation of the *Theory of Mind as Pure Act*, Professor Wildon Carr warns us that the task is not easy. In the study of this work we are reminded that 'Philosophy is not a pastime, it is a discipline, or it is nothing.' And in the Author's Preface (second edition) we are told—'The truths I ask my readers to devote their attention to here are only to be conquered on the lonely mountain-top, and they call for heavy toil.' This is, however, a condition of all genuine philosophy. The attempt then of another toiler than the author, who cannot be sure that he has laboured sufficiently for the attainment of these principles, to offer interpretation or criticism is only justified in view of

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the truth not less valid at least for idealism that man is by nature a philosopher, or that every true thought concerning the Universe must find some response in the mind of the individual.

To understand the peculiar form of Professor Gentile's Idealism, it is necessary to reflect on his concept of the 'spiritual act.' The key-note of the method by which he would guide his readers to the possession of this concept seems to be given in his doctrine of the One as *Mind*, in distinction from *Being*.[1] Idealism hitherto, as he in effect says, has regarded as *Mind*, that which can only be the result of mind, system rather than the act which creates or posits the system, something which is taken in abstraction from the creative act, and has *ipso facto* ceased to be mind. 'To detach the facts of the mind from the real life of the mind, is to miss their true inward nature, by looking at them as realized. . . . To speak of Mind, is always to speak of concrete historic individuality. . . . The spiritual reality is not mind and spiritual fact, it is purely and simply mind as subject.' Or again, 'It can only be known, in so far as its objectivity is resolved in the real activity of the subject which knows it.' Thus thought must not be conceived as making an object of knowledge as a finished product which is, as it were, mind objectified, a construction of mind, an ideal reality, such as the Platonic world of Ideas. Such a system, confronting thought, not less than the external nature of the Positivists confronts it, makes of thought a nothing. 'Modern Idealism modestly asks that thought shall be something.' Once this concession is granted, we find it revealed in Gentile's philosophy as everything. Those interpretations of the Universe which think to shew the ideality of the whole by demonstrating the logical rationality of every element as part of a system are rejected; their reality is no longer *thought* itself as eternal activity. Gentile looks for his type of mind to the mind of the individual in full activity, as we know it in self-consciousness. Only in this way shall we avoid the fallacy of conceiving mind as thing, rather than spirit.

[1] Chap. iii.

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It is evident that such knowledge is not easily won or preserved. There is no resting in contemplation nor in the memory of even the highest tension of thought; we may not stand still upon the mountain-top. Only so long as that activity has not ceased but is consciously energizing does it give us the secret of the process of creative mind. How are we to conceive this creativity? The understanding of Gentile's philosophy depends upon the interpretation of his doctrine of the 'transcendental ego.'

'If we would understand the nature of this subject, the unique and transcendental I, in which the whole objectivity of spiritual beings is resolved, confronted by nothing which can assert independence, a subject therefore with no otherness opposed to it . . . we must think of it not as a being, or a state, but as a constructive process.'[1] Our hope of understanding lies in our capacity for sharing in the process. This indeed is the only way of understanding admissible for Gentile, since to have true knowledge of something as an object is impossible—an object over against the mind is unknowable. It appears that *qua* taking part in the process of the universe the individual *is* the transcendental ego. The rôle in the universe of the empirical ego remains, however, obscure. The transcendental subject is, so to speak, the hero in the drama of the world. This is no Absolute of which as finite we can only know that in it 'we move, and live, and have our being,' no reality of which the human experience is a single phenomenal phase. Nor is it 'the eternal self-consciousness' of T. H. Green, 'which makes the processes of animal life organic to a particular reproduction of itself' in man, but concerning which in itself 'we can only make negative statements.'[2]

'The doctrine,' says Gentile, 'that the spiritual world is only conceivable as the reality of my own spiritual activity, would be clearly absurd, were we to interpret it in any other light but that of the distinction between the transcendent and the empirical ego.'[3] But his state-

[1] Chap. ii, 'Spiritual Reality.'
[2] *Prolegomena to Ethics*, chap. i book i.
[3] *Theory of Mind*, chap. ii.

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ments in regard to the transcendent evidently imply that it is the true self of the individual. In comparing his doctrine with that of Berkeley, he makes it abundantly clear that the act of the transcendental is not beyond the consciousness of the empirical. For it appears arbitrary to confine the term empirical to that stage at which the self is not conscious of its activity as thinking—nor does Gentile intend this. The transcendental is not something we must postulate in order to make experience intelligible, or whose thought we follow in a fragmentary and stumbling way, in our understanding of the world.

'The transcendental point of view is that which we attain, when in the reality of thinking, we see our thought not as act done, but act in the doing,'[1] whilst we can never 'transcend this act, since it is our very subjectivity, our own self. The new point of view which we then gain is that of the *actuality* of the I.' From this point of view, 'the I can never be conceived as its own object,' for when we attempt to objectify it, 'we leave outside the object just what we wanted to get in it—the thinking activity which always remains the "subject."' The point of view is not beyond common experience. 'It is the concept of our ordinary life so long as we enjoy a certain feeling of life as spiritual reality. It is a common observation that whenever we want to understand something which has a spiritual value, something which we can speak of as a spiritual fact, we have to regard it not as an object, a thing which we can set before us for investigation, but as something immediately identified with our own spiritual activity—and it makes no difference that such spiritual values may be souls with whom our own soul may not be in accord.'[2] It is clear that it is in a simple fact of experience that he finds the clue to his conception of the transcendental subject that is always subject.

The experience itself will not be questioned. We know it when we accompany another soul in thought, which seems through sympathy to become sight. The sense of alien individuality is at a minimum. The absurdity of

[1] *Theory of Mind*, chap. i. [2] Chapter i.

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our ignorance of our fellows as they really are is felt—if only in a lightning flash of time. Some chance individual, whose existence is illuminated at such a moment by the 'spark from heaven' which has lit up the twilight in which we usually perceive the inner selves of those we meet, is seen in his spiritual relations. It seems to be a fantastic convention that we do not know him with the truth of friendship, the naturalness of childhood. The veil falls from our eyes and we meet the eternal human and spiritual. We follow his thought to his home, his real interests. His memories and hopes are ours. We are, in Gentile's phrase, 'in his spiritual presence.' But is it a true interpretation of this experience, to explain it as identification, the overcoming of 'otherness' so that we are no longer 'confronted with the spiritual existence of others, as with something different from ourselves'? Is it not rather an expansion beyond our own thought, a crossing of the threshold of another's personality which would have no meaning unless there were an eternal difference which is more than 'empirical'?

In the Berkeleian conception for which human thought is a 'ray of the divine thought,' thinking, according to Gentile, only 'thinks what is already thought.' The whole is divine thought and our thought 'does not add anything. For reality—is the totality of the ideas of an objective absolute Mind, whose existence the human mind presupposes.'[1] Thus Berkeley is criticized as contradicting his own fundamental principle, the *esse est percipi*, since he distinguishes between 'the thought which actually thinks the world, and the absolute Eternal Thought which transcends single minds and makes the development of single minds possible.' And this leads in Gentile's view to the result that for human thinking Mind is still faced with a reality to which nothing is added by the development of thought, a reality which is already complete, and when presented to thought does not grow, and continue to be realized. In fact, as we might paraphrase Gentile, that material reality which Berkeley has expelled with a fork

[1] Chapter i.

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still returns and persists, immovable before mind. The idealist unexpectedly would meet the Naturalist. For anything we postulate as an object of thought, external to our own thinking, even though that object be the manifestation of the Divine Mind, is not mind, not spiritual, it is materialized. In this idealistic criticism of idealism, this refiner's fire which would burn away as too gross even the being which is left to thought as the construction of thought, we have one of the most striking and original aspects of Gentile's central conception. It is best understood, as may be suggested, if we regard it as expressing that side of the spirit of idealism into which the experience of the true teacher gives a peculiar insight. In the opening words quoted from the Author's Preface to the First Edition we may find a hint of the profound significance for him, of the relation between the teacher and the student of philosophy.

'I print this small volume—in order not to part company with my students, and in order that I may be ready —to repeat in these pages my reply, or my encouragement to make them seek their own reply—to meet the serious problems, so old yet ever new, which I have discussed in the class-room.' The discovery that only active individual thinking has value, that the mind is asleep, in receiving passively even the greatest truth, or that there *is* no passive receiving of truth, is most easily made by the teacher.[1] Yet the method in which Gentile expresses this principle, of which the teacher's experience conveys to him an image, his insistence that there is no receiving of a truth which the individual mind cannot feel itself to have created, seems to threaten an abyss of thought, to which the author gives little heed. 'Spiritual reality can be known, only in so far as its objectivity is resolved in the real activity of the subject who knows it.' To this we will return.

How are we to understand the conception of 'the constructive process' which is Gentile's description of the nature of the subject 'the transcendental I,' and by means

[1] *Cf.* 'There is just so much mind, just so much spiritual wealth, as there is spiritual life in act' (p. 21).

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of which he would solve the ancient problem of Unity and Multiplicity? It is not really analogous, as we might suppose, with Bergson's 'creative evolution.' The combination of the notions of creativeness and self-process presents less difficulty for Bergson, since his conception, in spite of the vague suggestions of spirituality attending it, cannot without strain be interpreted as that of a spiritual process. In Gentile, the idea of constructive process softens, though it does not really lessen, the paradox of the Ego which unites all other egos without implying their unreality. 'Nothing but the Constructive process is.'[1] This, we are told, is one of the vital concepts of which it is necessary to acquire a firm grasp. It is intended to illuminate the relation of the one to the many since development implies an immanent relation between unity and multiplicity. The unity is that of 'Life,' which is 'not an abstract unity but the unity of an organism, in which the harmony, fusion, and synthesis of various elements exist in such wise that there is neither unity without multiplicity nor multiplicity without unity.'[2] It is in multiplicity that is shewn 'the reality, the life of the unity.'

The notion of reality as an organism or an organic unity has played a great part in modern idealism and has undoubtedly been fruitful. In the hands of the Absolutists the unity is emphasized, and we feel the tendency (however brilliantly resisted by Dr. Bosanquet) to loss of the differences as real differences in the ultimate conception. In Gentile's neo-Idealism, on the other hand, multiplicity is clearly required by the spirit of the philosophy; but the endeavour to demonstrate it shews, we think, that the analogy of the organism is more consistently used by Absolutism. A comparison indeed between the uses of the notion of organism in the two doctrines brings out the danger of cleaving too closely to any metaphor in philosophy. In this case the only reason surely of philosophic importance, why the comparison with the unity of an organism has value, is that it is to the whole and not the

[1] Chap. iii. [2] Chap. iv.

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parts, however distinct their life may be in some organisms, that consciousness is attached. And this is sufficient to make the conception strictly appropriate only to a consistent monism in metaphysics, as it is also dangerous to all individual interests, in a philosophy of the state. It is then to Absolute Idealism that the organic idea more logically belongs than to neo-Idealism. Gentile's fresh analysis and valuation of the idea in the chapter on Unity and Multiplicity is very useful in making clear its implications. But he does not, indeed in our view he cannot, shew that it can be made to yield the kind of real and spiritual multiplicity which is required by his view of history and the moral experience. The main problem of the practical life for a philosophy that takes it seriously is that the relation of the individual to the whole cannot be completely equated with that of the member of an organism to its organic unity. Practical reality is unintelligible except in a world of many subjects, though reality for knowledge assumes only many points of view. The analogy of the organism cannot be truly applied to the whole of spirituality unless the practical is merely phenomenal. The kind of multiplicity which is necessary to the development of an organism, or a system of thought, cannot be taken as a type of spiritual multiplicity.

The development of the 'Infinite and unmultipliable unity' does not then seem to be recognizable in the form of history and practice or 'the gradual realization of humanity itself.' Consideration of the place of these manifestations in Gentile's philosophy will be best approached by some reference to his reply to the criticism of Benedetto Croce—the friend with whose thought he has so much in common—that his doctrine is near to mysticism. Gentile insists that the concept of 'the deeper Personality,' the Person which has no plurality, does not annul the empirical and is therefore not mysticism. 'The reality of the transcendental ego even implies the reality of the empirical.'[1] To us he seems not to avoid the dilemma of all forms of Absolute Idealism, inability to solve the human

[1] Chap. ii., see also xviii.

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problem, unless by denying its existence. The heights and depths of personality are reached in human experience only under the condition of the kind of plurality which is denied. There is no moral problem, if the empirical ego is unreal, and the view that we can safeguard the principle of individuality by affirming that it is implied in the reality of the transcendental subject seems illusory.

The moral problem, we are told, is there in so far as we become aware of the unreality of our being as empirical. This unreality passes away in so far as the separateness and distinction vanish, and even so passes away, we may add, the moral problem. Not indeed in Gentile's view, since in his theory, as he claims, there is 'fullest recognition of individuality, though not of the fantastic conception of the individual amongst individuals. The only individual is the Absolute I. This it is which thinks, feels, fears, hopes, wills, and works, has responsibilities, rights, and duties, constitutes for each of us the pivot of his world.' Here we seem to be not far from Spinoza. But for Spinoza more consistently, these activities, hopes, and fears, acts of will and so forth, become unreal in their separateness. The 'pivot of our world' we find to be 'one for all, if we seek and find the all where alone it is, within us.' 'I do not think,' Gentile adds, 'I need defend this idealism from the charge or suspicion of suppressing individual personality.'[1] There could be no more courageous insistence, that the most precious jewels of opposite schools of thought should be linked in one philosophic crown. But are the links fashioned by logic? According to Gentile the doctrine which means mysticism is that for which the individual difference is lost in the unity of the whole, as object, whilst his own conception of the relation of the Individual to the one avoids this consummation by means of the interpretation of the one as subject which can never be object, and the empirical ego as having its reality in an identification with this subject, and its unreality in becoming, like Berkeley's ego, an object amongst objects. In this identification with the One, the empirical self is supposed not to vanish,

[1] Chap. xviii. p. 274.

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seeing that it shares in the spiritual act which is alone real. That there is an important difference between the two positions is clear, but that it is a difference between a mystical and a non-mystical philosophy is not so clear.

The individual finding its reality in the deeper Personality is still individual, it would seem, in virtue of the spiritual act. The full implications of this conception, and its effect upon the meaning of experience, are perhaps best seen in connexion with the doctrine of time, to which that of space is closely bound. The theory of space, if we may do some violence to Gentile's method by separating it from that of time, is a brilliant illustration of that method. The mind is continuously making space through its spiritual act, or rather space is the Act of the mind as multiplying, the reality of space is spatialization. There can be no logically prior manifold on which space is imposed, no multiplicity—as obscurely imagined by Kant, outside the cognitive process, since the mind itself is the source of multiplicity, *i.e.* 'spatiality consists in the multiplication of the one'—'Strictly it is not the many which is synthesized, it is the one which is analyzed [1]—Spiritual activity posits space, not by positing it finally, once for all, but by continuing in the actuality of positing it.' [2] Therefore as he finely conceives, 'space, how vast soever it be, is always within the mind' (*i.e.*, as he has explained, the transcendental ego)—'the mind that is superior to it can look beyond its limits towards remoter limits.' In all this he seems to be in close harmony with Signor Croce. The infinite excluding every limit, by the same act assigns the limit to the object. This conception of the infinity of the mind necessitating the limitation of the spatial object, which limitation it is always transcending, is a remarkable solution of the Kantian antinomy of infinite and finite in the idea of space, and gives strength to Gentile's idealism. But when he affirms the substantial identity of the scheme which is at the foundation of the idea of time and of space, it is more difficult to follow him. Here, as in his rejection of the imputation of mysticism, he seems to be

[1] Chap. ix. [2] Chap. x, 'Immortality.'

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making the best of two philosophic worlds. The root of the conception is the notion that time as well as space is involved in the multiplying act of the mind. As the infinite elements of the world so the infinite moments 'in confronting me are in me, through my work.'

He recognizes the truth that 'the process of spiritual development is subject to the form of time even,' that 'chronology is an indispensable element of history in its more spiritual meaning,' but, 'what is temporal in experience is not temporal in the absolute knowledge which understands that experience, as the display of the activity of the transcendental, or true I.'[1] 'The temporal,' then, 'as mere positive fact is not spiritual, but the act by which the temporal is temporal is spiritual.' There seems to be a curious reflection in this passage of the definition of time given by Plotinus,[2] *viz.* that time is an energy of the soul in a movement of transition from one to another life. The fundamental conception that time results from a spiritual energy which is non-temporal, is as it were created by that energy, appears to be the same. But this conception seems more at home in the work which is the fountain-head of philosophic mysticism, than in that of Gentile. One of the greatest paradoxes of Gentile's philosophy results then from his doctrine of time, that is the combination of the idea of the whole as spiritual process or creativity which we regard as the history of humanity, with the doctrine that the only meaning in which the temporal is spiritual is as the act of the transcendental ego. This apparently does not signify that spiritual development necessitates time, or carries time with it as an essential part of the process. Such an interpretation seems to be rendered impossible, by the explanation that—'The coexistence of the elements of space has its exact counterpart in the compresence of the elements of time,' and 'The eternal present, on which the rays of time converge and from which all irradiate, is the intelligibility of time—Time is the temporality of the

[1] Chap. ix, 'Space and Time.'

[2] *εἰ οὖν χρόνον τις λέγοι (ἐνέργεια) ψυχῆς ἐν κινήσει μεταβαντικῇ ἐξ ἄλλου εἰς ἄλλον βίον ζωὴν εἶναι ἂρ' ἂν δοκοῖ τι λέγειν;*

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instant and the instant is non-temporal—The one reality is eternal, in regard to time.' [1]

The difficulty presented by this position, is not that the conception of an eternal present, a time which is the exact counterpart of space, in its significance for reality may not have a logical validity for Idealism, of a strictly 'Absolute' character, but in regard to its consistency with an idealism for which reality, or mind, is creative process and the moral experience is to be taken so to speak on its face-value for man. Certainly there is nothing spiritual in the mere fact of counted moments of time, Bergson's 'clock-time.'

'To-morrow, and to-morrow, and to-morrow,' the petty pace of the natural being to dusty death, the obscure knowledge of the finite mind, incapable of grasping a *totum simul*. Time is nothing for a spiritual being except as a condition through which certain values come to be and are realized. This condition may be describable as a 'spiritual act,' and the manifestation of these values as postulating the temporal condition. But Gentile's exposition of time hardly seems to admit of this interpretation. The empirical ego may, as in this exposition, be conceived at any moment to contemplate all the temporal lines of his experience as it has come to him, and will—in his expectation—come in the future, including his ideal experience of all the history he can survey—as rays converging on his present. But were he not conscious of a positive nature in the lines of the temporal past, a nature to which human actions have given a positivity which constitutes an 'other,' he cannot 'pass through without stopping,' to use one of those striking expressions of Gentile, which sometimes veil obscurities, time would not have its spiritual quality, nor history its spiritual meaning. The lines of time do not converge upon the present if this means that the present recreates them in a new act. But if the 'eternal present' is only for the transcendental ego as the unity of all egos, then for it all is completed, and there is no process. For surely Croce and Gentile do not signify

[1] Chap. ix.

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the obvious proposition that history can only be appreciated by the individual as a present experience, thus transforming the weakness of empirical mind into a strength for the transcendent mind? This difficulty does not appear to be overcome by the explanations 'The doctrine that reality is neither spatial nor temporal—need not imply that no form of reality can be represented rightly as space or time.' 'What we ordinarily think of space and time—is quite true, but not the whole truth—the half truth of immature philosophy.' [1] For in that half-truth lies all the untameableness for logic of the merely empirical.

It comes to this—that a philosophy which takes the conception of spiritual development, spiritual history in dire earnest, seems committed to an interpretation of time as the condition of real externality, the external which is necessary to the activity of spirit, and which must not be confounded with that pseudo-external of which space is the image. The true 'other' of the spirit, is in that great unknown of spirit which always escapes the knowing mind because time is the factor of its removal from all categories by means of which mind could unify it with itself. If we are to conceive the process of spirit as creative, if we take human history as the vehicle, or manifestation of its creativity, then we must recognize that the unknown of time is its eternal 'other' ever rising up again as soon as fresh territory is captured from it by a fresh act of the spirit. Only an Absolute Idealism for which there is no real process can swallow up time in mind. An Idealism which attaches real meaning to History is surely driven to recognize that the historic act of the 'now' is without significance unless there are other 'nows,' the relation of which to their 'irradiating rays' of time is unknown. Spirit exists beyond my spirit, wholly beyond, in a distance which only time can give, the otherness of which I cannot diminish or 'pass through.' The spheres of present and past are conceivably conquerable, as knowable, however unknown, they are not unknowable, but spirit faces its 'other' in the future. The spiritual reality of time then

[1] Chap. ix.

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assures us that there is other mind with which, if mind is process, it cannot form a unity in the 'eternal present.' It may therefore be said that although the walls of space give way before the first trumpet-blast of idealism, time does not thus vanish, at least for an idealism which takes to itself the notion of history as a real process. If this is irrationalism it may be recognized that a philosophy which conceives mind as development cannot wholly purge its universe of a non-rational aspect.

We must return to the problem of that abyss, on the brink of which at least Gentile seemed to stand when he denied the validity of Berkeley's distinction between 'the thought which actually thinks the world and the absolute Eternal Thought which transcends single minds.' In this denial Gentile throws away the plank which saves Berkeley from solipsism. Does his own theory supply another plank? He himself asks the question whether he may not seem to have destroyed the essence of individuality in identifying the individual with the universal. 'Do I really think the I, if I can think no other than the I?' It is the converse question which we would ask: Does he not rather seem to destroy the essence of universality in identifying the universal with the individual—or with that shadowy individual which stands in his system between the empirical and the transcendental, which wanders between two worlds, and in the company of which we seem at times to lose both? Gentile has only the one answer in varying phrases to all forms of the problem of the One and the Many. 'We are rendering profound homage to the truth of the Democritean atomism, which is the need of difference, when we expound the concept of mind as process.'

The transcendental for him is, as we have seen, a point of view the human thinker can reach. He finds it in his own experience, he does not assume it as the necessary postulate and explanation of that experience. Gentile goes back to Descartes' basis in self-consciousness. But since it would be contrary to his method to correct and enlarge that basis by use of the Cartesian ontological argument for the existence of a real or Perfect Being, he appears never

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to pass completely beyond the limits of solipsism. In the dialectic of that solipsism, indeed, we find it evolving now into the solitude of a composite self, now into the bare Unity of a Universal thinking. But as the first is not the concrete universal of neo-Hegelianism, so the second is not the eternal Thinker, the Divine Substance *qua* thinking through the finite—of Spinoza. Yet does his own exposition clearly save us from what may be termed a super-solipsism? For since there is nothing real outside the process, and the transcendental, though more than the empirical, is not more than the human mind attains to in experience, there is no criterion beyond in an 'eternal not-ourselves.'

'When we conceive God as outside the activity in which the human spirit is actualized, we are denying this infinity'[1] (*i.e.* of the mind).

Dr. Bosanquet, interpreting Gentile's meaning in his desire to avoid subjective idealism, observes, 'The thought whose thinking is reality, self-creating reality, is the thought which lives in the "we," the group-life, the social unity, of fact and will.'[2] This seems to go beyond anything that Gentile actually says in this book. If however it were his meaning, would the substitution of the social for the individual self, as bearer of the gains of the process at every stage, give the equivalent of the Universal which he seeks, or assure that reality of truth and value in the life of the spirit, which is ceaselessly imperilled if we identify it with the feeble flame, however low it may be burning, at any particular stage of the human process?

Multiplicity, he says, is imposed on the mind from within, in so far as it is conscious of things and persons. 'There is no other multiplicity than this—a multiplicity which we see arising to confront us from within our own inmost being.'

May we not trace a solipsism of another kind, another direction taken by the deeply subjective note in Gentile's idealism, in the idea of the eternal Present, a kind of

[1] Chap. xii, p. 185.

[2] *Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy*, Chap. viii.

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solipsist of history? For in this view there is no being in past or future, no being in history except as perceived in the mind of to-day. It has been suggested above that the lack of recognition that present time requires its 'Other' in a sense not admitted by the doctrine of the unmultipliable unity gives a certain unreality to the theory of history, and that the presupposition of all otherness of spiritual life is the unknown of time. A significant truth is indeed conveyed by the saying that the intelligibility of history consists in the unity of the real to which it belongs with the mentality of the historian. But there *is* this real, over against the mind in history, not primarily there as object, but as subject. Therefore it seems wrong to say that 'strictly speaking, history is not the antecedent of the historian's activity—it *is* his activity.' Obviously there is not 'a material element of history, which remains point for point the same, in the various representations which different historians offer, nothing which, when we have despoiled a history of all the historian's subjective particularity—according to the empirical conception—we can fix in its skeletal objectivity.'

No—not a material element—but surely there *is* a spiritual element which remains distinct from the particular historian's thought, an element which is not the less mind though not created by him? Croce, whose view of history seems in some important respects the same as that of Gentile, does indeed admit a common element as basis of all historic work.[1] Certainly the historian must feel that history is prolonged and concentrated in his consciousness. But this does not mean that it is nothing else or would not be history though it has not become part of his consciousness. Unless he assumes that there are spiritual events, independent of his mental activity, of which he may give a true or less true presentation, history is only a dream of the historian, nay, in Gentile's philosophy since mind is history, the world becomes again a subjective phantasm. Would the reply be—The historian in the spiritual actuality of his thinking knows that his presentation is true? But

[1] *Logic*, Part II chap. iii 'History.'

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how are we assured that he can communicate his knowledge to those who read his history? Is it not rather incommunicable, and can they do more than perform another historic act for themselves, using his history as their material? The doctrine then seems to result in an extreme relativity and subjectivity in regard to history.

Dr. Bosanquet in his criticism of neo-Idealism [1] treats the doctrine of Eternal History according to which the past as such is non-existent, only enduring in its effect on the present, or merely on the historian's mind, as appropriate to this philosophy and part of what he regards as the error of modern progressism, or progressive moralism. Nevertheless it seems paradoxical that for a philosophy of spiritual progress, whilst duration is fundamental, past duration should only have such continuance as present memory allows to it, like the grandparents in Maeterlinck's *Blue Bird*.[2] What of those torches of the past, which, long smouldering in forgotten records, again flame up in the grasp of worthy hands in a far-off time? Gentile's eternal present is the present of the Spirit now passing on—leaving behind in its adventure all that it has not resolved into spiritual history, in danger of dropping perhaps the greatest values of its predecessors, in its haste to grasp some seeming good. For the 'lost goods,' there is no eternal home as in the Absolute of the Hegelians, whose eternal present would include past, present, and future in a timeless experience. If for the neo-Idealist, history is nothing except in so far as it has entered into the consciousness of certain individuals as their contemporaneous possession, Dr. Bosanquet seems right in his view that here we have a serious impoverishment of values. In Benedetto Croce's theory it is indeed conceded that a forgotten tract of history may be recovered.[3] But what assurance have we that no value has perished? In some *a priori* view that

[1] *Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy.*

[2] Croce, however, speaks of 'The obscure depths of the memories that the human race bears with it' (*Logic*, II, ii, trans. by Douglas Ainslie).

[3] *Logic*, II, ii.

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the spirit must conserve every value? 'The condition of the existence' [of history] 'is that the deed of which the history is told must vibrate in the soul of the historian.' Thus contemporaneity is with him, as with Gentile, the intrinsic character of every history. Are we then to conclude (for example) that the Minoan civilization is clean gone for ever, forgotten as a dead man out of mind? It may happen that the spiritual heritage of a people is rejected as alien culture by a class which, having felt itself shut out from that inheritance, indignantly steps into the place of power from which to remake the national history. Is then some light extinct for all eternity? 'The spirit,' says Croce, 'itself is history, remaker of history at every moment. It bears with it all history which coincides with itself.' But since, as his references make clear, when we would know the nature of this history, we can only seek it in those elements which are at any time to be found preserved in the historic mind of the age (however capricious its interest may chance to be), we have apparently no standard of spiritual progress but the actual—Whatever is, is progress. And yet how frequent is it that the finest things of life, whether national or individual, the unnoted deed, the experience of an unremembered people do not get a place in the historic mind! Happy, nay perhaps holy is the people which has no history. This truth is exquisitely expressed in a little essay, or prose poem by Dr. Bosanquet, 'Unvisited Tombs.'[1] Indeed in the Absolutist philosophy, there is more place for the task of the recording Angel, than in the philosophy which conceives of spirit, as history. Here there is surely an inconsistency. If history is real, the past endures in the significance that it originally possessed and which is an aspect of its eternal truth, as well as in its 'contemporaneity.' If history counts, it counts not only in the result, but in every stage, not only in the royal stream which has flowed into 'the spirit' of our age, but in others unnoticed and forgotten. In this respect the logic of the philosophy of mind as process ought not to be less rigorous than the logic of the Absolutist, but more, since it would give a value

[1] *Suggestions in Ethics*, chap. iv.

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to the temporal order. The events must be thought of as the spiritual objects they were, before transformed by that understanding which is pardon—'Die Welt-Geschichte,' known as it was before it has passed into 'Das Welt-Gericht.' For the reconciliation, or the judgement, is not what it is, through the blending of things past with things present, but through their inclusion in their own right. The Timeless real of Absolutism seems then, contrary to expectation, to allow a better valuation of history than the 'eternal present' of Croce and Gentile. But in both these forms of Idealism, the contribution of history to a doctrine of reality is weakened. Is it possible that for both the meaning of history is somewhat obscured by an unconscious influence from the analogy of art? The artist aims at giving to his observer or reader the peaceful emotion of contemplating as object of consciousness that practical struggle, the character of which he has experienced as an agent. The time-order is nothing to him except as an element in the artistic work—moments of it may be ignored, it matters not that the order is different for his genius. In a similar way the human events may pass aesthetically into a new kind of order, and with a different significance as a universal for the Absolutist Whole. And for the neo-Idealist the spirit need only distil out of the past stream of time that essence which the present can turn to its purposes.

In his sympathetic and valuable study of the Philosophy of Croce, Dr. Wildon Carr explains in answer to the question, 'How does he treat the relation of the existing individual mind to the universal reality of mind?' that Croce's theory seems to meet the problem through the concept of history. 'Every individual mind is a history, and illimitable history exists in every actual mental process. The individual mind therefore carries along with it . . . a past which is itself determined in the present and which is also itself eternally determining the present. The reality therefore which confronts the individual mind, is history, and with history the individual mind is identical.'[1]—

[1] *Philosophy of Benedetto Croce*, by H. Wildon Carr, Chap. i.

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'History is present reality. It exists in the actual present in the same way in which the full reality of the individual past exists in the present moment of an individual consciousness.'[1] This sentence seems to furnish a key to the understanding of the doctrine of history as contemporary and its implications. The impoverishment of experience which we feel in this doctrine may not be apparent to its originators because of the analogy, which in Gentile borders at times on identity, between the individual mind and 'the spirit.' The past of the individual *is* his self, even if forgotten because it is his experience. But the past of humanity is not identical with the mind of any succeeding age, at least in the sense in which Gentile's neo-Idealism interprets that mind. (Croce's theory is of course not identical with this.) We may conceive it to form part of the mind of the whole in the Absolutist sense, but this conception cannot be combined with that of the constructive process. For Gentile the Spirit only *is* as act, or activity. And every Spiritual Act has passed away except in so far as it has entered into the present act, for mind dies out of it as the present contemplates it as object. We cannot see that there is any guarantee in this philosophy for the conservation of value, unless in an *a priori* assumption that progress cannot cease, but is inherent in the life of the Spirit.

It seems to result from these considerations that while the attempt to purify Idealism of the last remnants of the 'Thing in itself' does much to illuminate the task of Idealism, the total exclusion of the objective from reality seems to cast a certain unsubstantiality over the doctrine. In shrinking even from the 'otherness' of Spirit, it is in danger of confining spirit to the subjectivity of the ego, and thus approaching solipsism. In such a philosophy the theory of time and history as act of the mind gives a monstrous freedom to the ego, which seems inconsistent with the purpose of taking ethical experience in earnest. It seems that Gentile's philosophy might gain in elevation if it suffered the passage into mysticism which he deprecates.

[1] *Philosophy of Benedetto Croce*, Chap. xi.

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The intention of endowing the ethical relations with a real significance appears, moreover, to fail of fulfilment on account of the treatment of the moral problem as due to the empirical situation of the ego, whilst in the transcendental, multiplicity disappears. Again the doctrine of progress seems to halt because the theory of history as the eternal present constitutes as vehicle of progress that manifestation of mind, which in the form of written or acted history may be immeasurably limited.

The main difficulty then which I feel in the Philosophy of Spirit as Pure Act is that those very positions which it is most concerned to maintain, and in regard to which it purports to diverge from the other main types of modern Idealism seem insecurely held. Professor Gentile's intention of demonstrating that the interrelations of persons, the fact of personality have an eternal validity is made clear by his claim to have furnished a Christian philosophy. And yet we cannot but suspect that in the doctrine of the empirical and the Transcendental ego the personal principle undergoes a profound change from the moral colours of the human spectrum to the white light of thought. In this white light Absolute Idealism indeed finds the essence of religion as distinct from morality, but not surely of the religion which has most emphasized the infinite value of the person? For Gentile, however, the One, the spirit, is a creative process. Herein lies his most marked divergence from Absolutism with the *apparent* admission of the reality of time and change, of the principles of multiplicity and of progress. Not less ambiguous, however, in its effect upon the problems of progress, and the significance of human practice is, as has been seen, his theory of time as an act of the spirit and of history as the eternal present.

Gentile's treatment of those conditions of the human situation which determine the moral values and ideals seems then hardly less than that of Absolute Idealism to cause them to 'suffer a change, into something rich' indeed for theoretic thought, but 'strange' to practical thought. And from the point of view of the moral interest, the interest in tracing some real significance in the relations of

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the practical life, it seems preferable to carry out the idealistic criticism of practice to its utterly logical conclusion as in Absolute Idealism than thus to stop half-way. Not that we would imply the incapacity of Idealism for the task of a philosophy of practice as practice, and not a weakened form of thought. Professor Gentile's philosophic hand does not, however, seem to grasp the nettle of practice firmly enough to make it yield its own philosophy. Are we then to suppose that he has fallen unconsciously into the philosopher's fallacy due to a dread of the stings of practice for thought? Perhaps the deep-seated cause of the inadequacy of his interpretation of practice lies in the position that the act of thought ceases to be real, if objectified. For the act of practice would not be practice, or give rise to morality, unless it could become object. It is only by objectifying the 'I' that we understand the moral relations. For these a philosophic equality of selves with no insidious veil of solipsism between the worlds of one and of other spirits is necessary. If the *real I* can never see itself as object amongst other selves, the essence of the moral relation is gone. But according to Gentile in this consists its fall into the empirical state. And if we conceive the I as subject amongst other subjects, we do not escape, for unless the multiplicity is lost in the subject it is empirical. In the activity of thought the transcendence of difference means rising to a higher self, but in the moral activity it is to pass to the beyond self, the other. 'Nothing has for us spiritual value, save in so far as it comes to be resolved into ourselves who know it.' But at least it is not thus with the spiritual value of the practical life. In fact, I cannot but think that Gentile is resolving the good into the true, as the Absolutist resolves good into real. Truth requires the abstraction of all the differences of finite minds, for these differences are impediments from the stand-point of truth. For good there can be no identity of finite points of view—if there were the moral problem would disappear. Since, however, we are thinking creatures, we inevitably incline to substitute for the practical ideal of the harmony of spiritual beings, the logical ideal of the identification of points of view in

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knowledge. And this substitution may even be an inspiration for practice. For the truth of logic becomes the paradox of practical thought. And practice needs a regulative paradox.

Not that the reader of this book can doubt that the doctrine of Mind as Pure Act has essentially a moral value, and proceeds from the depths of a moral experience. The expression of the conviction that only in living activity does spirit shew itself, can leave no uncertainty in regard to the fine ethical idealism which inspires the theory. This conception having its source in practical experience is taken over into the theory of knowledge, and a special idealism of knowledge is developed, in which the idea of mind as life is carried so far that the subject-object relation, peculiar to mind, is almost dropped, whilst in the dialectic of knowledge, spirit becomes the universal, the Unmultipliable Unity. Brought back to the practical sphere, the doctrine returns with its wings clipped for practice, where it had its birth. This is the final impression with which we leave a work of great interest, and if of some seeming inconsistencies, the history of philosophy is not ashamed of these.

This consideration, already lengthy (though too brief for such a work), of *The Theory of Mind as Pure Act* must not be concluded without an expression of gratitude to Professor Wildon Carr for enabling non-readers of Italian to study a book so provocative to thought. It has seemed best to devote attention to a few of the leading aspects of the theory, though this has involved neglect of some applications through which the author endeavours to throw light on his central thought of mind or spirit as activity. Such are the interpretation of Immortality and of the Problem of Evil. Professor Gentile would pardon a treatment of his work not as a system but as a discipline in idealistic thinking. And he would assuredly not desire that it should be regarded as a last word.

HILDA D. OAKELEY.

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ART. V.—TITHE RENT CHARGE.

LEGISLATION AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS, A.D. 1888–1921.

1. *The Tithe Acts*, 1836–1891. By G. P. LEACH. Fifth edition. (London: Shaw and Sons. 1891.)
2. *The Law of Tithes in England.* By W. EASTERBY. (Cambridge: University Press. 1888.)
3. *The Law of Tithes in England.* By G. EDWARDES-JONES. (London: Clowes and Sons. 1888.)
4. Law Reports, 1921, *passim.*
5. Tithe Rentcharge Acts, 1891, 1899, 1918, 1920.
6. Hansard *Parliamentary Debates*, 1891, 1899, 1918, 1920, *passim.*
7. *Reports*—Ministry of Agriculture, Tithe etc. Acts, 1915–1920.
8. A Case submitted to Counsel, in 1741, by the Rev. W. NEWTON, Vicar of Sithney, Cornwall.

INASMUCH as a generation has passed since the matter of 'Tithe Legislation' was presented in 1888 to readers of this Review, it may be well to make some preliminary remarks on tithe and tithe rent charge before dealing with the more recent legislation and judicial decisions affecting this subject-matter. Although the term 'tithe' is often used in common parlance, it is a misnomer, and has been so since the Commutation Act of 1836. Tithe has been thus defined:

'Tithes are of that class of things which are termed incorporeal hereditaments, which are rights issuing out of things corporate, whether real or personal, or concerning or annexed to, or exercisable within the same; and they may be defined to have been a right to the tenth part of all the produce of lands, the stock upon lands, and the personal industry of the occupiers, but in their essence they have nothing substantial or permanent; they consist merely *in jure*, and are only a right. So that an estate in tithes is no more than a title to a share or portion of the produce

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of a certain tract of land, after it shall have been separated from the general mass.' [1]

It is evident that tithe rent charge differs very materially from tithes taken, as in most cases before 1836, in kind. It is also obvious that the collection of tithes in kind created contention, trouble, and inconvenience. A perusal of any such volumes as *Tithe Cases* by Eagle and Young, or by Gwillim (4 vols.), will indicate what an enormous amount of litigation ensued in pre-commutation days. We say 'pre-commutation days' meaning the times before the Act of 1836, although there had been long before that year a large number of voluntary money-compositions. Such compositions numbered some 4000 in 1835, that is, in about one third of the parishes in which lands were charged with tithes. These compositions, except when made under private Acts of Parliament, which were very numerous, were not binding on successors in the benefice. They could be modified or abandoned by such. The Commutation Act (6 & 7 Will. IV, c. 71) was passed to encourage and facilitate voluntary commutations of tithes; and to effect commutations compulsorily, where the parties were unwilling or unable to come to a voluntary agreement; and in either case to make all commutations arrived at under the Act permanent, so as to bind all subsequent incumbents and owners of tithe rent charge severed from the benefice by appropriation or impropriation. These terms are often confused; but the former strictly applies to tithes or tithe rent charge, severed from the benefice in the hands of corporations sole or aggregate; whilst impropriate tithe rent charge is such possessed by lay-folk principally.

The amount of tithe rent charge commuted and apportioned by the Tithe Commissioners, consequent on the Commutation Act was:

Payable to parochial Incumbents . .	£2,412,103
,, to spiritual appropriators . .	630,039
,, to schools, colleges, etc. . .	196,056
,, to lay impropriators . .	766,205
	£4,004,403

[1] Cripps, *The Law of the Church and Clergy*, ed. 1857, p. 304.

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This total has been altered since the commutation through various causes, and, according to the latest Report of the Ministry of Agriculture, 'the amount of tithe rent charge existing at the end of 1920 was £3,617,572, which at the present value is £3,950,262.'[1] The Report adds: 'There are no available statistics showing exactly what portion of this sum was payable to incumbents of parishes, but, probably, the amount was approximately £2,130,000, while about £360,000 was payable to the Ecclesiastical Commissioners, £224,000 to the Welsh Church Commissioners, £92,000 to capitular bodies, such as Deans and Chapters of Cathedrals, the balance being owned by various schools, colleges, and individual lay-owners.'[2] All these figures are the commuted values.

It is interesting to observe that the average amount payable for the whole of the period from 1836 to 1921 has not yet reached the par value. That average is £92 7*s.* 10½*d.* Thus, in the whole series of years, tithe-owners have received on the average some 8 per cent. annually below par value, though, of course, in some specific years they received much less than that, *e.g.* during thirteen consecutive years (1897–1909) they received less than £70 for each £100 of tithe rent charge. The highest value was in the years 1874, 1875, 1878, when it rose to between £112 and £113; whilst the lowest to which it fell was £66 10*s.* 9½*d.*, in 1901. It can thus be said beyond dispute that the tithe-payers have gained no little advantage financially under the Commutation Act. On the other hand, tithe-owners have lost not merely as just indicated, but far more by the estopping of all lands brought into cultivation after the date of the Commutation Act from bearing any tithe rent charge. No lands not included in the Apportionments as being subject to tithe rent charge can ever be made liable thereto. The old law as enacted by a statute passed in the reign of Edward the Sixth (2 & 3 Edw. VI, c. 13) rendered all lands brought into cultivation liable to tithes 'after the end of seven years next after such improvement.'

[1] Annual Report of Proceedings under Tithe, etc., Acts, 1920, p. 5.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 4.

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Previously, by the Common Law all land was liable to the payment of tithes immediately after it was brought into cultivation. This acted in the Middle Ages as a great bar to the spread of agriculture. In consequence, the statute of Edward VI was passed to encourage development of lands. It may appear strange to some in these days, when land is relatively so insignificant a property, in comparison with personalty, that tithes or tithe rent charge should be levied solely upon one form of property. But it was not always so. It must be remembered that in former times land was the chief kind of property, and, further, that it was visible and tangible. It was practically impossible to discover the amount of personalty held by inhabitants. Nevertheless, personal property was theoretically subject to tithe. Although the Commutation Act abolished all such liability, it may be interesting to say something about it here. So recently as the third decade of the Nineteenth century, certain persons were haled before the magistrates, and condemned for non-payment of personal tithe. And in June 1836 a Bill for the abolition of personal tithes was brought into the House of Commons by Lord John Russell and the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The Bill was read a second time on July 4 of that year. Personal tithe was one tenth of actual gains or profit. However compulsory such liability was, it is evident that payment became in most cases voluntary. For who was there who was able in those days to arrive at actual gains or profits, after all necessary expenses had been deducted? The most important of the mediaeval canons on this matter was promulgated at a synod held in London, and presided over by Archbishop Winchelsey in 1295. Lyndwood quotes it in his chapter *De Decimis*:

'We decree also that personal tithes be paid by artificers and merchants, for instance from the profits of any business, likewise by carpenters, smiths, plasterers, weavers, and by all other workmen working for wages, to wit to give a tenth part of their wages, unless the workmen themselves prefer to give something definite towards the work of the church if it be satisfactory to the rector of that church.'

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In the Fifteenth century considerable opposition to the payment of personal tithes arose. One William Russell, a Franciscan, was in 1472 accused in Convocation of preaching that such were not necessarily payable by God's commandment. He was promptly enjoined to recant at Paul's Cross, but before the day named he fled the kingdom. Thereupon Oxford sent to Convocation the famous letter in support of personal tithes:

'Dicimus et firmiter concipimus quod Decimae personales tam ex praecepto juris divini quam sanctorum Patrum traditionibus sub auctoritate Ecclesiae in concordi juris judicio debentur Ecclesiis et earum Ministris curam animarum habentibus et Sacramentis ministrantibus ex auctoritate Ecclesiae.'[1]

Russell was followed to Rome, accused there, and imprisoned. But, escaping therefrom, he returned to England, and was compelled to recant at Paul's Cross, and solemnly abjured his heresy, 'as they called it.' So Selden remarks. The imposition of personal tithes was not, however, left to the ecclesiastical authorities. For the statute of Henry VIII (28 Hen. VIII, c. 16) laid down the liability therefor, and set in motion procedure for the recovery of all manner of tithes, so that 'the spiritual Rights and Duties of the Church be preserved, continued and ordained.'

This was followed by the statute 32 Hen. VIII, c. 7, for the enforcement by civil procedure of the payment of tithes, 'according to the lawful customs and usages of the parishes and places where such tithes shall grow, arise, come or be due.'

To these two Acts was added the statute 2 & 3 Edw. VI. c. 13, which, *inter alia*, enacted that

'Every person exercising merchandises, bargaining and selling clothing, handicraft or other art or faculty, being such kind of persons and in such places as heretofore within these forty years have accustomably used to pay such personal tithes or of right ought to pay (other than such as be common day-labourers) shall yearly, at or before the Feast of Easter, pay for his personal tithes the tenth part of his clear gains, his charges and expenses,

[1] G. Edwardes-Jones, *The Law of Tithes*, p. 85.

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according to his estate, condition or degree, to be therein abated, allowed and deducted.'

It was the opinion of Bishop Stillingfleet that the words 'all ecclesiastical Duties' in the rubric of the present Prayer Book referred to compositions for personal tithes. Wheatley was of the opinion that the term probably included other offerings. In the case of personal tithes the use of money-compositions was, almost certainly, as old as the practice of payment. It is to be noted that the Edwardian Act limited the canon law in respect of personal tithes, in that it restrained these to such kinds of persons as had been accustomably used to pay them within forty years of the passing of the statute. The period of forty years was chosen because it was the usual time for the proof *de modo decimandi*. The only relics of personal tithes consist in payments in respect of mills and fish. The Tithe Commutation Act (sect. XC.) distinctly excepted all 'personal tithes other than the tithes of mills,' and as regards fish, the Act did not extend to them unless by special provision to be inserted in some parochial agreement, and specially approved by the Tithe Commissioners. The second Commutation Act (2 & 3 Vict. c. 62, s. 9), however, allowed tithes of fish and fishing to be commuted by a parochial agreement any time before the confirmation of a compulsory award. Amongst the ancient records of the parish of which the writer is the Incumbent is a very interesting copy of Counsel's opinion relative, *inter alia*, to tithes on mills and fish, dated 1741. This document incidentally discloses many interesting facts relative to tithes. It records that the Vicar from 1675 to 1737 'compounded for the tithe of hay and of fish,' and that 'the former Vicars compounded for all their small tithes, except the pig, goose, and honey, which both they and the present Vicar have received in kind exclusive of the composition money.' It is affirmed that 'the late Vicar' (1737–1780) 'was never charged by the Poor's rate, but the present Vicar is, though he compounds with the major part of the parish.' The query is asked of Counsel, 'Whether the Vicar is rateable for the small tithes, whether he compounds or not?' To

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this, Mr. R. Wilbraham, of Lincoln's Inn, replied 'I think that he is rateable to the Poor for the amount of the annual value of the tithes, whether he compounds or not.' Further this case submitted to Counsel discloses the fact that previous Vicars kept Accounts respecting tithes. This is a melancholy fact, inasmuch as not one such is now extant. But, reading between the lines of this document, it is quite evident that infinite trouble was caused to the parson, and that many of the tithe-payers were 'peevish and unreasonable,' as is plain from the following query, *inter alia*, 'The notices for setting out the small tithes are published by the sexton in the churchyard and on Sundays and Holidays, and sent to the Vicarage house. But their general way of giving notice is to have it published without acquainting the Vicar of it. Query, Whether such notice is regular, and after what manner notice is to be given?' Counsel replied, 'Tho' by the Canon Law, notice is to be given of setting out tithes, and it seems reasonable it should be so; yet I think that the common law does not require any notice; but the occupier is to set out his tithe fairly and justly at his peril.'[1]

There are other instances in this document of considerable friction between tithe-owner and tithe-payer, from day to day in matters relating to tithes.

It is known by those who are conversant with the Commutation Act that the basis of the tithe rent charge was the prices of wheat, barley, and oats, calculated on a seven years' average. But the reason for the choice of cereals rather than a gold basis is not generally known. That reason has been explicitly stated by one who, to use his own description of himself, was 'one of the committee of the Cabinet by which the Commutation Act was settled.' In a letter to Lord Halifax, Lord Grey wrote thus: 'The object with which the seven years' average of corn was made was to render the amount of the tithe rent charge as nearly uniform as possible, and to guard the Church against any loss that it might sustain by a depreciation of the currency.'[2] This

[1] The statute law did not compel notice to be given, *vide* Easterby, *The Law of Tithes in England*, p. 80.

[2] *The National Church* Journal, December 1887.

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basis of calculation has, on the whole, fairly provided for the periodic fluctuations in the prices of produce. Something will be said later as to the alteration respecting seven years' average by the Act of 1918.

It has been thought advisable to make these somewhat lengthy remarks as a preliminary to the consideration of the enactments of legislation and judicial decisions on tithe rent charge since 1887. Complaint is sometimes made as to the friction between tithe-payers and tithe-owners since the commutation. But such friction is insignificant in comparison with that which prevailed before the Act of 1836. Whatever tithe-owners may have lost financially under that Act, it has made for 'the peace of the parish,' to use a phrase which occurs relative to voluntary compositions before the Act. That 'grievances' will never altogether cease is probable, whether alleged by either party to the compact. But no one would wish to go back to the days of old.

Between the years 1836 and 1887 no less than thirteen amending Acts were passed relative to tithe rent charge. Various abortive attempts at further legislation were made during the next few years. But it was not until 1891 that the matter was again dealt with by the Legislature.

I.—Tithe Act, 1891 (54 & 55 Vict. c. 8).

An Act to make better provision for the Recovery of Tithe Rent Charge in England and Wales.

This Act is small in bulk, for it contains only twelve sections, though its scope is far wider than so few pages might suggest. It had three principal points:

(1) The owner of lands charged to tithe rent was made directly liable for payment thereof. Previously the charge ultimately fell upon the owner, although it was collected from the occupier. Section LXXX of the Commutation Act runs thus:

'Every tenant or occupier who shall occupy lands by any lease or agreement made subsequently to (such) commutation,

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and who shall pay any such rent-charge, shall be entitled to deduct the amount thereof from the rent payable by him to his landlord, and shall be allowed the same in account with the said landlord.'

Side by side with this original enactment must be placed the provision of the Act of 1891:

Section 1 (1) is:

'Tithe rent charge, as defined by this Act, issuing out of any lands, shall be payable by the owner of the lands, notwithstanding any contract between him and the occupier of such lands, and any contract made between an occupier and an owner of lands, after the passing of this Act, for the payment of the tithe rent charge by the occupier shall be void.'

This alteration in the compulsorily direct incidence of the charge was no little boon to tithe-owners and occupiers of lands. As regards the former, it simplified collection immensely, inasmuch as the whole amount of the charge on lands in the ownership of one person is to be collected from that one person instead of from many occupiers. And, as regards the occupier, it saves him the trouble of recovery from his landlord. The benefit to the tithe-owner under this Act is, however, being rapidly diminished by the breaking up of estates, creating a multitude of owner-occupiers. One firm of auctioneers alone disposed of one and three-quarter million acres during the last three or four years, and it is estimated that some 23,000 tenants have purchased their holdings recently. It is more than likely that considerable friction may arise between tithe-owners and these new owners of lands, particularly if the liability for 'tithe' was not made plain at the time of purchase.

(2) By section 2, the right of the tithe-owner to recover the charge is deferred until three months after it has become due. Under the former Acts he could distrain at the expiration of twenty-one days. This restriction may easily work to the disadvantage of the tithe-owner, though the experience of the writer is that very few tithe-payers defer their payments beyond a few weeks after they become due.

(3) By the same section the County Court is made the

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Court of first instance for the recovery of the charge after the expiration of three months from its becoming due. The only exceptions to this procedure are stated in sections 9 (2) and 10 (2).

(4) Section 8 enacts that the tithe rent charge is to be remitted in part in certain circumstances, *i.e.* if

'The County Court is satisfied that, if the sum claimed is paid, the total amount paid on account of the tithe rent charge for the period of twelve months next preceding the day on which the sum claimed became payable, will exceed two-thirds of the annual value of the lands, as ascertained and entered in the assessment for the purpose of Schedule B to the Income Tax Act, 1853, or as certified as hereinafter mentioned, the Court shall order the remission of so much, whether the whole or part of the sum claimed, as is equal to the excess, and the amount so ordered to be remitted shall not be recoverable.'

This is obviously a very important concession to landowners. Section 6 (3) enacts that tithe rent charge cannot be recovered unless proceedings therefor have been commenced before the expiration of two years from the date when it became due. It also provides that in cases where the rates on the charge cannot be recovered from the tithe-owner, the land-owner or land-owners may be ordered by the Court to pay the tithe rent charge to the collector of the rate until the amount due and any costs allowed by the Court are fully paid.

Previously, such rates were recoverable from the occupier or occupiers of the lands. The new provision for recovery by attachment of the rent charge was, probably, introduced in consequence of the decision in the Court of Appeal in 1889 (Lamplough *v.* Norton), that where a poor rate had been assessed upon the owner of the tithe rent charge, under 1 Vict. c. 69, s. 8, it was not recoverable by distress warrant against such owner, but by that process against the occupier of lands so charged with tithe rent. It may be noted here that the Act of 1891 made the rating of the owner of the charge compulsory; whereas the above statute merely said such 'may' be rated, though the Master of the Rolls in the above case opined that 'may' might mean 'shall.'

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II.—The Tithe Rent Charge (Rates) Act, 1899 (62 & 63 Vict. c. 17).

An Act to amend the Law with respect to the Payment of Rates on Tithe Rent Charge attached to a Benefice.

It will be noticed that the operation of this Act is strictly confined to parochial incumbents, as tithe-owners. It excludes all lay-rectors, all bodies of persons, such as the Ecclesiastical Commissioners, collegiate bodies, and trustees who own tithe rent charges from any benefit under its provisions. The reason for such differentiation was explained in general terms by the President of the Board of Agriculture, who was in charge of the Bill, in answer to a question thereon in the House of Commons: 'Our view is that the conditions of tenure and statutory obligations present in the two cases render it equitable to make a distinction between them, and hence the limitation set out in the Bill.'

In 1896, the Agricultural (Rates) Act was passed, by which the rating on 'agricultural land' was modified in its incidence. Tithe rent charge was not included within the definition of that term. Consequently, that charge derived no benefit under its provisions. In the same year a Royal Commission on Local Taxation was appointed, and, after taking a large amount of evidence, it issued a Report on the 'Valuation and Rating in respect of Tithe Rent Charge,' in 1899. After an historical review of the whole subject, the Commission reported:

I. 'That the representations made to the Commission on behalf of the owners of tithe rent charge not severed from the benefice have shown that the burden of local taxation upon such owners is unduly onerous, and that sufficient allowance is not made for the fact that the persons entitled to the rent charge are under a legal obligation to render services and to perform duties in return therefor.'

II. 'That the present law, as interpreted by the Courts, works unjustly and places those owners in a much less favourable position than other owners who are also occupiers of rateable properties.'

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After alluding to ' an exceptionally acute feeling of dissatisfaction with regard to the hardship of the law as it stands,' the Commission recommended :

' That . . ., pending the final recommendations of the Commission on this and the other matters referred to us, the case of the parochial incumbent owning tithe rent charge not severed from the benefice may properly be met by some special measure of relief.' [1]

This Report was signed by twelve of the fifteen Commissioners.

In consequence of the Report, the President of the Board of Agriculture introduced a Bill to give effect thereto in the House of Commons in June of the same year, and on August 1 it was placed upon the statute roll of the realm. Under its provisions ' the owner of tithe rent charge attached to a benefice shall become liable to pay only half of the amount of any rate to which this Act applies, which is assessed on him as owner of that tithe rent charge, and the remaining one-half shall be paid . . . by the Commissioners of Inland Revenue.'

How great a boon this Act has been is plain from the fact that the contribution of the Inland Revenue, which was only £193,000 in 1919, rose to £466,000 in the year ending March 31, 1921.

This Act was passed to cover the remaining period of the five years from March 31, 1900, during which the Agricultural (Rates) Act originally ran. That period was extended by 1 & 2 Geo. V, c. 22 until March 31, 1913, and both Acts are now included under the Expiring Laws Continuance Act, 1911.

It may be well to note here that the Tithe Rent Charge (Rates) Act of 1899, unlike the Agricultural (Rates) Act, 1896, casts no additional rating upon local ratepayers. Under the latter Act a very considerable deficiency has had to be met annually, chiefly by the occupiers of buildings and other non-agricultural hereditaments.

It is impossible here to deal with the complicated subject

[1] *Second Report, Royal Commission on Local Taxation*, 1899, paragraph 104.

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of the rating of tithe rent charge attached to the benefice. It has been dealt with in this *Review* within recent years,[1] by the present writer.

III.—Tithe Act, 1918 (8 & 9 Geo. V. c. 54).

An Act to amend the Tithe Acts, 1836–1891.

The immediate cause which led to this piece of legislation was the rise in the value of tithe rent charge from £75 16*s.* 4*d.* for each £100 in 1914 to £109 3*s.* 11*d.* in 1918. It may be recorded here that the charge had risen in some previous years beyond the value for 1918. In 1860, 1873, 1876, it was over £110, and in 1861, 1874, 1875, and 1878, it went beyond £112. Into the merits or the demerits of the restriction by this Act to the 1918 value for a period of seven years it is not proposed to enter. It was evident that the charge would rise considerably. In fact, but for this Act, it would have been £123 19*s.* 2½*d.* in 1919, £140 12*s.* 7¾*d.* for 1920, and £162 8*s.* 4¼*d.* in 1921.

Apparently, the ecclesiastical authorities were afraid lest the tithe-owning clergy would be regarded as 'profiteers.' From any such charge, however, they were shielded by the President of the Ministry of Agriculture, who used these words in the House of Commons: 'It must be remembered that when the tithe rent rises, even were it to rise to £182, the tithe owner gets only that which the Commutation Act intended him to get.'[2] In the House of Lords, the Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Agriculture said:

'Every man in receipt of wages or a salary has had additions made in order to enable him to keep up a necessary standard, and I think that it is perfectly clear that the tithe-owner is fully entitled to tithe, to whatever extent it may rise, even though it were fixed at the abnormal prices due to the war. And there is absolutely nothing in the erroneous idea that because tithe has gone up in consequence of the war therefore the tithe-owner is making a profit out of the war.'[3]

[1] *C.Q.R.* July 1910: Vol. lxx, pp. 381–400.
[2] Hansard *Parliamentary Debates*, vol. 110, p. 31.
[3] *Ibid.* House of Lords, vol. 31, p. 1166.

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These utterances make it quite plain that those who were responsible for the restriction laid down by the Act realized that tithe-owners were being asked to make a considerable renunciation by receiving much less than they were 'fully entitled to.' It was that fact, doubtless, which weighed with legislators when, two years later, the matter of the rating on tithe rent charge came before the Legislature. It will be seen from the statistics quoted above that the Act of 1918 inflicted no little diminution of income also on tithe-owners who were not parochial incumbents. The contract of 1836 applied equally to all tithe-owners, and considerable credit attaches to non-parochial-incumbent tithe-owners for their acquiescence in a rearrangement which was so much to their disadvantage. We are of the opinion that, in some degree at least, the provisions of the Act of 1920, by which the rates were modified, might well have applied to all those who suffer by the preceding Act. For the increased rates have made such property held by lay-folk almost, if not wholly, valueless.

The Act broke into the contract of 1836 in another way, in that it substituted, from January 1, 1926, for the seven years' average-values, a period of fifteen years. It is impossible to forecast what the financial result of this extended period will be even in the first year of its operation. But it is expected that this longer period will result in the rise or fall in values being much more gradual than either would be otherwise. In the classic phrase of a well-known politician, we must 'wait and see.' It may be that when the Act of 1918 expires, at the end of 1925, the whole matter of the incidence of this charge will be again reviewed by the Legislature.

Another matter was dealt with by this Act, *viz.* redemption of tithe rent charge and corn rents. Redemption relative to these did not come within the purview of the Commutation Act. Statutory provision therefor was first made in 1846 (9 & 10 Vict. c. 73). It is generally agreed by both tithe-owners and tithe-payers that the redemption of these charges on reasonable terms is desirable. Prior to the Act of 1918, the conditions of such transactions were not

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attractive to the latter. The amount payable in cash was in practically all cases 25 times the commuted value. Thus, if the charge fell as low as about £66, as in 1901, the sum of £2500 would be payable for every £100 of the charge as commuted. Further, the tithe-owner's consent was required for the redemption of all values over twenty shillings, and in the case of tithe rent charge attached to a benefice the consents of the Bishop and the Patron were necessary.

The Act of 1918 dispensed, generally speaking, with the necessity for any of the above consents, and provided for redemptions by agreement between the parties concerned, or, in default of such agreement, by the determination of the Minister of Agriculture. But the consent of Queen Anne's Bounty Board is required to all transactions affecting a benefice or cure. Special provisions were made for redemptions within a limited period. In the case of all applications made on or before January 1, 1921, the Schedule directs that 'the gross annual value must be taken to be the original commuted value,' and that, after the stated deductions therefrom, 'the purchase price shall be twenty-one times that net annual value.' These terms resulted in an enormous increase in the applications for redemption 'on or before January 1, 1921.' In 1920 the amount of the charge for which compulsory application was made to redeem was approximately four times as much as in 1913; whilst the amount involved in voluntary applications was over 216 times the amount for 1913. In December of 1920 alone, applications were received respecting twice the total sum involved in all applications from 1846 to the passing of the Act of 1918. There is no doubt but that the allowance of payment in respect of applications made within the above time, by annuities over a period not exceeding fifty years helped to attract tithe-payers. It remains to be recorded on this matter that the basis for redemption for 1922 is, as to gross annual value, £108 for each £100 of the charge, and the compensation, after the statutory deductions, is eighteen and a half times the net annual value.

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IV.—The Ecclesiastical Tithe (Rates) Act, 1920 (10 & 11 Geo. V. c. 22).

An Act to reduce temporarily the rates in respect of Ecclesiastical Tithe Rent Charge.

Although the value of the charge was restricted by the Act of 1918 to the value of that year, no provision was made therein for any restriction of rates thereon during the operation of that Act. For the year ending March 31, 1919, the amount levied upon incumbents as their contributory share in respect of rates on the charge rose to £240,000 from £193,000 in the preceding year, and, but for the Act of 1920, the amount payable by tithe-owning Incumbents would have risen to £466,079 for the year ending March 31, 1921. In view of the rise in the rates subsequent to the Act of 1918, it appeared to many to be inequitable that tithe rent charge restricted by statute should be liable without some similar restriction respecting rates thereon. In various ways, and by various agencies and persons, the whole matter of the rating of the charge attached to a benefice was brought under public notice, and a definite public opinion was thus formed in the direction of, at least, some mitigation of so onerous a burden. Early in the year 1920 Sir Samuel Hoare presented a Bill to the House of Commons having for its object the total abolition of rates on such tithe rent charge. But on being introduced for second reading on May 7, it was 'talked out' by Colonel Ward.

On March 24 a Bill was presented to the House by the Government through the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Agriculture (Sir Arthur Griffith-Boscawen) supported by Dr. Addison. This Bill was read a second time on April 21, without a division, and, after various amendments and full discussion, it received the Royal Assent in August 1920. It is interesting and important to record that this Bill was never divided on during any of its stages in either House, though it was amply debated.

The Act, unlike that of 1899, applies partly to 'tithe

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rent charge attached to an ecclesiastical corporation' as well as to such attached to a benefice. The term 'ecclesiastical corporation has the same meaning as in the Episcopal and Capitular Estates Act, 1851' (14 & 15 Vict. c. 104, s. 11). The relief or abatement on incomes not exceeding £300 or £500 does not extend to Ecclesiastical Corporations.

The period of the Act is limited to 'before the 1st day of January 1926,' as the Act of 1918 is limited.

It enacted that 'on and after the 1st of April 1920,' owners of tithe rent charge, as specified in the Act, should be, in varying degrees, relieved from the payment of rates:

(1) *wholly*, 'if the total income arising from the benefice estimated in accordance with the provisions of the Income Tax Acts on the fifth day of April preceding the date at which the rate was made, did not exceed three hundred pounds';

(2) *partially*, (*a*) if such total income exceeded £300 but did not exceed £500, the tithe-owner shall pay 'half of the amount which would otherwise be payable by him,' at the rate levied in the corresponding half-year of 1918; (*b*) if such total income exceeded £500, the tithe-owner is liable for the whole rate, on the basis of 1918.

The Inland Revenue continues to pay half of the current rate, under the Act of 1899, and any deficiency by reason of the provisions of the Act of 1920 is cast upon the parish concerned, generally. This fact has created some opposition to the Act even on the part of those who benefit very considerably under the Agricultural (Rates) Act, 1896, and whose relief throws a much heavier deficiency upon the local ratepayers who occupy non-'agricultural land,' that is the great mass of the rate-paying community of the parish.

It is unnecessary in these pages to enter upon the detailed Instructions relative to the Act issued, from time to time, by the Minister of Health, to whose Ministry, strangely enough, belongs, apart from the Courts of Law, the working of its provisions.

An illustration may explain precisely the working of this Act.

Say the current rates collectible in respect of an In-

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cumbent's tithe rent charge amount, at a 5*s.* rate, to £70; the Inland Revenue pays £35, and, suppose the rate in 1918 was 2*s.* 6*d.*, Incumbents in class (a) pay at 1*s.* 3*d.*, and those in class (b) at 2*s.* 6*d.*, in the pound, on the present rateable value of the rent charge.

Judicial Decisions.

It is impossible to set out here, in detail, the judicial decisions given in recent years on the complicated matter of tithe rent charge. There were none such except in local Courts, from the beginning of the period under review (1888) until 1921. But in that year three points were decided in the King's Bench Division, the second and third arising out of the Act of 1920, and the first in some degree relative to it.

(1) *Piggott* v. *The Assessment Committee of the Cuckfield Union.* (8 April 1921.)

The decision given in this case settled a question which had been a moot point ever since the passing of the Act of 1899, *viz.* whether or not, in arriving at the rateable value of tithe rent charge, the whole amount levied, or only the half actually paid by the Incumbent, should be deducted. Various Quarter Sessions had given varying decisions. But the Court in this case decided that the whole of the rate levied should be deducted. Thus this deduction is the law of the land.

(2) *Keane* v. *the Overseers of Ashbocking.* (19 Oct. 1921.)

No specific allusion was made in the Act of 1920 to the fact that more benefices than one are often held together as a United Benefice. Relative to such cases, the question arose whether or not the incomes should be treated for the purposes of the Act separately. Supposing neither income of two benefices so united exceeds £300, should the Incumbent be relieved or not from rates on the tithe rent charge? If, on the other hand, the incomes were aggregated, obviously the charge would not be relieved. The Court determined that each of such benefices united by Order in Council under Section 16 of the Pluralities Act, 1838 (1 & 2 Vict. c. 106), must be regarded and treated 'as distinct benefices for the

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purpose of abatement or relief from rates under the Act of 1920.' It must, however, be noted that a Bill annulling that decision is down for its third reading in the House of Commons, and thus the Incumbents of such United Benefices stand to lose the benefits of the above decision. It has been stated on behalf of the Government that the provisions of the Act were not intended to operate as the Court has held.

(3) *The King* v. *The Overseers of Latchingdon.* (13 Dec. 1921.)

The question at issue was as to whether or not certain payments by an Incumbent should be deducted in arriving at ' the total income of the benefice.'

Held, that ' the total income arising from the benefice means the total income arising to the Incumbent, and therefore, where the owner of the benefice is bound, by Order in Council or a declaration of the Bishop, to pay certain annual sums to the vicars of other parishes and to the late Incumbent, he is entitled to deduct such sums in making his statutory declaration of the total income.'

Thus, the following payments may be deducted :

(*a*) To a Licensed Curate ;
(*b*) Pension to a retired Incumbent ;
(*c*) Annuities or other charges created pursuant to statutory authority (of which the commonest form is a rent charge in favour of the Incumbent of another benefice) ;
(*d*) Interest (but not repayments of principal) on loans from the Governors of Queen Anne's Bounty or on other loans secured on the revenue of the benefice.

It will be observed that each of these three judicial decisions was favourable to tithe-owning Incumbents.

We have now concluded our review of legislation and judicial decisions respecting tithe rent charge attached to the benefice. But when the Acts of 1918 and 1920 expire, further legislation will probably be effected. It is, therefore, highly important that some common policy should be agreed upon by those interested in the matter of tithe rent charge, so as to be ready for any eventualities. One thing seems certain, that the tithe-owning Incumbent is, in respect of

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rating thereon, in a far stronger and more favourable position than he has ever been since the enactment of the Commutation and the Parochial Assessments Acts of 1836. If the present writer may suggest a policy, he is quite certain that there will have to be a compromise, in the spirit of 'give and take.' He ventures to suggest, as a settlement of these questions, that tithe rent charge should be fixed at par, and freed from the incidence of rates thereon. As the value of the charge in 1926 will probably be £140 for every £100 commuted value, the clergy will be surrendering income, under such arrangement. The redemption of the charge in its entirety appears to be beyond the borders of 'practical politics,' inasmuch as the capital value of tithe rent charge attached to the benefice is, at present, approximately £37,000,000.

WILLIAM C. TUTING.

NOTE.—Nothing has been said as to the legislation affecting tithe rent charge formerly attached to benefices in Wales, as such is now in the hands of the Welsh Church Commissioners. But one thing is patent to all those who sought for the disendowment of the Church therein, *viz.* that the charge has still to be paid. Many tithe-payers and others have been completely disillusioned!

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Art. VI.—LANGUAGE AND STYLE IN THE NEW TESTAMENT.

1. *A critical and exegetical Commentary on the Revelation of St. John.* By R. H. Charles, D.Litt., D.D. (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark. 1920.)
2. *A critical and exegetical Commentary on the Johannine Epistles.* By the Rev. A. E. Brooke, B.D. (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark. 1912.)
3. *The Pastoral Epistles.* With Introduction, Text, and Commentary. By the Rev. R. St. John Parry, D.D. (Cambridge University Press. 1920.)
4. *The Problem of the Pastoral Epistles.* By P. N. Harrison, M.A., D.D. (Oxford University Press: Humphrey Milford. 1921.)
5. *The Style and Literary Method of Luke.* By Henry J. Cadbury. (Harvard University Press. London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. Pt. 1, 1919; Pt. 2, 1920.)
6. *Testimonies.* By Rendel Harris, with the assistance of Vacher Burch. (Cambridge University Press. Pt. 1, 1916; Pt. 2, 1920.)

A large number of New Testament problems depend to some extent for their solution on considerations of literary style and method. Questions of authorship, in particular, involve the examination and comparison of the vocabulary, phraseology, and linguistic usage exhibited by the books concerned. This process has been carried out in detail by various commentators, and a number of conclusions in regard to date, authorship, and allied problems based on the results. It seems worth while, therefore, to pass under review the general subject of literary style in the New Testament, with a view to the possible discovery of some general principles of criticism.

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I

We begin with an enumeration and brief description of the chief problems of this class. The Pauline epistles afford the natural starting point, and the two epistles to the Thessalonians, which have some claim to be considered the earliest New Testament writings, at once present an example. The genuineness of the second epistle has constantly been called into question, and, as is well known, the difficulty arises largely from the literary relation between it and the first epistle. The curious resemblances in literary outline, and in certain phrases which have a kind of formal air, are balanced by differences in vocabulary and the handling of the subject-matter. The likeness of the second epistle to the first strikes us as not being of that spontaneous nature which we should expect in different writings by the same author, but rather as giving the effect of conscious imitation. The problem then is to discover why, if the second epistle is really the work of St. Paul, he should have taken the trouble to reproduce some parts of his former letter so literally, and yet to interweave in them matter of a different kind. Next, the epistles to the Galatians and Romans, while raising no questions of authorship, have to be considered in their literary relationship to each other, to help in the determination of their relative positions in St. Paul's life. In this case the problem is not merely a linguistic one; it must be solved partly by a consideration of the general character and circumstances of the writer. The question of language and style enters in, however. Both epistles deal with the same subject, but Galatians exhibits a fervid, excited utterance, while Romans is more restrained and argumentative. It is necessary to determine whether this difference is due to a development of St. Paul's mind and attitude, or to an increase in his command of language, or merely to the difference of circumstances in which the two epistles were written. On the answer we give to these

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questions will depend our view as to whether Galatians or Romans was written first, and the length of the interval which elapsed between them. From the literary point of view, it is no doubt easier to imagine a development from Galatians to Romans than *vice versa*, but we must consider whether the two styles may not be contemporary styles of the same author in different moods and different circumstances.

Colossians and Ephesians are the next documents to be considered, and it is here that we meet the problem of authorship in its more acute form for the first time. Both epistles shew a remarkable divergence in vocabulary and style from the group Galatians—Romans—1 and 2 Corinthians; and while they bear certain resemblances to each other within this divergence, yet each contains much which is peculiar to itself. The language reveals a new atmosphere of thought: on the one hand, a method of handling theological problems which approaches nearer to the mystical than St. Paul's earlier writings; on the other, a more definitely 'ecclesiastical' tone in the enforcement of practical precepts. It is clear that we are here involved in a wider question, that of the whole history and development of the primitive Christian community. The changes of style between Romans and Ephesians would be sufficiently explicable as developments of St. Paul's power and method of expression, if we could certainly postulate a corresponding expansion in the interests and organization of the Church. Thus, in this case, the literary problem is concerned with the probable interaction between the style of the writer and the growth of the community to which he ministered. A further stage of the same problem is encountered when we come to the Pastoral epistles, which have universally been felt to imply a state of ecclesiastical organization and discipline very much beyond anything discernible in any other Pauline writings. So far as language is concerned, it becomes necessary to ask whether the emergence of certain stereotyped phrases and, for example, apparent fragments of early Christian hymns, is to be expected within St. Paul's lifetime. And,

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on the other hand, we are faced in these epistles with what can only be described as a definite decline in the strength and vigour of the linguistic expression. Comparing the *Odyssey* with the *Iliad*, Longinus says, in an oft-quoted passage, that in it 'Homer may be likened to a sinking sun, whose grandeur remains without its intensity.' But in the Pastorals, as compared with the admittedly Pauline epistles, we should be forced to admit that neither the 'grandeur' nor the 'intensity' remains at the same level. So that the question of style here becomes mainly a matter of the personal development of the author. In order to maintain the Pauline authorship it would be necessary to establish the probability of failing powers in the Apostle's old age, and to shew that constant labour amongst small-minded converts had gradually dragged down his own mind from the lofty level of Romans or Ephesians to the more commonplace style of the Pastorals. This point is so frequently misunderstood that it is worth while to enlarge on it a little further. It is sometimes said that we should expect to find this difference in style because in the Pastorals St. Paul is dealing only with practical considerations and directions. But to suppose that in the great doctrinal epistles he is not trying to be practical is to misconceive altogether St. Paul's mind and method. All his epistles contain practical directions for the Christian life, and the more closely these are connected with 'mundane' affairs, the more emphatically does St. Paul link them on to, or rather draw them out from, his high spiritual teaching. Chapters v and vi of 1 Corinthians are instructive examples of this manner. But in the Pastorals the atmosphere is different. It seems that the author's interest is primarily engaged in the minor details of Christian conduct and method, rather than in the great principles and Divine verities which underlie them. This is the hardest problem which the supporter of the Pauline authorship has to face, and the more profoundly he has been impressed with the 'grand manner' of the great epistles, the more reluctant he will be to admit that the Pastorals are a product of the same mind.

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The epistle to the Hebrews can hardly be said to present a problem of style, except in so far as to make us wonder who was the unknown disciple who wrote such excellent Greek. The occasional resemblances which have been detected between it and the Pauline writings or those of St. Luke cannot be used to prove anything; it is extremely probable that if we had a wider field of first-century Christian literature with which to compare them, these resemblances would be found to be merely part of the natural affinities and connexions between Christian books. This epistle is, however, well worth study from the linguistic standpoint, as being, on the whole, the most 'classical' in style of the New Testament books, and as presenting some unique features, such as the tendency to rhythm.

Of the Catholic epistles, apart from the Johannine, which we shall come to later, we need notice only those which bear the name of Peter. In regard to the first, the principal point of interest is its literary quality, which has been felt to indicate a higher degree of education than we should expect to find in the Apostle Peter. In spite of this, the epistle has been widely accepted as Petrine, at least in the sense of proceeding from the Apostle, whether directly or through the medium of a literary secretary. If we adopt the view that it was actually composed as it stands by St. Peter, it becomes a matter of extreme interest to study the vocabulary and phraseology as examples of literary development which must have taken place unusually late in life. That the new stimulus provided by conversion to and work for Christianity should produce such a development is by no means improbable. The supposition that literary capacity can be developed only at an early age, even if applicable as a general rule, is certainly not of universal validity. Another point which has been raised in regard to this epistle is its apparent resemblances in vocabulary to the Pauline epistles, and literary connexion with Ephesians and Romans, evinced by a similar use of Old Testament quotations. But the significance of parallel quotations in different authors is now seen to be less than was formerly supposed, being due to the existence

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of collections of proof texts, from which early Christians were accustomed to draw their weapons of controversy with the Jews. This aspect of the matter has recently been most interestingly worked out by Dr. Rendel Harris in his work entitled 'Testimonies,' and, as we shall see later, it provides an object-lesson to warn us against hasty conclusions from the likenesses of one author to another. The second epistle of Peter has little in common with the first, either in regard to literary style or on any other ground. Where the materials on either hand are so restricted, it would be unwise to press the comparison or contrast too far. But, so far as it goes, the analysis of style bears out the other internal evidence in suggesting that the epistle cannot be the work of the same hand as the first. Its affinities are rather with the epistle of Jude.

Passing to the Synoptic Gospels, we find that St. Matthew and St. Mark are less distinctive in style than the majority of New Testament books. St. Mark is an example of very simple narrative, put together without literary artifice. St. Matthew being universally regarded as a compilation from various sources, we are not surprised to find few marks of literary style apart from those belonging to the sources themselves. Except for occasional preferences in the use of words, it would be difficult to enunciate any very clear canons of style adopted by the compiler. The chief interest from the stylistic point of view is to be found in the comparison of the Synoptic Gospels in the use of the various sources underlying them, and an endeavour to estimate how far literary considerations have influenced the form in which sayings and narratives occur in the gospels. In this comparison St. Luke, of course, takes an important, perhaps the most important, place. But the Third Gospel has a literary problem of its own, which is in many ways the most interesting of all questions of style in the New Testament. The argument from style has played a large part in the endeavours to prove the Lukan authorship of the Third Gospel and the Acts of the Apostles. That these two books are works of the same author seems to be amply demonstrated by the

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comparison of literary style; and that the 'we' sections which form so remarkable a feature in the later chapters of Acts are the work of the author of the whole book, and not an incorporation of a journal by somebody else, is also widely accepted. A large amount of attention has been paid to the supposed use of technical medical terms by this author, and the deduction has been drawn that the author was 'Luke the beloved Physician' mentioned in Colossians. As we shall see later, this part of the argument has recently received a serious check. But the writings of 'Luke' repay careful study from a linguistic point of view, for this author has more connexions with the main stream of Greek literary tradition than the other New Testament writers.

Lastly, we come to the 'Johannine' writings. Both the Fourth Gospel and the Apocalypse have well-marked styles, but the differences between them are so great as to strike the most casual reader. The majority of scholars have found it impossible to suppose that they were both written by the same author. The first epistle has generally been felt to be closely linked with the gospel, on literary as well as other grounds. The second and third epistles have given rise to more perplexity, some inclining to disconnect them from the gospel and first epistle and leave them independent, others to attach them to the Apocalypse, others to regard them as minor productions of the same pen which wrote the gospel and first epistle. The fact is that they are too short to afford a sufficient area of investigation. To this problem we propose to return in a moment.

II

It thus appears that almost every book of the New Testament is more or less affected by problems of style. We notice that two main lines of inquiry enter into them all. The first is, What is the necessary relation of one writing to another by the same author? How far may we expect to find variations in style at the same period

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and at different periods in an author's life? And what are the extreme limits of variation beyond which we cannot conceive any author to have passed? On the answer we give to questions such as these will depend our ultimate judgement on, for example, the authorship of Ephesians or the Pastorals, in so far as it is based on considerations of style. The second inquiry is, What are the natural connexions between literary style and outward circumstances? To what extent can we discover the circumstances of an author's life and experience from the manner of his writing? Some kind of answer to these questions must underlie, for example, a discussion of the view that the author of the Third Gospel and Acts was a physician, or of the 'Roman origin' of the Second Gospel. It is obvious that such general questions can never receive any definitely final answer, but an attitude towards them must be at the back of every investigation of detail. We next proceed, therefore, to examine one or two recent contributions to the discussion of stylistic problems, keeping in mind the two principles of inquiry which we have stated.

First we take the 'Johannine' problem, *i.e.* that part of it which affects the style of the five books concerned. The separation of the Apocalypse from the Fourth Gospel, now accepted by almost all scholars, is very largely dependent on linguistic considerations. A notable advance in the study of this subject is marked by the introduction to Dr. Charles' new Commentary. His searching analysis has shewn that the remarkable divergences from the orthodox rules of Greek grammar, exhibited by the author of the Apocalypse, are due to his possessing a grammar of his own. There is method in his madness: a method derived from the fact that 'while he writes in Greek, he thinks in Hebrew.' This fact explains the extraordinary freedom of his Greek constructions, and at the same time accounts for the power of his diction, a power which could never be possessed by a mere ungrammatical scrawl, however noble the thoughts which underlay it. As Dr. Charles very justly puts it, 'Notwithstanding its many unusual and unheard-of expressions, the book stands in its own

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literature without a rival, while in the literature of all time it has won for itself a place in the van.' Dr. Charles holds that the linguistic considerations are decisive in proving the difference of authorship of the Fourth Gospel and the Apocalypse. And, in fact, the discovery that the style of the latter is not so much *un*formed and *un*grammatical as formed on an unusual plan and working on a grammatical method peculiar to itself greatly widens the gap between it and the other 'Johannine' writings, and makes the supposition that at a later stage in his education the writer might have developed the more orthodox style of the gospel more difficult than ever. Dr. Charles, however, implies that such a supposition might possibly be worth considering, if 'a very long interval' intervened between the two books, but regards the latter assumption as impracticable for other reasons. But we should note that on purely linguistic grounds we ought not to be too dogmatic in asserting that such a change is impossible in the course of an author's development. Strong as these grounds are, it is only when taken in conjunction with other considerations that they justify the almost universal attribution of the two books to different authors. Less unanimity prevails in regard to the second and third epistles. While the first epistle must go with the gospel, the only alternative to identity of authorship being the hypothesis of imitation, it is by no means so clear that the two smaller epistles belong to the same group. Dr. Moffatt, for example, in his 'New Testament Introduction,' argues from linguistic data that they are to be separated from the gospel and first epistle, and inclines to attach them to the Apocalypse. Julicher ('Intro. to N.T.': Eng. trans. p. 254), after arguing at first in much the same sense, eventually concludes that the evidence is hardly sufficient to warrant us in postulating more than one author for the three epistles. Dr. Brooke, in the Introduction to his Commentary on the Epistles, carrying out the linguistic analysis in more detail, comes to the conclusion that there is an intimate connexion between the three epistles which can only be explained by common authorship or conscious

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imitation. Finally, Dr. Charles finds that 'the body of evidence in favour of a common authorship of John (*i.e.* the gospel) and (1), 2, 3 John carries with it absolute conviction,' the evidence he brings forward being parallel expressions, constructions, and grammatical usages. In particular, Dr. Charles is quite confident that 2 and 3 John have no connexion with the Apocalypse. 'They are with one exception free from the solecisms and idiosyncrasies of J^{ap} (*i.e.* Apocalypse).' It is, however, notable that the one exception (2 John ii) is an example of one of the most interesting peculiarities which Dr. Charles has recognized in the style of the Apocalypse, namely, the Hebrew construction of continuing a participle by a finite verb. Considering the shortness of the two epistles, and the fact that this construction is not found elsewhere in the New Testament, this is sufficiently remarkable, and must be allowed due weight.

We thus see that a consideration of linguistic style has led to exactly opposite conclusions in the cases of Dr. Charles and Dr. Brooke on the one hand, and Dr. Moffatt (who is in this respect confirmed partly by Julicher) on the other. This will naturally tend to make us cautious in the use of this particular method. It is of course to be noted that Dr. Charles' investigations are very much more detailed and elaborate than those of his predecessors. On the other hand, not all the instances and examples he brings forward are of equal weight, especially where the argument from silence is concerned. Thus, for example, 'In 3 John iii we have the genitive absolute, which occurs often in J but never in J^{ap} (nor in 1 John).' This might well be set against the 'one exception' noted above. The gospel has the genitive absolute frequently, 3 John has it once, and the Apocalypse never. Similarly, the Apocalypse has the participle . . . finite verb construction frequently, 2 John has it once, and the gospel never. So far as the connexions of the two epistles with either the gospel or the Apocalypse are concerned, these two items cancel out. Once again we feel the need of balancing literary criteria with other aspects of the problem. Dr. Charles attributes to Dr. Moffatt

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and others a 'failure to study the linguistic relations of 2 and 3 John.' It may, however, be possible to overdo the study of minute points of language: at least it is only when the results of such study are carefully related to the results of other branches of investigation that any true conclusions can be reached. Dr. Charles has certainly deserved the gratitude of all students for the great store of valuable material which he has presented to future labourers in this field.

We take as our next example the problem of style in the Pastoral epistles. Dr. Parry, in his recent Commentary, devotes part of his Introduction to the consideration of language and vocabulary, and reaches the conclusion that the linguistic evidence is not inconsistent with the attribution of the Epistles to St. Paul. He admits, as everyone must, the striking differences which they display in vocabulary and phraseology, as compared with the acknowledged Pauline writings, but regards this fresh vocabulary as 'sufficiently explained by the new subject-matter.' He proceeds to give an interesting classification of the peculiar words under the subjects to which they belong—erroneous teaching, the ministry and the qualifications for it, Church Order and Discipline, the special functions of Timothy and Titus, St. Paul's own experience and circumstances, the Scriptures, general lists of moral qualities and defects. From the resulting figures he deduces '(*a*) the predominant importance of subject-matter in determining vocabulary, and (*b*) the natural variation of vocabulary even on the same subject, in repeated treatment.' These two conclusions do not seem to be quite consistent with one another: the second to some extent weakens the first. The main point to notice, however, is that we are here once more brought back to the vital connexion of language and style with the circumstances of the author. If Dr. Parry's argument is accepted the question then becomes, Is it natural and reasonable and in accordance with St. Paul's known life and history that he should pass at this period to such a group of fresh subjects, involving such radical changes in vocabulary and phraseology? We cannot help

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feeling that underlying this is the misconception as to the nature of the problem of style in the Pastorals which we indicated above. To say or imply that in his acknowledged epistles St. Paul does not deal with 'erroneous teaching,' 'the ministry and the qualifications for it,' 'Church Order and Discipline,' and the rest, is to misread those writings altogether. The Apostle's mind is of that practical-mystic type which raises every detail of life to the level of the highest spiritual conceptions. Hence, when he deals with the subjects in question, he approaches them from a loftier outlook and keeps them on a higher plane than anything we meet in the Pastorals. Thus the linguistic phenomena are merely the outward symptom of characteristics which lie deep in the author's personality. It is not enough to argue that the author's vocabulary is appropriate to the topics which he discusses: the deeper question remains, Is his choice of topics, his manner of approaching questions of doctrine and discipline, such as we should expect to find in St. Paul? Dr. Parry's attitude to this question is indicated in the rest of his Introduction, and the linguistic considerations which he brings forward really make little difference to the conclusions as to authorship which arise from that attitude.

Quite a different point of view is revealed in the essay of Dr. P. N. Harrison on 'The Problem of the Pastoral Epistles.' This is a really delightful piece of work. Dr. Harrison examines all the linguistic phenomena with great thoroughness and lucidity, illustrating the relation between the vocabularies of the Pastorals, the ten Pauline epistles, and the Apostolic fathers, by means of graphs. This method sets vividly before us the wide gulf which separates the Pastorals from any or all of the acknowledged epistles, and at the same time the remarkable connexions between them and the writers, Christian and heathen, of the early Second century. In the 'ten epistles,' St. Paul's vocabulary is seen to exhibit a steady and continuous development, but the moment we pass to the Pastorals the curve bends sharply upwards in a manner altogether disproportionate to the rest of the figure. And this remains true from whatever

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point of view the phenomena are studied, whether it be the occurrence of *hapax legomena*, the absence of typical Pauline words, the absence of particles, or any other feature. Dr. Harrison concludes that it is impossible to regard the Pastorals as written by St. Paul, and in so far as this can be demonstrated by linguistic phenomena, we doubt if his conclusion can be invalidated. At the same time, we ought to remember that it is only in so far as they are safe indications of the author's interests, personality, and circumstances, that these phenomena prove anything. Thus the effect of this investigation is to analyze and objectify the feeling of strangeness which every sensitive reader must feel when approaching these epistles fresh from the study of Romans or Galatians or Ephesians. Taken as a whole, the Epistles strike us as something fundamentally different from the Pauline epistles. Analysis shews this difference to consist largely in peculiarity of vocabulary and literary style. This peculiarity does not finally establish the non-Pauline authorship, but it helps us to estimate the total effect of the uniqueness of these epistles, and to judge whether it is so great as to imply a personality different from that of St. Paul. An interesting fact which emerges from the study of Dr. Harrison's data is the solidarity of 'the ten epistles' when studied from a linguistic point of view. Whereas the Pastorals manifest a change of feature from any of the other epistles so sudden as to preclude the idea of normal growth and development, the ten epistles shew a steady and continuous expansion in vocabulary and usage which is just what we might expect. The result of the inquiry is, therefore, to strengthen the position of, for example, Ephesians, Colossians, or 2 Thessalonians, within the Pauline canon, while at the same time discounting the claims of the Pastorals to admission. With this must be taken the connexion which Dr. Harrison seeks to establish between the language of the Pastorals and that of the Apostolic Fathers and the Apologists. For this there seems to be some substantial evidence. Dr. Harrison, therefore, regards the author of the Pastorals as a Paulinist of the first half of the Second century, who had come into

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possession of certain Pauline notes and fragments (*e.g.* the 'Farewell Letter' in 2 Tim. iv, where almost all students have recognized the hand of the master), and himself provided the form and setting for them. With this interesting reconstruction we are not here concerned, but the whole book is a fascinating example of the possibilities underlying linguistic study of New Testament books.

Our last example is the Lukan problem. In this case linguistic study can do but little for us in discovering the actual author. The traditional ascription can hardly be confirmed or denied from internal evidence, for the simple reason that we know too little of the Pauline Luke to warrant us in saying either that he could or could not have written such books as the Third Gospel and the Acts. But in the absence of any other likely candidate for the position, and in view of the modicum of evidence suggesting that the author was a member of the Pauline circle, a perhaps increasing number of critics are content to speak of the author as 'Luke.' The one small piece of evidence which has been widely held to point to Luke as the 'companion of St. Paul' who wrote these books, is the supposed medical phraseology detected in them. Dr. Moffatt, for example, in his Introduction, regards the studies of Harnack as having 'proved pretty conclusively' that the author was a physician. Dr. Plummer, in the 'International Critical Commentary,' is careful to point out the need of discrimination in dealing with supposed instances of medical language, but nevertheless regards the medical argument as adding some weight to the case for the Lukan authorship. While rejecting a large number of the words cited in the well-known work of Hobart, he accepts such examples as *κραιπάλη*, *παραλελυμένος* and the other most familiar 'medical words,' as evidence of the hand of a physician. The first part of Professor Cadbury's work on 'The Style and literary method of Luke' contains an effective answer to arguments of this kind. It is shewn, for example, that it would be quite easy to make out a case, on similar lines to those employed by Hobart, for 'medical language' in Josephus, Plutarch, or Lucian. And it is further pointed

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out that the few genuine examples of medical terms which may be cited are of practically no value as evidence for the profession of the writer. They merely indicate that he was a person of culture, who had at his disposal a vocabulary fully equal to the various subjects he was dealing with. Every writer of really good Greek would command such words as these, especially as they were native Greek words, and not a hybrid jargon such as our modern technical vocabularies exhibit. As Dr. G. F. Moore points out, in a note to Professor Cadbury's essay, *κραιπάλη* is a peculiarly unhappy example of a 'medical word,' being, in fact, 'the vulgar word for a very vulgar experience,' and found in Aristophanes and elsewhere. It seems therefore that Luke's occasional use of a real medical word, and his occasional change of a Markan word or phrase for something slightly more technical, is the result, not of any medical training but of his general education and culture. These usages are to be compared with his correct use of political and other technical terms in Acts, which go to prove, not that he was a politician or lawyer, but that he was a careful observer and accurate historian. It may, however, be as well to remark that these considerations do not prove that this author was *not* a physician!

The second part of Professor Cadbury's work consists of a somewhat minute examination of the author's method of dealing with his sources. Parallel words and passages in the Synoptic Gospels are compared and the preferences of Luke indicated. This is another valuable piece of work. There is no attempt to make the phenomena prove anything: the various facts are set out to be studied and meditated upon. Detailed study of this kind cannot be too highly commended. At first sight dry and unattractive, it is soon found to open up all sorts of avenues of approach to an author's personality. It gives us that kind of insight into his mind and outlook which we can only get by watching people at work and observing their method as carefully as possible.

The importance of an investigation of this kind for our knowledge of the exact form of our Lord's sayings has

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already been mentioned. It is, of course, clear that in any given case we cannot be certain of the wording which best represents in Greek the Aramaic original. But the general result of Professor Cadbury's work is to shew that Luke is at least faithful to his sources. Such changes as occur in the passages derived from Mark, for instance, are usually merely amplifications of the original, due to literary predilections, and not substantially affecting the sense. Luke is fond of words such as 'all' and 'every,' and often rounds off a phrase by adding a generalization which sums it up. Thus 'sell what thou hast' in St. Mark x 21 becomes in St. Luke xviii 22 'sell *all* that thou hast'; and 'learn from the fig-tree' in St. Mark xiii 28 becomes 'behold the fig-tree *and all the trees*' in St. Luke xxi 29. On the other hand, we notice that words which might savour of exaggeration, such as 'great' and 'much,' tend to be omitted in St. Luke; for example, St. Mark x 31 'many first shall be last' appears in St. Luke xiii 30 as 'there are some first who shall be last.' Many of the changes consist merely in the substitution of one synonym for another, as for example where different verbs meaning 'to go' are used, or in a change of construction. But the original sense is carefully preserved. With these purely literary changes we may compare some of what may be called the expository variations to be found in St. Matthew. St. Mark ix 1 'Until they see the kingdom of God come with power' (where Luke has simply 'Until they see the kingdom of God') becomes in St. Matthew xvi 28 'Until they see the Son of Man coming in his kingdom.' A similar instance occurs in the case of words spoken by the disciples in St. Mark xiii 4 (*cf.* St. Luke xxi 7) and St. Matthew xxiv 3 where 'What is the sign when all these things are about to be consummated?' reappears as 'What is the sign of thy coming and of the consummation of the age?' In these cases there is no question of the changes being due merely to literary or linguistic preferences. Assuming that the Markan version is the nearer to the original, we can only regard the Matthean as an attempt at elucidation, enshrining what the writer believed to be the natural application of the phrase. But it would be difficult to

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produce parallel instances from Luke. His changes are almost always explicable on the grounds of style—preferences for certain words and constructions, or the desire to remove harshnesses and to produce a flowing and well-written narrative. And they lead to no alteration of the meaning of the original, but merely to a variation of form. This is an important result of stylistic criticism. Luke's faithfulness to his sources is in harmony with his technical accuracy and generally high scientific standard. Acts as well as the Third Gospel is, of course, affected by this conclusion; our whole estimate of the historical value of the Lukan writings rises.

III

Consideration of the facts which we have been reviewing will suggest the need of very great caution in the use of the argument from style. We may easily be led into absurdities without knowing it. A good instance of the insecurity of theories developed on this kind of basis is provided by a study of Dr. Rendel Harris' 'Testimonies.' It used to be asssumed that the passages in the New Testament where different writers use the same Old Testament quotations with the same peculiarities indicated a literary connexion between the two writers. In the best-known example, the texts about the 'corner-stone' cited in Romans ix 33 and 1 Peter ii 6, the evidence was felt to be so strong as to prove either that Paul used Peter or *vice versa*. Thus even so penetrating a critic as Dr. Hort, in his Commentary on 1 Peter, says 'It is morally certain that St. Peter borrowed from St. Paul those peculiarities in his mode of quoting the passage. . . .' A similar view is found in Dr. Chase's article on 1 Peter in Hastings' *Dictionary of the Bible*, and was indeed very general among scholars. The particular point which carried most weight was the fact that in both epistles two texts from quite separate parts of Isaiah are combined together, and that both make similar departures from the text of the Septuagint. This could hardly be ascribed to mere coincidence. Hence the usual

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course was to regard the author of 1 Peter (who is very 'Pauline' in other ways) as acquainted with the epistle to the Romans, and influenced in his quotation by reminiscences of it. And thence of course proceeded conclusions as to the dates of books and as to the possible relationship of the authors. But the new theory of 'Testimonia' has changed all this, or at least rendered it very precarious. In the particular passages under consideration it had already been tentatively suggested by Sanday and Headlam on Romans ix 33, that the explanation might be found in the possible existence at this early period of collections of 'proof-texts' from the Old Testament, for use in controversy against the Jews. This view of the immediate origin of the quotations in the New Testament has steadily gained ground, and has now been worked out and illustrated by Dr. Rendel Harris and Mr. Vacher Burch in the book mentioned above. The similarities between Peter and Paul thus receive an easy explanation; in the collection of proof-texts the two passages from Isaiah no doubt stood side by side ready for use in conjunction as might be required. And similar variations in the text would of course be due to the same identity of source. Thus the supposed literary connexion between Peter and Paul falls to the ground as far as this passage is concerned. And in all probability we ought to regard many of the lesser resemblances of vocabulary and tone which have been detected in 1 Peter and the Pauline writings as due rather to the natural affinities between Christian writers, engaged in similar work and educated in the same religious and literary atmosphere, than to any direct acquaintanceship with each other's writings. It is impossible to say at present how far the inquiry into the existence of 'Testimony books' may lead us. It is always just possible that a copy of an actual First-century example may be discovered, though the fact that they seem to have been absorbed into later Christian writings makes this extremely unlikely. But Dr. Harris believes that traces of the original Matthean Testimony book survive in a Sixteenth-century MS containing a work entitled *Treatise of Matthew the Monk against*

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the Jews. Whether or not we follow him in all his conclusions, we are bound to realize how fragmentary and imperfect is our knowledge of the literary atmosphere in which the New Testament grew up. The danger of dogmatic statements as to the reasons for the stylistic features of primitive Christian writings and the relationships which exist between them becomes increasingly apparent.

And even when we have avoided this danger and arrived at a proper conception of the nature of the evidence which may be expected to arise from considerations of style, there are further reasons for using it with a careful restraint. It may be questioned whether any problem concerning authorship, date, or kindred questions can be settled from the linguistic data alone. The fact that different critics draw opposite conclusions from the same phenomena shews the danger of isolating this particular aspect of criticism. The study of language, vocabulary, and literary method is one part of the study of the circumstances in which a book is composed: but the history of the author, the atmosphere of the communities addressed, the development of Christian life in the period affected, must all be studied too. And no conclusions can safely be based on the results of any one of these departmental studies. The evidence must be collated from all sides, and the verdict based on a survey of the whole field. It follows that the specialist in one particular branch of criticism may often be less qualified to pronounce judgement than the 'general practitioner.' Enthusiasm for certain aspects of a problem may blind us to equally weighty considerations of another kind. Thus the literary specialist may be led to form his opinion by the phenomena which appeal most strongly to his own particular interests and understanding. He may be, without knowing it, comparatively unresponsive to other factors no less important.

But this is not to belittle the function of literary and linguistic study. Conceived in the right way, detailed analysis of the flesh and bones of an author's work will enable us to appreciate more justly the spirit which animates the whole. We cannot know too much of St. Paul's word-

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preferences or St. Luke's favourite constructions. But in our study we must be content to do without very obvious 'results.' It is the 'labour which seeks for no reward,' which studies for the mere joy of the subject, that yields real advances in appreciation and understanding. Hence, perhaps future work on the style of the New Testament books will consist mainly in elucidating the actual facts rather than in drawing conclusions from them. If we are to understand St. Paul or St. Luke, one great means will be the study of their words, expressions, and sentences. Our object will be to recapture the atmosphere in which they talked and thought and wrote. When we have to some degree succeeded in this, the questions as to the authorship of one or two disputed books will become less important, for they cannot blur the main outlines in the reconstruction of the great personalities of primitive Christianity.

F. P. CHEETHAM.

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Art. VII.—REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON OXFORD AND CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITIES.

Report of the Royal Commission on the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge. (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1922.)

The Dean of Carlisle begins his great work on Mediaeval Universities with this impressive paragraph:

'"Sacerdotium," "Imperium," "Studium" are brought together by a medieval writer as the three mysterious powers or "virtues" by whose harmonious co-operation the life and health of Christendom are sustained. This "Studium" did not to him, any more than the "Sacerdotium" or "Imperium" with which it is associated, represent a mere abstraction. As all priestly power had its visible head and source in the City of the Seven Hills, and all secular authority was ultimately held of the Holy Roman Empire, so could all the strains of knowledge by which the Universal Church was restored and fertilized be ultimately traced as to their fountain-head to the great Universities, especially the University of Paris.'[1]

And he goes on later:

'The University no less than the Roman Church and the feudal hierarchy headed by the Roman Emperor represented an attempt to realize in concrete form an ideal of life in one of its aspects. Ideals pass into great historical forces by embodying themselves into institutions. This power of embodying ideals in institutions was the peculiar genius of the medieval mind.'

These quotations are sufficient to remind us how inadequately we have organized our political and spiritual life compared with the ideals at any rate of the Mediaeval Ages. Then, at any rate, the unity of the Christian and

[1] Rashdall, *Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages*, vol. i p. 4.

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civilized world was conceived and embodied in actual institutions. We are only just becoming conscious how wasteful is our system of contending independent nations, each trying to assert itself at the expense of the other, with little or no restraint from any international system of law. We are striving by Leagues of Nations, by Genoa Conferences, and meetings of Ambassadors to do away with this friction and conflict; we are not succeeding very well. We have suddenly become conscious of the failure of a divided Christianity. The Christian conscience is being stirred, and we have got so far as to talk about reunion. We are beginning, too, to recognize that the spiritual unity and solidarity of the civilized world may be nourished and sustained by the passage of students from country to country and university to university. In the Middle Ages Englishmen studied at Paris, at Padua, and at Bologna. All the great universities recognized their position as a 'Studium Generale.' We are now beginning to realize that universities ought to be something more than provincial or national, and that they should provide every facility not only for the education of our own fellow-countrymen but for enabling students from other lands to visit us.

The publication of the Report of the Royal Commission on the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge will give us an opportunity both for reviewing the position of Universities generally, and for saying something about the two most famous Universities of these Islands.

The history of the Commission which has thus reported contains some elements of interest. The immediate cause was an application from both Oxford and Cambridge for State Aid, but that application was not entirely spontaneous. Before the year 1919 no such aid was given to either of the older Universities, but in November of 1918 the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the President of the Board of Education received a deputation from the newer Universities asking for increased grants. The President of the Board of Education particularly requested the representatives of Oxford and Cambridge to be present. A particular invita-

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tion was sent to these Universities to submit statements of their needs; in fact, as much pressure as possible has been put upon them to make them apply to the State for grants. As soon as they were tempted by these proposals they were informed that a Royal Commission of Inquiry would be necessary, and they felt obliged to concur in the appointment.

Now, no doubt the action of the President of the Board of Education was entirely altruistic, but anyone who is acquainted with the workings of that institution will know the eagerness it has displayed to stretch its hands over every educational institution in the country. There was a time when the newer Universities were not under the Board of Education but directly under the Treasury, and great efforts, ultimately successful, were made by the Board to secure authority over them. Now they have succeeded in attaining the same authority over Oxford and Cambridge, and we believe the signs of this authority are already beginning to be apparent through the inquiries and demands of the University Grants Committee. That the Universities are in need of money is undoubted, but there have been many misgivings at Oxford at any rate as to the wisdom of applying for grants, and the excessive desire shewn by the Board of Education to make these subsidies suggests the proverbial analogy of the mouse and the toasted cheese and the trap. When once the University receives a large grant from the Board of Education the opportunities of interference from outside will be constant, and it may well be that in the future in some period of educational and religious or political excitement that strenuous defence of liberty which has sometimes been associated with Universities will become almost impossible. A threat to withdraw grants will mean starvation to the greater part of the University. We must remember that the self-governed institutions of this country have often been bulwarks of liberty in the past, and there is no reason that the necessity of such defences may not recur in the future. The record of democracies is quite as evil as that of any monarchy in dealing with unpopular opinions and minorities.

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It is proposed in this article, after speaking shortly about Universities in general and the Universities of this country, to examine the main problems presented by Oxford and Cambridge at the present time and without entering into too great detail to consider the main lines of the Commission's Report. It is of course impossible for an Oxford man to speak about Cambridge with any full knowledge either of its needs and requirements or the details of its constitution. I hope, however, I may not exhibit any unfairness and I can claim, I hope, a certain amount of experience which may help me from another point of view. I know the University of London almost as well as I know the University of Oxford. When I was in London I found myself continually trying to introduce what Oxford had taught me into that newer University, and I am now able to see some of the defects of Oxford in the light of London. I had also the opportunity of being brought in close contact with the work of most of the newer Universities and of studying the methods adopted by the Board of Education in dealing with them.

What is a University? What are its main characteristics? It is, I think, of some importance to settle this question, because inadequate and erroneous ideas of what a University should be have done much to injure the development of Universities in this country. Dr. Rashdall tells us that the following three conditions were necessary for the recognition of a 'Studium Generale':

1. That the school attracted or at least invited students from all parts, not merely those of a particular country or district.
2. That it was a place of higher education, that is to say, that one at least of the higher faculties—Theology, Law, Medicine—was taught there.
3. That this and all other subjects were taught by a considerable number—at least a plurality—of masters.

If we attempt to translate these characteristics into modern language, I should say that the essential character-

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istic of a University was that it was a place where teachers and students were brought together from all parts and were in constant and vital communication with one another. The essence, that is, of a University does not consist in its constitution, it does not consist even in its capacity for giving degrees, certainly not in anything like examinations; it does consist in the contact of mind and mind, in the contact of teacher and student, of student and student: it consists in bringing together in one place men who have devoted themselves to the pursuit of learning and a body of students desirous of attaining learning. In other words the essence of the University lies in its life, and everything else must be subordinated to that. If this be true it becomes obvious at once how imperfect are the ideals which have prevailed about Universities in recent times. The worst representation of a University that has ever been given is probably the old examining University of London which violated every principle of a University and enclosed learning in a cast-iron system of examinations. The modern federated and examining Universities are almost equally injurious: they have arisen no doubt from the difficulty of deciding the conflicting claims of various embryo institutions; but it has been a grave misfortune for our Colonies that they have not had the best ideal before them, that instead of the state grouping together in one place various institutions, it has attempted to federate distant colleges together by a mere constitution, and that it has always had before it the idea of keeping teachers in order instead of allowing them freedom for development.

It will be found that wherever anything approaching a University has existed it is this freedom of intellectual life which has been its main characteristic. We can see it in those schools of Athens that Newman described so eloquently: we can see it in the great democratic mediaeval Universities which had, no doubt, many defects, but which did bring together ardent students from all parts of the civilized world, and under teachers like Abelard created a real enthusiasm for learning. It has been this characteristic which has made Oxford and Cambridge, in spite of

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some defects, such brilliant expositions of what Universities should be.

The other characteristics of Universities are the necessary deduction from this intellectual life. A body of teachers or in one case a body of students necessarily formed themselves into a corporation, and these corporations like other similar ones obtained the name of *universitas* and were generally established by charters of kings or bishops. Protection was obviously necessary against incompetent teachers, and so the Degree—which is in its essence a licence to teach—became established, and all the ritual and custom of Universities grew up. The Middle Ages were fertile in creating self-governing corporations, and that gave to the Universities the autonomy necessary for their freedom. It is this freedom which is above all necessary for the proper development of the University, and that is implied in the recognition of Studium side by side with Imperium and Sacerdotium as a great mystery of the body politic. Just as the State must be free from the control of the Church, and the Church free from the control of the State, so learning must be itself independent, and if once the State or the Church get their heavy hand on the University, if learning is made subservient to the supposed interests of politics or religion, the result will be the decay of reality and truth in political and religious life.

Our ideal then is a federation of free, self-governing corporations devoted to the pursuit of learning, linked normally with the Church and State but free from the dominance of either, giving ready access to students from every nation, living centres for the creation and diffusion of learning, each developing its own life, but with such unity of structure and purpose as to make it easy for students to pass from one to the other.

Let us return now to the more recent developments of University Education in England. The Middle Ages left us with two great Universities, but in the turbulent times after the Reformation the country shewed that it did not know how to use them. The Commission has traced the history of the English Universities in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth

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centuries. No doubt the disturbed state of England may be held to be some justification for what was done, but the fact remains that the Universities were remodelled in a way which was bound to check their intellectual life. The University was made subject to the Colleges and to the authority of the Church. They lost just the freedom and autonomy which make intellectual life possible.

At the close of this article we shall discuss the right relations of Universities to theological studies; it is sufficient to say now that if once a University is made subject to ecclesiastical authority then the freedom of its intellectual life must suffer, and again, that as a University should be a free corporation of teachers and students, to subordinate it to the authority of smaller corporations whose interests would be mainly in their own concerns would inevitably lead to what ultimately happened. The government of the University was placed in the hands of twenty heads of houses, who at their best would be interested in education, and who would care primarily for the interests of their own institutions; and the history of the University of the Nineteenth century has been a history of its efforts to escape from the double control of Church and Colleges. Had it had a free constitution it would have been able to reform itself without the assistance of the State. It is impossible to calculate how far-reaching has been the result of the confinement of the Universities to the Established Church. It meant that the Nonconformist Churches were left in isolation, that there was no contact between their theology and that of the Established Church, and that the influence of the one could not extend to the other. If the great body of Nonconformist ministers at the time of the Oxford Movement had been trained in the two Universities, the religious development of the country in the last hundred years might have been very different.

The Nineteenth century was characterized by the reform of the older Universities and the creation of the newer ones, but the tradition was lost and the early attempts were not successful. At Durham the Bishop and the Dean and Chapter with great public spirit combined together to

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use their surplus revenues to found a University for the north of England, but they were too anxious to make it subordinate to ecclesiastical authority, and a Dean and Chapter are not suitable governors of a University. In London the contention of the two different ideals represented by King's College and University College, and the failure to realize that a University does not exist primarily to examine, but to teach, and that its government should be vested in the teachers, caused that huge excrescence on the educational system of the country, the old examining University of London. Meanwhile Colleges began to spring up at Manchester, at Birmingham, at Leeds, at Liverpool. In almost all cases they shewed a reaction from the excessive devotion to the Humanities which seemed to prevail at Oxford and Cambridge, and to the ecclesiastical control which was exercised there, and tended to exhibit the equally harmful bias of being anti-clerical and anti-theological.

Moreover, the development of our national education from the beginning took wrong lines. Education was always treated not as a great service to the State, but as something philanthropic: so we began to organize it from below upwards, instead of from above downwards. We never thought out our ideals and never brought any intelligence or system to bear on University development. When newer Universities began to be founded the importance of examinations and the federal system were the ideals that predominated, and our modern statesmen have not yet learned in the least either the importance of a University or what a University means. When the President of the Board of Education introduced the last Education Act we might have hoped that at last the education of the country might be looked at from an intelligent standpoint; that the services of the Universities in the war might have led him to see that it was with an adequate number of free, independent, and well-endowed universities that we must begin. Unfortunately the old ideas of the Board of Education prevailed, and the only result of that Act, had it been carried into effect, would have been to waste

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large sums of public money on unthought-out educational developments.

About the year 1900 somewhat better methods began to prevail with regard to Universities. In that year London University was reconstituted probably as well as the many opposing interests made possible. The old Victoria University was now finally dissolved into its three constituents of Manchester, Liverpool, and Leeds. New Universities were founded in Birmingham, Sheffield, and Bristol, and since then Durham has been reconstituted. In all cases it is becoming more widely recognized that if the University is to be efficient the greater part of the power must be in the hands of the free organization of teachers, but State action is still unintelligent and tiresome. It still persists in maintaining bureaucratic control over the newer Universities, and instead of giving them an adequate endowment deals out grants which have no stability attached to them.

It is interesting to notice the contrast between the way in which the Universities of Scotland and Ireland and those in England have been treated. When the new Universities were founded in Ireland a definite sum of money was granted to each, fairly adequate for the work they had to do, and security was established by the grants being included in an Act of Parliament. Scotland has large permanent grants for its Universities. The English Universities are kept under the University Grants Committee, which wastes time and public money by compiling masses of statistics such as bureaucrats love, that shew nothing at all about the real life of the place; which has from time to time interfered with Universities or Colleges most unjustly, and is now trying to get its hand into Oxford and Cambridge. We want a completely different policy, a policy such as that represented by the Universities Commission; we want a proper Commission to decide what Universities are required, what work they should do; then they should have stable and fixed grants secured to them by Act of Parliament which will leave them free to do their own work.

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A properly organized University knows its own business far better than Boards of Education or University Grants Committees, or any such bodies. The control of the Crown should be visitatorial and not administrative, it should give the University a good constitution, it should leave it free to work out its own salvation. It should only interfere when particular circumstances demand it by a Commission, and it should only exercise control over the desire to revise constitutions. If such a policy were carried out—and that is obviously what this Universities Commission desires—the Universities would become really strong. If the grants to Oxford and Cambridge are administered on the same principles as the grants to the newer Universities the only results will be irritation, friction, and inadequate return for the money expended.

With that amount of introduction we pass on to consider the Report.

The first point to notice is what the Commissioners have to say about the special value of the two Universities to the nation. No doubt one of the reasons for the appointment of this Commission was to try to remove the prejudices and, to a large extent, ignorance which prevail in some quarters about Oxford and Cambridge. As the Commissioners themselves say, many people still think that Oxford and Cambridge are what they were sixty or seventy years ago. The testimony of the Commissioners is:

'In the student democracy of Oxford and Cambridge, members of all classes and students of all subjects mix in the colleges on terms of perfect social equality and close intellectual companionship. The frank and friendly relation with the teachers, who devote so great a part of their time to personal instruction, is another element in the life of the student. The beauty of the ancient buildings, devoted from time immemorial to purposes of thought and learning, and their historical associations with so many great men, help to create an atmosphere favourable to disinterested intellectual life. We understand that of recent years the intellectual activity among the body of undergraduates has been very remarkable; among its

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features are a wide-spread interest in social questions, an increase in societies for discussion, speculation, and study, and for literature, music, and the drama, and an increasing connexion with many activities of the outside world. If in some cases these unduly interrupt work the educational advantages on the whole more than counterbalance the disadvantages; a many-sided preparation for the world into which the students are about to enter is constantly going on under favourable conditions.'

They then draw attention to the change which is taking place in the relation of business men to the Universities. It is beginning to be realized that a University training is of great advantage to higher business posts. In another direction they speak of the development of research work, 'the welcome offered to advanced students from the other universities of the Empire and the world.' 'Since the war there has been an increasing tendency in Universities beyond the ocean to welcome Oxford and Cambridge guests, and to send over here advanced students, who formerly went to Germany to complete their courses.'

A special note is added on the work of the Universities during the war.

'It would take too long to recount all services rendered individually by members of the Universities in these departments, and it would be most difficult to apportion the credit between the several Universities of the Empire, as so much of the work was done by teams of men loyally working in a common cause. But it is important that, in providing for the future, the nation should not forget the immense debt it owes University men whose training in languages, pure and applied science, or economics specially fitted them to grapple with new and totally unexpected problems which from time to time called for rapid solution. To those services the two older Universities contributed in a way of which they have reason to be proud.'

No one who knows Oxford and Cambridge can doubt the truth of this testimony. During the last hundred years they have contributed to the life of the nation in many

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directions, spiritual, intellectual, and moral. They have produced a continuous succession of men of ability and learning for the service of Church and State, and when the call came they crowned their work by the devotion of the younger men, who gave up their lives ungrudgingly, and the service in every department of learning which was contributed to the cause of the nation in the war by the trained intellect of the teachers. No one can doubt the truth, but it is right that it should have been said and said well.

We now pass to the specific recommendations of the Commission. The fundamental problem really before them was the organization of teaching and research. Are the two Universities making full use of the money that they have got? Could not the endowments and the Colleges produce much more if the teaching was organized in a different way?

There is underlying the whole of the Report what has now become a fundamental problem—the relation of College teaching to University teaching. Fifty years ago there was no organized teaching but that of the Colleges, though there was still a large amount of private coaching. The last Commission began the formation of a University Professoriate and the organization of University teaching by employing for this purpose the surplus revenues of the Colleges. That has gradually developed and now the problem is how far teaching should remain in the hands of the Colleges.

The Commission pay a well-deserved tribute to the College Tutorial system:

'With all its characteristic difficulties, drawbacks, and exceptions, which are on the increase, the system of College instruction is largely accountable for the educational achievement of the two senior Universities. The teaching of the undergraduate, man to man, by his Tutor or Supervisor, who is very often resident in College alongside of his pupil, gives to the education at Oxford and Cambridge something scarcely to be got elsewhere in such full measure. The rudiments of

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the system existed in the worst days of "old corruption," increased with the growing efficiency of the Colleges in the early Nineteenth century, and were brought to perfection in Balliol by the example and influence of Jowett. The system became general in Oxford and subsequently in Cambridge.'

And they add further:

'It is interesting to note that whereas the earlier Royal Commissions were concerned with providing against the indifference and want of conscientiousness of some of the Fellows, the charge now made in some quarters is that the Fellows overwork themselves at teaching and administration.'

Constantly throughout the Report the Commissioners dwell on the value of this College Tutorial system, and no one can doubt the truth of what they say; but they hint that there are limitations in the value, and it is important to consider these for a moment. When I came back to Oxford what struck me as very remarkable was not so much the merits of the Tutorial system as it prevails, but the extreme consciousness of their own merits exhibited by the College Tutors. It sometimes seems to me as if they protest a little too much. I heard one College Tutor defending a new School in Congregation, and remarking that as the teaching would be in the hands of the College Tutors it would be well done. They seem to suggest that they possess a monopoly of tutorial capacity. Now, undoubtedly their merits are high, they work well; there is the personal contact between teacher and taught; many of them indeed do too much. But there is another side. In the first place many Tutors are overworked, and not only are they overworked, but they have to make themselves acquainted with considerable minuteness with far too many different subjects. While an elaborate system of lectures provides formal instruction over a wide area given by many lecturers, the unfortunate College Tutor is often expected to take his pupils in every branch of the subject. In one School recently when a proposal was made somewhat to extend the curriculum one College Tutor,

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who has made himself conspicuous by his writing and research, complained very much. He said 'I know all the subjects on which I have to teach my men; if you add other subjects I will have to get them up, and it will interfere with the little time that I have for my own work.' The complaint was justified, but it was a condemnation of the system.

Then the present system means that there is really no career in Oxford for the ordinary College Tutor. Directly after he has passed his Schools, if he is a man of ability and prominence, he is seized by a College and given a tutorial appointment. Almost at once he is plunged into the routine of college work. He never has the opportunity, unless he is a man of great energy, of advancing his work to the higher stage which three to four years of leisure would have given. He has to go on for the rest of his life until he has earned his pension, too tired at the end of Term to do much more than rest in his vacations. Nor does this system really give the highest type of teaching. It must inevitably be too much subservient to examinations. The College Tutor is appointed by the College to see that the members of the College get proper assistance, and especially the weaker men; so a great deal of his time is taken up in making up for their deficiencies. The College Tutor has really very often taken upon himself the work of a private coach. His interest is in the student rather than in the study; he is more concerned with the men he teaches than with what he teaches them. His work must become routine, and he begins to think that his way of teaching is the only way which is legitimate. A Professor who does not lecture entirely for the Schools is looked upon with suspicion. Let me take two instances which have come to my knowledge. When Dr. Bigg was Regius Professor of Ecclesiastical History the efforts of the College Tutors were devoted to preventing their men from attending his lectures; one man who was an undergraduate at that time informs me that with great difficulty he attended them and found them extraordinarily good. Dr. Bigg's

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rival was a College Tutor, and when I asked what were the merits of these lectures I was told that they were admirable for the Schools, but made you determined never to look at the subject again afterwards. Now Dr. Bigg as a writer and lecturer represented a high standard of scholarly attainment. Curiously enough, in another School, the late Dr. Bywater suffered in the same way. He was one of the most brilliant scholars that Oxford has produced, and in my undergraduate days, when he was only a College Tutor, we were all allowed to go to his lectures; eventually he became Professor of Greek, and he was more or less boycotted. An undergraduate of a later date has told me with what difficulty he succeeded in attending his lectures on the *Poetics*, which in themselves were admirable, and how he found only twelve people there.

Then again, the present system leads to a constant opposition to any broadening of the subjects of study. If one man has to be responsible for a whole Honour School he naturally wishes the work in that School to be confined within certain limits. He is frightened of novelty, and the tendency of the College and the College authorities is against development. Recent events have intensified the difficulties of the present system of organizing tuition by Colleges. In old days when everyone learned Latin and Greek, and they were the basis of study, it was easy for a College to grapple with the amount of teaching required. Now there are nearly thirty avenues to Final Honours, and it is impossible for the Colleges to do it. Science and some of the newer Schools like Modern Languages and English are organized definitely with a University basis, and there is considerable friction with the older system. The difficulties must become greater as time goes on, and it will be found more and more necessary for the University to organize the whole of the work, both the formal teaching and tutorial supervision. No one College can organize the teaching required for so many Schools, and the combination of Colleges and the habit of hiring outside teachers means the breaking down of the old system.

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The Commissioners are cautious in their recommendations. At Cambridge they recommend that in all subjects alike the formal teaching should be placed on the Faculty basis, and that all fees paid for such teaching should go no longer to the individual Colleges or to the individual lecturers, but to the Faculty funds. In Oxford they recommend that in subjects other than Natural Science, English, and Modern Languages, Faculties be free to continue the present organization, or to modify it, should such a step be deemed advisable. It may be that they are wise in moving slowly in these matters, but I do not doubt that the time has nearly come when all teaching in Oxford and Cambridge should be organized by the University through its Faculties and not by the Colleges, and that all tuition fees should be paid to the University. If that were done, if the University controlled fees which would amount to over £100,000, a further grant of £100,000 from the Government and the College contributions which now go to the Common University Fund, it would have an income approaching £300,000 a year, the greater part of which could be directly devoted to the promotion of teaching and research. It would be possible to give quite as much individual instruction as is necessary in a much better way and to organize the whole of the teaching of the different Faculties so as to leave every teacher leisure for research or for the advance of his subject, and to provide within the University an adequate career for all able teachers.

The next point we must pass to is the question of Fellowships and the use of the College endowments. A serious difficulty at present arises from the great variation in income between the different Colleges. Some are almost able to cover the whole ground in tutorial matters, others find it hard to carry on at all. That inequality will, of course, be done away with the more the teaching is centred in the University. Further, it is widely recognized that the present allocation of Fellowships is not entirely satisfactory. The Commissioners begin by condemning Prize Fellowships. To many people this condemnation will hardly appear wise.

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Probably in old days the Prize Fellowship has been for many people the ultimate fact which has enabled them to attain the purpose of their career. We talk a great deal at present about the educational ladder, and it is right that there should be an opportunity for every clever boy to rise from the National School if necessary to the highest positions; but if when he has obtained his First Class we do not give him anything to help him at the beginning of his career in the world, he will be compelled at once to take some position where he can begin to earn money. What an able man without means of his own requires when he has taken his Degree is a moderate income for a few years which will enable him to start in any direction that he desires. A school has arisen in Oxford which has such things as research on the brain. What has been said above will shew that the present writer has full belief in the value of independent and original study, and its necessity for a University; but that is not the only function of a University. A University exists to send forth a body of able men for the service of Church and State, and if it allows either side of its work to overpower the other its life will be crippled. Some of those who attain Prize Fellowships would remain in Oxford or spend their time in advancing knowledge in other places; others would frankly go into the world and would be able to begin their career with a well-deserved advantage. Those who decide to remain in Oxford would be able to have their Fellowships continued as College officers, College teachers, University teachers, or as Research Fellows.

The proposals of the Commission do not go so far as this, though as a matter of fact they do something to approach it. They consider that young undergraduates should be elected to Fellowships under conditions both of examination and of research, but they modify that to a certain extent. They recommend that

'An unofficial Fellow, elected within three years from graduation, have at least one free year, or, should the College so decide, two such years, as a maximum, in which to prepare for his work; but that any such Fellow who does not comply

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with the conditions of research after the lapse of two years at most from his election, thereupon cease to be a Fellow unless he receive the permission of his College to become a Supernumerary Fellow,'

that is a Fellow with small emoluments. That suggests that they are prepared to contemplate the election of Fellows who may use their Fellowship for two or three years to start on any career, but will not have it continued unless they decide to do research or teaching. It would be better if the arrangements were simpler. Prize Fellowships for six years, renewable only for those who were working in the University, would really meet both cases and would have that element of freedom which is best for the ablest men.

The other classes of Fellows proposed are official Fellows connected with posts in the College or with University Lectureships or Demonstratorships, or with Professorial Fellowships, the latter being non-stipendiary. They further recommend that Colleges should be free to elect as many Fellows in the different categories as they like. Oxford, and I imagine Cambridge, have both suffered in recent years by the inadequate number of Fellowships other than tutorial, and at any rate these arrangements, if they are carried out, will be a definite improvement.

There is one section of the Report which deals definitely with All Souls College. Unfortunately in recent years the giving of Prize Fellowships has been confined almost entirely to that College, although Magdalen has been able to provide a certain number. For that and I suppose for other reasons there has always been a great deal of criticism expended by 'University reformers' on All Souls College. The section of the Report is one for which the Oxford members of the Commission alone are responsible, and it is apparent that some at any rate of the Cambridge Commissioners would have endorsed that criticism. As a matter of fact, All Souls College has been one of the most useful institutions in the University, and its Fellowships have preserved the ideal of a Fellowship better than those

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of any other College. They have had three characteristics: they have been given for intellectual ability, there have been no duties attached to them, and there has been a strict rule as regards income—no one whose income exceeded a certain amount being able to enjoy the emoluments of the Fellowship. That rule has enabled the College to recognize the intellectual merit of rich men as well as poor, a matter of great moment. They have provided a means by which able men, both rich and poor, have been able to lay the foundations of a brilliant career in the service of the State, and they have provided some of the ablest teachers of the University. The criticism extended against them has not been justified. It is the business of a University to provide men for the service of the country as much as to encourage learning and research. The real abuse of endowments has been the Tutorial Fellowships and the assignment of money from the corporate funds for tutorial work. The money coming from endowments has been used not for the endowment of research or providing positions for learning, but to cheapen coaching for examinations for undergraduates who, if they desire that luxury, ought to pay properly for it.

We pass now to the constitutional changes proposed, and here for the most part I am afraid that they seem to me to be on wrong lines. That is not the case with one; it will be a great advantage for Cambridge if they obtain a proper House of Residents corresponding to Oxford Congregation. It is the great body of resident teachers who ought to be normally the governing body of the University. The exact constitution of it is a detail which we need not discuss here. No one, I think, at Oxford has any criticism to make on the position of Congregation. I do not know whether there is any opposition to this proposed change at Cambridge, but I should like to assure members of that University that our experience here would tell us that it is a change which will be beneficial. Unfortunately the Commission have followed the way of so many so-called reformers in wishing to limit the power of Convocation and the Senate. This seems to me and to many others most unfortunate, and I am glad to think that there is opposition to the proposal at Cambridge

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also. No doubt for those hot-headed people who always think that it is better to change things this will seem an advantage, but it may safely be said that on no merely internal matter has Convocation at Oxford or the Senate at Cambridge interfered with the government of the University. It has left such matters to the responsible teachers themselves, and rightly, except where great principles are involved. The question of Greek, the question of the admission of women, the question of theological degrees were all points on which a wider expression of opinion was justified. The last point seems to me to be an admirable instance of the beneficial working of Convocation. Some ten or twelve years ago a proposal was brought forward to throw open Divinity degrees. Although it was carried in Congregation, it aroused the indignation of many religious-minded resident members. It was a thoroughly bad measure, harmful to theological teaching and really insulting to the Nonconformists it was supposed to benefit, because it said that they were only to be admitted on terms of equality into the University if the Christian character of theological teaching was repudiated. When a different type of measure was introduced, which gave the freedom that the times demanded, but preserved the Christian character of religious teaching in Oxford, it passed Congregation and Convocation alike without difficulty.

The real question at issue at Cambridge now is that of the position of women. At Oxford a great change was allowed to go by default during the period of sentimentality which followed the war. Cambridge had the courage to be staunch to its opinion, and it seems to many of us at Oxford most unfair that such continued pressure should be brought upon that University to change its point of view. The Commission proposes that everything which has been rejected, with one or two slight exceptions, should be now allowed. Some members of the Commission go further and demand that no grant should be given unless women are put on an absolute equality with men at Cambridge. This is an instance of the way in which the interference of the State with Universities may work harmfully.

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The position that women obtained in Oxford is much resented by many people whose opinion is worth respect. It is obvious that women are not fitted to take part in the government of a men's University, it is doubtful whether their presence there is beneficial either to themselves or to the men. Their introduction into Colleges and Schools elsewhere has caused serious harm and still greater misgivings. This is eminently a case in which a University should be allowed to express its own opinion, and in which the opinion not merely of the resident teachers but the great body of men who are concerned with the traditions of the place and who are in many cases the fathers of those who will come to the University should be allowed expression.

A second group of changes proposed concerns the administration of finance. At Oxford a new Finance Body has been constituted on lines which I believe are entirely sound. It has only been working for a short time and there is not enough experience to speak definitely about it. At any rate there is no excuse at all for the proposal put forward by the Commissioners for putting representatives of Colleges as such on that Board. This is a matter on which resident opinion is worth a great deal more than the opinion of a body of men however able approaching the matter from outside, and I am convinced that neither at Oxford nor at Cambridge will it be a good thing to make this change.

A third series of proposals still more harmful have been suggested, and here again I am glad to find that I have support at Cambridge.[1] At Oxford a few years ago a

[1] Professor Ridgeway writes in the *Cambridge Review*: 'May I make some remarks on a few of the vital points raised by the Report? The proposal for a University Secretariate will commend itself to all, whilst that for Faculties will meet with favour. But the proposals for extending the powers of the Council combined with the replacement of the General Board of Studies by a body of twelve, six nominated by the Council and only six by the Faculties (the whole body of teachers), excite a fear that we are to be ruled by a narrow bureaucracy, a fear confirmed by the proposal to abolish practically all control by the Senate and to vest all power in the body of resident office-holders.'

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proper Faculty organization was introduced which has worked well. The teachers have been divided into Faculties, each Faculty has had its appropriate board, which has consisted first of the Professors belonging to the Faculty, secondly of an equal number of elected teachers, and thirdly of a small number of co-opted members. Those bodies are, I think, constituted in a manner which represents the teachers of the subject adequately. The Commissioners, unable to leave things which are working well alone, propose that only some of the Professors should serve on the Board, which would mean that some of the subjects concerned would be inadequately represented, that there should be only a small number of representative teachers, and that outside members elected by Congregation should be added. That is to say, it will no longer be fully representative of teaching. Still more is this the case with the proposals concerning the General Board of the Faculties. This at present contains representatives of all the Faculties, and that is the only board which can possibly be satisfactory. Instead, it is proposed that there should be a sort of bureaucratic body consisting partly of representatives of Council, with six representatives of the teachers—three of Science and three of the Humanities—and three members of Convocation. The whole aim obviously is to subordinate teaching to other interests. It is difficult to conceive anything more disproportionate than this proposal to give Science and the Humanities an equal importance at Oxford and to leave out entirely subjects like Law and Medicine and Theology. The appended statistics will shew that the number of people working in all scientific subjects at Oxford is only about one sixth of the whole, yet Science is to have equal representation. Moreover, the Commissioners, who have shewn little interest in professional studies, have entirely failed to recognize that the interests of Medicine are not identical with those of Pure Science and that the interests of Law and Theology are different from those of the Humanities.

The following statistics will, I think, be found interesting. They are the number of candidates for the different Final Schools this summer at Oxford and Cambridge.

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(α) OXFORD.

	Men.		Women.	
Litterae Humaniores		144		6
Mathematics		26		–
Natural Science:				
Physics	23		2	
Physiology	50		4	
Chemistry I.	77		1	
,, II.	[42]		[3]	
Zoology	4		2	
Botany	8		1	
Engineering	26		–	
Geology	7		–	
	—	195	—	10
Law		135		2
Modern History		339		43
Theology		67		1
Oriental Languages		2		–
English		74		47
Modern Languages:				
French	36		14	
German	3		1	
Italian	1		–	
Spanish	3		–	
Russian	6		–	
	—	49	—	15
		1031		124

There are differences between Oxford and Cambridge which make comparisons not quite exact. Geography, Anthropology, and Economics are only Diplomas at Oxford.

(β) CAMBRIDGE.

Numbers of Candidates (men only) for the 'First Parts' of Triposes.

		Details—		Mod. Languages (approx.)	
Mathematical	135	Natural Science, Pt. I.:		French	62
Classical	64	Chemistry	207	German	19
Moral Science	5	Physics	135	Spanish	22
Natural Science	257	Mineralogy	29	Swedish	1
Theological	38	Geology	81	Italian	4
Law	48	Botany	90		
History	140	Zoology	67		
Oriental	5	Comparative Anatomy	–		
Mod. Language	84	Anatomy	69		
Mechanical Science	157	Physiology	100		
Economics	52				
Anthropological	6				
English	58				
Geographical	28				
	1077				

The totals under the second and third columns are not given, as each candidate takes more than one subject.

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Numbers of Candidates (men only) for the 'Second Parts' of Triposes. Not all these men are B.A.'s.

Mathematics	62
Classics	36
Moral Science	5
Natural Science	120
Theology	9
Law	125
History	138
Economics	38
Geography	11
	544

Details of Natural Science, Part II. All B.A.'s (one subject only taken):

Chemistry	49
Physics	29
Mineralogy	1
Geology	12
Botany	9
Zoology and Comparative Anatomy	4
Anatomy	—
Physiology	16
	120

It has been maintained that the present General Board at Oxford does not work well, and I believe similar accusations have been made at Cambridge. As regards the latter I am not able to speak; as regards the former I am quite clear that the criticisms are mistaken. It is, I think, true that the General Board as it is now constituted is not a very good body for distributing money, but that function is taken away from it by the Commissioners. In the future each Faculty will have its own funds assigned to it, we may hope in a just way. The main body of the General Board has to deal with questions of curriculum, and on that point of view I can speak with experience. For the last three years I have served on Council, for the last two years on the General Board, and I have no hesitation in saying that in all subjects connected with curriculum the General Board deals with them wisely and properly, and the Hebdomadal Council deals with them badly. The interests of the General Board are the interests of learning, and the representatives of all the different subjects are quite concerned with the proper teaching of other subjects than their own. The interests of Council are administrative in the supposed interest of the Colleges, and when once learning and teaching are subordinated to administration things will go badly. The real fact is that here, as is always the case, you get conflict of opinion between administration and the rightful claims of learning.

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The administrator hates the professor, for the professor is anxious about his subject and wishes to improve things, he is always pressing it on and he is often tiresome; he would not be fulfilling his functions unless he were tiresome. The administrator, especially the College administrator, likes to manage the teachers in a bureaucratic way. It was the fundamental mistake which ran through the proposals made by Lord Haldane's abortive Commission on the University of London. It is a mistake which is always exhibited by the Board of Education and the Local Education Authorities. If the money spent on education and on Universities in this country is not to be wasted, full weight and authority must be given to teachers represented as teachers in everything with which they are particularly concerned. Luckily the Commission have not given way to greater temptations; there are people who wanted the Board of Education to have representatives of the Government in the Universities, just as Lord Haldane wished to give the Crown greater authority with regard to the University of London. All such proposals and aims are harmful.

In this connexion there is one subject of which I may be allowed to speak for a moment, in which I am particularly interested, namely Theology. It is quite clear that the members of this Commission are entirely without interest in the Theological Schools of the Universities. I asked to be allowed to give evidence, but I must own I never felt in a more uncomfortable position. It was obvious that the body I was addressing was uninterested in what I said; they had no questions to ask, they did not consider the matter at all. In the same way when they sum up the work of the Oxford and Cambridge Schools of Theology in their Report they treat it in the most perfunctory way. Take the following statement with regard to the Cambridge Theological School:

'The great achievement of the Theological School at Cambridge has been to place the science of textual criticism on a sure footing, and its productiveness is still considerable.'

Compare that with the two pages of enthusiasm about the

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growth of Science. The history for the last hundred years is given us. The history of Theology in Cambridge for the last hundred years is also a matter of supreme interest. At one time under Westcott, Lightfoot and Hort it was probably the most important Theological School in the world, and played a great part in the transformation of theological thought.

Oxford is treated a little better.

'The Theological School well maintains its numbers and its fertility in published work of a high order, and has developed fresh vigour since the reorganisation of its curriculum on modern lines in 1903. In 1920 a severer test of learning was imposed for the Degrees of Bachelor and Doctor of Divinity, and they were freed from their previous denominational restriction.'

Just about half the amount of space which is given to the new School of English; yet in the last hundred years it is as a School of Theology that Oxford has been known. Most of its other work has been provincial and second-rate, its theological teaching has influenced the whole world. It is important to emphasize this point, for probably one of the most serious tendencies in the life of this country is the growing divorce of religion from the Universities, largely owing to the unfair treatment that it invariably receives from the State.

It must be remembered that all the Colleges in Oxford and Cambridge were, in their origin, religious foundations, that the main—though not the only purpose—for which they were founded was the promotion of Religion and the study of Theology. The great bulk of these endowments have been entirely taken away from the purposes for which they were given, and the process of piecemeal disendowment is still going on. Whenever an opportunity arises a little bit more is taken away, and side by side with this large grants of public money are given to education, but hardly a farthing of them is given to any form of theological teaching. It is clear that the Commission would like to disendow Theology still more if they could see the opportunity. All this is unfair and harmful. Nor is there any

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reason in the condition of opinion why it is necessary. The problem of the relation of Religion and Theology to a University has been solved in a way which is fair. Early in this article I emphasized the necessity of the freedom of the University from religious or theological control, and that of course implies that the University as such should be fair to all different religious bodies. There was a time when it was thought that this might be carried out by undenominationalism, but the religious mind has rightly repudiated that. It is now recognized that Theology as a professional subject of learning must be definitely connected with the religious bodies for which it trains its students. If this be recognized religious bodies can work well together in a University. That is shewn in London where the Theological Faculty is formed from the members of six Theological Schools representing four different denominations. That is really the situation now at Oxford and Cambridge. At Oxford, we have besides the Theological School connected with the Church of England, Mansfield and Manchester Colleges, three or four theological colleges connected with the Church of England, two or three belonging to Roman Catholics. There seems no reason why they should not all work together provided they are all treated with equal justice and freedom. Future development should take the form of recognizing the teachers of the other religious bodies, not of disendowing the Church of England. The Colleges are independent, and the preservation of their religious character does not interfere with the freedom of the University. It is, in fact, the only guarantee of real freedom. The harm in the past was the control of the University by the Colleges. Everything should be done to make it clear that the University is free and independent as a University, but also to allow religious institutions connected with different forms of Christianity to be developed freely in the University. It should be recognized that Theology is as much as any other a rightful subject of learning; that it is as essential to the well-being of the country as Science or the Humanities, and that it should receive a just share of its ancient endow-

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ments and a proper share of modern funds given to educational purposes.

I must pass over very shortly the proposals made with regard to the management of College estates, the domestic management of the College Scholarships, and so on. The tendency of all the proposals, which shew great industry and care, is, I think, to be too elaborate. I do not suppose that every College always gets quite as much from its tenants as it might; there is, I think, always a little humanity in its dealings with them. But supposing, as some people have suggested, that the property of the Colleges should be managed in one Estate Office by a body of professional land agents, I doubt if the net gain to the Colleges would be anything appreciable, and I am certain there would be less of the friendly relations of landlord and tenant which now prevail. I look, too, with grave suspicion on the proposal to sell the estates and invest the money in public or other funds. Surely we have had sufficient evidence of the perilous character of that process. The money which we invested in Consols twenty years ago is now worth little more than half what it was; the estates which we hold are now worth far more than they then were. If our ancestors had sold all their estates two or three hundred years ago and left us nothing but money endowments, our income would be a few hundreds. If we were to do the same now, in a hundred years time the income of our Colleges would be almost negligible. While money has steadily declined in value, land has kept its value or increased it.

There is no doubt again that the domestic arrangements of the Colleges are not always satisfactory. There are still a certain number of traditional abuses. Most undergraduates are too careless to be good people to cater for, and I do not know that College Bursars are always great experts. It is really somewhat scandalous that the richer a foundation the more expensive it is to live in it. If you want to live cheaply you have to go to the non-collegiate students or to St. Edmund's Hall or to a Hostel in the newer Universities where there is no endowment. If a college has £100,000

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a year, you may be sure it will be very expensive to live in. What is the explanation of these remarkable facts? It is perhaps a little difficult to say. The Commission make heroic attempts to remedy it. I doubt very much whether the proposals they have suggested if carried out would do much. The real fact is that dons and undergraduates alike are accustomed to a certain standard of life not excessive but comfortable, that they do not want to bother about such things too much, and that if any attempt is made to introduce economy it would certainly produce great friction. A capable man as Bursar might do a certain amount. A great deal of reform has been carried out in the last fifty years, but I doubt whether much more can be accomplished or whether these very elaborate proposals would be really effective. After all, perhaps Aristotle may be right that something of ἡ ἐκτὸς χορηγία is necessary to the higher life.

We have reviewed to the best of our ability the main proposals of this Commission. There are many more subjects upon which we should have liked to touch, but we have encroached too much upon the patience of our readers. No one can doubt the trouble that has been taken or the care with which the work has been done. Unfortunately we had not before us in writing this the Appendix containing documents and materials which would no doubt have helped in the elucidation of the Report. But the main lines are quite clear. The aim is to secure that the balance of power as regards teaching should pass from the Colleges to the University. This will be secured by the amount of £100,000 administered by the University: at Cambridge by the payment of all fees for formal instruction to the University, at Oxford by these payments in a certain number of subjects.

The result of this will, I believe, be beneficial provided it is recognized that the money which is given should be spent mainly upon teaching. If a University elects the best men for its teaching posts, pays them adequately, gives them sufficient but not excessive duties, encourages them to do the highest work and provides a pension for them

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when they are too old, everything else will follow—students, fees, research, benefactions, buildings, institutions. If it begins by wasting its money on buildings, institutions and administration, and forgets the teachers, everything will fail. If our administrators allow the teachers to be really the controlling body in the University, if they maintain the authority of the University over the Colleges and all other subordinate institutions, if they strengthen the University teachers and the control of the University over teaching, then I believe the development of Oxford and Cambridge in the future will be worthy of its past; but if they allow the College Tutor in the future an undue influence, the result will be that Oxford and Cambridge will begin to be second-rate.

ARTHUR C. HEADLAM.

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Studies in Seventeenth-Century France.

Jacques Bénigne Bossuet. A Study. By E. K. Sanders. With Two Portraits. 'Ecclesiastical Biographies.' (S.P.C.K. 1921.) 15*s.* net.

La Renaissance Catholique en France au XVII^e Siècle. Par L. Prunel. (Paris: Desclée, De Brouwer et Cie; A. Picard. 1921.) 7 *fr.* 50.

'English people do not like Bossuet. He has not Fénelon's charm, nor was he an aristocrat. Yet Bossuet is the greatest figure in French literature, and Sainte-Beuve could say that the glory of Bossuet had become one of the religions of France.' So with characteristic vigour wrote Neville Figgis just five years ago.[1] And Dr. Prunel, Vice-Rector of the Institut Catholique de Paris, sees in the great Bishop of Meaux 'Pindare et Isaïe ressuscitant au milieu d'un siècle peu préparé à ce miracle.' Both estimates seem a little lacking in sobriety. There are passages in Bossuet's voluminous writings which read rather like a French translation of Pindar, but that is no more Pindar than Bossuet resembles the prophet Isaiah; while as for the assumed prejudices of English folk it may seriously be doubted whether there are a hundred people in England who have ever read a hundred pages in French of each of the two great rivals between whom they are alleged to discriminate. And for one who has read a line of either there are scores who have read, willingly or unwillingly, the *Siècle de Louis XIV*. Dr. Prunel will probably see in this one more of the evil results of Protestantism, of which, save in the case of Leibniz and Newton ('ils sont protestants, c'est entendu; mais ils sont religieux'), he has little good to say; in reality it proceeds from quite different causes. The English are no more disciples of Voltaire than they are justified in regarding him, as they often do, as a typical Frenchman. The main value, and it is considerable, of Dr. Prunel's own book is that it displays in relief aspects of Seventeenth-century France which Voltaire omits or misrepresents; but anyone who used it as the basis of an estimate either of Louis XIV or of Richelieu would be as hopelessly astray in the opposite direction. So far as Fénelon finds readers in England, it is probably as a mystic;

[1] *Journal of Theological Studies* (July 1917), p. 313.

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so far as Bossuet is not read it is probably from the idea that he is a bulky, rather unpleasant, controversialist and a florid rhetorician of an age and style as dead as Isocrates or St. John Chrysostom or Tillotson.

We have been learning gradually to see that it is impossible to understand properly English history in the Eleventh and Twelfth centuries apart from the study of Norman-French history and institutions in the same period. But for the Seventeenth century our interests have been hitherto far more insular than for the Sixteenth. The result has been inevitable misunderstanding as well as a considerable lack of proportion. Richelieu is a favourite character for a certain type of historical writer whose interest is seldom primarily historical fidelity; but there is still, so far as we are aware, no first-rate study either of his career and policy or of those of Cardinal Mazarin in the English language. The Port-Royalists have received more attention, but few English students have devoted the same unremitting labour to French history of the period seen through French eyes as Miss Sanders in her special field. Angélique of Port Royal, Vincent de Paul, and Ste. Chantal, of whom she has already written, are names of which France is justly proud, and she has made them to many in England something more than names. Her present study, designed 'to induce English readers to discover Bossuet for themselves,' represents a task of greater difficulty. From one point of view it is a companion, even in a sense a palinode, to her work upon Fénelon written more than twenty years ago. From another it presents some curiously instructive contrasts with Dr. Prunel's book from which his readers would never gather that a work like the *Gallia Orthodoxa* was ever written, or that the Six Articles formulated by the Faculty of Theology assembled at the Sorbonne in May 1663 represent an element in the struggle against Ultramontanism which cannot be glossed by efforts to explain away Papal toleration of the 'Régale' or classing Gallicanism among the three heresies of which the learned writer disposed in half an hour, no doubt to the satisfaction of the 'élèves de la Rue des Postes.' 'The Roman Church,' they were told, 'was fighting at one and the same time for human liberty menaced by Jansenism, for spiritual independence compromised by Gallicanism, and for the rights of reason which Quietism was destroying. Ainsi va le monde.' But not happily 'le monde historien,' and Dr. Prunel in this case does himself injustice, for that lecture is integral to his subject: he could with ease have expanded it for a wider

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audience, and it is unseemly for the historian to dismiss in this summary fashion three topics which were among the main pre-occupations and anxieties of Bossuet's laborious life. That life extended from 1627 to 1704 and was a singularly full one, even if we consider only his literary activities. With far greater gifts of style, Bossuet had the same curious characteristic which was to be seen later in Dr. Pusey, for whom an intended Letter or Reply at once became a pamphlet, and the pamphlet had a way of developing into a substantial volume; in both cases, too, the matter at issue had a tendency to present itself as one *stantis vel cadentis ecclesiae* either actually or in its implications. There, perhaps, in view of the dissimilarity of the careers of the two men, the comparison should be allowed to rest, though an individual opinion may be hazarded that Dr. Pusey was the sounder scholar as he was certainly the fairer controversialist. And this may be said the more readily since we do not share the opinion that Bossuet was consciously unfair or disingenuous as Wake both thought and said. If Dr. Pusey had lived in Seventeenth-century France he would not impossibly have been a canonized saint, which has not been the fate, though for different reasons, either of Fénelon or of Bossuet.

The chief impression made by Miss Sanders' study of Bossuet's character and life is of a sustained, and on the whole a successful, effort to be fair to a great man whom she regards with imperfect sympathy. The result is a work which, in spite of the writer's skill, sometimes moves rather heavily, but which those who read it once are likely to read again and, unless we are mistaken, to do so with an increasing measure of appreciation as they become more familiar with Bossuet's own works. It is a very different book from the one which Dr. Figgis had it in mind to write, and for a book of that kind there is still an opening, though it involves a different method of approach and presupposes a different intellectual discipline. There is an observation of De Maistre which Miss Sanders quotes: 'In all political systems there are certain relationships which it is wiser to leave undefined'; and it is these which gave trouble to Bossuet and which Dr. Figgis would have delighted to elucidate. For Bossuet they were not rendered less difficult by the fact that for him one side of the relationship—that implied in the doctrine of the Divine right of Kings—was 'part of his conception of the universe.' He said of himself in his work on Quietism that 'he could learn from all things and was always learning,' but we have often wondered how far he really understood human nature, especially

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in cases where his affections or sympathies were engaged; and it was the same in a measure with his prejudices. Miss Sanders commends his patience as of no common order—the tutor of the Dauphin had need of it, though again he never understood the lad—but the illustration which she selects is different: 'he was ready to enter tolerantly into the detail of tiresome complication for which devout women are at times responsible.' The same seems to have been the experience of Ignatius Loyola, who is quoted by Dr. Prunel as having admitted the principle of 'Jesuitesses' and, after directing some of them asked the Pope to suppress them 'disant ingénument que le gouvernement de trois dévotes lui donnait plus de peine que toute la Compagnie.' But it is not clear that these strictures which may be paralleled in most ages have always been fair or that the lack of a sense of humour and of proportion which is at the root of most troubles of the kind has always been on the feminine side.

Dr. Prunel's book is a series of nine public lectures first delivered twelve years ago in Paris to a mixed audience, and now published. We may say frankly that they are exceedingly good lectures which anyone who wishes to appreciate duly the religious side of the 'grand siècle' in France may read with great enjoyment. The author, whether he is dealing with Reform in the Church of France, or Charity or Missions or Education or Science, succeeds in conveying an extraordinary amount of information without giving the impression of a mere catalogue or collection of statistics; and his work has the advantage, not a very common one in French books, of having a reasonably good index. He has a great story to tell and he tells it very well. In no age of its history had the Church of France shewn so great a capacity for recovery and development as in this Counter-Reformation, even if it be true that 'l'histoire de l'Église est faite de résurrections'; and while the historical student thinks of statesmen-prelates whose pastoral activities were secondary or undischarged, Dr. Prunel can trace the stirring of new life in the activities of numbers of men and women who earned a more durable distinction by lives of singular unselfishness and thereby were enabled to convert their dreams into facts. 'Le XVII^e^ siècle charitable se résume en saint Vincent de Paul,' as Descartes was the most complete personification of its scientific spirit, but the Compagnie du Saint-Sacrement, whose influence the author has himself done much to illustrate, was possible and effective because the leaven was working on other levels besides those of the rich and influential. Of course the 'santé morale' and the 'bon sens'

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in which Dr. Prunel sees one of the characteristics of the century and a resultant of the Catholic Renaissance is not an exclusive possession nor in any age receives complete exemplification. But the Feuillants drinking out of skulls are no more typical than Père Mersenne who recommended sermons based on propositions of Euclid and the use in them of geometry and algebra to prove the truth of religion with illustrations from natural science including Hydrostatics, Aerostatics and Pyrotechnics. As he justly observed, the preacher would thus be provided with material not simply for a single sermon but for a whole Advent course; and he was accustomed, so Dr. Prunel tells us, to prove the existence of God by the parallelogram, and the square on the hypotenuse by the existence of God. If we are thinking of an age in which before the Reform abbesses gave balls in convents, and after it Mère Angélique was horrified by the worldliness involved in the use of forks at meals, in the same age missionary and charitable work received a development which has shed an enduring lustre upon France. Of the Roman Catholic workers in the mission field at the present day we are told that three out of every four are French. It is a wonderful record, and its origin is rightly placed in the new life of the Spirit manifest in the Renaissance which is the subject of these lectures.

It is to the same century that there is due the impulse which was to lead later on to the more systematic training of the clergy in France and elsewhere. Dr. Prunel finds the origin of this in the Retreats for ordinands organized by Père de Bérulle, a truly remarkable man, and the Oratorians—retreats which, beginning with a week or ten days, came to be extended to two or three months. The full development was slow in coming. Dr. Prunel does not disguise, though he is a little unfortunate in his attempt to extenuate, the 'scandals which afflicted the Church at the end of the Eighteenth and beginning of the Nineteenth century'; it was, he says, a time of extraordinary liberty of morals and language; 'et quand on songe qu'il n'y avait pas alors [he is speaking now apparently of the beginning of the Seventeenth century] *de séminaires pour isoler le futur prêtre et le préserver, au moins pendant sa formation, du contact de l'air ambiant*, on trouve moins surprenant qu'il n'ait pas toujours eu le feu sacré et qu'il ait parfois manqué de zèle sacerdotal.' Dr. Prunel speaks in the words which we have placed in italic type with an ingenuous frankness which deserves our respect. With not less respect we commend to the consideration of those in England who occupy

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positions of central responsibility in such matters a later passage in which he says: 'On a pu reprocher, peut-être justement, au prêtre français du XIX^e^ siècle, d'avoir vécu trop solitaire, de s'être trop confiné dans la sacristie, pour employer l'expression consacrée, de ne s'être pas assez mêlé au monde et d'avoir par là perdu de son influence. Mais alors, nous l'avons dit, au début du XVII^e^ siècle, l'écueil était tout opposé.' The author adds: 'Il fallait arracher le prêtre au monde, l'isoler du monde et en faire un homme "intérieur,"' and says that this is what the foundation of the seminaries achieved. He prints also, however, an extract from the Easter sermon of the Bishop of Dijon in 1921: 'Nous avons perdu dans le peuple, dans les masses ouvrières empoisonnées par la presse et par la politique, dans les milieux mondains enfiévrés de plaisir.' We venture to doubt whether these are the only or even the principal reasons for the loss, and we wish that it were really compensated by the next words: 'mais les élites intellectuelles et sociales reviennent au Christ.' If and so far as that may be true no one with any knowledge of France would hold it to be due to a seminarist clergy.

We may be allowed to conclude with a sketch of the Oratorian method of the training of the clergy as instituted at Saint-Magloire in Paris in 1642. It is taken from a letter of the famous Père Bourgoing discovered by Dr. Prunel: 'Le Père de la Barde, que j'ose vous asseurer estre un des éminens de ce temps dans les sciences, leur enseigne la théologie morale; le Père d'Arci, qui a grand talent pour les missions, leur en monstre la methode, et de catéchiser et prescher utilement; un autre Père fait leçon sur le rituel, de la pratique de l'administration des sacremens et des autres fonctions, et un quatriesme bien dressé au chant ecclésiastique et aux cérémonies, les y exerce tous les jours. Ce sont les exercices de cette Académie spirituelle, sous l'ordre journalier des règlements de piété d'une vie consacrée au fils de Dieu en l'état ecclésiastique.'

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SHORT NOTICES.

Biblical Studies.

The Life and Growth of Israel: a brief Old Testament History (Biblical and Oriental Series). By Samuel A. B. Mercer, Ph.D., D.D. (Milwaukee, Wis.: Morehouse Publishing Co. 1921.) Price 1 *dollar* 75 *cents.*

This is an interesting little book, which should be widely used by that portion of the general public which desires to find in a small compass an account of the development of the Hebrew people, based on sound scholarship. Unlike many books of the kind, it is not dull. Using the analogy of the life and growth of an individual, Dr. Mercer traces the history of Israel from its ancestors, through infancy, childhood, youth, and coming of age, to maturity. His point of view throughout is that of one who is telling the religious rather than the secular history of the people of Israel—'the secular interests have been subordinated to the religious and spiritual.' And so all falls into line: for is not that the point of view of the original writers or editors themselves? Small stress is laid on secular events which have no bearing on religion; the history is pragmatic throughout. Thus, a truer impression of the life of Israel is given here than in books which confine themselves almost entirely to historical facts.

Perhaps it is inevitable in a small book that some dogmatic assertions should be made which go beyond what the evidence would seem to warrant. Such are the statement (p. 13) that Abraham left Babylonia because he decided not to tolerate a defection from the worship of Sin the moon-god—which is at any rate not more than an hypothesis; the assertion (p. 164) that 'the Zadokites became an energetic party consisting not only of Pharisees but also of reforming Sadducees,' and the suggestion that our Lord was 'a Pharisee or Zadokite,' and that the early Christian Church was 'a Pharisaic or Zadokite Church.' The latter remarks shew that Dr. Mercer takes an unusual view of the relations between the various Jewish

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parties, and assumes that Sadducees and Zadokites are not to be identified.

Also, it is at least inadequate to refer (p. 96) to J. and E. as the 'Judean' and 'Ephraimitish' histories, without a suggestion that the initials J. and E. refer primarily to the sacred names Jahweh and Elohim. Josiah's Reformation is dismissed in two lines (p. 108), and on p. 116, in a reference to the discovery of the Book of the Law, no mention is made of any possible connexion of the Law-book with Deuteronomy. There seems to be some inconsistency in regard to the remarks about Ezra on pp. 132, 133. If it is 'more likely' that Ezra's date is 398 B.C., how could the Samaritan schism have become complete 'after the promulgation of the Law under Ezra' and before 400 B.C.? It is a constant source of surprise to us that so many Old Testament scholars should write Naz*a*rite when they mean Naz*i*rite; and *moral*, in the sense in which it is used on p. 61, should be spelt thus, and not *morale*. The physiological metaphor on p. 98 ('their pulse beat steadily as a result of many a trying fever') is surely not in accordance with medical experience!

But it is an ungrateful task to call attention to small defects, and most of the points noted do not detract in any real measure from the general interest and usefulness of the book. It remains to add that there is an efficient index, three useful maps, a table of important dates, and a small bibliography.

The Origin of Paul's Religion. By J. GRESHAM MACHEN, D.D., Assistant Professor of New Testament Literature and Exegesis in Princeton Theological Seminary. (New York: The Macmillan Co. 1921.) Price 3 *dollars*.

THIS is a book which it would be difficult to overpraise. It is not long; it is admirably written; it is quite up to date; and it contains the best and most comprehensive examination that we know of the efforts that have been, and are being, made to explain the religion and theology of St. Paul, without admitting their truth. As Dr. Machen says, 'two facts need to be explained—the Jesus of the Gospels and the religion of Paul. The problem of early Christianity may be approached in either of these two ways. . . . And if it is approached in both ways the investigator will discover, to his amazement, that the two ways lead to the same result.' In England of late the former approach has been generally chosen; in this book

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the latter takes its place. Dr. Machen writes as an apologist; one so much in earnest about religion can write in no other way; once or twice we think that he does a little less than justice to his opponents' case. But in almost every respect his book is just what was wanted.

The early chapters are occupied with St. Paul's early life and ministry as recorded in the Epistles and in the Acts. Here we are traversing familiar ground; and, though the work is well done, they are less interesting than the chapters which follow. In these the problem of the relation of St. Paul to Jesus is admirably handled. It is shewn that St. Paul had abundant sources of information about the life of Jesus, that he regarded himself as His disciple, and was so regarded by those who had known Jesus best. Moreover, the harmony between the teaching of the two is strikingly exhibited. Both present the same view of the kingdom of God, regarding it as at once transcendent and ethical; both lay the greatest stress upon the Fatherhood of God, while regarding it as the possession, not of the world, but of the household of faith; both preach a doctrine of grace; and both give an ethical teaching precisely the same in what it contains and in what it omits. Now it is this solid knowledge possessed by St. Paul of the Lord which must be remembered when we come to consider both his Gospel and his Christology, and it is in view of it that Dr. Machen deals with the efforts to explain them by pre-Christian Jewish and Gentile thought. He seems to think that neither St. Paul's thought nor his language owes anything considerable to either. There is 'no evidence whatever of literary dependence upon the apocalyptic descriptions of the Messiah.' There is 'in the apocalypses no doctrine of an activity of the Messiah in creation,' 'no trace of the warm, personal relation which exists between the believer and the Pauline Christ,' and 'no doctrine of the divinity of the Messiah,' nor can these gaps be filled, as Windisch suggests, by reference to the divine 'Wisdom' of the Wisdom-literature. But the real question is not as to the sources of St. Paul's language—we think that Dr. Machen underestimates the importance of the Jewish literature here—but as to the reason why he applied it to Jesus, and here Dr. Machen's argument appears unanswerable. 'The more exalted was the Messiah in whom St. Paul believed before his conversion, the more inexplicable becomes the identification of that Messiah with a crucified malefactor.' The same is true with the conception of the divine 'Wisdom.' It does not matter whether, in the

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language used by St. Paul of Jesus, he had or had not this conception in his mind; what has to be explained is why, even if he had, he applied it to one with whose human life he was thoroughly acquainted.

The last three chapters of the book deal with the supposed Gentile sources of St. Paul's teaching, especially with the theology of the heathen mysteries, and with Bousset's view of the use of the title Kyrios by Gentile religious associations. Dr. Machen argues, much as Dr. Kennedy does, that the parallels between St. Paul's theology and that of the mystery-religions are largely illusory, and that the language which really resembles St. Paul's is far too late for any argument to be founded upon it. The fact is that the bases of St. Paul's thought are the teaching of the Old Testament and the experience of the Christian redemption. In short, the fundamental difficulty of explaining the origin of St. Paul's religion 'will disappear only when Jesus is recognized as being really what Paul presupposes Him to be and what all the Gospels represent Him as being—the eternal Son of God, come to earth for the redemption of man, now seated once more on the throne of His glory, and working in the hearts of His disciples, through His Spirit, as only God can work.' We have only one criticism to offer of Dr. Machen's treatment of this part of his subject. Protestant sympathies lead him, as they led Dr. Kennedy, to do less than justice to St. Paul's sacramental teaching. Insistence upon faith and insistence upon sacraments are not mutually inconsistent but mutually complementary. It is as mistaken to contrast faith with sacraments in the spiritual salvation which Christ brings to us as it would be to contrast faith with the touch of Christ in those whom He healed.

St. Luke, with Introduction and Notes. By LONSDALE RAGG, B.D. 'Westminster Commentaries.' (Methuen and Co. 1922.) 15s. net.

IT is a happy selection which has entrusted this volume of the Westminster Commentaries to Canon Ragg. We do not think that there is any other Commentary upon this Gospel so good for English readers unfamiliar with Greek. Instinctively we compare it with Mr. Rackham's admirable book on the Acts in the same series. It is perhaps less easy to read continuously; Mr. Rackham had a way of arranging his information which was peculiarly his own; but the new volume bears comparison with the old in every other way. What is especially noticeable

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is the happy balance of the whole book. There is no neglect of critical investigations; Canon Streeter's most recent work is brought under contribution, and full use is made of such well-known sources of information as Ramsay and Deissmann. Canon Ragg is modern in the best sense of the word; here and there, for example, our new knowledge of psychology is usefully employed. But these things are kept in their true place. The reader will find practical and devotional as well as critical and historical help, as he finds it in Godet's Commentary, while Godet's critical weakness is avoided. Perhaps the most distinctive characteristic of Canon Ragg's book is the frequent reference to Christian art, and to Dante. Knowledge of art is especially valuable in dealing with St. Luke. Whether or not St. Luke was himself a painter, he is certainly the most pictorial of the Evangelists, and Canon Ragg well points out that, in spite of the way in which mediaeval art neglects the parables, the greater number of its subjects are drawn from this Gospel. Here and there we differ from the interpretation given; St. Luke ii 35 should surely be interpreted, not in the traditional way, but, as the context suggests, on the lines of Heb. iv 12; and the difficulty felt about St. Luke ix 27 is eased when we notice that in St. Mark, the original authority, the words are a detached saying, of whose context we are ignorant. But it is not often that we find ourselves in disagreement. Special attention may be drawn to the note on the title 'Son of Man' (iv 24), due, like many other notes, to Mr. Paul Levertoff; to Papini's suggestion as to the difficult verse vii 48; and to the interpretation of xii 14, as a direction, on the lines of xx 25, to go to the constituted authority.

The Epistles to the Colossians and to Philemon. ('The Indian Church Commentaries.') By W. K. FIRMINGER, D.D., B.L. (Archdeacon of Calcutta). (London: S.P.C.K., and Madras: S.P.C.K. Depository. 1921.) *7s. 6d.* net.

ENGLISH as well as Indian students should give this book a cordial welcome. How necessary for the Indian Church it is to have Commentaries written by those familiar with Indian thought Archdeacon Firminger's book enables us to see, but their value is great for ourselves also. Too often we forget that just because Christianity is an universal religion, both the religion as a whole and its sacred books must be judged not only by their value for our own thought and life, but also by

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their value for other ages and peoples. The Epistle to the Colossians, to take an example, makes, in its controversial chapters, little appeal to the modern Englishman; but it is a living epistle in India, since the Indian missionary is face to face with errors similar to those which St. Paul has here in view. Mrs. Besant's union of intellectualism with baseless speculation, and the frequent combination of asceticism with sensuality in the religious life of the East, find in this Epistle the antidotes that are necessary. It is in the new help brought to us in this way that the chief value of this Commentary consists. We have references at every turn to the sacred books of India, and to modern thinkers such as Devendranath Tagore. But the value of the book does not at all lie in this alone. Dr. Firminger's knowledge is quite up to date. He has used not merely older Commentaries but books so recent as the first volume of Foakes Jackson's and Kirsopp Lake's work upon the Acts of the Apostles; and he has, as so few commentators have, a competent knowledge of Catholic theology. There are some good additional notes and essays. We have only one complaint. The long list of errata on pp. xii and xiii is far from complete, the Greek accents especially requiring attention.

The Beginnings of Christianity. Part I. *The Acts of the Apostles.* Edited by F. J. Foakes Jackson, D.D., and Kirsopp Lake, D.D. Vol. II. *Prolegomena.* II. *Criticism.* (London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd.). 24*s.* net.

The second volume of this book is less discursive than the first, and, we think, superior as a whole. As in the earlier volume, the Editors have called other scholars to their aid; Professor Cadbury is almost as prominent as the editors themselves; and those who collaborate are not all of the same school. The method involves some repetition; it would be useful, when important questions are handled more than once, for cross-references to be supplied as in Peake's *Commentary on the Bible.* But the advantages more than counterbalance the disadvantages; it is most useful, as in the case of the authorship of the Acts, to see opposite views defended by those who respectively accept them.

The first main division of this volume deals with 'The Composition and Purpose of Acts.' Here Professor Cadbury and the editors deal with the Greek and Jewish traditions of writing history, Professor de Zwaan with the language of Acts, and

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Mr. W. K. L. Clarke with its relation to the Septuagint; while Professor Burkitt discusses Luke's use of Mark, and the editors the sources of the Acts and the 'light thrown by analysis on the history, purpose, and theology of the book.' The account given of the ancient traditions of writing history is very full and interesting, but it is doubtful whether it throws much light upon a book of so distinctive a character as the Acts. The most important question here is that of the speeches which the book contains. No doubt it is possible that St. Luke may have freely composed some of them himself, but it does not seem very likely. The practice of inserting imaginary speeches into historical works did not pass unchallenged, as the editors themselves make clear; and there are peculiar difficulties in ascribing it to St. Luke. It is one thing to invent speeches for men of a bygone day—when the Old Testament 'Chronicles' were published, it must surely have been obvious that the speeches were imaginary—but it is quite another to do this for revered leaders, whose real words are still known and treasured. We must remember also how St. Luke treats the words of Christ and the Baptist as he finds them in the sources that he employs for his Gospel; he shews in dealing with words little of the freedom which he shews in dealing with narratives; and, though he might not have felt quite the same reverence for the words of his own contemporaries, his respect for them would have acted as a restraint upon his imagination. Indeed, there is more to be said. The speeches in the Acts not only are exceedingly well suited to the occasions of their delivery, but, as has been frequently observed, find points of contact with the actual words of the speakers, when their writings have come down to us. Bishop Chase has well handled this point in his *Hulsean Lectures*, and his argument should be met; the two-line reference on p. 432 is quite inadequate. In the later sections of the first main division of the book there is much that is valuable. Special attention may be called to Professor de Zwaan's criticism of Torrey's *Composition and Date of Acts*, and to the excellent summary on pp. 64, 65 of St. Luke's literary characteristics. But we do not think that the editors' discussion of the sources of the Acts reaches any assured results. The argument from alleged doublets in the early chapters is particularly unconvincing. St. Luke frequently repeats himself when he is dealing with matters which he regards as peculiarly important; indeed apparently he arranges his materials with the object of doing so, as we see in the cases of the story of Cornelius and the story of St. Paul's conversion.

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In the early chapters, the gift of the Spirit, the first preaching of St. Peter, the expansion of the Church, and its so-called 'communism' are all matters in which St. Luke has a peculiar interest; and what we find is probably not doublets, but deliberate repetition.

The second main division of the book deals with the authorship of the Acts. Here Professor Cadbury has collected and arranged the *Testimonia Veterum*, placing the originals and the translations side by side upon opposite pages; Mr. C. W. Emmet has stated 'the case for the tradition' of St. Luke's authorship, and Professor Windisch 'the case against the tradition'; while Professor Cadbury and the editors argue the question of the alleged medical language of St. Luke, and deal with his relation to Josephus, and some other subordinate points. It is this division of the book which seems to us the most important. There is much to be said for the view here advocated that the *Testimonia Veterum* are of little value, since their assertions of Lucan authorship may be no more than deductions from the internal evidence; but we must recognize the unlikelihood that the Early Church did not know the author of a book so universally accepted. We would also draw special attention to the discussion of St. Luke's alleged medical language; the attack here made upon the well-known argument based upon it is powerful, and, we think, successful. But it is the battle between Mr. Emmet and Professor Windisch which is most interesting, even though, as in so many controversies, the bombardment is at long range, and we should like to see the combatants at closer quarters. At present Mr. Emmet has the advantage, as the argument from the 'We' sections resists all attempts to break it down. Of course there is little in the fact that the style of the 'We' sections is identical with that of the rest of the book; St. Luke knows well how to transform the language of his sources; but it seems inconceivable that in transforming a travel-narrative written by another he would not have eliminated the first person plural. Indeed, Professor Windisch's long article is far from being the strongest part of the book; his imaginative reconstruction of the history of the Apostolic Decree is without any satisfactory basis. But most serious of all is his misunderstanding of Gal. ii 11ff., leading him, as it does, to rejection not only of the Apostolic Council of Acts xv, but of the story of Cornelius. The reason why, in dealing with St. Peter, St. Paul does not produce the Apostolic Decree 'in support of his position' is quite simple, even if we do not follow Mr. Emmet in dating

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the Epistle before the Council. St. Paul has no need to support his position, since St. Peter plainly does not challenge it. St. Peter is charged not with error, but with action inconsistent with his real convictions, and Professor Windisch's arguments fall to the ground. Is it uncharitable to suggest that Professor Windisch is not profoundly interested in St. Paul's 'doctrinal' arguments, and ceases to pay exact attention when he arrives at them? At the same time, we frankly admit that the difficulties about the Apostolic Council are real, and, though Mr. Emmet's dating of Galatians removes some of them, it hardly removes them all.

Of the third main division little needs to be said. President McGiffert gives a good account of 'the Historical Criticism of Acts in Germany,' and Mr. J. W. Hunkin of British work on the Acts. The contrast is instructive. German work is mostly done in the study alone; English, from James Smith of Jordanhill and Lewin to Professor Ramsay, largely in the open air by travel and the spade. We have no need to be ashamed for the result, nor has St. Luke. The more closely we approach solid facts, the more the accuracy of St. Luke is confirmed. The strength of the book before us is German rather than English strength. We admire the learning and ingenuity, which are so abundantly displayed. Few will fail to find much that will be new to them, and not a little of permanent value. What we sometimes miss is the solid ground of undoubted fact, and, we will add, of sympathetic understanding of Christian faith and the background of Church life. Theology is not altogether neglected; there is, *e.g.*, a valuable comparison of the Lucan writings with the Apostles' Creed, but some of the contributors seem to write rather as 'those that are without' than as those that are within. The book ends with some interesting appendices, the most valuable being an elaborate Commentary by Professor Cadbury on St. Luke's Preface to the Gospel. This he regards as a Preface to both St. Luke's books; and, though he does not here altogether convince us, we know of no other Commentary upon this to be compared with his.

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Philosophy of Religion.

Essays and Addresses on the Philosophy of Religion. By Friedrich von Hügel. (London: Dent. 1922.) 15*s.* net.

In this volume Baron von Hügel has collected papers and lectures which have been contributed by him to various magazines, and has added four new essays. The subjects dealt with are all connected with the study of religion, but there is no general theme or argument running through the book. Those who are acquainted with recent work in the Philosophy of Religion will not need to be told that anything from Baron von Hügel's pen is of the highest importance, and they will be glad to learn from the preface to this volume that he is engaged upon a large and systematic work on the philosophical aspects of the religious life. The essays here presented to us give a clear account of some of the fundamental positions which the author has taken in his previous writings, and which will doubtless form the basis for his promised treatise. From this point of view the two papers on 'Religion and Illusion' and 'Religion and Reality' are specially interesting. In these he is grappling with the problem of the validity of religious experience. The argument against the alleged illusory character of religious experience is specially directed against von Hartmann, but the discussion is sufficiently general to cover the whole question. The argument is carried forward in the following essay, the central contention of which is the presence of objectivity, of 'givenness,' in every level of human activity, whether theoretical or practical. 'In all these cases,' says the author, 'we have an absorption of the Subject in the Object, and a response—an assuredly gradual, ever only partial, yet a very real, self-revelation—of the Object to the Subject.' Thus the fact of revelation is discernible in experience other than that which we should describe as specifically religious. But it is the religious experience that 'gives us Revelation at its fullest, not only as to Revelation's content but also as to Revelation's form.' It cannot be said that Baron von Hügel has made his view completely clear with regard to the relation of religious experience to other forms, and the reader may be left in some doubt whether he holds religion to be different in essence from philosophy, for example, though having some elements in common. This and other questions will doubtless be dealt with more at length

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in the larger work which is promised. We have not space to do more than call attention to other valuable essays. The summary and criticism of Troeltsch will be useful to many who are unable to give the time to study for themselves the writings of that voluminous and somewhat difficult thinker. The papers on the Apocalyptic Element in the teaching of Jesus and the Essentials of Catholicism are worthy of careful attention. Baron von Hügel has not lost his gift of happy and homely illustration, nor his power of illuminating abstract discussion by anecdotes drawn from the lives both of saints and ordinary people. We feel while we read him that we are in contact with a mind that is great and full, but also profoundly exercised in the deep things of the spirit.

The Religion of Plato. By PAUL ELMER MORE. (Princeton University Press. 1921.) 10*s.* 6*d.* net.

THE distinguished author of the Shelburne Essays here presents us with the first volume of a series in which he intends to trace the Greek tradition from the death of Socrates to the Council of Chalcedon. The assumption on which the author proceeds is 'that Greek literature, philosophic and religious, pagan and Christian, from Plato to St. Chrysostom is essentially a unit and follows at the centre a straight line.' The first instalment of this ambitious undertaking fills us with eagerness to read the discussion of Christianity which is to follow. Expositions of Plato and Platonism are very numerous, but Mr. More has succeeded in giving a fresh and in many respects provocative outline of Plato's thought, in the course of which he has translated many long passages—a plan which helps the general reader to gain some insight into the Platonic method. Mr. More, rightly in our opinion, objects to the tendency to interpret Plato as an imperfect forerunner of Hegel and lays great stress on the radical dualism of the Platonic theory. There are signs that the author regards Christianity as a popularized Platonism, and we doubt whether he is likely to do justice in his succeeding volumes to the Jewish foundation of the Gospel, but it would be unfair to deduce what the writer will say from what he has said. We have to thank him for an interesting book, written as we need hardly say in a lucid and easy style and illuminated here and there by quotations from the store of literature of which Mr. More is master.

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Comparative Religion.

The Witch-Cult in Western Europe. A Study in Anthropology. By M. A. Murray. (Clarendon Press. 1921.) 16s. net.

The two main characteristics which are likely to impress themselves upon the reader of this extremely interesting book are its learning and its confidence. The witch-cult of which Miss Murray writes is 'the religious beliefs and ritual of the people known in late mediaeval times as "witches."' She claims that 'the evidence proves that underlying the Christian religion was a cult practised by many classes of the community, chiefly, however, by the more ignorant or those in the less thickly inhabited parts of the country. It can be traced back to pre-Christian times, and appears to be the ancient religion of Western Europe.' She gives it the name of the 'Dianic cult,' from Diana, the feminine counterpart of a god who 'is found in Italy (where he was called Janus or Dianus), in Southern France and in the English Midlands,' and who appears as a man with two faces. It is always a little disconcerting to be told at the outset that a case has been proved, and it is apt to raise uneasy doubts in a student's mind as to the writer's acquaintance with the nature of proof if his own limited opportunities of investigation have chiefly impressed him with the difficulty of arriving at more or less probable inferences. But Miss Murray has no such unworthy timidity. We read again: '*It is now a commonplace of anthropology* that the tales of fairies and elves preserve the traditions of a dwarf race which once inhabited Northern and Western Europe.' . . . 'As *the conqueror always regards the religion of the conquered as superior to his own in the arts of evil magic*, the dwarf race obtained the reputation of wizards and magicians, and their god was identified by the conquerors with the Principle of Evil.' At the risk of seeming to be merely sceptical we are conscious of desiderating several not unimportant qualifications in regard to both these statements.

The discussion of the evidence derived from the statements of witches as to the forms in which the devil presented himself to them would require another volume instead of a review. The list of the names of the witches given in Appendix III extends to more than twenty pages, and Miss Murray's collection of extracts and instances must have cost years of search. There

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are certain incidental features to which it may be permissible to call attention. Thus Elizabeth Sawyer, the witch of Edmonton, in 1621 says 'he the Divell taught me this prayer, *sanctibecetur nomen tuum*, Amen.' Andro Man at Aberdeen in 1597 says that the devil 'is rasit be the speaking of the word *Benedicite*.' In an alleged meeting with the devil by those engaged in a treasonable conspiracy for the destruction of James VI of Scotland in 1590 'his hienes name was pronunceit in Latine,' while the devil is represented as speaking French, and is regarded by Miss Murray as being Francis Stewart, Earl of Bothwell, nephew of Queen Mary's husband. The Somersetshire witches in 1664, as they were carried through the air to their meetings, used these words as they passed: '*Thout, tout a tout, tout, throughout and about.* And when they go out from their Meetings, they say *Rentum, Tormentum*.' At Aix, in 1610, 'the Magicians and those that can reade, sing certaine Psalmes as they doe in Church, especially *Laudate Dominum de Coelis. Confitemini Domino quoniam bonus*, and the Canticle *Benedicite*, transferring all to the praise of Lucifer and the Divels.' In the ceremony of laying the devil after he had been raised by the use of the word *Benedicite*, according to Andro Man's evidence, the word *Maikpeblis* was used. Sometimes, *e.g.* in the Basses-Pyrénées in 1609, an invocation has a Latin beginning and a vernacular ending. In Guernsey, in 1563, a man-witch claimed to make cows give blood instead of milk by saying 'Butyrum de armento.' Elizabeth Francis, a witch tried at Chelmsford in 1566, said that 'when she wolde wyl him [her familiar] to do any thinge for her, she wolde say her Paternoster in Laten.' (The familiar in this case was 'a whyte spotted Catte': it was called 'Sathan,' and kept in a basket.) All the instances quoted come from a period and, with one exception, from quarters where Latin made an impression on the hearers because it had become, or was becoming, unfamiliar. But there is another point. Miss Murray's list of witches, as we have said, is long, though it gives the names, of course, of only a small proportion of those against whom charges were made in the course of centuries. But her practice, no doubt a necessary one, of repetition under different headings, has concealed from her, as it seems to the reviewer, how relatively slight is the body of evidence upon which her far-reaching conclusions are based. It may be regarded as antecedently probable that in certain parts of England and Scotland survivals of rites and practices associated with what may loosely be called 'Nature Worship'

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will be found down to comparatively modern times, and the *Vitae Sanctorum Hiberniae* provides a starting-point for an inquiry which would not prove fruitless in regard to Ireland. And it may well be true that 'pseudo-science has prevented the unbiassed examination' of this as of other material. But it is equally possible for the scientific student to become obsessed with an idea: thus anthropology has often been in danger of being made ridiculous by a failure to remember that observation and interpretation are distinct operations. .'It would seem,' Miss Murray tells us, 'that the witches, like the adorers of animal gods in earlier times, attempted to become one with their god or sacred animal by taking on his form.' It may be a correct interpretation, though we do not think that it is, but two preliminary questions have to be asked. How far do the cases open to observation suffice for any conclusion at all? What inference would an unprejudiced observer draw? It requires far more than isolated, even if parallel, instances to prove a continuous cultus, a definite organization, an established ritual. Again, an inference to be valid must be based on a consideration of all the facts; thus Miss Murray's suggestion in regard to the Christian names of the witches as evidence would need to be supported by an examination of the distribution of Christian names in England and Scotland, and their relative frequency and any possible or probable causes—an examination for which in the greater part of the period with which she actually deals there is ample material. But of the influence of the dominant idea there can scarcely be found a more startling example than her treatment of Joan of Arc and Gilles de Rais. As to this we are content to ask, would any impartial historical student who read Appendix IV, with the evidence there stated and selected by Miss Murray herself, arrive at her conclusion that Joan 'was put to death as a witch, and the conduct of her associates during her military career, as well as the evidence at her trial, *bear out the fact that she belonged to the ancient religion, not to the Christian*'?

The evidence, sometimes barely printable, collected by Miss Murray, would, so far as it goes, support a suggestion of a standard of moral conduct often associated with one of the lower rather than one of the higher religions. It is a curious fact that a fairly wide study of legal records of the main English districts with which she deals in the same period, while certainly not indicating the prevalence of a high moral standard, is wholly opposed to any theory of promiscuity, however motived.

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We hope that in any future edition Miss Murray will see her way to withdraw a sentence on p. 179, as a scientist, if not as a woman, for it will not bear investigation, and by its offensiveness mars the general tone of her work.

History and Antiquities.

The Cambridge Medieval History. Vol. III. *Germany and the Western Empire.* (Cambridge University Press. 1922.) 50*s.* net.

The series to which this volume belongs was planned by Professor Bury, though we are expressly told that for the present instalment he has no responsibility. Since the second volume appeared Dr. Gwatkin, who had been one of the editors from the first, has died, and the war has intervened, with results which the student might please himself by comparing and contrasting with the dissolution of the Carolingian Empire were the situation less full of uncertainty as well as of tragedy. The labour of re-organizing the scheme and seeing the book through the press has fallen to Dr. Whitney, who has discharged a very difficult task with a measure of success that merits congratulation. He has been assisted in it by Dr. Tanner and Mr. Previté-Orton, who will for succeeding volumes be joined with him as editors.

There are few periods of mediaeval history more difficult for the ordinary student than the 250 years which, roughly speaking, are covered by this volume. Even though it may be true, as Dr. Whitney points out in his Introduction, that 'History is always changing and transitional,' yet here the specialist often seeks safety by declining to travel outside a limited field, and the reader who is not a specialist too often finds himself bewildered by what seem to him great accumulations of unrelated facts. From this point of view it is a real advantage that of the 567 pages of text, practically half should be the work of four writers only, two being French and two English. Thus Professor Poupardin is able to deal with Louis the Pious and the Carolingian kingdom (840–918); Professor Halphen with France from 888 to the Eleventh century, the kingdom of Burgundy, and the Church from Charlemagne to Sylvester II; Mr. Austin Lane Poole with Germany from the election of Henry I (the Fowler) in 919 to the death of Otto III of smallpox in 1002, and the reign of Conrad II (the intervening

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period under Henry II is dealt with by Mr. Edwin Holthouse, and the succeeding reign of Henry III by Miss Caroline Ryley); and Mr. W. J. Corbett describes the history of England from the death of Offa to that of Edward the Confessor. Side by side with the story of Tenth-century Germany as told by Mr. Poole the student will read that of Italy in the same age related by Mr. Previté-Orton, which affords some interesting points of comparison. Professor Allen Mawer's chapter on 'The Vikings' serves as an appropriate introduction to the two chapters on English history, though it might with advantage have come earlier still in the volume, and the remaining five deal with 'The Western Caliphate' (Dr. Altamira), 'Feudalism' (Sir Paul Vinogradoff), 'Learning and Literature till Pope Sylvester II' (Dr. M. R. James), and 'Byzantine and Romanesque Arts' by Professor Lethaby. As will be seen the ground has been mapped out in a way calculated on the whole to avoid overlapping, and though we should have welcomed the inclusion of a separate chapter upon Law, it was perhaps felt that this could be placed more conveniently in the next volume.

We have said that the chapter on the Vikings might have come earlier, and indeed should be disposed to recommend the student to read that essay and the one on the Western Caliphate before turning to the rest of the volume. A glance at the useful 'Chronological Table of Leading Events' will shew the reason. It is not merely reflexion on the facts, though they are significant facts, that the Vikings attacked Seville in 844, and the Saracens had sacked St. Peter's at Rome in the previous year; but upon the introduction of two new factors of far-reaching importance into the development of the history of the continent of Europe during this period. 'The influence of the Vikings,' as Professor Mawer points out, 'varied from century to century, not only according to the political and social condition of the lands in which they settled, but also to some extent according to the nation from which they came.' 'When two people come into contact,' says Professor Altamira, 'the higher civilization invariably influences the other. Such indeed was the case of the Arabs in Spain and the Spaniards from the beginning of the Ninth to the end of the Thirteenth century, when Arab philosophy and science were at their height. In practical life Arab influence was even greater, not only in political but also in legal and military organization.' And if Viking pressure and influence was inimical, as it certainly was, to learning, Viking power was based on a theory which, while aristocratic,

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was at any rate more friendly to liberty than the West European Feudalism which in the eyes of many is the most anti-social feature as well as, in Sir Paul Vinogradoff's phrase, 'the dominant fact of medieval history on the institutional side.' Of course there were not wanting persons to cloak injustice with a semblance of legal right, and in practice the system was often successful where in theory it failed; but those who have tended to regard the feudal system as an ordinance of Providence have probably been less troubled by the theological implications of their doctrine than were some of the greater minds of the Middle Ages.

It is told of Mr. Andrew Lang, whether truly or not we do not know, that to the dismay of his publisher he once reviewed unfavourably one of his own books. Professor Halphen perhaps more legitimately provides a summary of the contents of the work. 'The preceding volume,' he says, 'came to an end with the picture of a vast Empire seemingly destined to absorb Europe itself. This volume, on the contrary, has offered little for our consideration save the spectacle of Europe fallen to fragments, of its kingdoms sundered from one another, and of disintegration steadily advancing. The alluring dream of Charles the Great has vanished; after his death no temporal prince was found capable of carrying on his work, and it fell to ruins.' It was a time of travail wherein France and Germany, whether we consider them as sovereign units or as geographical expressions, were slow in coming to the birth, and the drama of Jacob and Esau was played afresh on a larger stage. Whatever the historical value of the Treaty of Verdun in 843, it set no barrier either of might or resolution that could not be passed. It is more profitable, no doubt, to enter into the spirit of the *Querela de divisione Imperii* with its lament 'Pro rege est regulus, pro regno fragmina regni,' than into the egregious nonsense of Regulus of Cappadocia, who, so Dr. James tells us, in company with Sedulius of Rome, went without food and sleep for a fortnight while discussing the inchoative and frequentative forms of the verb, or the still more absurd Galbungus and Terrentius, who 'disputed for fourteen consecutive days and nights as to whether *ego* had a vocative.' The grammarians of this age were probably not more completely dehumanized than those of most other periods, and if the Carolingian scheme of unity had fallen to pieces, it was not the only possible one, and the Church was preparing a new Grammar of Assent which in the interests of another unity formulated supernatural claims destined to be upheld in only too human a fashion. The story

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is one of fascinating interest, and though the results, as Dr. Whitney points out, belong to a later volume, we are already reading the first chapter at least.

We have little space for the discussion of individual contributions. The book deserves to be studied with care throughout, and while we are not sure that the student will derive an equally clear impression from all portions, that will depend of course to some extent upon what he brings to it. There are probably very few who will not learn much that they did not know from Dr. James' chapter on Literature, at least in regard to some of its by-paths; and if the story is sometimes a little colourless where in the original authorities it is vivid and even startling, it must be remembered that we are reading general history, not a series of essays in biography, nor can a writer in a work of this kind expect to be allowed space for discussion of points of detail. Yet we cannot help feeling that the story of Hungary, Bohemia, and Poland during the period deserved rather more lifelike treatment, if only for the reason that it is the side with which most readers will be least familiar. Dr. Whitney and Mr. Previté-Orton attach less importance than has sometimes been done to the conjunction of Otto III and Gerbert of Aurillac, better known as Pope Sylvester II; and their opinion is entitled to a good deal of weight. But it may be doubted whether the ordinary reader would gather from anything in this volume the extraordinary impression which the character of either makes upon the mediaevalist. However, if the volume is here and there a little heavier than it need have been, that will not detract from the high estimate which will be formed of its general value. Like its predecessors it is furnished with adequate maps in a separate case, and the admirable bibliographies provide a stimulus for further study, if sometimes regret that some of the most indispensable authorities should be beyond the reach of all but a very few in days when students are impoverished and the price of books is prohibitive.

The Life of Otto of Pomerania. Translated by C. H. Robinson, D.D. (S.P.C.K. 1920.) 8*s.* 6*d.* net.

It is a difficult task to make mediaeval biography readable or even intelligible, so thick is the cloud of vague verbosity which screens its heroes, and often so repulsive the pietistic vocabulary which is employed. Otto of Bamberg is more fortunate than some missionaries of his age, though Dr. Robinson makes him

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needlessly unattractive by rendering 'territory of the Polonii' when he means Poland, and by various other awkwardnesses. Sometimes he even misleads, as when he translates *Francia orientalis* by 'Eastern France.' It was the regular equivalent for Franconia. And sometimes he fails to supply necessary notes. The 'Amerbacensian rule' and the 'Hirsaugensian order' are likely to be unintelligible allusions for most of his readers. A line or two would have sufficed to tell where the great monasteries of Amorbach and Hirschau stood and what were their contributions to the religious life. The conversion of Pomerania was a feat very characteristic of its age. It had been vainly attempted by a grave and self-denying man, on whom the people had looked down, for he merely pleaded and did not command. Their land lay between Poland and the Baltic, and the history of Central Europe would have been changed had they been christianized under Polish influence, for then they would have adopted Polish nationality and Poland would have had an adequate frontier on the sea. But the Duke—Poland was not yet a kingdom—invited Otto of Bamberg to undertake the task. Otto was one of the statesmen-bishops of the time, to whom splendour and authority seemed the proper adornment of their office. He swept through the country preaching as he went, and baptizing multitudes who followed the example of their chiefs. It was the immemorial policy, and was to be followed by St. Francis Xavier and by some of the more eager missions which are confronted to-day by mass movements towards Christianity in India. No other policy was conceivable in the Twelfth century, and there is a strange anachronism in Dr. Robinson's criticism of Otto for not providing vernacular services and a translation of the Bible. The latter gift had been bestowed on the noblest of the Teutonic nations, and the Goths had read into their Bible the Arianism they had been taught to expect from it. Mission methods even now are so tentative that we may well refrain from judging the errors, or apparent errors, of others. Missionaries are men of their day, and Otto, as Dr. Robinson does not explain, shared the ecclesiastical proclivities of his. The Polish prince could not foresee how disastrous to his country was to be the conversion by Germans of his northern neighbours. But the German who undertook the task was attacking not only the paganism of Pomerania but the dominance of Magdeburg. The great sees, in Germany as elsewhere, were jealous of each other, and Bamberg, in its curiously independent position, struck a shrewd blow when it attempted to check the

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eastward advance of Magdeburg by annexing the pagans on its border. But St. Norbert, the Archbishop of Magdeburg, was a greater man than Otto, and the Premonstratensian order which he founded was to be the great instrument in civilizing and christianizing the Slavonic border-lands of Germany. Otto's effort, successful as it was, was personal and not sustained by his successors, and Magdeburg was soon to occupy the ground he had invaded and to germanize Pomerania. Nothing in this life is more characteristic of the age than the jealous criticism by Otto's biographer, whose sympathies were clearly Benedictine, of the new order and its founder. It is just like the attacks of the great St. Albans chronicler upon the newly come Franciscans. But all this only makes the biography the more life-like. It is indeed an interesting and touching record of an earnest piece of work done in the best spirit of its time, and we thank Dr. Robinson for his translation. But a denarium is a curious coin and gazelles are not to be found on the Baltic coast. Roedeer are more probable.

The Story of English Towns. Nottingham, by E. L. GUILFORD. *Birmingham*, by J. H. B. MASTERMAN. *Plymouth*, by A. L. SALMON. *Harrogate and Knaresborough*, by J. S. FLETCHER. *St. Albans*, by W. PAGE. (London: S.P.C.K. 1920.) 4*s.* each.

THESE are welcome additions to the useful series which the Christian Knowledge Society is publishing, and each of them in its way will enlighten and interest its readers and will evoke local patriotism. Two, those on Birmingham and Plymouth, are frankly compilations, quite competent and well written, which are at their best on the points where information is most accessible. That on Harrogate and Knaresborough is the weakest of the five. The author has eked out a somewhat limited acquaintance with history by a certain amount of padding, and he does not escape error. John Lilburne, for instance, never changed sides and fought for King Charles; his brother did so. But holiday readers will find the book both entertaining and instructive. The next volume, that on Nottingham, is on a higher level than these three. That borough is historically among the most important in England, and it is fortunate that it has fallen into competent hands. Mr. Guilford, as a trained historian, knows how to follow the main lines of development and to connect Nottingham, its charters and its castle, with the

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course of national affairs. The story is clear and interesting without being too technical for the general reader. But we should have liked to know whether the burgesses, under the system which expired in 1835, were hereditary as at Oxford and other towns, and who it was that had rights over the old common lands of the borough. It is interesting to note that Flesher Gate, the street of the butchers which in most old towns is called the Shambles, has been corrupted into Fletcher Gate. Perhaps the surname has undergone, in some instances, the same change. St. Albans is undertaken by Mr. Page, who has an unequalled experience in English local history. The work, of course, is admirably done. St. Albans is fortunate in its monastic historians, and in its position on the chief highway of England, which brought the monks into contact with bearers of news from every quarter and gave it experience of two sanguinary battles. Mr. Page gives a good summary of its history, including the struggle between monks and townsmen; but he has not attempted such an analysis as Mr. Stenton has made of the earliest traditions and charters of Abingdon. He has also brought out well the importance of St. Albans in the Civil War, and is candid on the corruption of its parliamentary elections. But perhaps his highest merit is his exact study of the locality, in such matters as the changes in the course of roads. He shews how interesting these may be in competent hands. It might be well that such a series as this were supervized by a general editor. Greater uniformity would be secured, and accidental blemishes, such as the description of Agricola as a Roman Emperor, would be avoided.

General Literature.

Johnsonian Gleanings. Part III. *The Doctor's Boyhood.* By Aleyn Lyell Reade. (Privately printed for the Author at the Arden Press, Stamford Street, London. 1922.)

Mr. Lyell Reade, of Treleaven House, Blundellsands, is the author of a series of studies relating to Dr. Johnson, his antecedents and connexions, which are of a rather remarkable kind. Inspired by a natural interest in his own family history, shewn in a book on 'The Reades of Blackwood Hill and Dr. Johnson's Ancestry,' which we have not seen, and another on the Mellard family and the author of *John Halifax, Gentleman*, already reviewed in these pages, he has followed up clue after clue which

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might from any quarter afford greater knowledge of Dr. Johnson. As in all quests of the kind, one inquiry has led to another, and the patient investigation and registration, with authorities given, of each piece of information has furnished material for a series of studies of which this is the third, while a fourth, for which he invites subscriptions of a guinea, will give a detailed Appendix of Documents. To anyone who knows anything of the topography of the Midlands and of the local history of the late Seventeenth and early Eighteenth centuries, the present instalment will be of fascinating interest for other reasons besides the picture, restored bit by bit, of Michael Johnson and his wife and son. There is, of course, much material for the genealogist, and there are many indications of fruitful sources of information. The story of Dr. Johnson's schooling is familiar already from Dr. Birkbeck Hill's *Boswell* and *Johnsonian Miscellanies*: '"My master whipt me very well. Without that, sir, I should have done nothing," he informed Bennet Langton to explain his accurate knowledge of Latin; and further told him that Hunter, while "flogging his boys unmercifully," used to justify himself by ejaculating "And this I do to save you from the gallows" . . . and Johnson, who never forgot his master's "remarkably stern look," said that "he never taught a boy in his life—he whipped and they learned."' So Mr. Reade quotes, but he himself has collected on his own account enough material to make the book amply repay the study of anyone who is interested in the history of education. The book, as it ends, leaves Samuel Johnson just entered as an undergraduate at Oxford with an unsolved problem of finance as to which we are inclined to remark that Mr. Reade seems to take an unduly liberal view of the purchasing power of money in 1728. There is a good deal of information to be gleaned from various quarters upon the expenses of undergraduates in the Eighteenth century and the general cost of university education, and the author would be doing a real service if he set himself to collect some of it for purpose of comparison. It may be quite possible that forty pounds covered all Johnson's expenses in the time he was at Oxford (little more than twelve months), as Mr. Reade agrees with Croker and Dr. Birkbeck Hill in thinking; but if so, he must have been unusually expert in a branch of learning in which, despite the strictures of writers on educational subjects, many undergraduates have become proficient in all ages—the art of going without.

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PERIODICALS.

The Journal of Theological Studies (Vol. XXIII. No. 91. April 1922. Milford). J. Bessières (ed. C. H. Turner): 'La Tradition manuscrite de la Correspondance de S. Basile. V. Les Leçons de divers MSS relatives à la Lettre 46.' T. Stephenson: 'Fresh Light on the Synoptic Problem.' A. E. Brooke: 'The Problem of the Pastoral Epistles.' Mgr. P. Batiffol: 'The *prima cathedra episcopatus* du Concile d'Elvire.' F. C. Burkitt: (1) 'Pistis Sophia'; (2) 'Toga in the East.' H. Stuart Jones: (1) 'Spilas'; (2) 'Aparche Pneumatos.' A. Souter: 'A Lost Leaf of Codex Palatinus (*e*) of the Old-Latin Gospels recovered' (MS Brit. Mus. Add. 40107). J. H. Baxter: 'On pseudo-Jerome *Epistle* XXX.' D. S. Sharp: 'Lexical Notes from Epictetus.' C. L. Feltoe: 'Was the *Sacramentarium Leonianum* ever at Milan?' V. Bartlet: 'H. G. E. White *The Sayings of Jesus from Oxyrhynchus*' (7 pp.). A. E. Brooke: 'Burton *Galatians*.' F. C. Burkitt: 'Cadbury *Style and Literary Method of Luke*'; 'Christian Thought in Egypt about A.D. 400' (Reviews an edition by Mr. Crum and Prof. A. Ehrhard of a Coptic papyrus MS in the Phillipps collection). H. L. Jackson: 'L. Patterson *Mithraism and Christianity*' ('meritorious'). W. Lock: 'Machen *The Origin of Paul's Religion*.' C. T. H. Walker: 'Lundberg *Kristus-Mysliken hos Paulus*.' W. Telfer: 'J. M. Shaw *The Resurrection of Christ*'; 'Darragh *The Resurrection of the Flesh*'; 'Rolt *The Spiritual Body*.' J. K. Mozley: 'Mackintosh *Historic Theories of Atonement*'; 'F. J. Hall *The Passion and Exaltation of Christ* and *The Church and the Sacramental System*.' W. E. Barnes: 'Devine *Ecclesiastes* and *The Story of Job*.' H. Stuart Jones: 'Snijder *De Forma Matris cum Infante sedentis apud antiquos*.' A. Nairne: 'Dalton *The Book of Common Prayer*' (favourable). S. A. Cook: 'Mercer *Life and Growth of Israel*'; 'Lanchester *Nahum, Habakkuk, Zephaniah*'; 'Schoff *The Ship "Tyre"*'; 'J. C. James *The Language of Palestine and Adjacent Regions*'; 'G. A. F. Knight *Nile and Jordan*' (critical); 'Eckenstein *The History of Sinai*'; '*Studia Semitica et Orientalia*'; 'Oesterley *Immortality and the Unseen World*'; 'Marmorstein *The Doctrine of Merits in Old Rabbinical Literature*.'

The Pilgrim (Vol. II. No. 3. April 1922. Longmans). H. Johnson: 'The Socialization of Credit.' V. MacMunn: 'Half-Conscious Mysticism.' P. Dearmer: 'Going to Church in the Second Century.' M. Shaw: 'What is wrong?' [with Church Music]. T. A. Lacey: 'Natural and Spiritual.' A. D. Belden: 'The Church and Spiritualism.' T. J. Hardy: 'The Romance of Faith.' Bishop of Manchester: 'National Education.' 'Pym *Psychology and the Christian Life*.' 'Carrington *Christian Apologetics of the Second Century*' ('brilliant and beautiful'). 'Luce *Monophysitism*.' 'Major *The Doctrine of the Resurrection of the Body*.' 'Gore *Belief in God*.' 'F. J. Hall *The Sacraments*.' 'Robson *The Kingship of God*.' 'Glover *The Pilgrim*.' 'Glasse *The Mysteries and Christianity*.' 'Jastrow *The Song of Songs*.' 'J. S. Stevenson *The Friend of Little Children*' (favourable). 'Webb *The Consumers' Co-operative Movement*.' 'Lord *Principles of Politics*.'

The London Quarterly Review (No. 274. April 1922. Epworth Press). J. Telford: 'Robert, Marquis of Salisbury.' C. J. Wright: 'Christianity and Healing "Miracles."' E. J. Bradford: 'The War Pope' (Benedict XV, Sept. 3, 1914–Jan. 22, 1922). W. J. Ferrar: 'Cornish Saints and Kings.' A. G. Curnow: 'Judaism in the Church of To-day.' F. H. Stead: 'Keir Hardie, Politician or Labour Evangelist?' E. J. B. Kirtlan: 'The Relation of Sin and Fate in Anglo-Saxon Literature.' T. H. S. Escott: 'The Services of Song and Work.' A. Clyne: 'Psycho-analysis and Sin.' W. E. Beet: 'Fordham *Maps, their History, Characteristics, and Uses*' (favourable). E. Boutroux: 'How to teach

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Philosophy.' 'Von Hügel *Essays and Addresses.*' 'Machen *The Origin of Paul's Religion.*' 'W. L. Davidson *Recent Theistic Discussion.*' 'Gore *Belief in God.*' 'P. E. More *The Religion of Plato.*' 'C. J. Ball *The Book of Job.*' 'St. John Thackeray *The LXX and Jewish Worship.*' '*S.P.C.K. Translations of Christian Literature.*' 'Eucken *The Spiritual Outlook of Europe.*' 'Jones and Muirhead *Life and Philosophy of Edward Caird.*' 'Miller *Essays on the Latin Orient.*' 'Sanders *Bossuet.*' 'Henson *Anglicanism.*'

Anglican Theological Review (Vol. IV. No. 4. March 1922. Columbia University Press). T. B. Foster: 'The Reconciliation of Catholicism and Protestantism.' C. A. Manning: 'The Russian Sects.' S. A. B. Mercer: 'New Evidence on the Origin of Israel's Laws.' F. J. F. Jackson: 'A Critique of Loisy's Commentary on the Acts.' J. F. Springer: 'St. Luke i 64 and 39.' S. A. B. Mercer: 'Jastrow *The Book of Job.*' H. C. Ackerman: 'Mercer *The Life and Growth of Israel.*' F. C. Grant: 'A. H. McNeile *St. Paul.*' A. H. Forster: 'Stanton *The Gospels as Historical Documents*, III'; 'C. H. Turner *The Study of the N.T.* 1883–1920.' P. V. Norwood: 'F. J. F. Jackson *Introduction to the History of Christianity*, 590–1314.' F. H. Hallock: 'Batiffol *Le Catholicisme de St. Augustin.*' R. M. Wenley: 'C. C. J. Webb *Divine Personality and Human Life.*'

The Journal of Religion (Vol. II. No. 3. May 1922. Chicago University Press). A. W. Fortune: 'The Kentucky Campaign against the Teaching of Evolution.' C. Zollmann: 'The Constitutional and Legal Status of Religion in Public Education.' G. B. Smith: 'Can Christianity welcome Freedom of Teaching?' F. C. Burkitt: 'The Religion of the Manichees.' C. M. Case: 'The Dilemma of Social Religion.' F. L. H. Pott: 'The Intellectual and Social Crisis in China.' L. H. Seelye: 'An Experiment in Religious Association.' C. A. Beckwith: 'Gore *Belief in God.*' W. W. Rockwell: 'Seeberg *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte*, IV.' H. H. Walker: 'Richter *Evangelische Missionskunde.*'

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'What do we mean by the word "God"?' T. F. Forth: 'The Tomb of Lazarus and the Text of St. John.' W. Spens: 'Gore *Belief in God*' (5 pp.). G. E. Hodgson: 'H. Lee *Present-day Problems in Religious Teaching*'; 'Griggs *The Child's Knowledge of God.*' May. R. H. Thouless: 'Authority in Morals. Its Grounds in Human Experience.' T. A. Lacey: 'Credo in carnis Resurrectionem.' G. L. May: 'Church Life as pictured in Crabbe.' A. J. Wilson: 'Textual Revision of the Book of Common Prayer.' C. L. Feltoe: 'The "First Resurrection" and the "Second Death." Liturgical References in Western Service Books.' H. R. Gummey: 'In Quest of the "Apostolic Anaphora." A Suggestion.' W. R. Sorley: 'H. Jones *A Faith that Enquires.*' E. C. Hoskyns: 'Jackson and Lake *The Beginnings of Christianity*, Part I. *Acts*, II.' J. S. Fletcher: 'Ditchfield *Old Village Life*'; 'G. P. Gooch *The French Revolution.*' W. J. Ferrar: 'Mackean *Christian Monasticism in Egypt*'; 'Lawlor *St. Bernard's Life of St. Malachy of Armagh.*' June. E. C. Trenholme, S.S.J.E.: 'The Urgency of Eucharistic Revision.' W. K. L. Clarke: 'The Acts of the Apostles in Recent Criticism,' II. Hon. E. Lyttelton: 'Eternal Punishment.' D. Harford: 'The Dual Idea of the Sacraments.' E. O. James: 'Science and Theology.' M. Frost: (1) 'The Date of the "Anima Christi"'; (2) 'References to "The world, the flesh, and the devil."' J. K. Mozley: 'Moxon *The Doctrine of Sin*' (6½ pp.). C. R. Haines: 'Leathley *The Roman Family.*' J. M. Harden: 'Carrington *Christian Apologetics of the Second Century.*' W. J. Ferrar: 'Ruggiero *Modern Philosophy.*' D. C. Somervell: 'Greenwood *History of the People of England*, I.' H. V. F. Somerset: 'J. S. Fletcher *Yorkshiremen of the Restoration*'; 'Kinsman *Trent.*' H. M. Relton: 'Macintyre *The Other Side of Death.*' R. H. Thouless: 'Swisher *Religion and the New Psychology*' (very critical).

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from Ps. xxii). J. Hastings: 'C. J. Ball *The Book of Job*'; 'Thackeray *The LXX and Jewish Worship*'; 'N. L. Robinson *Christian Justice*'; 'Rivers *Instinct and the Unconscious*'; 'Moxon *The Doctrine of Sin.*' 'Schweitzer *On the Edge of the Primeval Forest.*' 'Cabrol *Liturgical Prayer.*' 'Strack *Einleitung in Talmud u. Midras* and *Jüdische Geheimgesetze*, 7th edit.' W. D. Niven: 'Condamin *Jérémie.*' May. E. S. Forster: 'The Papyri and the N.T.' A. J. Gossip: 'The Prince of Believers' (St. James the Brother of the Lord). T. Nicklin: 'The Angel of God or God the King?' J. Hastings: 'Firminger *Colossians and Philemon*'; 'Pridie *The Spiritual Gifts.*' 'Abbott-Smith *Manual Greek Lexicon of N.T.*' 'Gentile *Theory of Mind as Pure Act.*' 'H. Jones *A Faith that Enquires.*' 'F. J. F. Jackson *Introduction to the History of Christianity.*' 'Paton *Spiritism and the Cult of the Dead in Antiquity.*' 'H. P. Smith *Essays in Biblical Interpretation.*' 'Somervell *A Short History of our Religion.*' June. C. J. Gadd: 'Thirty Years' Progress in Assyriology.' E. D. Jones: 'Was Mark the Gardener of Gethsemane?' E. Grubb: 'The Raising of Lazarus.' Rendel Harris: 'Enoch and 2 Corinthians.' J. G. Morton: 'Christ's Diagnosis of Disease at Bethesda.' E. E. Kellett: 'Gen. vi 16; xlix 24; xlix 4, 18; Job xxviii; Ps. xxii 3; Num. xxii 5.' 'Accidy.' J. Hastings: 'Jackson and Lake *Beginnings of Christianity*, II'; 'Burney *Aramaic Origin of the Fourth Gospel*'; 'Skrine *The Gospel of the Manhood.*' '*Cambridge Medieval History*, III.' 'Dowden *The Scottish Communion Office*, new edit.'. W. D. Niven: 'Charles *The Revelation of St. John*'; 'Allo *L'Apocalypse.*'

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Gabalda). M. J. Lagrange: 'L'Évangile selon les Hébreux.' Dom A. Wilmart: 'Un ancien Texte latin de l'Évangile selon S. Jean xiii 3–17' (Cod. Ambros. Lat. M. 12 *sup.*). Mgr. L. Gry: 'Les Chapitres XI et XII de l'Apocalypse.' P. Dhorme: 'L'Emploi métaphorique des Noms des Parties du Corps en Hébreu et en Akkadien' (*continued*). A. Vaschalde: 'Ce qui a été publié des Versions coptes de la Bible' (*continued*). L. H. Vincent: 'Une Villa gréco-romaine à Beit Djebrin' (illustrated). M. J. Lagrange: 'Reitzenstein *Das iranische Erlösungsmysterium*'; 'Bultmann *Die Geschichte der Synoptischen Tradition*' (6 pp.). Mgr. L. Gry: 'Allo *L'Apocalypse*'; 'Charles *The Revelation of St. John*' (9½ pp.). 'Hazzidakis *Tylissos à l'époque minoenne.*'

Revue de l'Orient Chrétien (N.S. Vol. II. 1920–21. No. 3. Paris: Picard). G. Furlani: 'Le Livre des Songes, texte syriaque et traduction française,' II. F. Tournebize: 'Les Frères-Uniteurs (Ounithorq, Miabanoghq) ou Dominicains arméniens (1330–1794),' II. G. Bardy: 'Thaddée de Péluse *Adversus Iudaeos*, étude sur trois MSS grecs de la Bibliothèque Nationale de Paris' (Codd. graec. 887, 1285, suppl. 120). P. Asbat: 'Catalogue des MSS orientaux de la Bibliothèque du R. P. Paul Asbat,' II. M. Chaine: 'La Poésie chez les Éthiopiens: Poésie amharique.' K. J. Basmadjian: 'Les Catholicos d'Aghthamar' (New List from 1113–1895). S. Grébaut: 'Contributions à la Philologie éthiopienne.' J. Burel: 'Meistermann *Capharnaüm et Bethsaïde.*' E. Tisserant: 'Drioton *Cours de grammaire égyptienne.*' E. Drioton; 'Crum *Short Texts from Coptic Ostraca and Papyri.*'

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(2) 'L'Apocalyptique chrétienne' (*continued*). L. Coulange: 'Métamorphose du Consubstantiel. Athanase et Hilaire.' G. Wetter: 'La Danse rituelle dans l'église ancienne.' 'Chronique Bibliographique.'

Internationale Kirchliche Zeitschrift (Vol. XII. No. 1. January–March 1922. Bern: Stämpfli et Cie). 'Anregungen zur Veranstaltung einer Gebetswoche vom 28 Mai bis 4 Juni.' E. Herzog: 'Vorschläge zur Herbeiführung einer Kirchlichen Einigung.' 'Dokumente zur Kirchlichen Unionsbewegung. I. Enzyklika der Kirche von Konstantinopel an alle Kirchen der Welt. II. Ein Kundgebung aus der bischöflichen Kirche Amerikas an die orthodoxen Kirchen des Orients. III. Briefwechsel zwischen dem Patriarchen Meletios u. dem Erzbischof vom Canterbury, sowie dem Bischof der christkatholischen Kirche der Schweiz.' H. Koch: 'Kirche und Auserwählung beim hl. Cyprian. Mit einem Anhang: Kennt der hl. Cyprian ein Fegfeuer? und zwei Zusätzen. (1) Der Zustand zwischen Tod und Auferstehung bei Cyprian; (2) "Unsterblichkeit" bei Cyprian.'

Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft (Vol. XXI. No. 1. 1922. Giessen: Töpelmann). H. Lietzmann: 'Symbolstudien,' I–VII. R. Reitzenstein: 'Ein Gegenstück zu dem Seelenhymnus der Thomasakten.' H. H. Wendt: 'Der "Anfang" am Beginne des 1 Johannesbriefes.' W. Sattler: 'Das Buch mit sieben Siegeln. Studien zum literarischen Aufbau der Offenbarung Johannis,' II. M. Wundt: 'Ein Wendepunkt in Augustins Entwicklung.' W. Dürks: 'Eine fälschlich dem Irenäus zugeschriebene Predigt des Bischofs Severian von Gabala.' E. von Dobschütz: 'Religionsgeschichtliche Parallelen zum N.T.' A. Sulzbach: Eine neue Talmudübersetzung. Eine Warnung.' (Deals faithfully with 'N. Schlögl *Der babylonische Talmud.*') H. L[ietzmann]: 'Mitchell-Bevan-Burkitt *St. Ephraim's Prose Refutations of Mani, Marcion and Bardaisan*, II'; 'Franchi de' Cavalieri *Note agiografiche*'; 'Eitrem-Fridrichsen *Ein christliches Amulet auf Papyrus.*'

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I. S. Sugiura: 'Luke xxiii 26.' 'Richard Baxter.' 'Abbott *What Christianity means to me.*' 'Davidson *Recent Theistic Discussion.*' 'Farnell *Hero Cults and Ideas of Immortality.*' 'Symes *Evolution of the N.T.*' 'Bosanquet *The Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy.*'

The Hindustan Review (Vol. XLV. Nos. 270–71. March–April 1922. Calcutta: 48 Bowbazar Street). 'How to evolve a Better World.' S. Bose: 'The Present Situation in the Far Eastern Republic' (at Chita in Siberia). L. Forbes: 'How Poisons are detected.' K. N. Prasad: 'The Philosophy of Pose.' J. N. Samaddar: 'Economic Culture as depicted in Valmiki's Ramayana.' April. S. Thirumalai: 'The Psychological and the Ethical Basis of Kindergarten System.' R. M. Talpade: 'The Place of History in the Conflict of Study.' K. M. Panikkar: 'The Interpretation of History.' P. Ananthaswamy: 'The Philosophy of Robert Browning.'

The Church Missionary Review (Vol. LXXIII. No. 838. June 1922. C.M.S.). E. Stock: 'Some Lessons from Past Times.' E. F. E. Wigram: 'The C.M.S. Delegation in India and Ceylon.' L. L. Shaw: 'College Girls of Modern Japan.' G. T. Manley: 'The Policy of the Christian Church in Egypt.' Most Rev. C. F. D'Arcy (Archbishop of Armagh): '"Alive for evermore"' (Anniversary sermon). H. Lankester: 'The Financial Position of the C.M.S.' Major-Gen. E. R. Kenyon and H. U. Weitbrecht Stanton: 'Notes on Africa and the Mohammedan World.' Sir H. H. Johnston: 'Claridge *Wild Bush Tribes of Tropical Africa.*' G. Steven: 'Schweitzer *On the Edge of the Primeval Forest.*' G. F. Smith: 'Livingstone *Laws of Livingstonia.*' F. Rowling: 'Roscoe *The Soul of Central Africa*'; 'Campbell *In the Heart of Bantuland.*' M. E. Faithfull-Davies: 'Kemp *Chinese Mettle.*'

The East and the West (Vol. XX. No. 78. April 1922. S.P.G.). C. R. Purser: 'A Christian Hermit in Burma.' E. F. Brown: 'The Brahmo Samaj.' F. H. Hawkins: 'The Union Medical College in Peking. A Romance of Modern Missions.' N. L. Ward: 'The Oriental Problem in British Columbia.' D. A. Hunter: 'The Race Problem in S. Africa.' M. E. Perfitt: 'The Indians in the W. Indies.' K. Hosokai: 'Monarchy and Democracy in Japan.' W. H. M. Walton: 'Japanese Newspapers and the Gospel.' 'Schweitzer *On the Edge of the Primeval Forest.*' 'E. J. Thompson *Rabindranath Tagore.*' 'Claridge *Wild Bush Tribes of Tropical Africa.*' 'M. Spencer *Impasse or Opportunity.*' 'Livingstone *Laws of Livingstonia.*' 'Cundall *Life of Enos Nuttall.*' 'Campbell *In the Heart of Bantuland.*' '*Mother Cecile.*'

Books Received.

The more important will be noticed in Articles and Short Notices as space permits.

Biblical Studies.

Burney, C. F.—*The Aramaic Origin of the Fourth Gospel.* Pp. viii + 176. (Clarendon Press.) 16*s.* net.

Charles, R. H.—*Lectures on the Apocalypse.* 'Schweich Lectures' 1919. (The British Academy.) Pp. viii + 80. (Milford.) 6*s.* net.

Heffern, Andrew D.—*Apology and Polemic in the New Testament.* 'Bohlen Lectures,' 1915. Pp. xviii + 414. (New York: Macmillan Co.) 3 *dollars* 50.

Skinner, J.—*Prophecy and Religion. Studies in the Life of Jeremiah.* Pp. viii + 360. (Cambridge: University Press.) 12*s.* 6*d.* net.

Whitla, W.—*Sir Isaac Newton's Daniel and The Apocalypse. With*

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an Introductory Study of the Nature and the Cause of Unbelief, of Miracles and Prophecy. Pp. xviii + 358. (Murray.) 15*s.* net.

WORDSWORTH J. and WHITE, H. J.—*Nouum Testamentum Domini Nostri Iesu Christi Latine, Secundum Editionem Sancti Hieronymi.* Ad Codicum Manuscriptorum Fidem Recensuerunt. Partis secundae asciculus secundus. *Epistula ad Corinthios Prima.* Recensuit H. J. W. Pp. 153–278. Oxonii: E. Typographeo Clarendoniano, MDCCCCXXII. 16*s.* net.

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SOUTER, A.—*Pelagius's Expositions of Thirteen Epistles of St. Paul.* 'Texts and Studies,' IX. i. Pp. xvi + 360. (Cambridge: University Press.) 40*s.* net.

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INDEX TO VOL. XCIV.

ALLEN, A. H., *From the Organ Loft*, 182

ANGLICANISM AND MODERN PROBLEMS [by the Rev. R. Hanson], 11 *sqq.*: (I) the present critical position of 'Ecclesia Anglicana,' 11; the decline of moderate Anglicanism, 12–13; Disestablishment at present would be premature and disastrous, 13–14; Anglicanism can survive only by means of a more cultivated intelligence, 14–15; (II) the historical background of traditional Anglicanism, 15–16; Catholic protest and Modernist revolt both based on a wider sweep of historic imagination, 17; the Reformation only the beginning of a process whose end is yet hidden, 18; disastrous results of the insularity of English theology in the Nineteenth century, 18–19; (III) Transcendence and Immanence: at present impatient of accurate definition, 19; transcendental concepts culminate in the era and the works of Aquinas and Dante, 20; the Modernist philosophy of 'creative evolution' finds its typical expression in Goethe, *ib.*; the clash between Mediaeval and Modern, 21; facts in the first case demonstrative, in the second creative, *ib.*; the insurgent character of modern civilization, 22; growth and development of mediaeval 'Catholicism' considered in detail, 22 *sqq.*; constant tendency of the concept of transcendence towards Ethical Monotheism, 23; the scholastic synthesis of Aquinas one of the greatest constructive achievements of the human mind, 24–5; its two main characteristics (1) common sense, 25–6; (2) dualism, 26–7; (IV) three chief causes of the difficulty of defining precisely the immanent interpretation of experience, 27–8; the contrast between old and new expressed in the difference between the *Paradiso* and *Faust*, 28; and exemplified in the writings of Dante, 29–30; Milton, 30–1; Goethe, 31–2; and Bernard Shaw, 32; steady drift in present day towards an immanental interpretation of the universe, 33; (V) the crying need of the day, that conservative Anglicanism should recognize the existence of the problem, 34; Catholics and Modernists should combine in an original presentation of Christianity to meet modern difficulties, 35; desirability of developing a Catholic philosophy of life apart from papal infallibility, 36–7; a body of educated opinion would exercise a moderating influence, 37–8; and most beneficially in the sphere of constructive theological speculation, 38–40; no essential antagonism between Catholic and Modernist standpoints, 40; there is room for an attempt to interpret Christianity in fresh categories, 41; need for a thorough investigation of the whole scholastic synthesis, 42; to identify Christianity with a transcendental metaphysic might ruin civilization, 43; the prior existence of a transcendent Deity an essential postulate of orthodox theology, 43–4; Modernism must try to state the fundamentals of Christianity in terms with which modern philosophy must deal, 45; the role of an enlightened moderate Anglicanism, *ib.*; the true Modernist will know that the great synthesis is not for his age to achieve, 46; some consoling reflections for the moderate Anglican, 47

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BECKWITH, Dr. I. T., *Apocalypse of John*, 165
BLUNT, Dr. J. H., *Book of Church Law*, 186

Cambridge Medieval History, III. *Germany and the Western Empire*, 372
CARRINGTON, P., *Christian Apologetics of the 2nd Century*, 175
COOP, Canon J. O., *A Catholic Primer*, 179
CORRESPONDENCE: Rev. Arnold Pinchard, 162; Dr. A. C. Headlam, 163

EDWARDS, Dr. L. P., *Transformation of Early Christianity*, 170
ERITH, L. E. P., *The British-Israel Fallacy*, 172

FIRMINGER, Rev. Dr. W. K., *Colossians* and *Philemon*, 362
FLETCHER, J. S., *Harrogate and Knaresborough*, 377

GUILFORD, E. L., *Nottingham*, 377

HEARNSHAW, Dr. F. J. C., etc., *Mediaeval Contributions to Modern Civilization*, 156
HOLMES, Ven. E. E., *Joyful through Hope*, 178
HÜGEL, Baron von, *Philosophy of Religion*, 367

IMMORTALITY AND RESURRECTION [by the Rev. H. M. Relton, D.D.], pp. 98 *sqq.*: (I) recent advancement in thought and research on the problem of immortality, 98–9; (II) outline of Prof. de Unamuno's position, 99–102; must we be irrational of necessity in the effort to preserve the desire to live? 103; (III) scientific materialism repudiated by present-day biology, 104; no conclusive reason against mind surviving the disintegration of the brain, 105; J. S. Haldane quoted, 105–6; science unable to give a decisive verdict, 106; J. A. Thomson's Gifford Lectures quoted, 107–8; results of the most recent advances in knowledge, 108–9; need for bringing the resources of our whole personality to bear upon the problem, 109; Unamuno's 'the truth is *sum, ergo cogito*' reverses Descartes' dictum, 109–10; the 'urge to fuller life' to be found in the deeper levels of human experience, 110; hope of personal immortality justified only by belief in God, 111; Unamuno's concept of God, built up on our 'hunger for immortality,' a false conclusion, *ib.*; development of Jewish belief in immortality, 112; the primary factor, God's Self-revelation to the human soul, 113; He awakens, and He alone can satisfy, the hunger for Himself, 114; (IV) need for reverent agnosticism concerning the Beyond, 115; Unamuno's impatience with this attitude, 115–6; dangers of a crudely materialistic belief in the life after death, 116; some guiding lines of thought suggested, 117 *sqq.*: a belief in our survival after bodily death a reasonable hypothesis, 117; the essentials for eternal life, 118; Prof. Drummond's use of Herbert Spencer's definition, *ib.*; analogy between physical and spiritual life, 118–9; Scripture warrant for Drummond's theory of spiritual death, 119–20; intermediate states between spiritual life and spiritual death, 120–1; quotations from 'Letters from Hell,' 121–3; the 'Vanity' of world-possession without God, 124; intimate connexion between eternal life and the 'New Birth,' 125; eternal life, a prize to be struggled for, 126; inadequacy of spiritism without God, 127; (V) Christ's attitude towards current Eschatology, 128; the Christian Personal God not the Stoic *Anima Mundi*, *ib.*; communion with Him the purpose of our true being, 129; the Hereafter to be a life of service to God and man, *ib.*; Robert Law's 'Tests of Life' quoted, 130; by communion with God here, eternal life becomes a fact of experience, *ib.*; Mozley on the locality of Heaven, and the survival value of Values, 131; Christianity

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opposed to philosophical tendencies seeking to define God in terms of the Absolute, 132; Unamuno's insistence on personal immortality, 132–3; and on the problem of the Resurrection Body, 133–4; Dr. Darragh's work on 'The Resurrection of the Flesh,' 134–8; the part played by the 'body' in spiritual life, 138; Christian teaching holds the promise of a continuance of human ties in a purified form, 139

JACKSON, Dr. F. J. F., and Dr. KIRSOPP LAKE, *Beginnings of Christianity*, 363

JAMES, Dr. M. R., *Lost Apocrypha of the Old Testament*, 164

JONES, G. EDWARDES, *Book of Church Law*, 186

LANGUAGE AND STYLE IN THE NEW TESTAMENT [by the Rev. F. P. Cheetham], pp. 302 *sqq.*: (I) enumeration and description of the chief N.T. problems, 303–8; the Pauline epistles—1 and 2 Thessalonians, 303; Colossians and Ephesians, 304–5; Hebrews, 306; the Catholic Epistles, 306–7; the Synoptic Gospels, 307–8; 'Johannine' writings, 308; (II) two main lines of inquiry, 308–9; the 'Johannine' problem, 309–12; the Pastoral epistles,: Dr. Parry's Commentary, 312–3; Dr. P. N. Harrison's essay, 313–5; Professor Cadbury on the Lukan problem, 315–8; (III) Dr. Rendel Harris' 'Testimonies,' an example of insecurity of theories based on the argument from style, 318–9; summing-up of the article, 320–1

MACHEN, Dr. J. G., *Origin of Paul's Religion*, 359

MACKINTOSH, Dr. R., *Historic Theories of Atonement*, 174

MASTERMAN, J. H. B., *Birmingham*, 377

MATTHEWS, Rev. W. R., *Studies in Christian Philosophy*, 183

MAY, A. S., *Marriage in Church, Chapel, etc.*, 187

Mediaeval Contributions to Modern Civilization, 156

MERCER, Dr. S. A. B., *Life and Growth of Israel*, 358

MORE, P. E., *Religion of Plato*, 368

MURRAY, Miss M. A., *Witch-Cult in Western Europe*, 369

NEW IDEALISM (THE) [by Miss Hilda D. Oakeley], 259 *sqq.*: strong claims made by Gentile's work, 259; its study 'calls for heavy toil,' *ib.*; his concept of the 'spiritual act,' 260; his doctrine of the 'transcendental ego,' 261–3; criticizes the Berkeleian conception of thought, 263; quoted on the relation between the teacher and the student of philosophy, 264; his conception of the 'constructive process,' 264–5; the metaphor of reality as an organic unity emphasized by the Absolutists; multiplicity demanded by neo-Idealism, 265–6; Gentile's reply to Croce's imputation of mysticism, 266; relation of his 'Absolute I' to Spinoza's 'pivot of our world,' 267; his theory of space in close harmony with Croce's, 268; his doctrine of time as a result of spiritual energy a reflection of Plotinus' definition, 269; paradox resulting from his conception of an 'Eternal Present,' 269–72; his answer to the problem of the One and the Many, 272; Dr. Bosanquet on Gentile's solipsism, 273; Gentile's solipsist attitude towards history, 273–5; the doctrine of Eternal History, 275–7; Dr. Wildon Carr on Croce's philosophy of history, 277–8; difficulties presented by the Philosophy of Spirit as Pure Act, 279–80; the theory inspired by fine ethical idealism, 281; summing-up, *ib.*

NEWBOLT, Canon W. C. E., *Christian Marriage at the Cross-Roads*, 181

ORIGIN OF THE GOSPELS [by the Rev. W. Lockton], pp. 216 *sqq.*: quiet assumption by critics that St. Mark is the earliest gospel, 217; this hypothesis does not explain the facts, *ib.*; the subject illustrated by the description of the storm on the lake, 218–9; and the eschatological discourse, 219–21; linguistic evidence, 221–2;

Digitized by Google

probable order of the Synoptic Gospels was St. Luke, St. Mark, St. Matthew, 222; illustrations of the development of thought found in this sequence, 222–4; St. Luke's information probably derived mainly from St. Peter and St. John, 224–6; St. Mark's from St. Peter, 226–8; St. Matthew's gospel even more strongly Petrine than St. Mark's, 228; two notable features of the First Gospel, the five great discourses and O.T. prophecies, 229; authorship and date of the First Gospel discussed, 230–3; the date of St. Mark, 233–5; and that of St. Luke, 235–6; problems raised by St. John's gospel, 236–8; summing-up, 239

Oxford Diocesan Service Book, 182

PAGE, W., *St. Albans*, 377

PAGET, Rt. Rev. H. L., *Peace and Happiness*, 178

PEAKE, Dr. A. S., *The Revelation of John*, 165

PERIODICALS, 190, 380

PHILOSOPHER (A) TO HIS WIFE: PORPHYRY *ad Marcellam* [by the Rev. W. J. Ferrar], pp. 85 *sqq.*: importance of Porphyry and main facts of his life, 85; his extant writings, 86; his importance as an opponent of Christianity, *ib.*; the real quarrel between the Church and Neoplatonism, 87; Porphyry's marriage to Marcella, 87–8; circumstances in which the letter was written, 88; the attraction in the philosophy of Plotinus, 89; analysis of the letter, 89–95; abiding interest of intimate correspondence, 95; our own impressions from the letter, 96; asceticism then common to Christianity and philosophy, *ib.*; vivid picture of a vigorous Neoplatonism, 97; Porphyry's veneration for Christ, *ib.*

PORPHYRY *ad Marcellam*, *see above*

PRAYER, THE PROBLEM OF [by Professor A. A. Cock], pp. 67 *sqq.*: recent literature on the subject, 67–8; (I) some difficulties of form, 68–70; (II) should prayer be vocal or silent? 70; (III) specific or continuing?, 70–1; (IV) prayer includes praise as well as petition, 71; the prayerful attitude exemplified in a modern scientist, 72–4; Mr. Anson quoted on Prayer as Understanding, 74; (V) difficulties due to the Sultanic conception of God, *ib.*; Kipling quoted, 75; Mrs. Meynell quoted, 76; Mr. A. C. Turner on Prayer and the World's Order, 77–8; and on the omnipotence of Divine love, 78; 'unanswered agonies,' *ib.*; application of Dr. James Ward's psychology to the subject, 79–80; prayer, as experience, a process of attention upon the presentation of God, 80; and a reciprocity of intercourse, 81; the highest self-consciousness, God-consciousness, *ib.*; the Spirit of God immanent in all experience, 82; prayer becomes increasingly for the hallowing of the Name and the furthering of the Kingdom, 83; prayer must be corporate and co-operative, 83–4; interest in others takes the form of prayer, 84

PRIDIE, Rev. J. R., *Spiritual Gifts*, 169

PRUNEL, Dr. L., *Renaissance Catholique en France*, 352

PSYCHOLOGY, THE SCIENCE OF [by the Rev. Dr. Aveling], 48 *sqq.*: purpose of the article, 48; impossibility of keeping philosophy and theology in separate compartments, *ib.*; the paper may help to provide an outlook upon basic theology, 49; need for perpetual re-testing of the empirical foundations of a formulated philosophy, *ib.*; two chief definitions of Psychology, 50; the 'ghost' and 'corpse' methods of treating psychology are out of touch with facts, 51; the facts, 51–2; problems of Epistemology omitted at this stage, 52; 'manifestations of life,' *ib.*; Comparative Psychology, 53; individuals the subject-matter of psychology, *ib.*; Descartes one of the chief factors in shaping modern views of psychology, 54–6; quotations from his works, 54–5; the opposition between Soul and Body, 55; Idealism in post-Cartesian thought, *e.g.* in

Digitized by Google

Locke, 56; in Berkeley, 57; in Hume and Kant, *ib.*; Prof. Sorley's 'Idea of God' quoted, 57–8; how Positivism derives from Idealism, 58; influence of the mechanistic theory of Descartes on philosophical and scientific progress, 58–9; in becoming positivistic, psychology became a science, 60; influence of the Nineteenth-century development of Natural Sciences, 60–1; systematic method, technique and apparatus, and mathematics indispensable, 61; the scientific treatment of the data begun by Wilhelm Wundt, 62; growth of interest in the sensory processes, 63; periodical literature on the subject, 63–4; practical value of the science in psychotherapeutics, 64; results of the discovery of the Unconscious, 65; summing-up of the article, 66

RAGG, Rev. LONSDALE, *St. Luke*, 361
READE, A. LYELL, *Johnsonian Gleanings*, 378
RELIGION IN CZECHO-SLOVAKIA [by the Rev. J. B. Seaton], pp. 201 *sqq.*: the interest of the new country, 201; statistics of nationalities composing it, 202; the Czechs in the Great War, 203; historical *résumé* of religious conditions in Bohemia, 204–5; a result of dissolution of Austrian Empire, a striking defection from Rome, 205–8; present position of the seceders, 208–10; the reformed Czecho-Slovak Church, 211–13; duty of the Church of England, 214–5
ROBINSON, Dr. C. H., *Otto of Pomerania*, 375

SALMON, A. L., *Plymouth*, 377
SANDERS, Miss E. K., *Bossuet*, 352
SCHÜTZ, Dr. R., *Apostel und Jünger*, 167
SNOWDEN, J. H., *A Wonderful Morning*, 177
STUDIES IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY FRANCE, 352

TEMPLE, Rt. Rev. W., *Life of Bishop Percival*, 187
TITHE RENT CHARGE [by Rev. Dr. Tuting], pp. 282 *sqq.*: Cripps' definition of 'tithe,' 282; the Commutation Act of 1836, 283; amount of tithe rent charge commuted, *ib.*; present-day figures, 284; fluctuations in the value of tithes, *ib.*; personal property theoretically subject to tithe, 285; Lyndwood quoted, *ib.*; a Fifteenth-century opponent compelled to abjure his heresy, 286; Tudor legislation on the subject, *ib.*; payments in respect of mills and fish, 287; instances of friction between tithe-owner and tithe-payer, 288; the seven-years' average of cereals, *ib.*; legislation since 1887: Tithe Act 1891, 289–91; Tithe Rent Charge (Rates) Act 1899, 292–4; Tithe Act 1918, 294–6; Ecclesiastical Tithe (Rates) Act 1920, 297–9; Judicial Decisions, 299–300; summing-up, 300–1

UNIVERSITIES COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE ROYAL [by the Rev. Dr. Headlam], 322 *sqq.*: Dr. Rashdall quoted on Mediaeval Universities, 322; modern universities should be something more than provincial or national, 323; causes of the appointment of the Universities Commission, 323–4; Board of Education's eagerness to seize control of Oxford and Cambridge, 324; the essentials of a 'Studium Generale,' 325; freedom of intellectual life the main characteristic of a University, 326–7; recent developments of University education in England, 327–31; Nineteenth-century changes, 328–9; national education developed on wrong lines, 329; better conditions in Scottish and Irish Universities, 330; the Report considered, 331 *sqq.*; its testimony to the national value of the Universities, 331–2; and to their work during the Great War, 332; the relation of College to University teaching a fundamental problem, 333; the Commission's tribute to the College Tutorial system, 333–4; serious limitations in its value, 334–6; cautious recommendations of the Commissioners, 337

Digitized by Google

sqq.; proposal to place formal teaching at Cambridge on the Faculty basis, 337; Prize Fellowships, 337–8; recommendations as to other classes of Fellowships, 338–9; unwarranted criticism of All Souls College, 339–40; proposed House of Residents for Cambridge, 340; beneficial working of Convocation at Oxford, 341; the question of the position of women, 341–2; proposed financial changes, 342; unsatisfactory proposals concerning the Boards of Faculties, 343; statistics of candidates for Final Schools, 344–5; mistaken criticisms of the Oxford General Board, 345; conflict between administration and the claims of learning, 345–6; the Commission's failure to recognize the rightful claims of Theology, 346–8; proposals regarding College estates and domestic management, 349–50; summing-up of article, 350–1

WHO ARE MEMBERS OF THE CHURCH? [by the Archbishop of Armagh], 1 *sqq.*: the pamphlet by Dr. Darwell Stone and the Rev. F. W. Puller criticized, 1 *sqq.*: its purpose, to overthrow the doctrine of Church membership implied in the Lambeth *Appeal*, 2; unity of conviction at the Conference, regarding this definition, 3; the positive grounds of the statement, 3–4; the critics' arguments examined, 4 *sqq.*: their confusion about 'heresy' and 'heretics,' 4–5; the question of excommunication, our Lord's teaching and example considered, 5–6; St. Paul's judgement upon the incestuous Corinthian, 7; Christ's teaching and practice as regards schismatics, 8; Christian unity at the Edinburgh Missionary Conference, 9; the views of representative Roman Catholic theologians, 9–10; summing-up of the article, 10

WILSON, Dr. W. T., *The Christ and His Gospel*, 180

WORCESTER INSTITUTIONS SIX CENTURIES AGO [by the Bishop of Worcester], pp. 140 *sqq.*: Bishop Cobham's Episcopal Register obviously incomplete, 140–1; remarkable speed with which benefices were then vacated and filled, 142–3; numerous cases of exchange of benefices, 143–4; William de Estamaco a typical pluralist, 144–6; instances of rapid filling of vacancies, 147–8; an elaborate and legalized system of non-residence in vogue, 149–53; personal bond between Bishop and flock weakened by employment of proctors, 154–5

WORCESTER PRIORY AND ITS BISHOP [by the Bishop of Worcester], pp. 240 *sqq.*: relations of a mediaeval bishop to the convent of his cathedral church, 240; on Cobham's death, Adam de Orleton appointed by papal bull, 241; Wulstan de Bransford chosen prior, 242; Cobham exercises his discretion in admitting postulants to monasteries and nunneries, 243–4; in disciplining penitents, 244; and in investigating charges against clerks, 245–6; excommunicates robbers of St. Oswald's shrine, 247–9; appoints new Warden of St. Mary's Hospital, Wiche, 249–50; his first visit to the convent on Nov. 26, 1319, 251; appoints a *custos* of the shrine, 252; lends the sacrist money for the fabric, 253; the bishop's right to release and appoint sacrists, 253–4; Cobham appoints Roger de Herwyntone sacrist, 254; his letter quoted, 255; a tale of a mitre, 256–8

WYATT, E. G. P., and FERGUSON, W. H., *Easy Plainsong Settings of the Holy Communion Service*, 183

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FOR

OCTOBER 1922 : JANUARY 1923

EDITED BY

MEMBERS OF THE FACULTY OF THEOLOGY

KING'S COLLEGE, LONDON

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CONTENTS:

		PAGE
I.	THE CHRISTIAN BELIEF IN GOD. By the Rev. ARTHUR C. HEADLAM, D.D., Regius Professor of Divinity in the University of Oxford	1
II.	UNION, INTERCOMMUNION AND THE LAMBETH CONFERENCE. By NICHOLAS N. GLUBOKOVSKY, Professor at the University and at the Orthodox Ecclesiastical Academy, Petrograd	14
III.	THREE FRENCH BOOKS	50
IV.	THE PHILOSOPHY OF REDEMPTIVE POWER IN CHRISTIAN WORSHIP. By the Rev. R. DE BARY, Horton Vicarage, Wimborne	60
V.	THE TRINITIES OF NON-CHRISTIAN RELIGIONS. By the Rev. F. HAROLD SMITH, B.D., Lecturer in Comparative Religion, King's College, London	75
VI.	JUDAISM AND HELLENISM. By the Rev. G. H. BOX, D.D., Professor of Hebrew and Old Testament, King's College, London	104
VII.	THE CATHOLICISM OF THE FUTURE. By the Right Rev. F. T. WOODS, D.D., Bishop of Peterborough	141
	MR. BOSANQUET ON CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY. By C. C. J. WEBB, Oriel Professor of the Philosophy of the Christian Religion, Oxford.	160
	A NEW INQUIRY INTO THE BELIEF IN GOD AND IMMORTALITY. By the Rev. A. CALDECOTT, D.D., Emeritus Professor of Moral and Mental Philosophy, King's College, London	166
	SHORT NOTICES	172

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CONTENTS

PAGE

THE CHRISTIAN BELIEF IN GOD. By the Rev. Arthur C. Headlam, D.D., Regius Professor of Divinity in the University of Oxford 1

UNION, INTERCOMMUNION AND THE LAMBETH CONFERENCE. By Nicholas N. Glubokovsky, Professor at the University and at the Orthodox Ecclesiastical Academy, Petrograd. 14

THREE FRENCH BOOKS 50

THE PHILOSOPHY OF REDEMPTIVE POWER IN CHRISTIAN WORSHIP. By the Rev. R. de Bary, Horton Vicarage, Wimborne 60

THE TRINITIES OF NON-CHRISTIAN RELIGIONS. By the Rev. F. Harold Smith, B.D., Lecturer in Comparative Religion, King's College, London 75

JUDAISM AND HELLENISM. By the Rev. G. H. Box, D.D., Professor of Hebrew and Old Testament, King's College, London 104

THE CATHOLICISM OF THE FUTURE. By the Right Rev. F. T. Woods, D.D., Bishop of Peterborough 141

MR. BOSANQUET ON CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY. By C. C. J. Webb, Oriel Professor of the Philosophy of the Christian Religion, Oxford 160

A NEW INQUIRY INTO THE BELIEF IN GOD AND IMMORTALITY. By the Rev. A. Caldecott, D.D., Emeritus Professor of Moral and Mental Philosophy, King's College, London 166

THE NATURAL VOICE. By the Rev. Clement F. Rogers, Professor of Pastoral Theology, King's College, London . 201

MINIMUM CONDITIONS OF INTERCOMMUNION. By the Rev. T. A. Lacey, Canon of Worcester 219

MINIMUM CONDITIONS OF INTERCOMMUNION: SOME COMMENTS ON CANON LACEY'S ARTICLE. By the Rev. Vernon Bartlet, D.D., Mansfield College, Oxford . . 227

SOME MORALS OF ESCHATOLOGY. By the Rev. N. E. Egerton Swann 237

MODERN CRITICISM AND THE PROPHETIC LITERATURE OF THE OLD TESTAMENT. By the Rev. Theodore H. Robinson, D.D. 250

THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE. By the Rev. L. W. Grensted, B.D., Egerton Hall, Manchester . . 281

SOME EARLY GOSPEL SOURCES. By the Rev. A. Bevil Browne 302

A THIRTEENTH-CENTURY CORONATION RUBRIC. By Miss Hope Allen 335

THOMAS HARDY AND THE POETIC MIND. By A. W. Reed, Reader in English, King's College, London 342

SHORT NOTICES 172, 348

INDEX TO VOL. XCV 391

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THE

CHURCH QUARTERLY REVIEW.

Nº. CLXXXIX.—*October* 1922.

Art. I.—THE CHRISTIAN BELIEF IN GOD.

The Reconstruction of Belief: Belief in God. By Charles Gore, D.D. (London: John Murray. 1921.)

In the Dedicatory Letter with which Frederick Denison Maurice began his great work on *The Doctrine of Sacrifice* he gives an interesting account of the growth of his religious opinions and he lays much stress upon what he had learned from Irving.

'I learnt lessons,' he says, 'from some of Mr. Irving's books which I hope I shall never forget. . . . What he taught me was to reverence the education he had received in the John Knox school, and the fathers who had imparted it to him. I had not that reverence before; I had shrunk from what I believed to be hard, narrow, and inhuman. He showed me, that the old patriarchs of Scotland had a belief in God, as a Living Being, as the Ruler of the earth, as the Standard of Righteousness, as the Orderer of men's acts in all the common relations of life, which was the most precious of all possessions to them, the want of which is the cause of all feebleness and immorality in our age. He made me perceive how entirely different their *godliness* was from the *sentimental religion*, which consists in feelings about God; or from the *systematic religion*, which consists of notions about Him. He led me to see, that unless we begin from God—unless we start from the conviction, that *the thing which is done upon earth He doeth it Himself*—the belief in Christ will pass into a belief in a mere Saviour for us—the belief in a Spirit will be at first a mere recognition of certain influences acting upon us, and will evaporate at last into Pantheism.'

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To Maurice the fundamental need of the time when he lived was the restoration of the belief in God. People discussed schemes of salvation and so on and troubled themselves with the particular applications of religious truth without thinking of the one tremendous truth which must lie behind all religion, and when they went out to preach the gospel to the world they preached subordinate points instead of bringing home to man the reality of God and the duty of every man living his life in the sight of God.

I believe that much the same thing might be said at the present time. The great body of people in the world are suffering because they do not believe in God. Some of them may have some sort of metaphysical conception of God, some of them may have a certain amount of sentimental feeling on the subject, but the real belief in God, His providence, His justice, His judgement, the belief that we are responsible to Him for our lives, the belief that righteousness means the righteousness of God, the belief that if we do not fulfil His will we can get no happiness here or hereafter, all these things people put aside, and even the Christian Church seldom teaches us any of these things. It no doubt assumes such belief; but when it goes out and teaches, it teaches all the subordinate points of religion, it troubles itself with controversies on points which the world has begun to think very unimportant. On the other hand, there is an active and virulent anti-religious propaganda which would aim at destroying any belief in God at all.

It is then of immense importance that the Church should turn to its fundamental principles and try to commend them to the intellectual and religious world of the day, and when we heard that Dr. Gore on his retirement from his bishopric was to devote himself to doing this for us we felt that the task was being undertaken by one of the few men who would be able to do it. There is no one, if he allows himself to present his best, who can make a greater appeal both to the religious and intellectual life of the day than he can. His influence has been very great: it has been an influence which has affected many men of intellectual power, and has also appealed to vast numbers of more

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ordinary people. We all of us owe a great deal to him. When he edited *Lux Mundi*, now something like forty years ago, he and his friends did more than had ever been done before to enable the Christian Church to conciliate modern thought, and we might hope that he would do this for us again. We might hope that he would do for the Christian belief in God what Professor Pringle-Pattison and Professor Sorley have done for the metaphysical and moral presentation, and we had hoped that he would give us a book which would be as authoritative as those two.

We have said 'if he allows himself to present his best,' for he does not always do so and his influence throughout his life has been limited in two directions. In the first place he sometimes seems not to have the courage to follow his intellect. When he wrote about the relation of Christianity to Old Testament criticism there was no timidity or want of courage. He boldly faced the problem; he did not allow traditional modes of thought to hamper him, and he enabled the Christian Church and in particular the Church of England to grapple with the difficulties which seemed to arise without any misgivings. I suppose most educated Christians nowadays feel that the religious value of the Old Testament is stronger than it has ever been. The old difficulties about its morality are to the educated theologian irrelevant. He feels that they represent stages in religious progress, while its testimony to the religious belief in God remains as strong as ever. There has been, we think, also no timidity in dealing with the relation of religion and science, but in certain other directions Dr. Gore has not shewn the same courage. In relation to New Testament criticism he has always seemed to halt a little between two opinions, and we believe that this has been unfortunate. We doubt if he had given his reason full scope whether the result would have been any different from what it has been. The arguments for the traditional belief in Christ and for the belief in the Virgin Birth and the Resurrection are far stronger than people have realized. The reconstruction of belief in the New Testament would have been convincing. But he has always hampered the

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freedom of his investigation by what was really an irrelevant appeal to authority. If, at the same time that he tries to prove to the doubting Christian the reality of the Virgin Birth or Christian miracles, he tries to persuade the bishops to anathematize those who disagree with him, his arguments will always fail to have force, and that is what he has done.

And then, secondly, he has allowed his interest in the particular presentment of Christianity which appeals to him most to overpower the width of his outlook. There have been times when he has spoken about Church authority or Orders or Sacraments in a way to make a real appeal to thoughtful people, but at times he has allowed a feeling of party loyalty to overpower the wisdom of his outlook. He has supported the least intelligent members of his party and has thus injured his influence. Pusey and Liddon did not really help the belief in the Incarnation or the Trinity by forcing the Athanasian Creed on unwilling congregations and saying that they would retire into lay communion if anything was done to interfere with it. Dr. Gore will not make people accept the Catholic theory of Orders any more easily by threatening resignation if anything is done inconsistent with his particular point of view. We believe that the rational appeal on religious subjects will ultimately prevail, we believe that Dr. Gore combines the rational and religious appeal as few others do at the present time, and we have often deplored that a mistaken conscience or mistaken sense of duty seems to interfere with the free exercise of his reason and therefore to limit his authority.

The book before us begins by a discussion of the break-down of tradition, and considers the possibilities of hopeful reconstruction. Dr. Gore then examines the grounds of belief in God from the point of view of Natural Religion and passes on to belief in God as revealed in the Old and New Testaments and shews how this revealed religion is not in any way inconsistent with reason. The latter portion of the book is devoted to the study of the historical present-ment of religion in the New Testament. He examines the historical value of the New Testament, discusses the 'pre-judices' of criticism and concludes with the historical evidence

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for miracles, the Resurrection and the Virgin Birth. There he leaves his argument for the present in order to consider in a second volume the belief in Jesus Christ and in a final volume the belief in the Holy Spirit and the Church.

It is perhaps unfair to make demands on an author for something else, when he has not produced quite the particular book that one wants. No doubt everyone has a right to write his own book and to put the argument as it appeals to him. At the same time we do feel that he has not quite done what we think is necessary. It would have been much better, we think, if this first volume had been devoted primarily to an exposition of the Christian idea of God as authoritative as the books we have mentioned. The latter part, the discussion of documents and so on, does not seem to harmonize quite with the earlier part and, moreover, it is not quite on the same level. It is not that the arguments in favour of the historical character of the New Testament are not good, but we do not feel that Dr. Gore has approached the problem for himself; he has not independently asked himself, 'How did the New Testament grow up, what was the historical character of the manifestation of Christ?' He knows the subject, he has read the best books, and he selects what he wants for his purpose, but this section does not give one the idea of independent and free thought. It is different with the earlier portion. There we feel that he is really giving us an argument which he has built up himself, and we can only express our regret that he has not strengthened this and postponed the historical investigation to a later volume.

The book we are glad to know has had a wide circulation, as wide as any other religious book in recent years, and it deserves it. There is about the whole of the earlier portion a sincerity, a solidity, and a lucidity which make it admirable for its purpose; if it had only been a little better it would have been a great book, and what we regret is that we cannot call it that.

I propose now to deal with certain of the main topics which are discussed, presenting and, so far as I can, corroborating the argument.

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Dr. Gore's arguments from Natural Religion for the Belief in God are three-fold. First reason and order in the Universe, secondly the beauty of the world, and thirdly the argument from the moral values of mankind. Under the first heading he really seems to combine two different points of view: the one is the Order of the Universe as we see it:

'Reason is that in us which demands sequence, regularity, and order in things. It resents mere accident and chance occurrence. It could, in fact, only exist in a *cosmos*, *i.e.* an orderly world. And such a *cosmos* it finds from the first in sun and moon, in plant and animal, but mixed as it appears with what is incalculable and purely capricious—that is, irrational. But the more it knows, the more ground it finds for confidence that the appearance of capriciousness is due only to its ignorance.'

Then he goes on to say

'This argument (if it is to be called an argument, or this almost irresistible impression made upon us by the world) is the more popular form of what is called the epistemological argument —the argument, that is, from the analysis of knowledge.'

Does not this one argument represent two points of view, the one the argument from the world as we see it, the other the analysis of our own mental capacity for knowing. After all the world as we see it has to be accounted for, and though when we come to examine it the problem of knowledge presents difficulties which the ordinary observer does not see, yet the argument from that point of view is different in character from the other.

But what is the value of these arguments for the nature of God? Can we in any way prove that He exists? It was a custom of philosophers and theologians in former times to attempt in some way a logical proof. But is such a proof valid? The validity of our mental processes is surely limited by the world in which we find ourselves. Our mind is one constructed for dealing with the present world, and have we any grounds for thinking that those processes which we know as valid here are valid for that which transcends experience? I hardly think so. Surely

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the arguments which may prove the existence of God are of a different character. We analyze our experience: our experience is first that of the external world, its order and purpose, its beauty and its harmony; then secondly our own mental experience, the fact that we can construct a fabric of knowledge; and then thirdly, the fact that we form what are called value judgements, that is to say we estimate things not only by their pleasantness or utility or beauty, but by their conformation to a moral standard. How can we account for all this experience? The ultimate answer which we give is the existence of what we call by the name of God, a supreme reason and a righteous reason as the cause of all things and of ourselves, and that seems to us the most convincing explanation. But we cannot say that it is a proof, and we distrust profoundly those logical arguments by which metaphysicians attempt to prove their idealist construction of the world, transforming it into a logical construction.

Let us apply this method to the well-known ontological argument. This we appear to owe originally to St. Anselm Archbishop of Canterbury. The following is the account which he gives in his own words: it is taken from the Proslogium or Allocution on the existence of God. He tells us how the argument which he had developed suddenly sprung upon him after years of painful thought.

'Our belief is this,' he writes: 'Thou art a Being than which no greater can be conceived (*quo nihil maius cogitari potest*). . . . Even the foolish man is convinced that something than which no greater can be conceived is in his understanding, because when he hears this he understands it and whatever is understood is in the understanding. Now certainly that than which no greater can be conceived cannot be in the understanding alone, for if it was only in the understanding it would then be further conceived to be also in reality, which would be a greater thing. Therefore if that than which no greater can be conceived were only in the understanding there would be something still greater than it, which assuredly is impossible. Something therefore without doubt exists than which no greater can be conceived and is both in the understanding and in reality.'

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Here we have the argument put in scholastic form. It implies first of all a demonstration of the necessity for thought of a Being than whom no greater can be conceived. Our mind feels it necessary, so Anselm argues, to have this conception; but then, secondly, he identifies this than which no greater can be conceived with God, and thirdly argues that such a Being must necessarily exist in fact.

The same argument was put in another form by Descartes. His starting-point was this: 'Cogito, ergo sum'—'I think, therefore I am.' Reality he could only find in the human mind, all things else were passing objects. He then goes on to ask, Is there any other existence or co-existence? He answers: The only other thing of which you can say that it exists is the Deity. There is nothing real to be found anywhere else in the region of finite or imperfect or contingent things. Doubt is always possible there. It can only be in that which is perfect and infinite that there can be any other reality. There only remains therefore the idea of God in which it is necessary to consider whether there is anything that cannot be supposed to originate with our own mind.

'By the name of God,' he says, 'I understand a substance, infinite, eternal, immutable, independent, all-knowing, all-powerful, by which I myself and every other thing that exists, if any such there be, were created. But these properties are so great and excellent that the more attentively I consider them the less I feel persuaded that the idea I have of them owes its origin to myself alone. And thus it is necessary to conclude from all that I have before said, that God exists: for though the idea of substance be in my mind owing to this, that I myself am a substance, I should not however have the idea of an infinite substance, seeing I am a finite being, unless it were given me by some substance in reality infinite.'

We know the criticism which Kant made upon this argument. 'You cannot,' he says, 'argue from an idea to reality; the conception of an absolutely necessary being is a mere idea, the objective reality of which is far from

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being established by the mere fact that it is a need of reason.' 'We may as well,' he says, 'hope to increase our stock of knowledge by the aid of mere ideas as the merchant to augment his wealth by the addition of noughts to his cash account.'

Now as against the argument as it is put by Anselm or Descartes this criticism seems sound. Here is an instance of the impossibility of demonstrating the existence of what transcends experience; but cannot the argument be put in another way? Are not we bound to declare valid an ideal which is bound up organically with the very conception of knowledge? The real problem is how we can have knowledge. How does it happen that there is an agreement between the ideal laws of our thought and the real laws of being? Why does the human mind and its workings correspond to the reality of things outside? The answer that is made is that you can make that correspondence intelligible by presupposing a common source of thought of both, in which thought and being are radically one, which manifests itself in objective existence and subjective thinking. That is to say, to put it quite simply, the world was created by God and my mind comes from God, and therefore my mind can be in contact with it and have a knowledge of things as they have been created. The ontological argument for the existence of God is as valid and valid in the same way as Kant's argument for the existence of God as a postulate of the practical reason. We cannot explain the moral ideas latent in the Universe and in ourselves without assuming a belief in God: so in the same way we cannot explain the fabric of the human mind and human knowledge without a similar belief.

Dr. Gore passes on from his arguments drawn from modern Metaphysics for the belief in God to a criticism of the metaphysical conceptions which are put forward by modern philosophers. As he says, the fundamental question is not whether we believe in God, for in some sense most thinkers appear to do so, but what sort of God we believe in. The tendency is to preserve everything which is implied in the belief in God, but to denude the idea of

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God of personality. I venture to suggest that modern philosophy when it develops in this direction really uses language which is meaningless. It is of course the old difference between philosophy and religion. Philosophy desires always to see things as abstractions, religion demands what is personal. The God of the philosophers is pure being which almost becomes not-being. The God of religion must be a living God. But the philosopher is prepared to use such words as spirit, or purpose, or even righteousness in relation to the existence of God, yet what meaning have any of these words apart from the conception of personality? Take the idea of spirit; in old days, I imagine, spirit was conceived of as a more subtle essence while matter was that which was heavy and gross; spirit was something suggested by the air or human breath and was supposed to be a quasi-material influence on material things. But all such ideas are impossible now. The idea of the grossness of matter is gone. There is one substance which appears in many forms, and the idea of the spirit as a subtle essence is an impossibility. What then do we mean by spirit? We mean by spirit a power which we find in human beings, which though it may express itself through material things is not itself capable of being measured as are material things. A single man may have the authority to issue a command: that command may be either to declare war or to preserve peace; between those two ideas there is nothing ponderable on material grounds: the command to preserve peace leaves the world apparently as it was; the declaration of war has incalculable effects on the human race and even on the material world. Yet its force and power is entirely spiritual.

Now that is what we mean by spiritual, and that can only be thought of and conceived in relation to a person. If then I speak of a spiritual influence which affects the minds of human beings from outside, my language, it seems to me, can have no meaning except in relation to a person.

Take again the idea of purpose. Purpose I know only as a conception conceived in the mind of a personal being which he is able under certain conditions to carry out.

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He carries it out by planning things and arranging them. Now if I find or think I find in the Universe such an idea of purpose, can it have any meaning except as implying something such as we call a person behind? To my mind, at any rate, the metaphysical idea of purpose being worked out in the world by an impersonal God is meaningless.

And so with other ideas: what meaning have righteousness and righteous except in relation to a person? Where can I find beauty except in relation to the person who thinks the thing beautiful? What is the meaning of the word love except as an attribute of a person? It seems to me that a non-personal God, whether it be pantheistic or whether it be that logical construction of the metaphysician which he calls the Absolute, is really meaningless, that it does not explain anything.

Dr. Gore points out that the antithesis to a world of order and purpose is a world which is the result of chance. We cannot accept such a theory, and the only alternative seems to me a mind which has a purpose, and that mind must be, as it appears to me, personal.

Dr. Gore then goes on to analyze the God of Religion, the Personal God, revealed to us in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments: he estimates the authority which that revelation has, he analyzes its teaching, and he shews that it does not conflict with the teaching of reason. What is the validity of this authority? Is the teaching of the Bible about God the result of revelation and inspiration, or is it merely a psychological experience? I would venture to suggest the following arguments, which must be stated very shortly, in favour of believing that we have reason for thinking that here is an objective revelation.

In the first place we find among the prophets of the Old Testament what, looked at from the standpoint of the present day, we must recognize to be a higher conception of God than has existed amongst other nations or in any other place. It is a belief in one God, Personal, Transcendent, Righteous, and such a conception in its completeness has never been held except amongst those who have derived it directly or indirectly from the Old Testament. Judaism

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Mohammedanism, Christianity are alone in this belief in an ethical monotheism. Then secondly, we find that these prophets of the Old Testament were convinced that Israel had a special relation to God, and a special mission to perform in the world. That belief was quite different from anything which prevailed in any other nation, it became intensified the greater were the sufferings of the people. Though they had lost their independence and their country, and though temporal greatness seemed ever more and more remote, their belief in their mission became stronger. Thirdly, they looked forward to the fulfilment of this mission through a figure described as the Messiah. The conception, no doubt, took varied forms. It was often vague and undefined. But that the belief and expectation existed there can be no doubt. And then, fourthly, we find this mission of Israel and this conception of its future fulfilled by One Who, in a far higher way than men had ever expected, presented the ideal of the prophets; and then there came as a result the Christian Church and the development of Christianity.

Was all this the result of accident? Is there no purpose here? Do we not see the purpose of God working itself out? And if that be so, may we not argue from this exhibition of purpose back to the truth of the revelation through the prophets of Israel and the New Testament?

There is one more point in Dr. Gore's argument which we desire to notice. He says that for him the most difficult belief is in the conception of God as Love. He finds it hard to reconcile such a belief with the state of the world. He found it hard before the war, for the state of the world conflicted with everything which he might expect it to exhibit. He would find it harder still now. This difficulty that he feels is undoubtedly a difficulty which many people feel and feel increasingly. If God be good, if God love mankind, how can you reconcile with such a conception the world as it is? The mass of human misery? The terrible destruction of life which took place when the nations of the world were fighting with one another? And the sin and wickedness too of the world as we know it? How can

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you justify the ways of God to man? I think we must ask what God wills man to be, what does the Christian Dispensation tell us of the purpose of God in relation to man? Surely it is that, granted man's freedom, under the conditions thus given him he should exhibit that character which may make him a worthy object of the love of God, and make himself worthily fulfil God's will. But how can there be any test or probation for a man except in a world such as that we know of mingled good and evil? Do we think that the love of God for man should be displayed in the same way as the love of an elderly lady for her lapdog? Is the purpose of God that we should be comfortable? Is the world constructed that there might be the greatest happiness on earth for the greatest number? Or does God shew His Love for mankind by placing men in circumstances in which they may exhibit all those moral qualities which we admire, and then judging them with mercy and justice?

That is what Christianity suggests to us as the meaning of God's dealing with man, and is that really inconsistent with His love for mankind?

There are many problems beyond these which we cannot touch on in this article, the problem of freedom, the problem of creation, the limiting of God who is infinite by the construction of a world which is finite, but if we have the courage really to believe in God does not that belief make all these subordinate difficulties small? For what is belief in God? It is the belief in One Whose attributes are reason and righteousness and Who being what He is transcends the limits of our human thought in a way which we cannot conceive. If God be what we claim Him to be, to say that in His divine knowledge there can be no place for human freedom and in His divine power no place for creation is really to limit His greatness by the feebleness of our own minds. The only conception which will ultimately explain for us both the world we live in and human destiny is the belief in God and the courage to accept that belief with all that it implies.

ARTHUR C. HEADLAM.

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Art. II.—UNION, INTERCOMMUNION AND THE LAMBETH CONFERENCE.

Dedicated to the Venerable Jonathan Söderblom, Archbishop of Upsala, Pro-Chancellor of the University of Upsala, Doctor of Divinity and Philosophy, who is so zealous for the unity of the Church.

'Because the bowels of the saints are refreshed by thee, brother' (Philemon 7).

'And above all these things put on charity which is the bond of perfectness, . . . and be ye thankful' (Col. iii 14–15).

[We have received the following article by the courtesy of Mr. Silas McBee, Editor of *The Constructive Quarterly*, who procured its translation from Russian into English, and gladly publish it as one of the series of discussions of Reunion Problems from different points of view which have appeared in our pages. It was written by the author, who is Professor at the University and at the Orthodox Ecclesiastical Academy at Petrograd, in exile in Karstila, Viborg, Finland, in November 1921.—*Editors*, C.Q.R.]

'Add . . . to godliness, brotherly kindness; and to brotherly kindness, charity. For if these things be in you, and abound, they make you that ye shall neither be barren nor unfruitful in the knowledge of our Lord Jesus Christ. But he that lacketh these things is blind, and cannot see afar off, and hath forgotten that he was purged from his old sins' (2 St. Peter i 7–9).

I

All around is darkness. . . . I can distinguish nothing. . . . It is hard to feel my way. . . . I am afraid I may again and for ever fall into the abyss. . . . These are the feelings of an intelligent Russian who, with much difficulty and at great risk, has escaped from the 'sinful darkness' of unfortunate Bolshevist Russia. For there everyone is

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not only in a cruel prison, but also in a dark grave, buried alive and condemned to torturous destruction 'in the shadow of death.' They are all blinded, they have lost the sense of sight; their heart is tormented and does not function well; memory has grown weak, the brain is foggy and ceases to reason.[1] Much kindly interest is needed to help the Russian who has so wonderfully been saved to begin to recuperate. He remains under the spell of the bloody terrors inflicted on him, and continues to see everywhere terrible visions of the horrors he has lived through. For him everything is painted in ill-omened tones and enveloped in an impenetrable fog, in which he is not able to find his way or orientate himself with assurance. Before him there arises a nightmare of chaos, with the most fantastic anomalies, which plunge him into the extremity of despair.

It is necessary to disperse this diabolical mist, to illuminate the stormy reality with the Divine light which brings with it peace, to open out free and consoling perspectives. Then all diabolical suggestions will disappear, and the awakened mind will again see God's light, in which all great things are accomplished and attained through suffering alone—*per aspera ad ardua*; the kingdom of God will once more shine forth in all its life-giving constancy, and, forgetful of his own personal wrongs, man will rise again to serve its truth in the name of and for the sake of the general good.

This is the frame of mind in which I was living when reading and studying the documents I received concerning the Lambeth Conference of 1920. From near and distant friends, from new patrons, from my own countrymen and others, there came not a few acts of kind and touching consideration, providing means for a modest physical existence, if even for a short time only. Gradually internal tranquillity was attained, but as yet no rejoicing peace of mind. War, intended as a holy sacrifice for the redemption

[1] I can testify to the fact that the *intelligentsia* have lost their memory for names and surnames, even those of close friends. European and American colleagues should bear this in mind.

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of truth and brotherhood, resolved itself into treachery; it established the domination of mean lies and sowed misanthropy. Everywhere there is innocent blood and needless death.

In the past—a yawning abyss into which all culture and ideals have fallen. In the present—terrible ruins covered with the thick ashes of hopeless mourning. In the future—the absolute need of a new creation which alone can restore, to the glory of God, the mutilated face of the dishonoured nation. The now awakened mind, which had for a time been enabled to live by the impossibility of thinking, conscious now of everything, is ready to fall into absolute insanity at the sight of this apocalyptic picture. It was necessary to soften the bitter and evil outlines of the latter, to shew the mutual solidarity of living forms, and to open up the springs of universal regeneration, so that past destruction might seem but an imposing lesson in a self-denying search for the assured construction of a better world order. The Lambeth Conference of 1920, whose work will for me always remain a great and comforting theodicy of modern history, which is as yet so sad and disastrous, has endeavoured to accomplish this. It was as if the Spirit of God were soaring above the primal, infuriated elements. These eminent Anglican Bishops, by means of a heavenly power, were enabled to bring all worldly situations and relations within their horizon, not leaving out of consideration a single important element which might lead to disharmony through individualization. But that inspired, all-comprehensive conception testifies to an inward concentration without which success could not have been thought of. It means that there is some universally assimilative principle which is able to subject all things to its creative regeneration. This is the clear Christian light which spreads itself over modern life with its many sides, each phase receiving its real significance, and all together joining in a pure and harmonious organism which is impressed with the one Christian spirit. The deafening absurdity of cosmical anarchy imperceptibly disappears before the calm proclamation of Divine truth,

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which disperses darkness and discord by its radiance; and in that illuminated atmosphere all becomes harmoniously and practically united. All things come to life again, merging together and forming a living tabernacle of the great miracle-working wisdom of God.

This great act of universal, spiritual transformation is inaccessible to the individual or the collective efforts of the natural man and calls for supernatural factors. Understanding this, the Anglican Bishops, therefore, rightly appeal to the Holy Ghost and to a special call of God,[1] which otherwise might sound like vain pretension. But thence it follows that the chief significance of the Lambeth Conference consists, in principle, in a prophetic Christian interpretation, in which everything finds its proper place and obtains a reliable opportunity to arrive by a convenient road at its ultimate object. Here there is only a clearing of the soil and provision for fruitful labour. This is not a practical, detailed project, but a broad idea, which guarantees freedom to all honest effort, and strengthens all single aspirations by directing them to the one final end. It should serve as a standard, and be adapted to certain concrete relations of the dismal life of the day.

Christianity in its substance desires to institute everywhere true Christian communion, with all its burning problems, to establish 'universal fellowship.'[2] From this point Christian regeneration should start, and this is possible on a foundation of Christian mutuality only. Hence the special importance of Christian unity throughout the world. But Christianity—as established by our Lord the Saviour—exists on earth in His Church,[3] and functions through it with all the fullness of a gracious revival. Christian unity, therefore, is necessarily coincident with Church unity. So we come inevitably to the old and delicate question of inter-Church communion. It is not necessary to speak of its constant importance in accordance with the nature of Christianity, but now it is 'an imperative necessity'[4]—a pressing demand of the times. And

[1] Pp. 26, 136.
[2] P. 13.
[3] St. Matt. xvi 18.
[4] P. 11.

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the immense service of the Lambeth Conference consists in this—that it earnestly adheres to this ardent aspiration and gratifies it accordingly. The Lambeth resolutions are, of course, intended to further a real and living unification of the Churches.

II

Having in mind the failure of previous efforts—which has suggested to many the utter futility of this work—how are we to look upon this new enterprise ? [1] It is understood that union among Churches must be accomplished in a manner that is ' Church-like.' Therefore, it is first necessary to explain what constitutes the ' One Church ' and what are its requirements.

And in this respect the Resolutions of the Lambeth Conference do not appear to me to be clear.[2] The Anglican prelates appeal to all Christian people, as ' Archbishops and Bishops of the Holy Catholic Church,' [3] which means that the Church has a real existence. Anglicanism is also referred to as ' our branch of the Catholic Church,' which indicates that there are other more or less equivalent branches of the one stem. In this case it would be practicable to discuss the healing of that external separation which took place and is maintained for various incidental reasons. The result would be a union of certain Churches comprising in their unity a practicable plenitude of the Catholic Church ; nevertheless it would not embrace the

[1] Cf. *Den Ortodoxa Kyrkan och frogan om sammanslutning mellan dekristra Kyrkorna :* tre föreläsningan, pa uppdaag av Olaus Petri-Stiftelsen hallna vid Upsala Universitet, Sept.–Okt., 1918, av Professor Nikolaus Glubokovski. *Den Ortodoxa Kristonheten om Kyrkam emheten,* Stokholm-Upsala, 1921, pp. 1–98.

[2] I am not a special critic of the Lambeth Resolutions and am not offering any of my own—this is beyond my powers and outside my purpose. I wish only to express a few general considerations in regard to the Lambeth Resolutions, and, knowing well their judicial value (p. 23), I use all equally as material. In quoting, I refer to the second edition of the *Conference of Bishops of the Anglican Communion,* London, S.P.C.K., 1920.

[3] Pp. 9, 26, 133.

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true plenitude of the Catholic Church, just as the multitude of branches does not itself comprise the trunk.

According to these observations it seems that the Catholic Church is an ideal quantity realized in part only in different Church organizations and serving them all as a regulating norm. Naturally the Lambeth resolutions generally speak of 'the standard of the universal Church'[1] to which the separate Churches must attain, as, for instance, that the Anglican Church in her achievements becomes 'less Anglican and more Catholic,'[2] although she is also 'the Anglican Communion.' It seems plain that with the above properties the Catholic Church becomes quite abstract, manifesting a general, living principle.

As such she appears also in the more detailed descriptions: as, for instance, in the following:

'We believe that God wills fellowship. By God's own act this fellowship was made in and through Jesus Christ, and its life is in His Spirit. We believe that it is God's purpose to manifest this fellowship, so far as this world is concerned, in an outward, visible and united society, holding one faith, having its own recognized officers, using God-given means of grace, and inspiring all its members to the world-wide service of the Kingdom of God. This is what we mean by the Catholic Church.'[3]

The elements mentioned here are adopted and to a certain degree possessed by any organized Christian society, and the differences between them only shew that one is higher than another, or more 'genuinely Catholic.'[4] The common characteristic virtue of all the Christian Churches will be —Catholicity. It is 'the common ideal of the Church as God would have it to be.'[5] Concerning this ideal, it is necessary only to recognize it as a principle in order to become associated with it as a confession of faith. Accordingly it is formulated: 'We acknowledge all those who believe in our Lord Jesus Christ, and have been baptized into the name of the Holy Trinity, as sharing with us membership in the universal Church of Christ which is His

[1] P. 138. [2] P. 137. [3] Pp. 27, 133.
[4] Pp. 27, 134. [5] P. 12.

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Body.'[1] If all such persons unquestionably participate in the Church body of Christ, then obviously the latter implies a dominating force independent of its outward reflection and always remote from it. No adequate embodiment being presupposed here, one authoritative commentator on the Lambeth resolutions remarked that 'the Church is imperfect.'[2]

We may conclude that the One Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church does not exist empirically, but is being reproduced in part in all regular Christian societies accepting and adopting its fundamental principles. In a word—it is Christianity itself in its genuine, ideal condition. If this be so, it is not necessary to be anxious about the establishment of a real Catholic Church, and Church unity would be of no avail for this purpose. Even if all became united, only a quantitative increase would follow, augmenting internal energy and external effectiveness, but there would be no complete identification with the ideal. The combined rays of reflected light do not replace or swallow up the fountain-head, but they themselves are extinguished when the latter is closed. At the same time there is no doubt of the oneness of their source, and what is further necessary is simply common concentration for mutual solidarity. There is no necessity for particular dogmatic unity between the several Church organizations, since they are united by their mutual participation in the ideal Catholic Church. It is only necessary to recognize this fact, and then, forgetful of all old misunderstandings, to enter into external inter-Church union, forming 'a reunited Church.'[3] The whole problem will then consist in arranging practical communion, upon which all the solicitude of leaders and the inclinations of laymen should be concentrated.[4]

[1] Pp. 26, 133.

[2] See 'The Need for a United Church,' by the Bishop of Peterborough in *The Constructive Quarterly*, September 1921, p. 395.

[3] Pp. 29, 135.

[4] Pp. 33, 147, 149, 150, 151; *cf.* the Archbishop of Melbourne, 'The Lambeth Conference and the Orthodox Eastern Church,' in *The Christian East*, September 1921, p. 137.

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III

The dogmatic premises of the Lambeth discussion appear to me thus. Their essential and distinctive thesis consists in this, that accepting existing Church conditions, they try to build up on them practical intercommunion throughout Christianity, and to establish intercommunion without union. I sympathize deeply with these aspirations, but I do not understand the purpose and the nature of the desired inter-Church unity in view of the thesis formulated. According to the expectations of Lambeth, they do not presuppose any mutual absorption,[1] nor any external uniformity, but are ready to give their honour and glory for the common cause,[2] each sharing the privileges of others, using all honours, so that the Church may be 'all unto all,' not 'in some vague federation,' but as 'one visible society whose members are bound together by the ties of a common faith, common sacraments, and a common ministry.'[3] According to the Lambeth ideology, however, there does not seem to be any special necessity for, or any particular advantage in, the latter. All Christian communions are already united in the Catholic Church by the faith and baptism of their members, and any further unification may lead to mutual friction by reason of the many characteristic differences, overshadowed by the aspect of ideal unity, but now gaining their natural strength. Not much will be attained by the practical aspiration to 'universal fellowship,' even with 'the Church itself a pattern of fellowship.'[4] On this account it would be easier and more expedient if all Christian communions, concentrating on the general aim of unity, would set aside all enmity and discontinue their efforts at mutual submission. It seems to me that Anglicanism reasons thus, systematically avoiding all proselytism and recognizing in this its problem and its prerogative.[5] The latter I do not doubt, although I suppose that everybody who sincerely

[1] Pp. 29, 136. [2] P. 161. [3] P. 12.
[4] P. 11. [5] P. 147.

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confesses the truth of his faith will naturally attract others to his side. Of course, the means employed should be worthy of the recognized sublimity of the confession, otherwise these may tend to degrade it and witness to the irreverence and simulation of the zealot. But, on the other hand, to enfold oneself in a cold unconcern for the fate of others would only reveal religious differentism and possibly even scepticism.

Accordingly it follows that all the affairs of the Church should be left in their present condition, setting aside mutual rivalry, although competition is always and everywhere considered a security for unremitting progress. Certainly the Christian conscience can never reconcile itself to such a result, and therefore every serious and reverent attempt at unification is entirely legitimate. The Lambeth Conference purposes thus, but in my opinion its projects are not founded on dogmatic premises and simply express an invitation: 'Let us stop our former quarrelling, and let us simply live in peace.'

This blind symbiosis does not promise inner confluence, and to obtain this we must seek other aid, which would really demonstrate the need of mutual inter-Church unity and the form it should take.

To be sure, the latter must be accomplished in the bosom of the Catholic Church of Christ. In its turn this is possible only on condition that each separate communion become a member of the Catholic union in which all, having equal rights, shall become organically dissoluble. But in this case each shall be equally Catholic—with external peculiarities of reproduction of the common principle according to distinctive given quantities (nationality, form of government, etc.). Any such Church will shew itself individually Catholic in its very own concrete historical being.

Consequently Catholic Church union postulates the real effectiveness of the Catholic Church, which must be a living reality and not an abstract, heavenly ideal.

What does the Bible teach on this subject? Our Lord says: 'I will build my church; and the gates of hell shall

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not prevail against it' (St. Matt. x 18). This promise refers to building on the rock of Peter's confession, when it will receive the solidity of true reality in the confession of Christ, the Son of the living God, by the faithful. But such a confession is possible and attainable only under earthly conditions, and the prophecy is bound to be fulfilled within these conditions. Therefore if there be on earth a complete confession of Christ as the Son of God—and the certitude of Christianity testifies to this—then the one, true and Catholic Church of Christ in the world is a fact. It cannot be doubted that these great words of Christ have been fulfilled, whether the moment be the Resurrection or the Ascension, but from the day of Pentecost the Church which was promised in history has functioned. 'And the Lord added to the Church daily such as should be saved.'[1] Undoubtedly this Church conformed perfectly with the designs of Christ, and was therefore indeed Catholic, *i.e.* everywhere obligatory and always complete in its perfection. And in all the dignity of its perfection the Church propagates itself by means of the growth in grace of the peoples and it continues Catholic; hostile strength shall not prevail against it, it will be preserved unto the end, when Christ will be with the faithful for ever (St. Matt. xxviii 20). Such a truly historic Church is doubtless intended in the ninth article of the Nicene Creed. In any case there can be no doubt that its authors, all the ancient confessors of the faith and apologists have always and everywhere regarded this as a fundamental dogma when exhorting others to participate in the 'One Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church.'

The preceding arguments shew that such a Church was in fact established by Christ and exists unalterably on earth. But the question may arise as to the degree of realization within it of all the richness of divine salvation in its boundless power, and the active association of the real and the ideal. Inasmuch as such are not the conditions of our world it is admitted that the true Catholic Church is always unattainable concretely, and therefore remains

[1] Acts ii 47.

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exclusively 'heavenly' in its inexhaustible depths. But our Lord's promise does not permit such an interpretation when He predicts the foundation of His Church with all its peculiar perfections. None other is dreamt of as surpassing it. It is evident that there is but one truly Catholic Church of Christ. And as to its limitation, this is not a functional defect but a peculiar virtue of the Church, as an institution predestined to a certain definite mission. The supreme ideal of life is the 'Kingdom of God,' which proceeds from God, recognizes in Him its head and faithfully executes His holy will. In this form the command given was as yet incarnated in the person of our Lord and Saviour only, who presented a concrete realization of it in the 'Kingdom of Christ'; but among men it realizes itself in conformity with earthly conditions in the 'Church of Christ,' which constitutes a moment only in the historical revelation of Christ's Kingdom, and does not entirely cover or exhaust it. This will be accomplished in the Kingdom of God the Father under 'new heavens and a new earth'[1] 'when all things shall be subdued unto him, . . . that God may be all in all.'[2] The Church serves as a transitory stage, and conditional adaptation is one of its natural properties. It is perfect in this very concrete limitation, inasmuch as it was conceived in the beginning by Christ and remains His in practice.

There is nothing which contradicts this in the description of the Church as 'the Body of Christ.' Apostólic testimony declares[3] that Christ is the Head of the Church only inasmuch as the Church is His Body. This certifies that the Church is the Body of Christ by virtue of the supremacy of Christ alone, and without this it could not even exist. The Church is created organically by Christ and from Him receives its strength.[4]

In consequence of the above considerations we cannot fail to recognize that, according to the teaching of the Bible, the Holy Catholic Church exists as a complete reality in the world. Even if it does not fully express itself in our

[1] 2 St. Peter iii 13.
[2] 1 Cor. xv 28.
[3] Ephes. i 22–23.
[4] Ephes. iv 15–16, Col. ii 19.

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limited reality, it still remains an ideality. Otherwise it would be swallowed up by the former, and this would only testify to the fact that it had before been not an ideality but a mere abstraction which was destroyed by its realization. On the contrary, we think of an eternal reality which is an inexhaustible life-giving ideality, gradually revealing itself under earthly conditions by surmounting them and submitting them to itself. Evidently there are present here in fact all Divine powers in all their abundance, and their curtailment will result only from their historical actualization. Members of the Church may not realize their mission, but this does not prevent them from being the guardians of all the covenants of salvation, from benefiting by them themselves and providing for the benefit of others by uniting them with the Church. Possessing in fact all the Divine gifts which produce in it corresponding action, the Church is Catholic, holy and ideal. And in this capacity it presupposes the existence of assimilative objects and a proportional effect. This would not be so, if Divine energy itself created adequate conditions or realized itself immediately in all its majesty; there would then be no salvation, for this is acquired by personal effort, although it is given freely. The ethical moment requires also ethical objects with an ethical nature of individual conception and independent application. In our world, only a mechanical form may realize itself entirely, and thus prove its perfection; but a living force affirms its majesty only in that it draws to itself, directs and strengthens, for the real and ideal perfection of the individual. In like manner the Catholic Church is perfect precisely for the reason that it cannot be exhausted or dissolved by earthly limitations, but, being present in the world with all the heavenly saving gifts of Christ, it gradually transforms all by its direct influence. Here the Divine ideal of the inner being easily reconciles itself with the relativity of the Catholic Church, which is truly of Christ, inasmuch as it possesses the Divine gifts realized by believers.

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IV

So, then, the One Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church has been established by Christ historically, it continues practically and remains immutably. Consequently it follows inevitably that Church unity is possible only by means of union with it, in order to participate in its gracious life under Christ, its Head.

How is this to be attained? By drawing near and adopting the properties of this Church. By properties is meant all the practical means for this act, for all and for always.

And what is meant by the saving Church of Christ? It is an organization instituted by God, in which all members equally avail themselves of the redeeming grace of Christ and its sustaining blessings. In this sense membership in the Christian Church appears as a gracious life in the faithful, and may be acquired by union with this life, by admission into it for continuous and personal adoption of it. Undoubtedly to join a life is possible only through life, by receiving into oneself all its vital elements. Here no simple theoretical confession will suffice, for that would mean nothing of itself, but would only prepare the soil for action, leading to definite active decision. A purely dogmatic confession certifies to a certain real preference, generates and sustains respect for it; but it does not give practical enjoyment, which is everything where membership in grace is concerned. And this is organically built up by the supremacy of Christ, and is therefore available only through vital inclusion in this organism of grace, through practical grafting into it, when the vital forces flowing from the common centre shall completely permeate the new elements.

It is necessary now to explain the natural properties of this life, and to find its fountain-head, from whence it may be drawn. There is no shadow of doubt that in speaking of Christianity we mean a truly and actually beneficial life, which makes it possible for human existence to become a

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pure and continuous blessing. From the beginning humanity was destined for this and has aspired to it through all its history. Neither individuals nor humanity as a whole could approach this great ideal, in fact the opposite was seen; heathenism lost its way in the darkness of sin and practised well-nigh complete corruption. Israel preserved the divine covenant, but by its bold pretensions shewed only its real helplessness, and moral responsibility to it—God's holy law, which He had revealed, became as a blinding light for the diseased eye and only produced death[1] with the accompanying knowledge of sin.[2] The whole historical world did not attain to salvation, and by its negative experience testified to the general inaccessibility of the latter to the natural forces, and by this had prepared a vital receptivity for a higher creative energy which could necessarily only be divine. And so now, when the time of this experience is 'fulfilled,' there is being revealed the successful action of the Divine factor, and the Heavenly Father sends into the world His only begotten Son, that He may take upon Himself our human nature and secure to it His saving grace, delivering it from the condemnation of the law and endowing it with His gracious Sonship.[3] Without fear of contradiction it may be said that this Sonship is endued with true saving grace and grants fullness of life, providing all that we look for.

The blessed life is, therefore, of divine origin and may be embraced by man, but not created by him independently. Human creative genius is absolutely absent here, being concentrated in the sphere of active individual reproduction. And this being so, the Christian life continues through Divine factors alone. Otherwise it would submit to cosmic limitations and would not be itself, ceasing to exist in all its dignity or disappearing as a reality. By the will of God the work of Christ was begun and is carried on through the power of the Lord. Therefore its precise function on earth is practically secured by the Holy Ghost.[4] On the other hand, the Divine Founder certainly assumes divinely

[1] 1 Cor. xv 16.
[2] Rom. iii 20.
[3] Gal. iv 4.
[4] St. John xvi 13.

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authorized persons for the propagation of the Gospel, endowed with Divine gifts. For this purpose the Apostles were chosen and received a command to teach all nations; but even after the Ascension of our Lord, in accordance with His commandment, they awaited 'the promise of the Father,' and remained inactive until on the day of Pentecost 'they were all filled with the Holy Ghost,' Who communicated unto them Divine authority and granted them Divine powers. So now it is necessary to have this unfailing condition, which requires such fully authorized agents of Christ's saving life.

Thence it follows that this life, being given freely and guaranteed previously, must be drawn from the fountain-head, which is Christ the Lord. It is, therefore, necessary to be united with Him indeed, in order that the strength of God may be made perfect in human weakness.[1] Such unity is impossible physically, and it is clear that all are constrained to become practically one with the active blessedness of Christ, and an organic part of 'Christ's Body.' There must be an act analogous to the descent of the Holy Spirit throughout the earthly history of humanity, and one no less mystical. There was then a transmission of the Divine gifts of Christ, and consequently the same is expected now, when it is necessary for all men to become vitally united with the Lord that they may participate in His life of grace. And so faith brings a man to Christ, and for his Saviour he surrenders his own personality to be merged in his Divine Redeemer.

The faithful follower is crucified with Christ (Gal. ii 20) and in baptism puts on Christ (Gal. iii 27) and is buried with Him (Rom. v 3), so that his own existence is lost and he no longer lives of himself, but Christ lives in him (Gal. ii 20). There takes place a deeply mystical (sacramental) but vitally real union with Christ by a dissolution of the human personality into Christ's. We then become mystically identical with the Saviour, and since He is Son of God, we are personally related by the gracious power of the Holy Spirit through Him (Gal. iv 5, Rom. viii 15), and

[1] 2 Cor. xii 9.

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become in fact children of God. But every true son is also an heir of God through Jesus Christ (Gal. iv 7), sharing with Him the gifts of His blessed life; and thus this gracious blessedness is assumed and by equal participation the same mutuality is secured for all.

Through the Redeemer Christians become children of God, and as such are by nature brethren. Inasmuch as our gracious relation to God as sons is sure, our Christian brotherhood, which is derived from our first being and constitutes its natural, concrete expression, is also real.

V

Now we come to the ideal which Christian intercommunion is in search of, and we can determine exactly the conditions for its real attainment. Here everything depends on and is guaranteed by mystical, gracious action, which produces and preserves the whole process.

The theoretical moment is not independent, but merely auxiliary. It shews the source of salvation, establishes means of union with it, and regulates its conscious utilization, but it does not of itself create nor provide blessedness. In order to attain it, it is necessary (1) to approach the source of blessing and (2) to become united with it.

How does the recent Lambeth Conference meet these requirements?

As we have seen, it desires to secure intercommunion upon the basis of existing conditions with a consentient recognition of some common inter-Church platform. Thus, out of two formulated stages, the second is at once accepted, and for this a very suitable method is also proposed. How immeasurably great is the prophetic power of faith which is capable of rising to altitudes of contemplation and vision where all gradations inevitably vanish!

We bow reverently before that inspired flight, and wish that all Christian organizations could participate in it. But the preceding pages have shewn that the second of the moments mentioned clearly depends on the first and is by its very substance predetermined by it. And so, from

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this point of view, it appears to us that intercommunion cannot be complete until Christian societies first unite ecclesiastically; the proposed norms will also be insufficient for the production of an act of perfect inter-Church unity, as they are too indefinite and inadequate in content and action.

Of such conditions three only are indicated and these are considered capable of securing 'the visible unity of the Church.'[1] Their inadequacy serves as an external guarantee of usefulness and success, inasmuch as it is always true that when much is asked nothing is received.

Heavy burdens are grievous to be borne of men (St. Matt. xxiii 4), but the yoke of Christ is easy (St. Matt. xi 30). In this respect the postulatory principle is even laid down that 'creedal requirements should be reduced to a minimum.'[2] Why is this, and what is its purpose? Recognition of truth evidently demands its acceptance in its entirety, because it is neither too large nor too small, but merely—all.

Both minimum and maximum are, therefore, here out of place, inasmuch as the latter is inapplicable to truth, and the former does not give it at all. Minimum truth is fiction or delusion. According to cosmic conditionality these measures are unavoidable in actual fulfilment, which may be proper and excellent, but the norm itself must be accepted in its full comprehension, and only then will it cover and unite all by its inexhaustibility. Without this there will not exist that which is the most important of all —a complete union of principles. And what kind of perfection in actual communion can there be here? The Orthodox Church has had a very great and sorrowful experience of this kind, when even the solemn union of Greeks and Latins at the Florentine Council was called 'the renunciation of the truth.'[3] A very threatening and un-

[1] Pp. 28, 134.

[2] *See* C. B. Wilmer, 'The Bishops of the Anglican Communion and Church Unity,' in *The Constructive Quarterly*, September 1921, p. 456.

[3] It is so stated in the epistle of the Church of Constantinople to the Czechs, January 1, 1451.

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forgettable lesson was given to Russians in the Unia which completely incensed both parties and which is to this day a great evil, making reconciliation with Roman Catholicism difficult. The same is made clear to us by the 'conformists' (*yedinovertsi*) of the Russian Church, who are allowed to preserve their ritual peculiarities as being non-essential: the *Nikonians* condescendingly consider the latter just tolerable, while dissenters (*raskolniki*) attach a dogmatic importance to them, with the result that there is no real communion, nor unifying sincerity, owing to misunderstandings and suspicions. . . .

As to the matter in question, a clause of the Lambeth Appeal declares that 'the whole-hearted acceptance of the Holy Scriptures, as the record of God's revelation of Himself to man, and as being the rule and ultimate standard of faith,'[1] is necessary. This formula permits of no uncertainty as to its general meaning, but its practical benefit is doubtful because this view is clearly shared by all Christian confessions, and, consequently, it brings nothing new, but leaves everything in its former indeterminate state. This means that this condition cannot create inter-Church unity by reason of its very reciprocation, which is still clearer than is its general correctness. The Scriptures are indeed 'the record of God's revelation,' but in how far is this record complete and exact? On this point it is necessary to have a distinct agreement, for only thereby can the efficacious validity of the Scriptures be made clear. If the Scriptures are conditional, then such will also be their normal guidance in the matter of faith; consequently a difference of appraisal and a diversity of application will be generally admissible. Existing conditions of isolation among the Churches will not be removed thereby, but will rather be sanctioned in the present and strengthened for the future. Theoretically this danger is by no means excluded, and in one commentary I read that the Lambeth Conference has adopted 'the Protestant position about the Bible,' and 'nothing is said about any Church tradition paralleling the Scriptures and governing their interpreta-

[1] Pp. 28, 134.

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tion,' so that 'we are free to study the Bible for ourselves (sic !), whether we agree with the Fathers or not,' having in view that 'no theory of inspiration is asserted, verbal, plenary, or any other; nothing about inerrancy.'[1] I do not know whether this interpretation of the matter is correct, but, seemingly, it is quite possible and legitimate. In any case, the extreme vagueness of formulation, wherein even the Biblical term 'God's Word' is missing, is very characteristic. But if the Scriptures are not altogether divinely inspired, human authorship will predominate, and they will be subject to all the limitations historical and literary criticism bring to bear on them. Their fallibility is, therefore, surely inevitable, which morally tends to change and emendation, and, consequently, the Bible allows of at least partial rejections and quite extensive correction, even though founded on its own premises. It may be the 'ultimate standard of faith,' but this expresses no more than that, to a known degree, all will be in relation to it, and justified by it. In that case the 'guidance' of the Bible will consist in general regulation, which will become practically individual—in proportion to a man's immediate understanding.

So far a sound guarantee has not been assured for inter-Church unity. Neither is it fully assured in the further indication of 'the Creed commonly called Nicene, as the sufficient statement of the Christian faith, and either it or the Apostles' Creed as the baptismal confession of belief.'[2] The preference for this dogmatic Creed is not of itself quite clear. We believe that the cause for this is not in its general acceptance, for it is not everywhere equally held and used. Its whole significance is in its authoritativeness, which is somewhat analogous to that of the Bible, and this could rest only on its derivation from the most venerable sources. It is the traditional model, sacred to all believers on account of its early use in the Church. In it we have a monument of dogmatic tradition, but then

[1] See C. B. Wilmer in *The Constructive Quarterly*, September 1921, p. 454.

[2] Pp. 28, 134.

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the removal of this tradition as an auxiliary in the elucidation of the faith would seem to be unwarranted. In this case the Nicene Creed will itself become insufficiently definite, furthering much misunderstanding. For illustration, let us refer to the ninth article, on which we differed radically in our interpretation of the chief question concerning the substance of the Catholic Church, from which no complete agreement regarding methods for its arrangement has as yet ensued.

With such breadth of principle, the whole structure cannot be closely bound together, for it lacks practical stability. It can exist only on its own free historical foundation, from which we have here the binding cement only, which possesses a natural capacity for spreading. It is quite clear that the necessary authority for mutual unification by general submission will be lacking; and this is confirmed by the proposal to adopt the Nicene Creed. As a basis for unity, the Creed should be one for all; so for this reason a readiness is expressed to insert in the English version the word 'Holy' before 'Catholic and Apostolic Church.'[1] And the motive assigned for this is the use of that addition 'in all parts of the East and West.' But this fact would become of undeniable importance only through a recognition of the indispensability of the early form, which is an expression of the universal voice of the Catholic Church in its oecumenical decision, through infusion of the Holy Spirit. Acknowledgement of this principle—the authority of oecumenical Catholicity—would clear all inter-Church perspectives, though it is not likely to be accepted with absolute rigidity and exactitude. The complete silence in all the resolutions regarding the *Filioque* is distressing. Indirect comment in other documents strives to convince one that this insertion 'involves no belief in more than one *αἰτία* in the Godhead'[2] and expresses only 'the teaching of St. John of Damascus—

[1] P. 148.

[2] See the Archbishop of Melbourne, 'The Lambeth Conference and the Orthodox Eastern Church,' in *The Christian East*, September 1920, p. 140.

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that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father through the Son.' [1]

But here there is great inconsistency as to why the Anglicans do not canonically ordain the worshipping of icons [2] when they state precisely that 'they honour icons conformably to the spirit of St. John of Damascus.' [3] Here the authority of the latter plainly illustrates the decision of the Oecumenical Council and, consequently, strengthens it, while above this is not the case, for St. John himself undoubtedly read the Creed without the addition, and at any rate he cannot serve as an authority for the insertion.

But is it necessary? Will it explain the mysterious depths of the Deity, which we are to accept with humble faith? Does it not sooner breed useless misunderstandings, and evoke doubtful commentaries? Divine mysteries do not require to be logically exposed, but rather reverently confessed. And when we endeavour to base the *Filioque* on the authority of different Fathers of the Church above and despite true biblical testimony (St. John vi 26), do not the Scriptures then cease to be 'the ultimate standard'?

Patristic argumentation simply endeavours to justify the existing fact, but it cannot secure for it the unquestionable certitude which is peculiar to all of the original Nicene Creed. This is natural only to the authority of the Catholic Church, expressing itself through the Oecumenical Councils;

[1] *The Christian East*, September 1920, p. 148: 'Suggested Terms of Intercommunion between the Church of England and the Eastern Orthodox Church, by a Theologian of the English Church.'

[2] *Teaching of the Church of England on Some Points of Religion, Set Forth for the Information of Orthodox Christians of the East*, by Bishop John Wordsworth, with the approval of the Archbishop of Canterbury, second edition, London, 1903, pp. 15–16: 'The Church of England does not consider itself bound by the decrees of the seventh (Oecumenical) Council (of Nicaea), which were not received at the time of its meeting, in the Western Church, and which relate to observances which it does *not consider helpful* or necessary for the people committed to its charge.'

[3] See Professor Hamilcar Alivisatos, 'Aspirations toward Union,' in *The Christian East*, September 1920, p. 127.

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and that is why the Roman Church, in creating for itself the right to new dogmatic decisions, assumes these prerogatives.

Without this, venerable antiquity would alone remain, and this may be good and useful as historical material, but not as a dogmatic 'rule of faith.' After this nothing remains infallible ecclesiastically, and the Lambeth Conference speaks in this spirit when it declares that no Church could make claim to be infallible or absolutely right, that we should explore the field of Christian thought and action to try to find a more fundamental basis on which we could unite.[1]

I am afraid, but I am compelled to say, that under such suppositions we evidently do not altogether believe in the Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church, inasmuch as no infallible Councils are admitted, and in general 'there is no infallibility in this world.'[2] We have really nothing unconditional, universally obligatory and subjugating. In this case, much less general stability may be expected from any new unity. For this will be held only by a thin thread of artificial compromise, even by good agreement, which will inevitably be broken; and meanwhile on this human thread there is a desire to hold all spiritually developed non-Christians: Jews, Buddhists, Mohammedans, etc.[3] Here the breadth of conception very naturally becomes purely visionary.

It may be directly inferred from the above that the Lambeth Conference so far does not guarantee ecclesiastical union, nor does it guarantee its stability. And this clearly proves that without valid ecclesiastical mutuality there will be no internal fusion, for without this all proposed formulae appear to be lacking in concrete substance, and they can only draw it from a living confession of the already unified universal Church.

[1] See Professor A. C. Headlam, 'Union with the Orthodox Church,' in *The Christian East*, July 1921, pp. 92–93.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 94.

[3] See C. B. Wilmer in *The Constructive Quarterly*, September 1921, p. 458.

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VI

Further, it follows logically that if Church unity does not exist, there can be no real Church intercommunion, and it is not strange that the Lambeth Conference does not establish the latter firmly and unequivocally. It invites the acceptance of 'the divinely instituted sacraments of Baptism and the Holy Communion, as expressing for all the corporate life of the whole fellowship in and with Christ.'[1] But, again, neither of these sacraments finds exact definition here, and in every confession and community they are given their particular and very specific predicates. There will, therefore, be no practical correspondence, and the various Christian groups will repudiate each other, considering external similarity deceptive and seductive. Is it possible then to have true, sincere and 'whole-hearted' intercommunion, even among those who accept all the Lambeth theses? Will not all feel a moral compulsion in the demand to consent in advance to all the doctrinal and practical attributes of the sacraments accepted?[2] If not, then the latter will lose their most distinctive qualities and be reduced to an inefficacious form by their properties which are common to all. The one sacrament for all will prove to be a meaningless magic rite, and its inner power will be mutually abandoned, inasmuch as the full import is contained therein.

But let us admit that there is sufficient agreement on this subject, although as yet it is founded on nothing, and seemingly is not directly assumed. And withal the conditions for the desired success are not given. The sacraments of Baptism and the Eucharist are called 'an expression' of the corporate Christian life. And what is it that produces and preserves this life, which is manifested

[1] Pp. 28, 134.

[2] In this respect the notable reserve of the Bishops at Lambeth regarding the Dutch-Norwegian-Finnish Church, the Unitas Fratrum of the Moravians, and the Reformed Episcopal Church, is very remarkable.

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through them in the brotherhood? Is this life independent of the Sacraments—is it at any moment of its existence merely more essentially and correctly 'expressed' through them? From the latitudinarianism of opinions and formulations predominant in the resolutions of the Lambeth Conference, this does not appear quite evident; but, meanwhile, they must be giving rise to entirely disparate currents of thought. In the case of an affirmative answer, it must be admitted that Christianity may be constructed without these sacraments, even without their 'expression,' and accordingly it follows that they are not absolutely necessary. I have no doubt whatever that the Conference intends quite the opposite, but then we must regard the sacraments as the generative elements of the Christian life, which is always and in all respects mystical (sacramental).

Is it possible for the universality of Christianity to be exhausted in two sacraments? It seems as if the very question presupposes a negative answer. Baptism brings a man into the sphere of Christianity, makes him a member of the gracious Kingdom of Christ, but does not communicate all its gifts, merely opening an approach to their enjoyment. This is clear, for the reason that Baptism may in an emergency be administered by a layman, and is not acknowledged to be sufficient of itself, but in most confessions is followed by Confirmation. Consequently, Baptism, which regenerates 'through the Holy Ghost unto a spiritual and holy life,' does not immediately and entirely grant this life as a sure and personal gain. It is necessary to attain to this gracious, spiritual state and, in accordance with its Divine nature, it is attainable through the sacramental means of co-operating grace, which is active in all the chief relations of a man's being.

For us the Eucharist is sacramental union with Christ and mutual incorporation in Him as living members of His Body. To be sure, this mystical act requires the most profound and complete preparation that that which is most holy may find for its reception perfect purity; otherwise he who participates shall be guilty of the Body and Blood

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of the Lord (1 Cor. xi 27, etc.). Is it possible for human strength to attain the necessary purity without the aid of a cleansing sacrament? The Eucharist, exalting the 'communicant of God's substance' to immediate union with the Heavenly Christ, requires that he should not defile it by walking 'under the elements of the world' (Gal. iv 3, 9; cf. Col. ii 8). It is obvious that other vital conditions should enjoy the same sacramental consecration, so that everywhere our sonship to God through Christ, which is inseparable from common brotherhood, should be preserved and expressed. I am not referring to the number of the sacraments; but to group them under the categories 'Evangelical' and 'ecclesiastical' is to affirm the questionable point that the ecclesiastical order which confers grace was conclusively formulated in the Scriptures in a complete and stereotyped form, and that nothing was communicated and left to the Apostles and their successors. I think that this view, which is not in accordance with Biblical data regarding the divinely ordained historical development of the Apostolic Church, and which is dangerously extreme, is contradictory to the creative working of Christ's grace, which creates for itself a proper and authoritative fullness of blessed manifestation. With such an understanding, it seems that it must be admitted that the Church of Christ exists practically and possesses sacraments which confer equal grace. In any case, two of them alone, separated from the others, and not clearly defined, do not secure inter-Church communion; because Baptism simply leads to the Christian brotherhood, without as yet conferring all its prerogatives, and the Holy Eucharist is not guaranteed to unite all, inasmuch as we do not consider it a purely magic act.

The latter indication raises the question as to the ministers of the sacraments. The ministry is declared to be 'a ministry acknowledged by every part of the Church as possessing not only the inward call of the Spirit, but also the commission of Christ and the authority of the whole body.'[1] Undoubtedly it is the priesthood which

[1] Pp. 28, 134.

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is described here, but it seems remarkable that its sacramental nature is not plainly stated, the omission being the more noticeable by reason of the insistence on authority. For this purpose it is especially suggested that the episcopate be representative and constitutional.[1] But Christ said to the Apostles: '*Ye have not* chosen me, *but I have* chosen you, and ordained you' (St. John xv 16). And if the priest is certainly called by the Holy Ghost and by the commission of Christ, he does not receive his authority *from* the whole body, but independently of it possesses it as absolutely obligatory *for* that body. Priesthood without episcopal ordination is not rejected,[2] and 'the spiritual reality of the ministers of those communions which do not possess the episcopate'[3] is recognized. With such an understanding the priesthood will be merely a 'representative body,' necessary only for the convenience of the organization, but not for the very being of the community. The episcopate as a principle becomes no longer indispensable, and is therefore accepted and defended according to the same practical motives[4]; it is taken as an historical fact, without a strictly exact doctrinal argumentation,[5] merely 'in some form' and exactly 'in its Scriptural and primitive form,'[6] which form does not exist and is not considered absolutely necessary.[7] The result is something very indefinite, capable of including even Bishops ordained by presbyters, which happened long ago and sometimes happens now too. . . . In such a case there will be no dogmatic necessity for a priesthood in general, and we are told that 'it is possible to have both Christianity and Church without any

[1] Pp. 28, 31, 135. [2] Pp. 29, 135. [3] Pp. 28, 135.

[4] See the Bishop of Peterborough, in *The Constructive Quarterly*, September 1921, pp. 387, 392.

[5] See C. B. Wilmer, *ibid.* p. 464.

[6] See the Bishop of Peterborough, *ibid.* p. 387.

[7] See the Archbishop of Canterbury in *Lambeth and Edinburgh*, September 1921, p. 372: 'Without some form . . . of an Episcopate, can we frame, even in vaguest outline, a working plan which would meet our need? I think not, but perhaps in saying that I am mistaken.'

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ministry at all.'[1] If such deductions and applications as these are admitted, we must maintain that the point under consideration is uncertain in itself and causes uncertainty with regard to all previous points.[2]

In Christianity man becomes the graciously sacramental abode of Christ,[3] and this life may be attained only by way of mystical (sacramental) communion with the Lord and, certainly, only through them that received His gifts of plenipotence. Otherwise—if hierarchical participation were unnecessary—everyone could enjoy communion with the Redeemer directly, and in that case any dogmatic necessity for a strictly binding mediation would cease to exist. But inasmuch as the latter is required, there must also be plenipotent mediators by their sacramental origin and pre-eminence entirely conformable with this purpose. Sacramental grace is a beneficial living water and its dispenser must be one who has it from the Fountain-head through immediate succession. Without this all orders—even if 'recognized' by many communities—will simply form an administrative body, and the sacraments will become outward symbolic rites without the gracious life-giving power.

It is now necessary to state the categorical sum which shews that sacramental intercommunion is inadmissible while the sacraments are insecure.

VII

According to our opinion, therefore, we find that neither Church union nor sacramental communion is guaranteed to us.

Does this mean that the Lambeth Conference of 1920 was and shall remain without fruit? We do not for a

[1] See C. B. Wilmer in *The Constructive Quarterly*, September 1921, p. 463.

[2] It is, therefore, easy to understand the anxiety of the Lambeth Committee 'to make it clear from our formularies that we regard ordination as conferring grace and not only as a mere setting apart to an ecclesiastical office' (p. 148).

[3] Gal. ii 20.

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moment believe so, but rather the reverse. Our fundamental difference consists in the fact that we reckon as necessary both of the above-mentioned points, whereas the Conference, omitting the first directly and entirely, concentrates upon the second. The problem stated has been—how to arrive at real inter-Church communion without practical Church unity. Naturally, this could be realized only by way of elimination of inter-confessional diversity, by smoothing and obscuring every sharp difference. Hence the astonishing and seemingly intentional vagueness of the language used, not because of want of exact terms, but because of their inexpediency for the purpose of the conciliation of existing dissension. Much may and must be forgotten, yet this will not wipe out history and change reality. Elimination always implies diminution and depreciation. Confessional differences are so many and so varied that what remains after their elimination is little and devoid of concrete vitality. It is but dry grain requiring for its growth proper soil and the most favourable conditions. Hence it follows that if we recognize value in it for us all, we shall certainly become anxious about its proper growth and cultivation. It is impossible for any of us to doubt the former; the latter, therefore, becomes no less incontestable and obligatory for every sincere Christian. On this account the Lambeth theses happily and in timely fashion provide for a practical basis for inter-Church friendship, thus really and fruitfully promoting the same. Is this not a truly great and holy work, this construction of the Catholic body of the universal Church by the power of Christ and the grace of the Holy Ghost? The ground is prepared for the Christian temple which is to serve all, and experienced builders are invited, with all the accumulated material ready to begin the work. And now the Lambeth Conference solemnly declares and testifies clearly that the opportune moment has arrived. A happy beginning is always most important. When that is given, the continuation is not hopeless and may lead to a blessed termination.

Evidently it is necessary here to move in a reverse

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direction—concentrating scattered energy. The field is too wide; it is necessary to narrow it down to the central points of orientation, around which all the diverse elements must be formed into living organisms, in order that by mutual attraction they may be led to close unity in faith and life in Christ. Practically I would regard as unprofitable the accepted comprehensiveness of outlook, because it results in mutual, aimless indefiniteness, devoid of concrete outlines. These are secured by the complete and historically established realization of general fundamental principles. In this sense it is quite correct and expedient to concentrate on the union of great Christian organizations, leaving it for them to arrange an understanding with their subdivisions, and these will gradually become weakened and more friendly in their attitude through inter-Church union, so that their estrangement will grow less and they will submit themselves to the influence of an approved solidarity. But, it is said, these are old methods; 'the demands of the new age' require 'a new outlook and new measures.'[1] Some protest is even heard against the principle that 'the old is good.'[2] Certainly 'no man putteth a piece of new cloth unto an old garment. . . . Neither do men put new wine into old bottles.'[3] But are we preparing a new wine instead of that which the Lord gave us as the only life-giving drink? Has the garment of Christ become so old that we intend to cast it away, preferring our own new shreds, instead of gathering ourselves together under its beneficial shelter in the One Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church? If not, then it is true to say that 'the old is better.'[4]

However, it seems as if 'the great historic Churches' are renouncing the thought of union, and that any efforts on their behalf at orientation are destined to be useless.[5] Despondency in this matter is so great that it has sug-

[1] Pp. 27, 29, 134, 136. [2] P. 15.

[3] St. Matt. ix 16–17; St. Mark ii 21–22; St. Luke v 36, 37.

[4] St. Luke v 39.

[5] See the Bishop of Peterborough in *The Constructive Quarterly*, September 1921, p. 391.

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gested to Professor A. C. Headlam very bitter and even offensive expressions[1] regarding the Orthodox Church which can be excused only on account of the desperate position of their author, for I have encountered nothing similar in recent years even in pamphlets of a distinctly polemical character. . . . It is as if any approach were absolutely barred by dogmatic impossibility; as if Eastern theologians and Churchmen were congealed in the atmosphere of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth centuries and were absolutely beyond the reach of the ideas of the Twentieth century; it is even useless to waste time on them, one ought simply to leave them in their sound sleep! This is really the tone and the spirit of the very darkest days of the Middle Ages. . . . It is impossible to refrain from saying with sad firmness: 'It is a hard saying; who can hear it?' (St. John vi 60). But it is particularly astonishing and deplorable in a discourse on Church unity, where the greatest consideration and effort must be applied to those parts which are the least compliant, inasmuch as all the others will accept it without difficulty. And this very obstinacy of the former compels us to admit, if only theoretically, that they may have treasures which are quite sufficient for their own existence and feel no need of replenishment. Is it not possible that such a categorically prejudiced and complete dismissal of all intercourse may lead to a situation where 'whosoever hath, to him shall be given; and whosoever hath not, from him shall be taken even that which he seemeth to have'?[2]

To be sure such danger is not precluded from the very concrete proposals described by Professor A. C. Headlam in the form of a nocturnal vision; this form of expression has for some reason become usual in England lately when discussing inter-Church problems. On a wide plain there are represented men majestically seated in their chairs. Not one of them will rise for a friendly handshake with others. Each is proud of his own seat, not noticing that it has already been impaired by the ages and that the legs

[1] *The Christian East*, July 1921, pp. 92, 94, 95, 97.
[2] St. Luke viii 18; St. Matt. xiii 12, xxv 29.

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are being severed by the saws of historical criticism, scientific discovery, religious liberty, and national freedom. The Orthodox Church, in particular, has for long been slumbering, is devoid of intelligence, and does not even know history.[1] This odd picture is astonishing. It is calculated to make an impression but does not well accomplish this, for it is intentionally very overdone and recommends dangerous ways. On its account we are the more convinced of the necessity of a definite, mutual understanding[2]; and if 'Easterners' are not sufficiently informed as to Anglicanism,[3] some only by means of caricature,[4] and sometimes admit 'a very uncomplimentary sentence about the English Church,'[5] then similarly with regard to 'the Bishops assembled at Lambeth—it may reasonably be doubted whether any considerable number of them are sufficiently familiar with Eastern theology to tackle so serious a problem.'[6] We think, however, that Orthodox theologians, and Russians in particular, have studied the Anglican Church in all its peculiarities, and understand it much better than is the reverse case.[7] Therefore they may desire only an appropriate reciprocity, which is as yet very rare, but they are not confused by mysterious visions, varying according to conditions. While 'Easterners' are being frightened by dreams and visions, it seems none the less true to them that they occupy the golden mean, and that it will avail nothing to call them to an open space where there is neither end nor beginning, where it is most natural to disperse on

[1] *The Christian East*, July 1921, pp. 95, 97, 99. *Cf.* Canon Hichens in 'Some Thoughts on Reunion with the Orthodox Church,' *The Christian East*, September 1920, p. 119: 'Most of the Orthodox priests are not learned; they are, in fact, ignorant and unlearned.'

[2] P. 147. [3] P. 146.

[4] See Leighton Pullan in 'A Notable Book on Reunion' in *The Christian East*, July 1921, p. 98.

[5] See Leighton Pullan, *The Christian East*, July 1921, p. 98.

[6] See Leighton Pullan, *The Christian East*, *ibid.* p. 98.

[7] *Cf.* the Rev. J. A. Douglas, *The Christian East*, April 1921, p. 55: 'The Eastern Orthodox understand the Anglican Churches very well.'

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different sides, to lose and be lost. According to the Gospel, the strait gate and the narrow way are preferable.[1]

Truly these Orthodox guards have remained till now immoveable in their apostolic seats, but they do not prevent others from sitting beside them with equal dignity, as, for example, with the Syrio-Chaldean Nestorians, who were received into communion with the Orthodox Church, March 25, 1898, at St. Petersburg. And it is said that the legs of these 'apostolic' thrones have been weakened, have become shattered, and are ready to fall. No such thing has, however, yet taken place, and long experience leads us to presume that these supports are not so bad from the historical or so frail from the human point of view. In Christian construction the original principles are absolutely firm, being founded upon an authority which is superior to human strength; and sacred history is their main support. With regard to the human element here, it is capable only of creating an agreeable compromise in forms readily accessible to the mind. It is even frankly stated that what is looked for at present is 'a Catholicism tempered by all that is true in Protestantism.'[2] Can this possibly be true? Who will make up his mind to sacrifice his precious inheritance and leave his 'first love' (Rev. ii 4) for an artificial and ephemeral *mixtum compositum* which has no other seal than one accommodatingly modernistic?

One should gently approach the old historical Churches and view them diligently. Let us not in advance make the assertion that they are stiff and incapable of perception, but let us shew them the brotherly kindness and charity (2 St. Peter i 7), 'which is the bond of perfectness' (Col. iii 14).

I am not called upon and do not undertake to speak in the capacity of an authority of the Orthodox Church; I am reasoning as a Biblicist and an historian only.

It is thought that complicated dogmatics impede all efforts at an understanding with the East, although

[1] St. Matt. vii 13–14; St. Luke xiii 24.

[2] See the Bishop of Peterborough in *The Constructive Quarterly*, September 1921, p. 393.

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'theology will always be for the few and ecclesiasticism for the politicians,' and also—'the world has been different since the advent of Christ—not because Peter confessed Him to be the Christ, the Son of the living God, but because Jesus lived and loved.'[1] This, of course, is not to be doubted, but if there were no true confession there would be no beneficial action in the body of the Church, and all the rest would remain as before. Is it untrue? If not, then we must all agree that definite Christian dogmatics are absolutely necessary, inasmuch as they illuminate the work of Christ, bring us to Him and guarantee a conscious enjoyment of the gifts of grace.

But the question arises as to the volume of these dogmatics, which must not exceed the necessary limits, for then they would cease to be a guide and light, and become despotic and blinding, suppressing freedom of conscience.[2] In so far as inter-Church unity is concerned, these dogmatics must evidently serve as an authoritative expression of the common Christian knowledge of the whole Church. This is possible only in case of the practical oneness of the Church which had its existence through the period of its indivisibility and unanimous consensus at the time of the Oecumenical Councils; the word reunion commonly used in English testifies to the earlier union. Having decided, with all objectivity, whether the harmony of old was destroyed by reason of internal weakness or for external reasons, it would, in accordance with the significance of

[1] See Peter Ainslie, 'The Compelling Forces in the Quest for Unity,' in *The Constructive Quarterly*, September 1921, p. 504.

[2] See Canon Hichens in *The Christian East*, September 1920, p. 120: 'A highly placed bishop (of the Eastern Orthodox Church) brought forward, as the chief obstacle to union with us (Anglicans), a somewhat startling objection. He said that he could not wish for union whilst we reject Transubstantiation.' This I do not understand, and I may explain it only in the sense of a necessity to acknowledge clearly and firmly by some definite (though conditional) formula the truth and reality of a partaking of the Body and Blood of Christ in the sacrament of the Eucharist, as for instance, the following: "The doctrine of the Holy Eucharist, as it is taught in the liturgies of the Orthodox Church . . . is adequate and sufficient' (*The Christian East*, September 1920, p. 149).

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the cause and for its advantage, be most natural to start from dogmatic principles, and upon these begin to build up the new union. The whole character of the resulting construction will depend on these principles.

But, it is said, the intolerance of the 'Easterners' who insist that 'outside the Church there is no salvation' is an impediment to this. I reverently believe in this testimony, but I do not share the rigorism. The Fountain of grace is one, and flows normally through its one adapted channel. He who has no desire to come to it and be immersed in it, naturally does not avail himself of its life-giving properties. Yet separate streams are possible, streams which at their source receive clear waters and preserve them, but later, joining other waters, become turbid and polluted. . . . Something similar takes place in the formation of dissenting bodies, which persistently place themselves beyond the saving grace of the Church. But it is most natural for the separated stream to return to the main channel and be absorbed in its clear inexhaustible waters, where all foreign matter will settle and the defects of an inadequate supply be made good.

There is not any vital self-denial here. On the contrary, there takes place simply a vital regeneration of all that was best in the past, which does not vanish completely, for it comes to its lawful purpose. This is beneficial and natural and is, therefore, not burdensome to any, but equally desirable and agreeable to all; for then all shall become 'kindly affectioned one to another with brotherly love; in honour preferring one another' (Rom. xii 10), setting their mind not on high things, but condescending to men of low estate (Rom. xii 16).

Thus without much pains the process of inter-Church unity will be decided. Mutual restrictions are inevitable, much will have to be abandoned and much accepted; the old is to be forgotten and the new to be borne in mind, both requiring a convincing denial of undisturbed quiet. It is therefore right and timely that all should be invited 'to make sacrifices for the sake of a common fellowship, a common ministry and a common service to the world,' even 'reordination, or any sacrifice, however great, for an

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end so immeasurably superb.'[1] This is an unquestionable and holy truth, to which it may be added that there is no sacrifice where superfluity is being put aside or inadequacy made up. But the invitation must not be too one-sided; and here it seems to me that a disproportionate burden is put on the Eastern Church. Anglicans declare, 'We cannot part with the children of our own mother, even to obtain the much desired reunion with our brethren of the East.'[2]

This is not altogether apostolic,[3] and, besides, the 'Easterners' are almost compelled to part with their own mother, the Orthodox Church, for the Lambeth conditions would take from them their inherited treasure, leaving a deplenished minimum of sacraments, dogmas and oecumenical authority. They are expected to enter into communion with those who have hitherto denied the third Oecumenical Council, and, abasing the Orthodox, reverence[4] the authors and upholders of discord in the Churches, who err in their very opposition to oecumenical unity. Certainly, the Orthodox Church will even after this be permitted to preserve her traditional treasures; notwithstanding she will be obliged to think that these are only superfluous accessories, or even burdensome ballast, misleading to all other participants of the union. But the Apostle wrote: 'If meat make my brother to offend, I will eat no flesh while the world standeth, lest I make my brother to offend' (1 Cor. viii 13). According to this commandment the 'Easterners' would be morally obliged to forsake all typical peculiarities derived from the early days of Christianity, and become depersonalized in an historically impracticable, Christian, primitive condition. Can

[1] See the Bishop of Peterborough in *The Constructive Quarterly*, September 1921, p. 394.

[2] J. A. Douglas in *The Christian East*, April 1921, pp. 54–55. *Cf.* Leighton Pullan, *ibid.*, July 1921, p. 98: 'These hopes (for union with the Eastern Churches) were very imperfectly fulfilled, and the Anglican Bishops devoted their attention rather to the question of reunion in Great Britain than the question of reunion with the East.'

[3] Romans, ix 3.

[4] P. 150.

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this be just? Is such self-denial possible? And is it good for the cause? Would it not be of greater benefit for all concerned to accept the principles and fundamentals of the 'Eastern inheritance' which offend none?

I do not undertake to offer a perfect solution of the problem, but I beg consideration of my arguments for the sake of the desired success of Christian intercommunion. Once again I declare my profound and sincere conviction that the Lambeth Conference substantially promotes intercommunion by its inspired work. Although I do not believe in a miraculously rapid accomplishment of it,[1] there can be no doubt that the Conference facilitates the practical possibility of real reciprocity and friendly progress. And this will stand on a firm foundation if Christians, not wise in their own conceits (Romans, xii 16), acquiescing more or less,[2] will not stop here, but will be careful first to establish true unity with the Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church.

On this narrow path, encumbered with human errors, prejudices and partialities, there lie many obstacles. But truly, 'the fellowship of the members of the one Body . . . is the work of God, not of man.'[3] And if, with sincerity and self-denial, with profound penitence, with warm prayer and clear faith, we will seek first the Kingdom of God and His righteousness (St. Matt. vi 33), we shall see this great miracle; our vile body shall be changed 'that it may be fashioned like unto His glorious body' (Phil. iii 21), and 'the crooked paths shall be made straight, and the rough ways shall be made smooth; and all flesh shall see the salvation of God' (St. Luke, iii 5–6) in the Catholic Church of the Living God, which is 'the pillar and ground of the truth'[4] unto the end of the world.

NICHOLAS GLUBOKOVSKY.

[1] See the Bishop of Peterborough in *The Constructive Quarterly*, September 1921, p. 383: 'If put in action to-morrow with the willing and self-sacrificing concurrence of Churches concerned, it could heal the wounds of the whole body.'

[2] *Ibid.* 1921, p. 390. [3] P. 12. [4] 1 Tim. iii 15.

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ART. III.—THREE FRENCH BOOKS.

1. *A Soldier's Pilgrimage.* By ERNEST PSICHARI, with introduction by M. BOURGET. Translated from the French *Le Voyage du Centurion* by E. M. WALKER and M. H. M. CAPES. (London: Andrew Melrose. 1917.)
2. *Entretiens dans le tumulte.* Par GEORGES DUHAMEL. (Paris: 'Mercure de France.' 1919.)
3. *L'Epreuve du Fils.* Par CAMILLE MAYRAN. (Paris: Plon-Nourrit. 1920.)

SOME years ago a paper on the religious aspects of modern French literature appeared in this Review.[1] In recalling the names of authors then popular, we find that while some of them have reached an assured place in the sky of literature, others have lacked that almost inexplicable something which gives permanent fame, and others are still on their trial, still being read in spite of the many newer authors whose names appear in the publishers' lists.

But it was with the mentality of the then current fiction rather than with its literary merit that the article to which we have referred was concerned. And the trend of thought, as revealed in the best fiction of those days, when the war had not yet turned men's minds into new and unexpected directions, seemed to the writer to be towards mysticism, and chiefly orthodox mysticism which did not need to stray from the fold of the Church into less trammelled forms of belief. An early example of this trend was found in the novels of Ferdinand Fabre, whose idylls of country *presbytères* were eagerly read, and whose place, a modest place perhaps, is assured in literature. He interested men in the lives of priests and the faithful, and wrote as one

[1] *Church Quarterly Review*: January 1907.

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who never lost the *cachet* of the seminary, the loyal adherence to its training. Then came J. K. Huysmans, a more stormy soul and one whose books required careful reading, his prose lacking much of that direct simplicity which is the heritage and the charm of the best French prose writers. He did not play on a sweet shepherd's pipe as did Ferdinand Fabre: his was an organ voice, and sometimes the stops were harsh. But his books were popular, and their numerous editions shewed that there was an audience interested in the things of the spiritual life, and especially in that mystic element which, hidden in monasteries or in the hearts of those who frequented the 'dark, close, fragrant aisles' of churches, had to be reckoned with in any consideration of spiritual dynamics.

Perhaps the outstanding exponents of orthodox religious life in French fiction in the closing years of the last century and the first years of the present century were Fabre and Huysmans. And then came the war and men were face to face with new and unexpected conditions. How did that cataclysm affect religious thought in France?

If the writer judges aright, religious thought, as represented in current literature, has not been *désorientée* by it. No doubt thought has gone into somewhat new directions, perhaps more practical directions. Some souls found Christianity in the upheaval: those who did not accept the orthodox faith acquired new thoughts, and at least new ideals which were Christian at the root of them: the faithful never lost heart. It would be idle to suppose that any one book reveals the thoughts of a whole people. But when certain books which take a serious view of life, books which bring higher thought and higher seriousness—*philosophoteron kai spoudaioteron*—have passed through many editions, it must mean something. It at least shews that the books are read, that they appeal: that they have in them some echo of what is passing in many minds: by this popularity the thoughts of many hearts are revealed.

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I

The three books whose names stand at the head of this article may be taken to represent three types of mind. The first on the list, *Le Voyage du Centurion*, was completed in the spring of 1914, and in the August of that year, its author, Ernest Psichari, 'fell at the battle of Rossignol in Belgium, defending his guns to the last minute and faithful unto death to his religious and patriotic convictions.'[1] The preface calls the book a novel: 'it is one, but of so new a type that one hesitates to use the word. . . .'[2] It tells the old story which men, from St. Augustine onward, have never wearied of telling: the story told twenty years ago by M. Coppée and by Huysmans, told again by Psichari. 'We who knew Ernest Psichari,' says M. Bourget in the preface, 'know that Maxence is himself; that he really made that expedition in Africa; that he himself went through those crises of the soul.'[3] But Psichari's conversion has a new and a wonderful setting. Not in Paris, not in the old Churches 'saturated with the prayers of ages,' not from the voice of a priest—('Maxence is alone—no aid is to come to him from men'—[4]) but in solitude, in the African deserts, does the light slowly come. The book has no plot, no story. It only records the mystic beauty of the desert, the mystic thoughts with which that desert fills the author's mind and through which he, 'brought up far from the Church,' emerges into peace. His father 'had provided food for the intellect, but not for the soul.'[5] But Maxence is the unconscious inheritor of Latin Christianity. Its influence is felt throughout the book: he has that inheritance, and he has a copy of the Gospels.

And he has inherited something besides Latin Christianity. He was a grandson of Ernest Renan, and something of that Breton streak, that mentality which, as Mrs. Humphry Ward once wrote, is 'for ever moved by

[1] *A Soldier's Pilgrimage*: Publisher's note, p. xxxiii.
[2] *Ibid.* Preface p. viii.
[3] *Ibid.* Preface p. xix.
[4] *Ibid.* p. 215.
[5] *Ibid.* p. 7.

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sounds and sights to which other natures are insensible,' was his. And he has his grandfather's power of describing the things that move. He lived three years in Africa, he knows its voice, its moods. He brings the veritable desert, the relentless sunshine before us.

'No forms, no colour' [he writes]. 'Light without colour. One Personage alone counts, and that is the Sky. Immense, of a beautiful deep azure substance, it occupies all available space, and seems to be the most certain of created things. . . . The earth is visibly of no account at all except as a prop for this sky, and by the very fact of her thus accepting the part of a slave, she too points the way to fulness of heart and silent contemplation.'[1] 'There is no cloud, no obstacle of any kind to prevent the gaze from following the course of the sun. Man has been set down face to face with light; there is no shadow on the earth except his own, and that of his uncertain dwelling.'[2]

The book gives a haunting impression of infinitude: of spacious skies, of vast stretches of desert, of solitude, of emptiness, of silence. 'Le silence éternel de ces espaces infinis m'effraie,' said Pascal. They do not so affect Maxence. His is 'the scholastic of the heart, the dialectic of the feelings': he thinks and feels, he does not reason. But a conversion wrought by such means need not be the less certain or the less lasting. The heart has reasons. They must be reckoned among spiritual forces.

'Great things' [says Psichari] 'can assuredly be accomplished under such a sky. Its silence and its depth impress Maxence and drive him out of himself into that region which lies beyond the evidence of the senses and outside the narrow circle of egoism. And he says: "I feel that, beyond the fading beams of the horizon are all the souls of the Apostles, martyrs, and the innumerable army of Witnesses and Confessors. . . . I will not stand still, I will continue to go forward towards the highest type of humanity, towards the great people yonder behind the most distant line of the horizon, who are being swept along the track of Infinity by the breath of the Divine Spirit. . . ." The beautiful he could already perceive, and

[1] *A Soldier's Pilgrimage*: pp. 129, 130.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 131.

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through it he was drawing near to a knowledge of God. . . . And does he not already belong to Heaven, he who so desires it and who feels its mysterious attraction?'[1]

Then comes a time when even thought and feeling seem suspended:

'Maxence has ceased to think. . . . Just as the ebbing tide recedes to the farthest limits of the shore, so everything has receded before this man, leaving him only with a sense of space, as though the mansions of his soul had grown immeasurably greater. Everything has vanished, nothing exists any more, and over all the world hangs a feeling of intense expectation. Then he, who has struggled for so long, surrenders. The fighter falls on his knees. . . .

'Go on your way. And hope—hope on, out of the fulness of your heart and with all the strength of your renewed youth, and all other things shall be added unto you. . . .

'"Why, Lord! is it, then, so simple to love You?"'[2]

So *Le Voyage du Centurion* ends. The only English book with which we can compare it is *The Story of My Heart*. But how widely different are the surroundings, the setting, of the two souls! Around Richard Jefferies English fields and familiar hedgerows: around Maxence vast desert spaces and African skies. And how differently do the monologues end! Jefferies' whirlwind of mysticism, 'a mysticism beyond mysticism,' for which words are inadequate, and to which forms are unthinkable, ends in negation: the mysticism of the French soldier ends in the ordered religion of the Catholic Church.

II

The very thoughtful little book which stands next on our list, *Entretiens dans le tumulte*, has serious things to say, and it has been read and valued or it would not have reached its numerous editions. The friends whose conversations it records are at the Front. They are ex-

[1] *A Soldier's Pilgrimage*: pp. 167, 168, 169.
[2] *Ibid.* pp. 247, 249.

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periencing 'le plus monstreux assaut que la puissance des ténèbres ait donné aux âmes humaines.'[1] And then it ends, 'le péril, la besogne désespérante et l'oisiveté pire que la mort. . .'[2] It is over: 'les douces cloches de la paix ont fait pleurer, rire et rêver tous les villages de France. . . .'[3]

'Et maintenant, c'est fini! Les voici sortis des entrailles de l'enfer. Les voici, brusquement—ah! combien brusquement! —rendus au monde. . . .' And 'nous avions pu croire qu'ils renaîtraient; ils se contenteront de continuer. Et on ne peut pas le leur reprocher, et on les aime quand même; mais on a l'impression que ce n'était pas cela qu'ils espéraient, quand ils murmuraient, au plus fort de la misère: "Si je sors de là, je ne recommencerai pas à vivre comme autrefois. . . ."'[4]

Here is a sermon indeed, and it perhaps comes with new force now that years have intervened since the bells rang for peace: years which seem to have brought no regeneration, no higher seriousness. The little book candidly allows a want.

'Et pourtant, je te l'affirme, c'est une religion, une religion seule qui peut rétablir la paix dans les cœurs, dans la France et dans le monde. Mais quelle religion? quelle religion?'[5]

There the author leaves it, but returns to the thought or to like thoughts, to practical religion if undogmatical.

'Qui donc suit l'enseignement du Christ? Personne, absolument personne. Mais il est quand même merveilleux que le Christ ait parlé. Il a changé le parfum du monde, et c'est avec des mots qu'il a fait cela. Nous n'en sommes meilleurs ni les uns ni les autres; nous savons toutefois ce qu'il faudrait faire pour être meilleurs.'[6]

The closing words of the book perhaps give the key to the thoughts underlying the whole: to a gospel of morality, which yet has, surely, its root in Christianity.

[1] *Entretiens dans le tumulte*: p. 157. [2] *Ibid.* p. 157.
[3] *Ibid.* p. 156. [4] *Ibid.* pp. 157, 158, 159.
[5] *Ibid.* p. 165. [6] *Ibid.* p. 253.

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'Révolution? Oui! Mais entendez bien: il n'y a de vraie révolution que morale. Tout le reste est misère, sang gaspillé, larmes vaines.'[1]

It is a gospel indeed far removed from the mysticism of Huysmans; far removed from that of Fabre's gentle and good priests and religious, and of the faithful telling their beads as they walk through quiet streets under a noonday sun or kneel in the shadow of dark churches after their day's work. But to the present writer the book is full of charm as well as of thoughtfulness. It has been likened to *Friends in Council*, but the friends here are in the midst of an upheaval of which Milverton and Dunsford in the ordered tranquillity of their day had never dreamt: an upheaval, an experience, in the midst of which to have thought sanely was in itself a mental triumph.

III

Le Voyage du Centurion is the story of the heart of a mystic of our own day, *L'Épreuve du Fils* combines supernatural with practical religion. It never discards or belittles the first, but it demands the second also. 'And this commandment have we from Him, that he that loveth God love his brother also.'

Augustin Morlat, the hero of the book, is brought up by his aunt Ursula Morlat. It is a strange, sad childhood, shadowed first by absence from the mother he loved, and then by the bitter knowledge of her fault.

'Il n'aimait pas sa tante de la tendresse du cœur, mais il subissait la suggestion de tempérance et de piété qui émenait d'elle, de ce visage qu'elle avait, si austèrement doux, si pur, et dont l'aspect faisait penser à une hostie. Tandis que chez sa mère, tout le charmait en l'étonnant, il éprouvait avec sa tante le sentiment d'un accord profond, sans surprise possible. Il lui serait naturel de l'imiter. . . . Il avait pris l'habitude de l'accompagner chaque matin à la messe où elle communiait . . . À ces moments-là par la seule force de sa présence, elle

[1] *Entretiens dans le tumulte*: p. 269.

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apprenait au petit garçon à lever les yeux vers la vie éternelle. Le soir il retournait avec elle au salut. . . . Sa piété se transforma. Il se mit à prier Dieu . . . Et Dieu était venu à son secours et, peu à peu, cette grande idée de devenir prêtre avait pris possession de lui. . . .'[1]

He goes to the *Grand Séminaire* at Nevers and is ordained. His first Mass is described with the detail of a Huysmans, but with more simplicity. Matthew Arnold could recognize that 'the accessories of Catholicism' have 'a nobleness and amplitude,' and here all that is 'august and imaginative' in them is set forth in that limpid prose of which French writers are so absolutely masters.

He approaches his first curacy through 'blés bleutés, parsemés de coquelicot et la vigne en fleur qui répandait son frais parfum.'[2] He sees distant hills, he sees the forests of Berry, and the Loire

'en bleus méandres, lente et radieuse comme est lente une mélodie que le chantre achève à regret. . . . L'amplitude du paysage satisfaisait Augustin. Il sentait son âme pareille à cette terre vêtue de clarté, heureuse, forte et innocente, comme ces prairies en fleur. . . . Pas un recoin d'ombre en lui, pas un regret, pas un souvenir impur, rien qui put résister à l'irruption de l'allégresse divine. . . .'[3]

It might seem that he has reached the highest point in that august and supernatural life which he has chosen. But he has not yet learnt the not unaugust duties of human life. An hour after this radiant happiness in the first sight of wider horizons than he had ever known he is alone in his room at the Presbytère. The sky of his soul is darkened by a sudden storm of sadness:

'Il éprouva cette sorte d'angoisse qui vous étreint la première fois qu'on pénètre dans un lieu où l'on devra vivre. Les murs prennent possession de vous. Ils sont indifférents et réels comme le destin. "Ici, tu souffriras" semblent-ils dire avec une froide certitude.'[4]

[1] *L'Épreuve du Fils*: pp. 59, 60.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 118.
[3] *Ibid.* p. 117.
[4] *Ibid.* p. 127.

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It is the beginning of the revelation that something more is required of him than the august duties of the priesthood. He realizes that he owes a duty to his mother. He sees his duty, but he does not do it :

'C'était le dégoût persistant de la faute ; c'était la vieille rancune pour la déchéance familiale ; c'était plus intimement encore, la crainte de retrouver sa mère—image si chère, la seule dont son cœur eut jamais frémi—marquée dans toute sa personne par tant d'années d'une dépendance qui prolongeait le déshonneur.' [1]

He seeks for enchantments : he does not set his face towards the wilderness. But in the end he realizes that he is resisting the voice of conscience ; realizes it because he sees to what lower depths he might fall if God abandoned him. After a night of bitter struggle—*Jacob contre l'ange*—his resolution is made and peace comes with the surrender. He is greeted by a dawn in which even Nature seems to sympathize with him and to rejoice in the finished struggle.

'It cannot be
That I am he
On whom Thy tempests fell at night.'

'L'horizon avait la couleur des violettes, mais plus haut, d'ardentes ailes dépliaient au-dessus des collines leur plumage de feu. Augustin, tout ébloui, les contempla de minute en minute, dans leur fuite vers des profondeurs de pâle azur, jusqu'au moment où le soleil, surgissant derrière le profil gris de la terre, les dévora dans sa gloire. Il lui semblait avoir vu de célestes créatures, faisant un signe d'appel ou d'annonciation,—l'ombre éclatante des séraphins.' [2]

And how simple the difficult task has become ! 'Pourquoi ces jours et ces nuits d'angoisse, ces labyrinthes étouffants où il s'était perdu ?' At Mass each word of the prayers seems once more full of life and truth :

'ruisselant d'une lumière qui purifiait en lui jusqu'aux derniers plis d'ombre fétide. Il y avait si peu de jours encore qu'il avait prononcé les mêmes formules dans le grouillement du scrupule, dans les timidités d'une conscience qui n'est pas droite,

[1] *L'Épreuve du Fils* : p. 209. [2] *Ibid.* p. 216.

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dans l'angoisse et la honte d'être devant le Maître le serviteur qui se refuse, l'ami qui se reprend. Maintenant il était délivré.' [1]

The lesson, the message, of the book is surely found in the text which Augustin quotes after his awakening. ' Celui qui n'aime pas son frère qu'il voit, comment aimera-t-il Dieu qu'il ne voit pas ? ' The priesthood and its duties are never belittled or denied their high place, but they offer no substitute for the humbler duties of the man.

And in reading these books of to-day we find the old grace, the old charm, the old joyousness of soul. The war has not swept these things away. It would, as we have said, be idle to suppose that they will appeal to all alike. But they may at least be taken as representing what is going on, thoughts that are being thought, lives that are being lived. They take us into the inner citadel of at least some hearts, reveal something to us. And the revelation is one to which at least some hearts will respond.

[1] *L'Épreuve du Fils* : pp. 225, 226.

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ART. IV.—THE PHILOSOPHY OF REDEMPTIVE POWER IN CHRISTIAN WORSHIP.

1. *Liturgical Prayer: Its History and Spirit.* By the Right Reverend FERNAND CABROL, O.S.B., Abbot of Farnborough. (English Translation.) (London: Burns, Oates and Washbourne Ltd. 1922.)

2. *The Art of Public Worship.* By PERCY DEARMER, D.D., Professor of Ecclesiastical Art, King's College, London. (London: A. R. Mowbray and Co. 1920.)

IF some wizard could suddenly arrest an ordinary crowd of passers-by, say in Trafalgar Square, and persuade each unit in that crowd to reveal the state of his soul, both the pyschologist and the Christian preacher might hear much that would be news to them.

At that strange penitents' bench every member would be found desiring something. The greater number would be found to desire—that is, merely desiring, apart from believing or expecting—the Kingdom of God, and this more emphatically than our psychologists might lead us to suppose.

But on the other hand, the number of those to whom any Christian formula of the burden of sin, of consciousness of offence given to a loving God, and of desire for the forgiveness of such offence conveyed any true meaning would be very small.

It would probably be found that while men desire God's Kingdom and wish to be redeemed from all the hindrances and frustrations of His rule, yet they desire this redemption vaguely or in some fashion of their own. Perhaps no one in all the crowd would be looking to the actual Church as aware of the secret of their soul's real grief or capable of ministering to them any salvation that they could really desire.

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To one man The Kingdom means happiness, to another success, to another an immortality of fame. To many it means Progress, and they believe in progress—especially British progress. To some the Kingdom is a kind of general millennium, a social paradise, or a communistic paradise. A few would be found to believe in a kind of prosperous after-life, apart from anything that could be called redemption. There are some who believe in the general persistence of the ego, or personality, as a natural evolutionary advance. Spiritualists and persons who cultivate the New Thought look for an enlargement of their individualities, for a real career after death. There are stouthearted folk so sure of their own personality that they feel pregnant with perpetual advance, and capable of infinite adaptation to after-death environments, and of infinite persistence after bodily death.

But how many would be thinking of the soul in the Christian sense? And what of those who desire salvation of some kind, but have no trust or expectation of ever meeting with it?

Much that was once generous desire has been broken up into selfishness and cynicism. Many a one is conscious of having wandered down blind alleys and followed vain lures. In his disillusionment he is contemptuous of all optimism. Others have retained high ideals in the heart, but buried them under self-gratification, injustice, untruth, and 'the world's slow stain.' Of course in such a crowd there would be also the open sinner, the criminal, and the social outcast. But, these apart, what a burden of grief of mind, grief of soul, of shattered nerves, of hardness, of chains, of imprisonment, of frustration! The general tone would be one of cynical practicality, mated to the good-humoured tolerance so proverbially characteristic of a British crowd.

To sum up, the members of our crowd desire but do not believe in a new creature—not indeed a new creature of moral righteousness after the old Puritan ideal, but a creature of new spiritual richness. The thoughtful modern man desires inspiration and a well of delight. He wants to be saved from the slavery of materialistic fetters and curbs, from the walls that cut off the horizon and hamper the free

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movement of his personality. He wants to enjoy himself, his spirit, his identity, and the universe too, and to do so unceasingly. But he does not recognize this desire in any Christian category. He does not say he wants to be saved from sin and death. For the offer of any such salvation has hitherto come to him only, or at least chiefly, in a Puritan garb, a wearisome and hateful garb smelling of the camphor of negatives, of 'shalt nots.' Still the average modern man does genuinely want some kind of regeneration, some real if vaguely conceived new creation. Rightly apprehended our Christianity is fully able to satisfy all these lips, thirsting in their different ways for the cup of life.

But the real meaning of Christian Redemption has never been grasped by any save a very, very few of the members of our crowd. The meaning has not been grasped because it has not been truly presented. Most men ignore Christ because they have been led to suppose that He had nothing to offer but a puny semblance of their real, if only half-conscious, life desire. The average man feels, and with reason, that the average teacher or preacher does not offer him such a *copiosa redemptio* as could really satisfy him. For the average estimate of Christianity is that its secret is chiefly an ethical one and the average man feels that ethics, while useful in the conduct of the world's affairs and of his own, are yet not life, and that what he is most conscious of, what he vaguely thinks of as himself, is not craving so much for instruction as for some deeper and more personal satisfaction. Man wants the satisfaction of his physical and psychical ego. For if the things done in the body can stain the soul, it is true also that the soul cannot be truly satisfied without the body. Man is a complete entity and not an hotel containing three separate inhabitants—body, soul, and spirit, to be catered for without reference to one another. So his religion must appeal to the whole man and not merely restrain the body and exercise the intellect. Having a philosophy of life may be helpful, but it is not the same as having a religion. How is it then that out of such a crowd as we have pictured many men of real religious capacity are

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left unattracted by Christianity? Is it not partly because the redemption, the comprehensive saving offered in the Christian Gospel, is to be found and conveyed less in and through preaching than in and through worship? Is not the philosophy of the Christian Hope enshrined in Christian worship rather than in Christian preaching? For he who truly worships knows that he is in touch with the riches of life and existence. For if the Father seeks those who will worship Him in spirit and truth, it is not as a sovereign desiring courtiers, but as a bird hovering with food in the beak desires that the fledglings should open their mouths. And sacrifice and sacrificial death are efficacious worship. And Christ who spoke of the rewards of sincere worship saved the world, not by preaching theology, but by worshipping supremely on Calvary. And in doing so He justified man's instinctive sense that worship, brought to the pitch and intensity of true sacrifice, of the inner self-giving of which the sacrifice is the expression, is a living, constructive, creative and productive force. Israel's first Passover was an act of worship which drew the saving presence of Jehovah down among His people and made them a nation. One needs no faith but merely an ordinary historical sense to see that the temple-centred, sacrificing Judaism was pregnant of a world Christ, but the later Judaism, though intellectual and ethical, gives birth only to a Mahomet, a Spinoza. A man may be trained and disciplined in the Synagogue, but in the Temple he can be transcended. Prayer and preaching educate, build up the moral and intellectual man, but sacrifice creates, and has therefore its element of mystery, and like all creative forces, invites our co-operation rather than our exact analysis. Like other vital impulses the impulse to sacrifice is instinctive, and this is why the appeal of Calvary is so wide and deep and immediate. The human race sees itself there in the presence of a self-giving which it intuitively recognizes as creative, so that it is prepared to see a great harvest springing from the burial of such a seed, and is not staggered at the thought that a new world—not merely a new moral world, but a comprehensive influx of life for all the groaning and

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travailing creation—should have its foundations upon the perfect sacrificial worship of Calvary, should rest upon the surrendered life of Christ as upon the shoulders of a new and unwearying Atlas.

For the self-offering on Calvary broke with the traditions of human nature, overcame the tendencies which frustrate divine fruitfulness. We are so used now to the thought of gain out of loss, life out of death, that we are not arrested by the paradox of Calvary long enough to be moved by it as the Centurion was moved. Christ had won few disciples when He said 'I, if I be lifted up, will draw all men,' but even in that crude, brief summary of St. Peter's early preaching, one sees how Christ's sacrifice awoke a like spirit in those who contemplated it.

But to 'lift up' Christ in these days, so that He can be seen and 'draw,' is more difficult because thick clouds of theological and conventional phraseology obscure the view. We need to make a fresh start with Christian worship as the centre of Christian philosophy, and the real begetter of the creed.

Liberal and modernist critics undermine Christian sacrificial worship, or attempt to do so by claiming to trace its origin to totemism, taboo, magic, or animistic superstition, the wish to buy off ghosts, to propitiate tutelar gods, or to identify the tribe with the flesh and blood and consequently with the life and personal existence of its god.

But supposing sacrificial worship is philosophically defensible? Suppose there is something more vital in worship than those who see in it a mere aid to edification and sanctimony have allowed?

Suppose there is such a thing as a human nature of the ages, a nature with characteristics persisting even in the crowd of to-day? May not the sacrificial system which has roots in the tribal gathering, and fibres in the heart of primitive man, bear blossom of true promise to-day?

Just as fantastic ways of feasting and fantastic marriage customs do not disprove hunger and sex, so the old taboo and magic does not disprove religious need. There are certain great essentials, certain firsts and lasts uniting man-

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kind, or indeed forming the very stuff of human nature, and therefore as purposeful and significant to-day as ever they were.

Modern psychology teaches us to look more deeply into the recesses of human nature, to seek for a greater and more vital impulse behind human action, than could be supplied by a mere imitative custom.

The question is not: Is there a comparison between Pagan and Christian custom, but is there any intrinsic quality in humanity as a whole which must express itself in religious acts? If sophisticated peoples only made use of sacrifice and worship, we might suppose that institutional religion was an invention like a piano or the rules of a game. But even that would be a superficial judgement, for the strength of the hold of the piano and the organized game is in their appeal to the love of music and motion so general among healthy beings.

But if we find the most primitive peoples practising religious rites, however crude these rites may be, we are obliged to acknowledge that there is in the human *psyche* a hunger that is not satisfied by filling the mouth, or by reproducing the species; there is, in short, a spiritual nature with its own innate desires, its hunger for sustenance, union and increase.

After all the race does not change so greatly. The first human baby ever born needed fresh air and milk, the last to be born is likely to have the same necessities. If our modern sacrifice bears such resemblance to an ancient rite as a fur coat to a raw hide, or an embroidered robe to an apron of leaves, that is no reason for discarding it. The motive that led to the use of the one still makes the other desirable.

As Patmore said, Christianity is a true 'experimental science' and has probed into human nature with insight and judgement. It has gently handled the whole make-up of man, including his maladies.

There was complete knowledge of the material to be redeemed before the enterprise of redemption was undertaken. It is true that this adequacy of Christianity is not

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so apparent in any religious science or doctrine as in the implications of its redemptive activities. By examining a man's tools one may discover not only the craft of the man but the nature of the substance upon which he works, and the tool of Christianity at once indicates our human nature and is indicated by it.

It is generally agreed that there is in human nature some quality or latent possibility, some primary substance or tendency which makes of the human race a real *genus homo*, and not merely a species of animal. For the greatest capacity displayed by the greatest man must yet be latent in the race. One may cultivate a wild daffodil and improve its size and colouring or modify its form and colour in many ways, but one cannot give it characteristics that are at variance with the nature of a daffodil, except by calling in some exterior life, by crossing the daffodil with some other species not too far removed. So whatever we find in man to-day was latent in the primary man. The modern psychologist seems to overlook this fact. He is always analyzing man as if there were none but a fictitious or conventional difference between the animal who is also man and the animal who is not man; as if man were merely an exaggerated animal running to brain. The psychologist blinds us with words. He calls religion a manifestation of the 'herd instinct,' but the herding of all animals who are only animals has reference to their physical safety, yet religion over and over again sends man into physical danger, and some communities have risked extinction and even suffered extinction in the name of their religion. Moreover, religious founders have always begun by stepping out of the herd in which they found themselves. Gautama, Abraham, Mahomet, and our own Founder, were all distinguished by their strong sense of personal relationship, not with any herd, but with what they felt to be a transcending though invisible influence whose allurement was stronger even than the call of parenthood, the hope of nationhood, or personal bodily safety.

It is true that religious founders have shewn the shepherd instinct, but that entails loneliness, and has usually been

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accepted in obedience to a supposed mandate from an unseen lord of shepherd and herd.

And the object of all such religious herding has transcended all animal herding. The animal creeps away from the herd when it feels the approach of death. The deer dies alone in the brake, the doe hides her young. But it is actually death that gives value to the religious herd. Death, and not the hunt for the means of life, is the bond between man and his religion. In the most primitive, as in the most sophisticated worship, can be traced the working of man's intuitive sense of the fruitfulness of religious fellowship; its capacity for creating a kind of collective body and soul in which the individual can get nearer to the god, and through which a substratum, a nucleus, a foothold is provided for the survival of human existence—the single human life which would otherwise be at the mercy of death, finding thus survival in the ark it has helped to build, a body which is in part the child of the human faith or religion and in part its foster parent.

For what is that conviction of the necessity of sacrifice which runs through all religions but an intuition that worship of an intensity which entails the surrender of life to the god must be creatively breeding a life beyond the mortal existence of man? Christianity, coming not as revolution, but as fulfilment, has no need to deny these pagan adumbrations of the truth. The seat of the tribal god's presence with his people was their unity, the collective body of worshippers. The assistants at a sacrifice felt that as they identified themselves with the offering, as they brought firstlings of the flock or spoil of war and willingly surrendered these, so they provided their god with a point of vantage, a lever, a sort of body, knit of the substance of the tribe, so that the god should be both a citizen and soldier among them, and a captain of their future adventure across the bridge of death.

And Christianity with its promised blessing to the united prayer, the united worship of two or three, acknowledges these primitive instincts as true. Man's sacrificial worship, undertaken in that creative intensity on which the prophets

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insisted, does really help to dissever phases of our bodily life. It takes the subservience to self, and sacrifices the life position to God in the hope of higher fruitfulness in the survival state, in that Mystical Body which is built up organically out of the worship and sacrifice of the living believers. Man has by nature not only the spirit of companionship and sympathy, as distinct from the herd or hunting or defending spirit, but he has also spiritual fellowship. He can by means of such fellowship set free creatively a real element of his own life. His self-dedication in co-operation with that of others becomes pregnant and brings forth a life which is not subject to the death of the body. For to suppose that all the instinctive worship and sacrifice which man, following his instincts, has offered and will offer, is ineffectual, is to suppose that the universe is inconsistent with itself, that appetite does not imply the existence of food, that the eye was not meant for seeing nor the ear for hearing.

The Christian religion acknowledges the spiritual nature, the capacity for fruitfulness in fellowship even of a temporal order, and it finds such fellowship everywhere frustrated or hindered and imperfect and it sets about a business of repair, of restoration of the birthright of true manhood. Christianity takes the pagan in his uneasy spiritual adolescence and shews him how to become a man, how to exercise all his manly prerogatives.

But if worship is so effectual and makes such revelation of the nature of man and the redemption provided by God, how is it that while there has recently been an increased sense of the value of worship, there are still such multitudes of persons almost untouched by its influence and largely ignorant of its possibilities?

The answer lies, so far as the cause is special and not part of the general imperfection and ignorance of the world, in the history of Christianity. The traditional cultus of Christianity, centred as it is in the Liturgy, is now recognized as shewing a grasp of the meaning of life which is rather in line with the pagan grasp than in contrast to it. The Christian cultus neglected the chance expression, but saved the

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underlying humanism. Even now a Greek of the days of Aeschylus, could he be recalled, might more readily comprehend some elements, even of reformed Christianity, than the average member of a modern crowd. For the first Gentile converts to Christianity were drawn, not out of Teutonic heathenism, but out of Classic paganism, and no religion which failed to satisfy the instincts hitherto fostered, however imperfectly, could have appealed successfully to men so experienced in worship, mystical and sacrificial. If the inhabitants of old Corinth or Imperial Rome could be brought into our London churches to-day, would they not be at home just in proportion as they found worship rather than moral instruction as the key-note? These pagans would, by training and custom, be prepared to recognize those non-moral but vital and cosmic implications which still assert themselves in our Liturgy, though we so often miss and ignore them. Such pagans would readily see in the Church, and especially in the liturgical keeping of all the sacred seasons of the Eternal Life, a solemn assertion of survival, and therefore of the purpose, the worth of this present life. And if life is purposive and survival provided for, then it is worth while to seek for forgiveness of sins.

It is because our modern Christianity has failed to persuade men that there is an eternal purpose in life that men of to-day are so indifferent about the forgiveness of their sins. St. Peter of old first shewed his hearers that the Christ could not be holden by that so willingly suffered death, that the seeming tangle of an unjust execution was yet full of purpose and destiny and crowned with triumph, and then roused their consciences till they cried 'What shall we do?' For if life is without purpose and without final goal that justifies the way, how can it be worth while to repent or to seek approach to any eternal indwelling or over-ruling Spirit?

In the Middle Ages the Resurrection stood in the foreground. Men built well, worked well, studied well, sought to build up a character, a personality for eternity. It was a time of great sinners, conscious of gambling with eternity, and of great saints to whom the earthly life was much less

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than the puling infancy of the larger life. To such a religious state various names have been given. According to their bias writers speak with varying suggestion of approval or contempt of the 'sacramental,' the 'quasi-pagan' or the 'plastic-art' developments in religious practice. In this country the term used by M. Loisy, 'Mystical-Catholic,' has been adopted, and this phrase, however technically accurate, can yet be misleading, because the word 'mystical' is so often used to express a tendency to independence of sacramental or institutional religion, whereas the true Catholic mystic sees in worship—sacrificial and sacramental—an infinitely real, vital, and creative force. The term 'mystical-Catholic' should be restricted to the definition of what the ancients called 'mystery-religion' and should not be confused with that devout Christian realism, the fruit of solitary prayer and meditation, that intuition of divine truth, which at its highest is known as mystical inspiration.

To avoid confusion, the two principal components of religion may for the purpose of this article be spoken of as the 'Resurrection element' and the 'Forgiveness element.' By the 'Resurrection element' is meant the assurance of man's place in the universe, of purpose and plan in his life cycle, of the power of religion to conduct him and his personality through the disintegrating state of bodily death, through all the dread changes of cosmic evolution, to be, in short, for him that 'strait gate' and 'narrow road' that leads to life.

By the 'Forgiveness element' is meant that influence upon the individual will and inclination that leads to conversion, to the desire for innocence and holiness, to the seeking for forgiveness of sin and the formation of a character worthy of the Resurrection destiny and capable of life in a purified state.

It was with this 'Resurrection element' that the Reformers in manifest good faith did battle. They saw in the Catholic 'provision for resurrection' an unscriptural complexity and even an exploitation of man's burdened conscience, and superstitious credulity.

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The Reformers had no intention of rejecting or belittling the first section of the message of the New Testament, namely the Resurrection, the witness to the purposiveness of life through sacrifice. But that form of expression of the World Hope which had been suitable for the soul of Mediterranean humanity, with its Greco-Roman tradition, did not adequately appeal to the mentally newly rich of this island, for whom pagan Greek and Latin religions were as specimens in a museum and not the dust of their fathers. But the imperfect presentation—if such it were—on the Catholic side; and the imperfect grasp on the Protestant side, need not have led to this modern wide-spread indifference as to whether there be a forgiveness of sins, had not the Reformers' philosophy of life turned upon the assumption of the prescriptive immortality of the soul as upon a pivot. The Reformers were so anxious for the honour of the sacrifice on Calvary as sufficient and complete, so anxious to see Christ as the substituted Lamb, that they forgot that He was also 'Captain of our Salvation' and as such to be followed through sacrifice to resurrection. The sacrificial worship that they knew seemed to them mediatorial and therefore superfluous, because the soul, intrinsically immortal, had only needed forgiveness from Calvary. But this prescriptive immortality does not appeal to the modern man accustomed to see all things in movement, to calculate on ebb and flow, supply and demand, give and take. For the modern man is nearer to the ancient world in his scepticism about life's purpose and persistence than to the world of the Reformation. The word of the Church means little to him because he hears many voices and reads many messages. But function is another matter. He knows that for function there must be an organism. He would believe in the Church if he knew that it functioned as nothing else could function. When he sees worship as a creative act, when he enters into the atmosphere of worship and is aware of loss, of sacrifice willingly endured, willingly offered, and abundantly fruitful in himself, he will realize what the Church is for, what her function is, what is man's need of her, and what the setting free of God's power within her.

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But how is the modern man to be drawn into an atmosphere of worship? How can his definite unbelief or his vague indifference be beguiled for the moment so that worship may have its chance? How is the careless passer-by to become at least an onlooker?

Can the original significance of those Christian seasons, the keeping of which is now a pious tradition of the orthodox, be made efficacious for our modern crowds? It is obviously not enough to invite the passer-by to turn aside at Christmas to see the demonstration of the Word made Flesh, or at Passiontide to see the world reconstituted. A reluctant and incredulous world must be taken by surprise. We have had missions of fellowship, but no mission of worship, and yet only worship can give a body to this abstract fellowship soul. We must somehow bring men into the presence of such a worship as they shall recognize to be creative, competent for spiritual generation as domestic love is competent for physical generation. And this regeneration through worship must not be thought of as mere moral reform or even rebirth, but as a fruitful budding of our whole humanity absolutely, comprehensively, and eternally.

Something much more than mere pulpit work is required to open the ideas of the average man to the vital force of worship. Only in the presence of worship can he be led to worship and cry with à Kempis, 'Taceant humani doctores quum Veritas Ipsa loquitur.' But this Truth Itself that speaks must not be narrowed down. The craving for union, for perpetuation, for increase of life, for reconciliation, for completeness and satisfaction must be acknowledged and met. The note of reality, the sense of assisting at a real creative work, of providing organic support for human fellowship, must be there. For this work of arousing knowledge of, and interest in, the real power of worship, a certain amount of artistic skill, of ability to judge of the mental and emotional effect of the words and music and actions used is necessary. To those brought up with a traditional and experimental experience of worship the old, old forms will be ever fresh and increasingly effective, but for the attraction of the untrained all sources should be

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ransacked. Hymns with too many particular associations should be avoided in favour of hymns, psalms or poems suggesting the encompassing love of God linking up our whole humanity and all the inanimate and animate creation.

One day's worship might seek to effect especially the projecting of each individual soul out of itself towards the entity formed by all the souls united in worship. Some intelligent idea of a Body Mystical, some guess as to how Christ might be the living Head of such a Body, of how salvation may be won through the unifying power of worship, might be conveyed.

Another day of worship might be directed especially to the lovingkindness of God, taking care to let those present feel that there was no ignoring of modern modes of apprehending life and natural providence. By natural providence is meant that arrangement which gives to every acorn a power of growth, yet leaves that latent power dependent on favourable conditions. Man can make these favourable conditions for his own spiritual growth, for his own fruitfulness. In conjunction with his fellows he can provide an organism, a Body, in which God's providence can be effectual. For the overcoming of death is within this Body of Love not because God has an arbitrary liking for a narrow Church, but because the Church can and does subserve Nature. The Church is the favourable ground in which the conversion, regeneration and redemption which are potential in actual human nature become effectual. The Church is truly the Body Mystical, the organic vital unity in which the single cell can live. The Body Mystical is not a magical body, it is slowly synthesized. Divine Love concurred with evolution for an eternity before we were made, and will concur for an eternity after we have been made. The Body Mystical is not merely an organism useful to divine providence, it is that providence itself.

Another day of worship will reveal especially Christ and the creative efficacy of that sacrificial worship without whose aid all that we mean by Heaven would cease to exist for us.

The true nature of man and of God as learnt on the former days of worship would prepare for this worship of

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Christ. Christ would be seen to be that 'grace divine' by whose help we say 'O Nature, we are thine.' But though we can accept the teaching of Immanence that there is a divine image within us that can be universally redeemed, this redemption is yet not the easy affair that some of our Immanentists would have us believe. On the contrary Christ Himself only effected with all the agony of Gethsemane and Calvary the needed creative and perpetually fruitful sacrifice. Not the most orthodox of theologians could exaggerate the difficulty, the genius, the perfection of creative skill by which the Unique Artificer brought the power of sacrifice latent in the nature of things into effective and fruitful activity.

Christ's death delicately opened the breast of mankind's loving remembrance. Christ is Redeemer because our personality can become so identified with His that with Him we enter and win fruitful remembrance in the Mystical Body. For the identity of each soul is the fruit of endless corporate self-giving, a self-giving which means progress towards an unending communion with all the divine sources of life within the universe.

Our Christ worship should awaken the artist and artificer within ourselves. We can through pupilship to our Master shape our paradise and our immortality, and it is in the act of creation that we find out the meaning of the risen body.

All this is naturally not the work of a day or two, but yet a day or two may see the work begun. Man may have a glimpse of the creative purpose of life which shall arouse his interest in sacrificial worship, and draw him on till he knows what it is to be born again, to give of his perishing bread and wasting water, and taste of the living bread of Christ's providing and the water which wells up into everlasting life.

RICHARD DE BARY.

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ART. V.—THE TRINITIES OF NON-CHRISTIAN RELIGIONS.

1. *The Religion of Babylonia and Assyria.* By MORRIS JASTROW. (Boston, U.S.A.: Ginn and Co. 1898.)
2. *The Religions of Ancient Egypt and Babylonia.* By A. H. SAYCE. (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark. 1902.)
3. *Religion of the Ancient Egyptians.* By A. WIEDEMANN. (London: H. Grevel and Co. 1897.)
4. *The Religions of India.* By E. W. HOPKINS. (Boston, U.S.A.: Ginn and Co. 1895.)
5. *The Soul of India.* By G. HOWELLS. (London: James Clark and Co., and Kingsgate Press. 1913.)
6. *Bhagavad-Gita.* Edited by L. BARNET. (London: J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd. 1905.)
7. *Studies in Japanese Buddhism.* By A. K. REISCHAUER. (New York: The Macmillan Co. 1917.)
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10. *Philo: De Vita Contemplativa.* Edited by F. C. CONYBEARE. (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1895.)
11. *The Philosophy of Plotinus.* By W. R. INGE, D.D. (London: Longmans, Green and Co. 1918.)
12. *Comparative Theology.* By J. A. MACCULLOCH. (London: Methuen and Co. 1902.)
13. *The Doctrine of the Incarnation.* By R. L. OTTLEY, D.D. (London: Methuen and Co. 1911.)

And other works.

THE comparative study of religion confirms the fact that religious devotion has never really been satisfied with a

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God devoid of attributes. Practical religion looks for a deity which will satisfy man's many aspirations, and help him in every phase of his existence, so that the variety of human endeavour has given colour to the supreme object of devotion. This diversity of human interest accounts also for the 'gods many and lords many' of non-Christian religions which have not grown out of the pre-philosophic stage of their religious evolution. It is this desire for a God correlative to the many-sided nature of man that produced the Zoroastrian Ahura Mazda, with so rich a wealth of attributes—attributes which became separate distinctions within the unity of the Godhead, so that the divine abstractions of Right, Good Thought, Piety, Dominion, Welfare, and Immortality even crystallized, in a later age, into archangels outside the being of God.

On the other hand reflective religion has ever sought for a unity within the manifold of the Divine Idea. The intellect wants a unifying centre round which it can orientate its ideals, in order to produce a systematic harmony.

Theology has endeavoured to satisfy this twofold attitude of religion—the practical and the reflective—in various ways. It has made an attempt at harmony by arranging its gods into a hierarchy of divine beings, or by making them manifestations of an underlying pantheistic principle. A wide-spread method, however, has been to arrange the chief deities into small groups, the most prevalent being the triad, the members of the group being treated as bound together by a deeper unity. The polytheism of India, for example, represents the manifold of its primitive and unreflective devotion, the Vedanta philosophy its intellectual quest for unity, the two moments finding a synthesis in the dogmatic construction of the theological schools, the Trimurti of Brahma, Vishnu, and Siva. The doctrines of the Trinity, therefore, in the religions of the world are, for the most part, attempted solutions of the philosophic quest as applied to the conception of God, *viz.* the desire to find unity within the manifold of the Divine Idea.

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The religions of the world teem with such trinities and triads, but the student of the comparative study of religion needs to exercise great care in making comparisons between them and the Trinity of the Christian Creed. It is very easy, with such an accumulation of undigested material provided by the archaeologist, the traveller, the anthropologist, and the historian, to treat as cognate or parallel doctrines to the Christian conception, theological ideas which are in their development and outlook totally different. The first missionaries to China, overjoyed by their discoveries, thought that they had found in the Tao of Lao-tze a parallel to the Christian teaching on the threefold nature of God, so that Montucci thought that none who read the *Tao-Teh-King* could doubt 'that the mystery of the Holy Trinity was revealed to the Chinese five centuries before Christ.'[1] Amiot's translation of the Tao as Khi, Hi, and Wei, had led people astray. The truth of this once famous Trinitarian theory was doubted by Julien in his translation of the *Tao-Teh-King*, and since 1842 it has been entirely discredited.[2] Lao-tze may have written 'Tao produced Unity, Unity produced Duality, Duality produced Trinity; and Trinity produced all existing objects,'[3] but the Tao of the Chinese sage—the unitary mystic reality underlying phenomena—is by no means the Heavenly Father spoken of by Jesus Christ, nor is the evolution of phenomena from Tao similar to the tri-personal distinctions within the Godhead as formulated in the Christian Creed. A numerical similarity was thus mistaken for a resemblance in idea. The work of the comparative study of religions then is to sift very carefully the mass of material with which it is confronted, in order to discover where non-Christian trinities are or are not parallel to the Christian doctrine, and even if, in the end, we discover few true analogies to the Christian Trinity, our study will not have been in vain, for their very divergencies from the Christian faith will prove instructive and illuminating to

[1] Art. 'Lao-tze,' *Enc. Brit.*, vol. 16, p. 192 (*b*).
[2] *Le livre de la voie et de la vertu*, 1842.
[3] *Tao-Teh-King*, sect. 42, § 1.

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us in endeavouring to harmonize the many parallel developments of the evolution of religious phenomena.

If on the one hand man's inveterate love of the number 'three' has led students of religion into discovering analogies which do not exist, on the other hand comparative religion is shewing more and more that man's religious longings are at the bottom strikingly similar all the world over, and the triads which are found in other religions may, in many cases, be real parallels to the Christian Creed, owing to the indubitable fact that man is everywhere fundamentally the same—a religious being, and as such the channel of Divine revelation.

We propose to consider, within the limits allowed by an article of this kind, one or two of the most prominent of non-Christian trinities, at the same time comparing them with the Christian doctrine. It is our desire in such comparisons to be quite fair and scientific in our treatment of the subjects under discussion, and we sincerely hope that our devotion to Jesus and His teaching will not blind us to the great issues which are at stake when comparisons are being made between religions that have for centuries captivated the hearts of nations.

From very early times man seems to have had a predilection for the number three, and triads are to be found in practically every religion—triads of gods or triads of ideas. The Vedic threefold stride of Vishnu, or threefold nature of Agni, the Hindu mystic A–U–M or sectarian Trimurti, the Buddhist Triratna formula or Trikaya doctrine, the Babylonian amalgamation of Anu, Bel, and Ea, the Egyptian Father–Mother–Son, the Homeric world-division between Zeus, Hades, and Poseidon, the Capitoline Jupiter, Minerva, and Juno, are a few examples of such a tendency to form triads. Aristotle indeed denied the possibility of the fourth dimension, on the ground that 'all things are three and three is everywhere; for, as the Pythagoreans say, the all and all things are determined by the number three.' (Arist. *De Caelo* I, 1.) [1]

Dr. Macculloch states that non-Christian Trinities 'are

[1] *Vide* Inge, *The Philosophy of Plotinus*, vol. i, p. 122.

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often the mere result of an accidental grouping, which has then received a theological meaning or symbolism; or, as in the Sabellian doctrine, they are emanations or appearances of the Supreme Deity.'[1] It is not fair, however, to dismiss triads summarily as accidents, for accidents have causes, and need explaining. In this connexion we might consider the Babylonian triads, which seem to be the most accidental of trinities, amalgamations which 'were loosely constructed and had apparently no significance for the local and royal cults.'[2] As an example, let us take the well-known Anu–Bel–Ea amalgamation. The three deities came together because they were the gods most prominent in men's minds and dear to their hearts, the prominence of Bel and Ea being due to the fact that the city-states that worshipped them prospered, and prosperity rendered the tutelary deity famous as the author of its worshippers' fortunes. As separate local deities these gods were dear to men, but theological schools set to work to find unity within the manifold of one of the most complex and crude polytheisms the world has ever witnessed. Consequently the 'representative idea' of deity arose. The universe was parcelled out between three deities, and these spiritual beings represented respectively their particular portion of the universe, including the remaining gods of that portion. The Anu–Bel–Ea triad is therefore not an arbitrary association of local deities, but an amalgamation made with the object of acquiring a more satisfactory theory of the divine and of enabling the worshipper to propitiate all the powers of the universe under a single formula. Bel, designated by Tiglath Pileser I 'the father of the gods,' the god of the earth is linked with Anu the god of heaven, and Ea the god of the deep, thus bringing the worshipper into touch with the gods of the whole universe. Dr. Jastrow comments on this triad as follows:

'When therefore Anu Bel and Ea were invoked, it was equivalent to naming all the powers that influenced the fate of man.

[1] *Comparative Theology*, p. 88.
[2] Toy, *Introduction to the History of Religions*, p. 329 *n*.

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They embraced as it were the three kingdoms of the gods, within which all the other gods could be comprised.'[1]

There is just so much Tri-unity in the idea, as the attempt to embrace the many gods of a very polytheistic religion under one formula is a crude attempt to harmonize the manifold of the Babylonian pantheon; but a systematic attempt to do so was never made. We might compare this parcelling out of the universe with the partitioning of the universe by lot among the three brethren, Zeus, Hades, and Poseidon, in the Homeric Epic. But a nearer ana'ogy is to be found in the classification of the gods of ancient India by the earliest commentator on the *Rig Veda* (Yaska, c. 500 B.C.) into the deities of Earth (Agni etc.), Air (Indra etc.), and Bright Heaven (Surya etc.), the three gods Agni, Indra, and Surya, sometimes standing as representatives of the remaining deities. It is well to observe, however, that in Babylon the making of triads such as the one we are considering was not a popular movement. It arose in academic circles and never influenced the worship of the masses to any very great extent. The schoolmen were aided in their choice by the Anu–Bel duad of Hammurabi, these two gods having, according to this ruler's account, given him sovereignty over the land. In the hands of the theological schools the triad partook of a formal character, though the individual members, in isolation from the trinity, were felt to be living deities. When rulers appealed to Bel or Marduk alone, the god was felt to be near and dear to the worshipper, and the relationship existing between the man and his god was felt to be a living one, replete with warmth and glowing vitality. The triad, however, shared the nature (in a religion of magic) rather of an incantation formula, and thus lost its profoundly religious significance. It was used, for instance, on monumental inscriptions, where the formal curse of Anu Bel and Ea was directed towards any who destroyed the works of art for which ancient Babylonia was famed.[2] The work

[1] *Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, p. 147.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 149.

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of fixing the names of the months, according to Sargon, was ascribed to Anu Bel and Ea.[1] Parallel with this tendency to become formal was the loss of personality in the gods which were linked together. The triad occurs in the fourth tablet of the Creation series, and there it marks the introduction of fixed order into the universe. The personification of chaos (Tiamat) is slain by the hero-god Marduk, who becomes chief deity, and the mention of the fact that 'he established the districts of Anu Bel and Ea' means that he brought order into the universe. The formal character of the gods is here so prominent that their personalities seem to have faded away, the triad practically becoming a symbol for the eternal laws of the universe.[2]

When we come to place the Babylonian triad side by side with the Christian Trinity, we find the distinction between them too glaring to need a long discussion. The Babylonians were grossly polytheistic, and to the end the monuments reveal not only triads but combinations of varying numbers from duads upwards. The Christian idea of God is due to the growing knowledge by man of the *one* God, the culmination of the prophetic teaching of the Old Testament, the unfolding of the Divine Nature by revelation, so that the Divine Unity, in the light of the teaching of Jesus on the Fatherhood of God, the Divine Humiliation and the Spirit of Truth, is found to be threefold in distinction, but one in essence. On the other hand, the Babylonian triads are due to the amalgamation of local deities, and though the aim was to harmonize, it never reached the stage of unification, the triads were purely tritheistic and polytheism reigned supreme. With regard to the personality of the individual members of the triad in contrast with the impersonality of the whole triad, just as any member alone, Anu Bel *or* Ea, was thought of as a personal and living deity, so it does not seem untrue to say that centering the thought on One Person of the Christian Trinity arouses a more living and vital religious feeling

[1] Jastrow, *Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, pp. 208–236.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 432.

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than on the Triune God. 'Our Father' belongs to the sphere of a more living religion than 'Eternal Trinity'; 'Jesus' belongs to the realm of a more glowing faith than 'Holy Trinity'; 'Spirit of Truth' to-day still lacks in our minds the full idea of personality, but on the whole it inspires more than the Trinitarian formula. This kathenotheism is the earnest to us of the truth of the Unity of God, we can only centre our thoughts in a living way on one Person of the Holy Trinity at a time, and that One Person includes the rest. True, on Trinity Sunday we may feel the grandeur of God, 'Holy, Holy, Holy, Lord God Almighty,' but it is a fact of universal experience that in prayer we appeal more often to our 'Heavenly Father,' or 'Jesus Christ our Redeemer.'

On turning our thoughts to India we discover a very fruitful field for the comparative student. India is full of triads, from the primitive threefold stride of Vishnu across the heavens to the later construction of the theological schools, the Trimurti of Brahma, Vishnu and Siva. In the Vedic stage triads occur not unlike the Babylonian, as we already saw. Agni, Indra (or Vasu), and Surya, Fire, Storm-Cloud (or Wind), and Sun, take the place of Anu, Bel, and Ea. The Fire is the Earth God, Wind or Indra the god of the atmosphere, and the Sun the god of the sky. A later pantheistic form of this triad produced a trinity not unlike the Sabellian—Fire, Wind, and Sun are not only divine but manifestations of the One Divine World Soul. Again, as the following prayer to Agni shews, one of the gods may be thought of as manifesting himself in a triple way.

> 'One in thy Essence, but to mortals three,
> Displaying thy Eternal triple form.
> As fire on Earth, as lightning in the Air,
> As sun in Heaven.' [1]

The steps of Vishnu represent the sun in the three

[1] Vide *Satapatha Brahmana*, 'Sacred Books of the East,' vol. 41, p. 284, §4.

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portions of the Heaven (Dawn, Noon, and Sunset), and can be compared with the Egyptian Sun-God Ra:

'I am Khepera in the morning, Ra at noon, Tum in the evening'[1]; the three divine names standing for the rising, midday, and setting sun respectively.

The later development of the Trimurti is of greater interest to us than these earlier triads because of the doctrine of incarnation (avatar) connected with them. The gods of the Trimurti belong to three separate strands of development. By the side of the Upanishad Brahman (the pantheistic World-Soul, which became the focal point of Hindu thought), there arose the idea of a personal Divine Creator Brahma. It is the latter deity which became the Father-god of the Hindu triad, but his associations with the philosophically abstract concept of Brahman prevented his becoming a popular deity, and he had little to do with the daily round and common task, as was the case with the other members of this triad, Vishnu (the preserver) and Siva (the destroyer). There is practically no Brahma cult in India to-day, and the majority of Hindus are worshippers of either Vishnu or Siva. The Vishnu of the ancient Vedas is of Solar origin and becomes, as a god of the triad, the Preserver and Loving Guardian of all created life, who incarnates himself in order to help mankind. Siva has developed out of the fierce storm-god Rudra of the Vedas, and also owes many of the ideas which cluster round his name and worship to a primitive reverence of the powers of reproduction in man and in nature. Hence he represents on the one side 'destruction,' and asks for human sacrifices, and on the other 'renewal' (*a*) spiritual in his character as the God of Love, and (*b*) material in his character as the god of sensuality, and in some of the degraded sects a very low moral standard of worship is still adhered to.

The representation of these three divinities as a three-headed god (Trimurti) is of mediaeval origin. No doubt the conjunction of the deities was due principally to the influence of philosophic monism, which would make the gods manifestations of an underlying Divine One, but like

[1] Wiedemann, *Religion of the Ancient Egyptians*, p. 31.

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the triads of the Babylonian theological schools, the Trimurti never really rose above tritheism, or entered deeply into the hearts of the people.

'It is really little more than a philosophical speculation aided by certain developments of popular worship, it is cared little for by the people, for while Vishnu and Siva are held by their adorers to be manifestations of the highest essence of Godhead, they are practically regarded as distinct gods—a development, however, not without theistic results.'[1]

Although the Trimurti as a triad did not appeal to popular worship, its formation was in reality an accommodation of Brahmanism to the religion of the populace. In order to provide a united front against the inroads of Buddhism, it was necessary to combine the forces of Hinduism, and thus to bring into an attempted harmony the conflicting sects of Vishnuism and Saivism. This the Trimurti did to a great extent, and sectarian intolerance, which could say 'Vishnu is the divinity of the gods, the Trident-holder [Siva] is the divinity of devils,'[2] was to a certain extent reduced to harmony. Nevertheless the triad did not in reality produce a Trinity: it only stereotyped a duality, the duality of the two great sects which dominate religious India to day—Vishnu and Siva standing at the head of each, and both sects claiming for their own god the exercise of the threefold functions. The Trinity remained a speculation of theologians, and in essence was a tritheism produced by the bringing together of different gods. Thus, as Mr. Howells states in *The Soul of India*:

'It needs to be noted that the Hindu Trinity is not the outcome of a progressive development of thought regarding the person and work of one Supreme God, but is a unification of the activities and personalities of what were once worshipped as three independent deities.'[3]

It cannot be denied, however, that this Hindu triad did become a lofty doctrine in the hands of theologians,

[1] Macculloch, *Comparative Theology*, p. 94.
[2] *Kurma Purana*, 22, § 43.
[3] *Op. cit.* p. 315.

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and, in its developed form, was thought of in a way comparable with the highest Christian theology. Kalidasa, the greatest of Indian poets, thus expresses the threefold unity:

> 'In those three Persons the one God was shown—
> Each first in place, each last—not one alone;
> Of Brahma, Vishnu, Siva, each may be
> First, Second, Third, among the Blessed Three.' [1]

The triangle (Trikona) symbolizes the triune equality, and a representation of the Triad cut in the solid rock at the Cave of Elephanta, near Bombay, with three majestic heads resting on one body, reminds the passer-by very powerfully of the threefold divine equality.

The really interesting member of the Triad to the Christian student is Vishnu, who becomes incarnate in various forms for the good of mankind, the avatars finding their highest watermark in the teaching of the *Bhagavad-Gita* (The Song of the Adorable One), a book known and loved throughout India. Krishna, who to many is a worthy rival of Christ, is the incarnation of Vishnu, and he tells Arjuna on the field of battle that

> 'Whensoever the law fails and lawlessness uprises, O thou of Bharata's race, then do I bring myself to bodied birth. To guard the righteous, to destroy evil-doers, to establish the Law, I come into birth age after age.' [2]

The fact that the second member of the trinity is connected with an incarnation is hardly analogous to the incarnation of the Second Person of the Christian Trinity, because in the former case Krishna is the incarnation of Vishnu, and Brahma the first member is not thought of, whereas Jesus is the incarnate Son of the Heavenly Father the First Person of the Holy Trinity. In the Christian doctrine the whole Trinity is implied in the fact of the Incarnation, but in the Indian doctrine the incarnation and the triad are absolutely distinct and separate theological facts. The Christian Incarnation and Atoning

[1] Quoted by Monier Williams, *Hinduism*, p. 87.
[2] *Op. cit.* 4, §§ 7–8.

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Death, being 'able to save to the uttermost them that draw near to God' (Heb. vii 25), took place 'once for all.' But the Hindu incarnations were manifold, human and sub-human, Vishnu became a fish, a tortoise, a boar, a man-lion, a dwarf, Rama with the axe, Rama, Krishna, Buddha—an accommodation to the new heresy—and will yet come as Kalki. Such incarnations also varied in the degree of divinity that came to bodied birth. The Krishna avatar is the fullest incarnation, Rama embodies half the divine essence, Bharata a quarter, Lakshmana an eighth, ordinary men, animals and inanimate objects can have the divine qualities or virtues infused into them in lesser degrees. It does seem, however, that the avatar doctrine of the *Gita* has been a real blessing to India, and Vishnu 'is the only member of the Trimurti which can be said to have infused his essence into actual flesh and blood for the salvation of the world in times of peril and calamity.'[1] But the *Puranas*, unfortunately, tell another story, *viz.* Krishna's sensual sports with the Gopis, and although the Krishna of the *Puranas* may not be the Krishna of the *Gita* in origin, the two are so essentially one in the minds of men, that the radiant light of the Adorable One is dimmed by the shadows of Puranic theology. Lastly, and this point is of great importance, 'from the standpoint of critical scholarship, there is no ground for regarding the personality and utterances of the Krishna of the *Gita* as having any historical basis.'[2]

In the *Gita* Krishna at times (for it is an eclectic book) is thought of as Brahma, the World Soul, itself, and in a Sabellian way speaks of his threefold manifestation to men. Krishna declares himself to be the Imperishable, the 'One Set on High'; also the Changeless Sovran, who enters and supports the threefold world 'Supreme Self'; and as immanent in the world 'Male Supreme'[3]; but this triune nature of transcendence above, maintenance of, and immanence in the world, never became a popular doctrine.

[1] Monier Williams, *Hinduism*, p. 109.
[2] Howells, *The Soul of India*, p. 490.
[3] *Bhagavad-Gita*, 15 §§ 16, 17, and 18.

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To return to the Trimurti. One interpretation of philosophical thought was that it represented the eternal self-existent Spirit taking to Himself the three qualities (gunas) of the finite world, and in this sense the members of the triad are thought of as analogous to the qualities of the human soul (the microcosm), somewhat in the same way as modern apologetic at times speaks of the Trinity as analogous to the ultimate modes of the human consciousness—cognition, affection, and conation. In this development of the guna doctrine of the Sankhya philosophy, we have an interesting account of the relationship of God to His creatures. The gunas are from one point of view qualities of the human life, pleasure (sattva), pain (rajas), and indifference (tamas). Every man possesses these qualities in varying degrees, they represent his virtue, his passion, and his folly or apathy. But 'it is a remarkable doctrine also that pleasure, pain, and apathy not only exist in subjective and individual experience, but have their objectively real correlates in the external world,'[1] *i.e.* the universe as the macrocosm also possesses them. The self-existent spirit is unconditioned, and therefore possesses no gunas, Brahman is nirguna, and according to the mystical explanation of Hindu theology, Brahman took to himself *rajas* to become Brahma the Creator, *sattva* to become Vishnu the Preserver, and *tamas* to become Rudra the Destroyer. The Trinity is purely temporary and economic, like that of Marcellus of Ancyra. Brahma, Vishnu, and Siva are ways in which a monistic Brahman multiplies himself, and at the end of a Kalpa or aeon of time, returns again to simple soul (Kevalatman). Similarly for Marcellus the Divine Monad expands itself 'into a triad,' and 'ultimately when the Logos and Spirit should have fulfilled their respective functions, it would again "contract itself."'[2] Everywhere in India, owing to its pantheism, the trinities take a Sabellian turn.

Another Hindu trinity, which is perhaps even nearer

[1] Hastings, *Dictionary of Religion and Ethics*, vol. vi, 'Guna,' p. 454 (*b*).

[2] Ottley, *The Doctrine of the Incarnation*, p. 328.

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to the Christian Trinity philosophically than the Trimurti, is the threefold designation of Brahman in the *Vedanta* philosophy as *sat*, *chit*, and *ananda*—*viz.*, being, intelligence, and bliss. This trilogy is not due to the amalgamation of deities, but to the unfolding of the divine nature by Ind an theological thought. It is a trilogy of attributes, and, as is to be expected, Sabellian. Unfortunately too, the attributes are devoid of real positive content. *Sat* is unconditioned and absolute existence bereft of attribute and relation; *chit* is pure thought devoid of the subject-object relation, thought without a thinker; and *ananda* is the bliss of an absolutely passive and dreamless sleep. 'Silent is that Self,' teaches Bahva, and Cave's comment on this is to the point: 'In that one sentence the difference between the Vedantic and the Christian conception of God is well summed up. Our God is a God who seeks to be revealed. The only real Brahman is a God whose revelation is silence.'[1] The Christian Trinity is implied in the Revelation of Divine Love—the Love of the Heavenly Father, the Incarnate Son, and the indwelling Spirit, but the Hindu 'sachchid-ananda' only sums up the ultimate modes of an Unknowable Absolute who possesses neither desire nor love. But Love was bound to come to its own, and the second and third members of the Trimurti have become the objects of a loving and passionate devotion (*bhakti*) for a vast number of Hindus. The hymns of the Tamil-Saivite Saints,[2] and the Maratha Saints [3] (*c.* Seventh to Seventeenth century A.D.) glow with spiritual fervour, and though the love displayed is chiefly that of the simple child towards its mother, it is none the less profound and living.

We pass now *per saltum* to catholic Buddhism, designated Mahayana (Great Vehicle). The historical Gautama is thought of as only one Bodhisattva amongst countless others who have renounced all the joys of Nirvana till every sentient creature is saved. These Bodhisattvas are manifestations of Buddha, thought of in an impersonal way,

[1] *Redemption, Hindu and Christian*, p. 84.
[2] *Vide* Kingsbury and Phillips, *Hymns of the Tamil-Saivite Saints.*
[3] *Vide* Macnicol, *The Psalms of the Maratha Saints.*

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as the World-Soul. The Buddha may thus be regarded from three points of view :

(1) As the Absolute or the Noumenon that underlies all phenomenal existence.
(2) As an Ideal person or the personification of virtue and wisdom.
(3) As an Historical person in human form.[1]

Now the famous Trinity of Buddhism refers to the three God-bodies (Trikaya) of the Buddha in these three planes of reality—Absolute, Ideal and Spatial. The Law-body (Dharma-kaya) of Buddha is that of the highest sphere, the Dharma itself, and represents the very essence of Buddhahood. The compensation-body (Sambhoga-kaya) is the symbol of the Buddha ideal, and might be compared to the ideal conjured up by the imagination, and yet having a place in reality. The Amida-Buddha of the Japanese sects is an example in point. He is the manifestation of the Absolute Buddha as an ideal person often thought of in the nature of a loving father who cares for his children—but he is no longer the Absolute as such, for personality is true only of phenomenal existence, he is the ideal personification of mercy and wisdom, the object of a loving devotion (*bhakti*). The transformation-body (Nirmana-kaya) is the Buddha in human form, the incarnation of the Absolute. The historical Gautama was one of many such incarnations.

Underlying the Trikaya philosophical Buddhism places the Bhutatathata or Absolute (' that which is such as it is,' *i.e.* incomparable with anything else). This Absolute, reached by a *via negativa* (' the Empty '), is practically synonymous with Dharma-kaya, which might be described as its ' devotional symbol.'

With reference to this Trinity, McGovern in his recent book on Mahayana Buddhism, writes :

' Comparing the Trikaya with Western ideas we may say that Bhutatathata stands for the essence of Godhead, the ultimate

[1] Reischauer, *Studies in Japanese Buddhism*, p. 208.

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and unmanifested Deity, the Dharmakaya to the norm of the manifest world, the Christian God the Father, the Sambhogakaya to a compound of the Logos, the Resurrected Christ and Wells' Invisible King, and the Nirmanakaya to the incarnation of the divine.' [1]

Perhaps the analogy with Christianity is more correctly expressed as follows. The Trikaya is rather a Christology (Buddhology), and is analogous to the three states of Christ: pre-existent, incarnate, and exalted. Dharmakaya is the Pre-existent Logos, Nirmanakaya is the Historic Jesus, and Sambhogakaya is the Risen Lord. The Bodhisattva in the Tushita Heavens represents the pre-existent state, Gautama in India the incarnate, and Amida-Buddha of Japan the exalted ideal. Bhutatathata then represents God the Father, which 'no man hath seen at any time,' and the Holy Spirit does not occur. It is interesting to see Buddhism grappling with the same problems as Christianity, and reaching a solution not unlike it. There is no reason to doubt an entirely independent development in both religions, and the truth of the Christian solution of course does not depend on its Christology being like or unlike the Buddhist, it depends on whether Jesus is what He undoubtedly and rationally appeals to us as being, the Son of God. In this connexion we might quote a few lines from Moore's *History of Religions*:

'There is no reason to think there is a historical connexion between the Christian and Indian conceptions; they are entirely explicable as independent—and indeed inevitable—solutions of an identical problem.' [2]

Each religion points to its particular doctrine as indeed its own. On the one hand, the Buddhist theory starts with the Indian incarnation theory, and grew on Indian soil alongside the wider avatar movement of Hinduism, and on the other hand the Christian theological construction displays a distinctly original and unique stamp of

[1] *Introduction to Mahayana Buddhism*, p. 80.
[2] *Op. cit.* I, p. 310.

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its own. In spite of the so-called Hellenization of Christianity, the stamp of the Christian Trinity is the revelation of the Fatherhood of God in Christ, but the stamp of the Buddhist doctrine is the metaphysics of Buddhahood—the former idea of God being concrete and personal, the latter abstract and impersonal. The Trikaya is a metaphysical theory of how the Buddha manifests himself to men, of how the quiescent Absolute becomes a normal, ideal and phenomenal being, and tells us nothing of the Ultimate Reality itself. The Christian Trinity revolves round the truth of Divine Love, and tells us something of the Divine nature in itself, the Love of God the Father revealed in the Son on Calvary, and through the Holy Spirit the Comforter, the doctrine at the same time expressing the truth that the three hypostases are personal and eternal distinctions in the One Godhead.

The Buddhist Triratna of the Buddha, the Dharma and the Sanga, which dates from the early years of Buddhism and is often treated as an analogy of the Christian Trinity, we have intentionally not discussed, because it is patently quite different from the kind of trinities we are considering; it is simply the Buddhist formula of Belief in the Master (Buddha), the Doctrine (Dharma), and the Order or Church (Sangha). True, these objects of belief were represented later by the heads of two divine beings (Buddha and Sangha), and a tablet of written words (Dharma), the whole forming a single image (Sam-bo); but there does not seem to have been a distinctive Trinitarian doctrine relating to this threefold representation. Before leaving Buddhism, we might observe that the Trikaya is thought of in different ways by different sects of the Mahayana School. For instance, in the Kegon sect the Dharmakaya is thought of as the noumenon, and the Sambhogakaya and Nirmanakaya as phenomena: the Tendai sect treats all three bodies as noumenon and phenomenon, the latter sect subdividing into the Sangai and Sangé schools, one treating the three bodies as 'separate entities with a common basis, rather than one entity with three phases,' and the Sangé 'as three absolutely identical things, three ways in which the Absolute

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reveals itself in the world.'[1] McGovern compares the Sangai and Sangé theories to the orthodox and Sabellian trinities of Christianity respectively. But the Sangai metaphysics is far removed from the Christian doctrine, which emphasizes the Fatherhood of God.

Farquhar reminds us that the Hindu Triad gave birth to similar triads not only in Buddhism but in Taoism as well, triads which are merely the conjunction of three deities or deified persons.[2] Indeed the Taoists assert that Lao-tze, to whom they trace their faith, disappeared from China to India, and became re-incarnate as Buddha in China. The Taoist triad of the Three Pure Ones consists of Lao-tze, the mystic philosopher, T'ai-shi (Great Original), a philosophical idea personified, and Yü-huang-shang-ti (The Divine exalted Supreme Ruler), a mythical personage. The legend of his supernatural birth is borrowed from Buddhism, and the title Shang-ti from the ancient Chinese State Religion. Here we have the association of three deities, but no attempt at unification is made, and they are worshipped as separate gods. The third deity is the most popular of the three divine beings, and is worshipped as a domestic deity, as well as in the Temples. The once notable theory of the Trinity in the Tao-Teh-King of Lao-tze we have dealt with already.

The triads of Egypt now come to be considered. The material is plentiful, for practically every district had its triad of gods. These trinities, like those of Babylon, are for the most part due to the correlation of deities which were originally separate, and so we have Tritheism and not Trinitarianism in the true sense. But we also discover a real difference between the Babylonian and Egyptian triads. On the whole, the former were loosely constructed, and had little place in the popular cult. The Egyptian triads were due not only to the desire for systematic groupings of the deities on the part of the priestly and theological class, but also to the desire to have a family of gods, the resultant groupings finding a place in the religion of the

[1] McGovern, *Introduction to Mahayana Buddhism*, p. 94.
[2] *Crown of Hinduism*, p. 312.

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people. Deities were thus brought together or constructed in order to form triads of father, mother, and son, and this 'correlation of the primitive deities . . . strongly influenced the theology of later times, until each temple possessed an artificially created triad of purely secondary origin, upon which an Ennead was then built up.'[1] Enneads, however, were trinities gone to seed like the Buddhas of Lamaism, and were not the outcome of any profound philosophy. 'The members of an Ennead were united rather by reasons of state than kinship, the chief god being lord and king, while the other deities formed his court, assisted him in the government of the world, and therefore participated in the honours paid to him.'[2]

The Egyptian had a concrete mind, the power of abstract thinking being at a very low ebb. Hence every idea had to be represented by a concrete object or picture. The triad of gods thus aided the Egyptian in his attempt to represent to himself the abstract idea of eternity as an attribute of the divine. The son was the father in another form and took the place of the father at his death, for the gods, like mortals, were thought of as subject to change and decay. 'Thus the son became the father, and the Egyptian texts could speak of the gods as eternal; for so soon as the elder god vanished, he would be succeeded by a divine personality precisely similar. In this sense the god was self-begotten, being father to the son, who was as himself.'[3] In spite of the difficulties presented to a modern philosophical mind, the triad was also in most cases thought of as a trilogy of independent gods, all of whom could be worshipped. The consort, however, generally had no defined personality. 'Sometimes,' writes Professor Sayce, 'recourse was had to grammar and the second person in the Trinity was obtained by attaching the feminine suffix to the name of the chief god.'[4] It is the father and son who are the definitely individualized deities, though the

[1] Breasted, *History of Egypt*, p. 56.
[2] Wiedemann, *Religion of the Ancient Egyptians*, p. 105.
[3] *Ibid.* p. 104.
[4] Sayce, *Religion of Ancient Egypt and Babylonia*, p. 231.

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son sometimes lived so much in the father that the first person alone was the clearly defined god of the triad. The mother needed no daughter to carry on her being, owing to the subordinate part she played in the significance of the triad. On the other hand, especially when Enneads came to be formed, the father and son were often looked upon as the same deity, or the mother merged in the father, or *vice versa*, the father in the mother.

Professor Sayce traces these families to a Solar origin:

'As Tum, the God of the sunset, was identified with Khepera the sun of the morning and Ra the sun of noonday—all three being but one god under diverse forms—so the divine father was believed to engender himself in the person of the divine son and the divine mother to be one with the divine father and son . . . it was eternal fatherhood, eternal motherhood, and eternal generation.'[1]

In such cases an identification of the persons becomes analogous to the unity of the Christian tri-personality. To quote a great scholar again:

'Two personages,' writes Maspero, 'thus closely connected were not long in blending into one, and were soon defined as being two faces, the masculine and feminine aspects of a single being. On the one hand, the father was one with the son, and on the other he was one with the mother. Hence the mother was one with the son as with the father, and the three gods of the triad were resolved into one god in three persons.'[2]

Thus the trinity as a metaphysical unity was reached by Egyptian theologians in the attempt to form Enneads of gods out of a greater number than nine, because, in order to keep the number to nine, various mergings of deities into one another had to be made.

An example of the family triad would be the Theban Amen (The hidden one), Mut (The Mistress of the gods), and Khunsu (The Traverser, the Man), the three forming a Father–Mother–Son triad. Khunsu was originally the old moon-god of the nome.[3]

[1] Sayce, *Religion of Ancient Egypt and Babylonia*, p. 232.
[2] *The Dawn of Civilisation*, p. 150.
[3] Sayce, *The Religion of Ancient Egypt and Babylonia*, p. 231.

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The Osiris–Isis–Horus triad stands on a different footing from the previous ones in being connected with a legend which was very popular in Egypt because of its connexion with the belief in the resurrection. In this triad, Isis the mother-god plays no subordinate part. Set treacherously kills his brother Osiris, and Isis searches for her husband's body. Horus, the son, the third god of the triad, avenges his father by fighting against Set. But Osiris was not really dead, for he lived on as King of the World beyond the grave, and the Egyptian believed that by identifying himself with Osiris, in a pantheistic way, he would have immortal bliss. He was the personification of good in contradistinction to Set, the representative of evil. He was the god-man who 'typified to the Egyptians in all ages the being who, by reason of his sufferings and death as a man, could sympathize with them in their own sickness and death. The idea of his human personality also satisfied their cravings and yearnings for intercourse with a being who, though he was partly divine, yet had much in common with themselves.'[1] Isis the second member of the triad was worshipped as the ideal of motherhood, though gross stories as to her magical powers marred such idealization. As the pattern of motherhood, she was represented in pictures and statues suckling her son Horus. Horus, the third deity, was not only a replica of his father as 'successor,' but as his 'avenger,' became intercessor for the children of men by leading them, after death, to the judgement seat of Osiris, and pleading for them.[2]

The doctrine of the Ka is also of importance when estimating the influence of Egyptian theology on the Christology of Alexandria. The Ka was the

'divine counterpart of the deceased holding the same relation to him as a word to the conception which it expresses or a statue to the living man. It was his individuality as embodied in the man's name; the picture of him which was or might have been called up in the minds of those who knew him at the mention of that name.'[3]

[1] Budge, *Egyptian Religion*, p. 59. [2] *Ibid.* p. 72.
[3] Wiedemann, *The Immortality of the Soul*, p. 11.

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Now the gods also possessed Ka's, and inasmuch as the Ka was 'a disjunction of the personality from the person,'[1] we have here the beginnings of speculation on the plurality of 'personalities,' within the godhead. Ra is often referred to as possessing fourteen Ka's corresponding to his attributes, such as majesty and wisdom. Neither was the disjunction of personality and person rigorously insisted on, for though 'the two were indeed separate,' yet 'they were so far one as to come into being only through and with each other.'[2] The Ka was thought of as a material duplicate of the body, owing to the inability of the Egyptian to think in purely abstract terms, but in this Ka-philosophy there is really a nearer approach to the philosophy of the Christian doctrine of the plurality of Persons in the One Godhead than in the tritheism of the triads and enneads.

Now the problem of the indebtedness of Christianity to the trinities of the Egyptian is more acute than the question of its relation to Babylon or India. Sir James Frazer, in one of his footnotes to Volume III of *The Golden Bough*, refers to a probable influence of the Egyptian father–son–mother triad on the formulation of the Christian doctrine. In such an event 'the function originally assigned to the Holy Spirit may have been that of the divine mother.'[3] He then mentions the apocryphal Gospel to the Hebrews, Alcibiades of Apamea and the Ophites, who refer to the Holy Spirit as the Mother of Christ, or as a woman. As, however, such authorities belong only to the backwaters of Christianity, it is much more likely that they never really represented Christian teaching, but were distortions of it. Mahomet too, who seems to have got hold of this heretical teaching,[4] gives such an erroneous idea of Judaism and Christianity in many of his references, that as an authority for anything but Mahommedanism he is worthless. The interesting point for us is, however, that the orthodox Christian doctrine is inconsistent with any idea of the

[1] Wiedemann, *The Immortality of the Soul*, p. 16.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 16. [3] *The Dying God*, p. 5 *n.* 3.
[4] *Koran*, Sura 4.

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Spirit as female in nature, and if the Christian Trinity should owe any slight indebtedness to Egypt for its formulation, the really important thing to remember is that the framework of the doctrine is not the fundamental doctrine itself. Egypt never gave Christianity—'Your Heavenly Father knoweth,' 'God so loved the world that He gave His only begotten Son'—'I will send you another Comforter.' If, therefore, we find in the Egyptian religion anything that influenced the formulation of the Christian doctrine, we shall see in it the divine *praeparatio evangelica*, not the fountain-head of its teaching. 'Never did Christianity,' sums up Sir Wallis Budge, 'find elsewhere in the world a people whose minds were so thoroughly well prepared to *receive* [not *to give*] its doctrines as the Egyptians.'[1] If further in the Hermetic writings and Philo we shall come across anything approaching the Christian doctrine, we shall rejoice at discovering prophetic adumbrations of the truths we hold so dear at heart. But, after all, it is the content of the teaching which makes Christianity unique, not its metaphysical constructions. Even if Egypt, with its developed idea of God, spoke of Him as 'at once the Divine Father, Mother, and Son,' as 'three persons God in God,' 'combined to constitute His infinite perfection,' or of a separate Personality 'conceived of God, born of God, without separating from God' (Maspero), yet on the other hand the Incarnation in the Christian sense, as the supreme revelation of the love of the Father, is foreign to the religion; and the Christian doctrine of the Trinity is built up on this great truth. 'If the toiling myriads who raised the Babylonian ziggarats, the Egyptian pyramids, or the Peruvian temples, held that the King was the incarnation of the highest deity, they could only worship him as cringing slaves.'[2] Indeed, Christianity saw in Isis and Horus a prototype of the Virgin Mary and her Child rather than the Trinity, and Egyptian speculations on the idea of God produced rather the abortions of Gnosticism and Arianism than the teachings of Christianity.

[1] *Egyptian Religion*, p. 81.

[2] Macculloch, *Comparative Theology*, p. 132.

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Hermes and Philo are just as different in subject-matter from Christian teaching as the Egyptian developments, and it is through these channels (if any) that Egyptian teaching would have filtered into Christianity. Suidas (the Greek lexicographer) wrote:

'Hermes the Thrice-Greatest. He was an Egyptian sage, and flourished before Pharaoh. He was called Thrice-Greatest because he spoke of the Trinity, declaring that in the Trinity there is one Godhead,'

and then he quotes from the Corpus Hermeticum. But on looking at Hermes we are disappointed at finding *only* the merest reference to a Trinity most unlike the Christian doctrine. Indeed, as Mead has pointed out, the *two* quotations of Suidas are incorrect copies of two Hermetic fragments in the writings of Cyril of Alexandria.[1] We quote the one which most resembles the doctrine of the divine Trinity:

'. . . He is Lord of all (their) Father, and (their) God, and Source, and Life, and Power and Light and Mind and Spirit. For all things are in Him and for His sake.'[2]

Cyril found in this, and another passage we have not quoted, a reference to the Father, Son (Mind, Mind of Mind), and Holy Ghost (Divine Supremacy and Power), but the passages referred to are as unlike the Christian Trinity as any passage could be. The only really Trinitarian passage in the Corpus Hermeticum appears to be the opening words of the 'Sacred Sermon'—'The glory of all things is God (ὁ θεός) and Godhead (τὸ θεῖον) and Nature (ἡ φύσις).' Nothing further is said about *this* Trinity, and these passages would hardly have been worth quoting were it not for the fact that recent studies on *the* Hermetic writings are tending to shew a deep kinship between them and Christianity.[3]

[1] Mead, *Thrice-Greatest Hermes*, vol. 3, p. 268.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 258.
[3] *Vide* Petrie, *Personal Religion in Egypt before Christianity*.

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The Trinities of Philo are also very unlike the teaching of Christianity. In reference to the Therapeutae, we read of the Lesser Mysteries as including the revelation of the doctrine that God is a Trinity in Unity (*τριὰς ἐν μονάδι*), a union of three potencies (*δυνάμεις*), and in Himself incomprehensible (*ἀπερίγραφος*). This teaching, a divine mystery (*θεῖον μυστήριον*), is revealed only to the initiated, to the soul that is becoming an initiate in divine rites (*τῶν τελείων μύστις γενομένη τελετῶν*).[1] God, according to Philo, 'accompanied by His two Highest Potencies, dominion and goodness, making One [with Himself] in the midst, produces in the seeing Soul a triple presentation, of which [three persons] each transcends all measure; for God transcendeth all delineation.'[2] In this Trinity there is an equality of parts, because God 'transcends His potencies, both making Himself manifest without them and also causing Himself to be seen in them.' Such knowledge is not for all, it is part of the *disciplina arcani* reserved for the 'Epoptae.' It is also interesting to see in Philo a reference to Abraham at Mamre, which has often been made by Christian apologists. 'Abraham elevasse oculos universos . . . appareret ei sicut Trinitas, et Trinitas velut Unitas.'[3] The influence of the Egyptian triad on Philo is seen in such words as 'Following the anthropological (and Egyptian) analogy, Father and Mother (Wisdom) have a Son—the "only and well beloved Son," which is the World.' These Trinitarian references are so mystic that they remind us little of the Christian doctrine, and indeed, though Philo teaches a very developed Logos doctrine, making 'the second god' a distinct hypostasis within the godhead, the whole theology is highly speculative and finds no room for the Incarnation idea.

It is very difficult to get a definite picture of Plato's idea of God from the poetic philosophy of the *Timaeus*, but one thing is quite clear, *viz.* that for him God is no solitary unit devoid of attributes and distinctions. Within

[1] Conybeare, *Philo De Vita Contemplativa*, p. 304.
[2] *De Sacrif. Abelis et Cain*, ch. 15, 1, 173.
[3] *Quaest. in Gen.* iv 2, quoted by Conybeare, *op. cit.*

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the mind of 'the Father and Maker of all this universe' there existed the 'Self-existent ideas,' 'the pattern of the unchangeable.'[1] The ideas are not personified, and yet they are thought of as distinctions within the Godhead. The third member of Plato's Trinity may be thought of as either (1) the demiurgic deities, the 'children of the gods,' to whom was entrusted the creation of mortal beings; or (2) the 'World Soul' itself, which was created 'a blessed god.' Such a Trinity (or Quaternity) might suggest sublime and lofty thoughts, but it is difficult to find anything more than an adumbration of the Christian Trinity of three persons in One deity underlying the poetic imagination of the *Timaeus*, and the unknowable and passive nature of the Father Creator separates him from the Heavenly Father of Christianity. He is 'past finding out,' and after commanding the demiurgic deities, 'remains in his accustomed nature,' as a deistic God.[2]

Numenius (the precursor of neo-Platonism) according to Proclus held a Trinity of Father, Maker, and the Created World, after the pattern of the Platonic Trinity.[3] The Neo-Platonists stressed the passivity and unknowability of the ultimate nature of God. The original Being (the Good, the One, the First) is without qualities of any kind; from this Primal Absolute emanates Spirit or the Intelligible World (*Nous*), a perfect image of the One, and from the *νοῦς* the World-Soul (*Psyche*). 'Derived existence, however, is not like the original Being itself, but is subject to a law of diminishing completeness.'[4] Here we do not find a trinity of co-equal persons, but a subordination of emanations derived from an abstractly conceived ultimate Reality. Plotinus certainly deifies the three principles of his trinity, and refers to them as hypostases, but he does not think of them as persons. To sum up in the words of Dr. Inge 'the suggested parallel with Christian theology is misleading' and the attempt 'made

[1] Jowett, *The Dialogues of Plato*, vol. iii p. 449.
[2] *Ibid.* vol. iii pp. 449, 462.
[3] Proclus, *Comm. in Timaeum*, ii 93.
[4] Art. 'Neoplatonism,' *Enc. Brit.* vol. xix p. 375 (*a*).

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by Christian Platonists to equate the doctrine of the Trinity with the three divine hypostases of Neoplatonism . . . a failure.'[1]

We have now glanced quickly through the principal trinities of Babylonia, Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism, Egypt, and Neoplatonism. Babylonia *inter alia* gave us a triad which was a crude attempt to find unity in the manifold of a gross polytheism, by appealing to the powers of the universe under a single expression, but the triad became formal and the three members impersonal, and in so far as popular religion worshipped the gods of the triad separately, tritheism or rather (with the rest of the gods) polytheism gained the day. Primitive India supplied us with some elementary trinities, and its later scholastic period, the Trimurti, the trinity of the *Gita*, the gunas as qualities of Godhead, and the sachchidananda as aspects of the divine nature. All of the trinities were found to be pantheistic, and, as such, unsatisfactory. So far as the deities of the Trimurti were worshipped separately, the trinity was in the end tritheistic; so far as they were philosophically explained, Sabellian and modalistic. Neither were the incarnations of Vishnu satisfactory, so crude and mythic were they discovered to be. With the Christian Trinity the whole doctrine centres on the Incarnation, whereas in India the avatar is external to the triad. Further Krishna, the best known avatar of Vishnu, has no historical foundation in fact, and is debased by Puranic legend. The Trinity of the *Gita* remains in the background, though the *Gita* itself has found a home in many hearts. The guna-interpretation of the Trimurti was that of an economic Trinity, similar to the teaching of Marcellus of Ancyra, and the sachchidananda interpretation of Brahman was too abstract a metaphysic. All of them were too pantheistic and Sabellian to satisfy man's innate desire for a personal Deity. The Buddhist Trikaya was found to be, in many points, akin to Christian doctrines, but in the end we found it to be an abstract philosophy of the Absolute, shewing its relation to different planes of reality. Taoism so far as it

[1] Inge, *The Philosophy of Plotinus*, vol. ii pp. 193, 209–10.

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supplied us with a Trinity was pure tritheism. Egypt gave us family triads of peculiar interest, as probably standing in a close relationship to Christianity, but the triads, in spite of ideal interpretations, remained tritheistic, owing to the concrete nature of the Egyptian mind, and even the Ka-philosophy remained a crude symbolism to the end. The Trinities of the Hermetic writings were found to be totally unlike the Christian teaching, and Philo's references were discountenanced not only by their mystic vagueness, but by his inability to appreciate a doctrine of Logos made flesh. The Platonic triad of the *Timaeus* was suggestive, but too poetic and imaginative to be of any real value, and its Father God passive and unknowable. Finally, Neoplatonism displayed an emanationism entirely unlike the Christian doctrine which makes the Three Divine Persons co-equal distinctions in the One Godhead. All were attempts of varying quality at the solution of the problem of the one and the many as applied to Deity, but Christianity in approaching the same problem aimed primarily at reconciling a profound belief in Jesus as the Incarnate Son of God with a living belief in God as the Heavenly Father, so that the doctrine as a whole found its focus in the earthly life of Christ from Bethlehem to Calvary. It is just in this fact that the Christian teaching derives its power to grip the hearts of men. The doctrine is not a mere formula, but the sort of God that is demanded by a living faith in Jesus; it is not a tritheism, but the expression, for belief, of the revelation of the Fatherhood of God in Christ and through the Holy Spirit; it is not a Sabellian pantheism, but an attempt to realize within the limits of human language the reality of three distinctions in the Godhead standing for vital truths in the revelation of God to man; it is not an economic Trinity destined to fade away, but a belief which stands for truths of Eternal validity; it is not an abstract metaphysical concept, but the outcome of a profound belief in a Personal God; it is not an emanationism, but a Trinity of co-equal Persons—the doctrine, as a whole, standing for the inspiring truth that 'God so loved the World.'

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Finally, as regards the influence on Christianity of other doctrines, Babylon as a possible source has had its advocates, but an influence through the Jewish Diaspora or otherwise is unlikely. The Indian Trimurti is much more probably due to a borrowing from Christianity than *vice versa*, as Christianity reached India prior to its formulation, but a development of the Hindu doctrine, as a natural outcome of Indian thought, can be traced, so that there is no necessity to call in a theory of interaction. The Buddhist doctrine also is a late development of the Mahayana, but in spite of its similarity to the Christian teaching, the resemblance can be better explained by the fact that somewhat identical problems produced somewhat similar formulations of belief. Egypt, as represented by the family triads of the national faith, the Corpus Hermeticum, and Philo—Greece, as represented by its philosophical thought, and the triads of its mysteries: one and all formed part of the *praeparatio evangelica* by providing an atmosphere for the reception of the Christian doctrines, though in each case the particular teaching is strikingly and fundamentally different from the Christian faith, which starts from the fact that 'God sent forth His Son, born of a woman . . . that we might receive the adoption of sons.'

F. Harold Smith.

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ART. VI.—JUDAISM AND HELLENISM.

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IN spite of some superficial appearances to the contrary, it cannot be affirmed that the age-long controversy between Jew and Greek, between Judaism and Hellenism, has yet been finally decided. At certain periods, indeed, it has seemed as if the rising tide of Hellenic culture and ideas would submerge everything else. But every crisis of the kind has been followed, sooner or later, by a certain reaction—the tide has ebbed. Above the 'face of the waters' there has emerged something of the old, still surviving unshaken and undismayed.

It cannot be denied that at the present time the emphasis falls unmistakably upon the Hellenic element as the central and vital essential both of our religion and culture. The tendency is rather to belittle the importance of the Hebrew factor. Dr. Richard G. Moulton, who has done so much to promote the study of the English Bible as noble literature, has recently protested with justice against this unfortunate and disastrous dislocation of values. He says [1]:

'From the educational, as distinguished from the religious point of view, the Old Testament is the most important part of the Bible. Our whole modern civilization and culture rests upon the coalescence, in the old Roman world, of Greek and Hebrew thought. We should look for a reflection of this in

[1] *The Modern Reader's Bible for Schools, Old Testament*, p. vi (London: Macmillan. 1922).

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our higher education. Unfortunately our educational systems crystallized into their present forms when the Hellenic factor was being unduly emphasized. They do full justice to Greek Classics. But the corresponding Hebrew Classics they leave to religious study, that is to specialization; as a result these Biblical classics have fallen out of general culture, to the scandal of our higher education. Yet there is not a single point that can be urged as to the educational importance of the Greek Classics, which does not tell equally in favour of the Biblical Classics, . . . It may well happen that a reader who has been saturating himself with the imaginative flights of Isaiah or Habakkuk or Joel, may turn to his Pindar and be conscious of a drop, rather than a rise, in poetry.'

But the question with which we are vitally concerned lies in the religious sphere. What in the last resort is the fundamental and essential character of Christianity? What is Christianity? The answer which would alone satisfy some of us, and which we believe is in accordance with the history and development of the religion, is that Christianity is Judaism transformed into a world-religion. It will be necessary to define carefully what 'Judaism' exactly connotes in this connexion. Historically Judaism developed along more than one line: we have to reckon not only with Palestinian Judaism, but with the Judaism of the Diaspora which had been to a greater or less extent Hellenized. It is admitted, on all hands, that there is a large Greek element in historical Christianity. The problem is to determine what the true significance of this element is, and what place precisely is to be assigned to it in the historical development. Some ardent Hellenizers would, apparently, maintain that the 'Judaic' factor was a temporary phase, which quickly disappeared; Christianity really found itself only when it came into contact with Hellenism. Thus the Dean of St. Paul's, in the essay he has contributed to the volume entitled *The Legacy of Greece*, says:

'The Christian Church was the last great creative achievement of the classical culture. It is neither Asiatic nor mediaeval in its essential character; it is not Asiatic; Christianity is

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the least Oriental of all the great religions. The Semites either shook it off and reverted to a Judaism purged of its Hellenic elements, or enrolled themselves with fervour under the banner of Islam, which Westcott called a "petrified Judaism." Christian missions have had no success in any Asiatic country.'[1]

These sweeping assertions and generalizations would need a good deal of qualification to make them even tolerably accurate. Something less than bare justice is done to Eastern Christianity, which created so much, both in institutions and literature, that is permanently valuable, and within quite recent times has developed missionary energy on a large and successful scale.

Dr. Inge proceeds to observe that Catholicism (*i.e.* of the West) 'preserved the idea of Roman imperialism, after the secular empire of the West had disappeared. . . .'

'It maintained the official language of antiquity, and the imperial title of the autocrat who reigned on the Seven Hills. Nor were the early Christians so anxious as is often supposed to disclaim this continuity. At first, it is true, their apologetic was directed to proving their continuity with Judaism; but Judaism ceased to count for much after the destruction of the Holy City in A.D. 70, and the Second-century apologists appeal for toleration on the ground that the best Greek philosophers taught very much the same as what Christians believe. "We teach the same as the Greeks," says Justin Martyr, "though we alone are hated for what we teach." "Some among us," says Tertullian, "who are versed in ancient literature, have written books to prove that we have embraced no tenets for which we have not the support of common and public literature." "The teachings of Plato," says Justin again, "are not alien to those of Christ; and the same is true of the Stoics."'[2]

Dr. Inge's eagerness to eliminate Judaism from the tradition of Christianity is obvious. 'Judaism ceased to count for much after the destruction of the Holy City in A.D. 70.' What exactly does this assertion mean? It can hardly be intended to suggest that Judaism ceased to be taken seriously by the Christian Fathers in face of the overwhelming evidence that exists of a body of *Testimonia*

[1] P. 30 f. [2] *Ibid.*

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adversus Judaeos, which emerges, in various forms, all through the Patristic literature. If it means that after A.D. 70 the Jewish basis of Christianity had given place to something else, that is an assertion for which Dr. Inge offers no proof, and which, we venture to add, he could not possibly prove. The fact that the Second-century apologists tried to harmonize their Christian beliefs and ethical standards with the best elements in pagan philosophy is certainly no proof. In a precisely similar fashion Philo, though it must be admitted with far less justification, found Platonism in the Law of Moses. But the Hellenism with which the Church actually found itself confronted in the Second century included a great deal more than the philosophy of Plato and the ethical system of the Stoics. What Mr. Edwyn Bevan has called 'a floating, ill-defined body of popular belief' had established itself in the Greek world of the Second century, which was a farrago made up of 'Greek philosophical dogmas, Orphic and Pythagorean beliefs, ideas from Egypt, ideas from Babylonia, ideas from Persia, ideas from Judaea, with a plentiful dose of crude old magic'—in a word all that is summed up by Reitzenstein under the term 'Hellenistic theology.' Confronted with this mass of popular belief and superstition the Church was compelled to select and assimilate what it could, and to reject unhesitatingly what was incompatible. Hence the life and death struggle with Gnostic heresy in the Second century, from which the Church emerged, scarred but braced by the conflict, and with the New Testament scriptures in her hands. What factor was it in the Church that kept it steady and enabled it to fight down alien elements amid this terrific storm? Was it the Platonic philosophy or the Stoic ethic? No! it was the strong fundamental Jewish conviction about God and God's character, the overwhelming personal claim of God manifesting Himself in Christ—it was all these rooted in the deepest instincts of historical Christianity, and grounded in the ethical monotheism of the great Old Testament Prophets, which purged away all the baser elements that threatened to overwhelm Christian theology.

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It is far from the desire or intention of the writer of this article to attempt to disparage or underestimate the importance of the Hellenic element in historical Christianity. Such a proceeding would be as futile as it would be foolish. But it is surely possible to do justice to both the essential elements, the Hebraic and the Hellenic, and to avoid unguarded and extravagant language on the one side as well as on the other; to approach the consideration of a difficult and delicate problem in the spirit of one of the wisest and ablest of modern scholars, who said more than thirty years ago:

'Supposing it to be made out that there *has* been in the formulating of Christian doctrine a certain encroachment of Hellenism, the true way to redress the balance is—not to disparage Hellenism, which surely had a work to do in the providence of God as well as Hebraism, but to go back to the old Hebraic foundations of our religion and lay them again more deeply and more firmly—or rather see how they have been laid by an Architect wiser and mightier than we.'[1]

In the same connexion Dr. Sanday analysed Christianity 'as a formulated system' into three main elements:

'(1) The common foundation of Hebrew religion, as contained in the Old and the New Testaments, but primarily in the Old; (2) a specially Christian element which is due to the life and work of Christ; (3) certain peculiar forms of expression, gradually determined upon after six centuries of keen controversy, which are to a large extent of Greek origin. Compared with these, the part really contributed by modern times is very small indeed.'[2]

This estimate of the relative values of the elements which have made Christianity what it is, is probably as true and just an analysis as can be made. To justify this statement is the main purpose of this article.

I

As has already been remarked Judaism by the First century of our era had developed along two main lines: there was the Judaism of Palestine and the Judaism of the

[1] Sanday, *The Oracles of God* (1891), p. 125. [2] *Op. cit.* p. 113.

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Dispersion. In its most intensely Jewish form Judaism was entrenched in Palestine, and more especially in Judaea. But perhaps even more significant and important was the Judaism outside Palestine, and in particular that part of the Jewish Dispersion which was included within the confines of the Roman Empire, and was most in evidence along the shores of the Mediterranean. The Jewish Diaspora of the Graeco-Roman world was naturally permeated with Hellenic influences. How heavily Greek culture told upon them the Judaeo-Alexandrine literature eloquently attests. They used Greek even in their religious services; they read the Bible in Greek, Hebrew being an unknown tongue to the great majority of them; they adopted Greek names, and, to some extent, Greek organization in their communal institutions.

Nor was Palestine itself untouched by Hellenic influence. Palestinian Judaism in the First century of our era was a different thing from the Rabbinical Judaism which was the result of the reaction against Hellenism that followed Bar Kokba's revolt (A.D. 132–135). Many indications suggest that Palestine itself down to A.D. 70 and even later was permeated with Hellenic influence, not, of course, to the same extent and in the same degree, as the Greek-speaking Diaspora. A certain amount of difference there was, due to a difference of conditions and environment. In Palestine Aramaic was the vernacular, and Hebrew was cultivated and used in the services of Temple and synagogue. But in spite of these differences there was no sharp cleavage between Palestinian and Diaspora Judaism in matters of religion. The mass of the Hellenistic Jews who worshipped in the synagogues of the Dispersion in the First century regarded themselves, and were regarded, as orthodox Jews, who looked to Jerusalem as their spiritual metropolis, and numbers of whom were in constant evidence there at the great festivals. They would have been very much surprised to hear that their Judaism was of doubtful authenticity.

So long as the Temple stood, no sharp division between the Judaism of Palestine and that of 'Hellenistic circles'

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made itself seriously felt. Both were divided, to some extent, by party conflicts, and the liberal tendency was rather more marked in the Diaspora than in Palestine. But down to A.D. 70 there was a perpetual inflow and outflow of mutual influence. The Greek language had not yet come to be regarded as dangerous, and was cultivated even in Rabbinical circles in Jerusalem itself. In fact the new-Hebrew language used by the Rabbis is full of Greek words. On the other hand, the Greek-speaking Jew, who clothed his Judaism in a Greek dress, and still read the old Greek translation of the Bible (the LXX), which was not yet banned, felt himself to be a genuine Jew—not a Greek—in religion, and was conscious of a sharp and fundamental opposition between the religion he professed and that of the heathen Greek world around him. As Philo puts it, the Jews (of the Dispersion) called themselves Palestinians in religion, but Hellenes in language.[1]

That this is essentially a just way of stating the fact is proved by the amazing zeal displayed by the Diaspora Jew in propagating his faith. The idea of Israel as the chosen nation received a lofty interpretation. Israel had been chosen to be a priestly nation for the whole world. To Philo the Jewish people is 'above all the nations beloved of God, one that has received the priesthood for the whole human race.'[2] And this idea possessed the people as a firmly rooted conviction. The oldest part of the Sibylline oracles[3] predicts that the Jewish nation shall become very powerful and be 'guides of life to mortal men.'[4] The Jews of the Diaspora were convinced that they were destined to realize the prophetic word: *I have set thee for a light of the nations* (Isaiah xlix 6).

In spite of obstacles—prejudice and hatred on the part of the old pagan world—this overmastering missionary enthusiasm of the Diaspora Jew was ready to overcome all difficulties, being possessed with the conviction that

[1] Cf. *Jewish Encycl.* vi 337 (Art. 'Hellenism').
[2] *De Abrah.* ii 15.
[3] *Sib. Orac.* iii 97–829.
[4] iii 194 f.

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Moses and the prophets must win in the end. As the Sibyl has it:

> *'And then shall all*
> *the islands and the cities see how much*
> *the immortal God loves Israel, for all things*
> *help them in conflict and deliver them.'*

Then the cry goes up from the pagan world:

> *'Come, falling on the earth, let us all pray*
> *the Immortal King, the great eternal God. . . .*
> . . . . .
> *Since He alone is Lord, and let us all*
> *meditate on the Law of God Most High,*
> *which is most righteous of all laws on earth.*
> *For from the path of the Immortal we*
> *have wandered, and with senseless soul we honour*
> *works made by hand and wooden images*
> *of dead men.'* [1]

This propagandist zeal was probably no new thing in the Diaspora. In fact the old Greek translation of the Bible, the LXX, almost certainly owes its existence to zeal for the conversion of the heathen world, as Philo [2] suggests.

The Jewish propaganda, carried on with immense energy, provoked fierce opposition in certain quarters, which is reflected in the work of a number of heathen writers,[3] and the struggle was often of the severest. The Jewish propagandist was, perhaps, occasionally inclined to grow weary. Thus the Sibyl [4] prays that some respite may be granted from conflict:

> *'O Thou, high thundering, blessed, heavenly One!*
> *Thou who hast set in their place the cherubim!*
> *I, who have uttered what is all too true,*
> *entreat Thee, let me have a little rest;*
> *for my heart has grown weary from within.'*

[1] *Sib. Orac.* iii 709 ff. (= Terry's transl. iii 887 ff.)

[2] *Vit. Moysi*, ii 136.

[3] Notably Apollonius Molon of Rhodes, 90 B.C.; Posidonius of Apamea, 70 B.C.; the Alexandrine Cheremon, 50 B.C.; Lysimachus, 30 B.C.; Apion, the contemporary of Josephus.

[4] *Op. cit.* iii 1 f.

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But the inner constraining power is too great to allow this mood to last. So the Sibyl continues:

> *'But why again leaps up my heart and soul,*
> *with a whip smitten from within, constrained*
> *to utter forth its message unto all?*
> *But yet again will I proclaim all things*
> *which God commands me to proclaim to men.'*[1]

Thus we see the Diaspora Jew fired with unquenchable zeal to convert the heathen world to his own pure, ethically severe, and monotheistic faith. All the Graeco-Roman world was his field of action; and over all this world a number of forces were operating to make the missionary's message at once timely and, in many quarters, welcome.

'It must be admitted,' says Th. Reinach, 'that Judaism lacked certain of these attractive features which drew the multitude to the cult of Mithras and of the Egyptian deities. Its physical exactions repulsed those wanting in stout courage; its cult, devoid of imagery and sensuous rites, presented only an austere poesy separating its adepts from the world, and cutting them off, to some extent, from communion with the cultured. But the practical and legal character of its doctrine, furnishing a rule of life for every occasion, could not but appeal to a disintegrated society. The purity and simplicity of its theology captivated the high-minded, while the mystery and quaintness of its customs, the welcome Sabbath rest, the privileges enjoyed at the hand of public authorities, recommended the Jewish faith to those more materialistically inclined.'[2]

That this propaganda met with amazing success is unquestionable. No doubt the statements of Josephus, Philo, and even Seneca, 'who represent the whole world as rushing towards Jewish observances, are in some degree exaggerated.' Nevertheless, after every allowance has been made, the success must have been remarkable. We are told by Josephus that, in his time, a large portion of the Greek population of Antioch judaized.[3] Later, as we

[1] Terry's translation.
[2] Article 'Diaspora' in *Jewish Encyclopaedia.*
[3] *B.J.* viii 3. 3.

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know, they became Christians. According to the same authority, also, 'almost all the women in Damascus' observed the Jewish customs.[1] St. Paul met with proselytes in Pisidian Antioch, in Thyatira, in Thessalonica, and in Athens. In Asia Minor numerous indications suggest that Jewish proselytes were numerous. In Rome the success of the propaganda is vouched for by Horace, Persius, and Juvenal. 'We cannot account for the enormous growth of the Jewish population in Egypt, Cyprus, and Cyrene without assuming a large adhesion of Gentile proselytes.'[2]

II

When we ask ourselves how we are to account for the extraordinary success of the Jewish propaganda, we can answer unhesitatingly that the causes were fundamentally moral. As Paul Krüger has pointed out in *Hellenismus und Judenthum im neutestamentlichen Zeitalter* (1908), the epoch of late Hellenism is a time of general disintegration. 'Institutions in political, social, and religious life, which had the prestige of centuries behind them, fell to pieces, and were obliged to assume new forms.' The cultural ideal of ancient (classical) Greece had been an encyclopaedic one—one man could compass all departments of knowledge. The new age, with the more exacting scientific standards which followed from the teaching of Plato and Aristotle, developed specialized departments of culture—those of the philosopher, the rhetorician, the grammarian. In political organization the city-state had given place to larger ideals—pan-Hellenism, and (ultimately in the Roman Empire) imperial absolutism. Contact and intercourse on the part of different races had bred a spirit of cosmopolitanism; the individual had come to his rights (as is shewn by the emergence of a new department of literature, that of biography). As regards philosophy, individualism asserted itself in the domain of ethics. Philosophy itself had become intensely serious and democratic in the Cynic

[1] *B.J.* i 20. 2. [2] Th. Reinach *ut supra*.

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propaganda, with its peripatetic beggar-preachers, whose diatribes against the prevailing luxury and immorality deeply impressed the masses of the people. They also proclaimed a more deeply spiritual ideal of religion. The Jewish and later Christian propaganda in the Graeco-Roman world owed some of its success to the earlier labours of the Cynic preachers of righteousness.

At such a time the break-up of the old national religions was inevitable. One of the results of this was the popularizing of new (especially Oriental) cults in the Western world—Orontes flowed into Tiber; another was the state-evolved cultus of the Emperors. The religious needs created by the new situation demanded satisfaction in some higher and more spiritual type of religion. This need was supplied by missionary Judaism, which was succeeded later by the Christian mission.

The Diaspora Judaism which laboured so effectively to win converts from the heathen world around it is rightly described as 'Hellenized' Judaism or 'Hellenistic Judaism.' It is sometimes assumed, however, that the term 'Hellenized' in this connexion practically means that the Judaism so described had been transformed into something entirely Greek. Thus, even so competent an authority as the late Professor Siegfried, speaking of Jewish Hellenism in Alexandria where it 'reached its greatest development,' says: 'Here, freed from the national bonds which held it firmly to tradition in Palestine, Hellenistic Judaism became more Hellenistic than Jewish.'[1] Moriz Friedlander, the brilliant author of *Die religiösen Bewegungen innerhalb des Judentums im Zeitalter Jesu* (1905), and other equally stimulating works, has said, repeatedly, much the same thing. The tendency here has been to over-emphasize the importance of certain 'liberal' elements in the Jewish Diaspora, of an extreme kind. It is, therefore, not surprising to find the Dean of St. Paul's taking a similar view. In his essay on St. Paul, which contains so much for which we are all grateful, he writes[2]:

[1] Article 'Hellenism' (*Jewish Encyclopaedia*, vi 336 f.)

[2] *Outspoken Essays*, p. 217.

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'The crisis came when numerous "Hellenists" attached themselves to the Church—Jews of the Dispersion, from Syria, Egypt, and elsewhere. A threatened rupture between these and the Palestinian Christians was averted by the appointment of seven deacons or charity commissioners, among whom Stephen soon became prominent by the dangerously "liberal" character of his teaching. Philo gives important testimony to the existence of a "liberal" school among the Jews of the Dispersion, who, under pretext of spiritualizing the traditional law, left off keeping the Sabbath and the great festivals, and even dispensed with the rite of circumcision. Thus the admission of Gentiles on very easy terms into the Church was no new idea to the Palestinian Jews; it was known to them as part of the shocking laxity which prevailed among their brethren of the Dispersion.'

While it is true that the Jews of the Diaspora, as a whole, were characterized by a certain 'liberal' attitude towards the Gentile world, it was only a comparatively small section of them that developed antinomian practices. Schürer in the fourth edition of his *History*[1] has some important remarks on the distinctive character of the Judaism of the Diaspora which can be summarized here. He points out that in the Diaspora there was, owing to the force of circumstances, a tendency to emphasize the purely religious and moral elements in religion at the expense of the cultural and ceremonial. But the difference between the Palestinians and the Jews of the Diaspora was only one of degree. In Palestine at this period the broader type of religion had not entirely been depressed by Pharisaism; while in the Judaism of the Diaspora legalistic tendencies were active. 'The view [championed by Moriz Friedlander] that in the Diaspora a strongly marked radical antinomian movement existed, is by no means confirmed by the sources.' The antinomians blamed by Philo can only have been very few in number. Diaspora-Judaism held fast to the connexion with Palestine, sent year by year the prescribed tribute to the Temple, and observed

[1] *Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes im Zeitalter Jesu Christi*, vierte Auflage, Dritter Band (Leipzig: Hinrichs. 1909), pp. 136–139.

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the Sabbath, the dietary and the purification laws. If these were not carried out with the punctiliousness of the Pharisees in Palestine, yet we have no right to say that any deliberate non-observance of the Law would have been tolerated in the synagogues of the Dispersion.

Schürer's view of the situation is essentially sane and just. The people who made all the trouble were the extremists on the Pharisaic side—probably members of the Shammaite Party which was at this time dominant in Palestine—who insisted on the whole Law, and nothing but the full requirement of the Law, both for Jew and Gentile. The people who opposed this party, both in Palestine and outside, were not all radical antinomians. What St. Paul objected to was not the observance of the Law by members of the Jewish race, but its imposition as an indispensable requirement upon non-Jews who wished to become incorporated into 'the Israel of God.'

Philo is rightly taken as an example of the influence of Greek thought upon an outstanding figure of the Jewish Diaspora. But Philo, though his thought was so profoundly influenced by Greek philosophy, yet remained at heart a Jew. His ethical standpoint is strictly Jewish, and he insists on retaining legal observances. 'He is,' to use Paul Krüger's words,[1] 'an example of what the Apostle James (cf. James i 8) calls an ἀνὴρ δίψυχος, a man with two souls, of which one thought as a Greek, the other felt as a Jew.'

It is clear that even where the Jews were most deeply immersed in Hellenic influence, there was something that found its most significant expression in their religion and religious customs, which remained intractable to Hellenic elements. This Jewish residuum was like a rock, which might be submerged by the rising tide, but remained immovable beneath the waters, only to re-emerge, grim and unshakeable, when the waters ebbed.

It should not be forgotten that the Jews of the Dispersion were markedly distinguished in many ways from

[1] *Op. cit.*

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the non-Jewish population amid which they dwelt. Professor Siegfried notes that 'the Jews outside Palestine were so different from the peoples among whom they lived that they were bound to attract attention.' They lived in a separate quarter, mostly in the cities; enjoyed special privileges and exemptions under the law; they were allowed also to organize themselves as autonomous communities, having control of their own affairs and organization—there was no mistaking their distinctive character and position. Nor was anti-Semitism, or something very much like it, unknown in the ancient Graeco-Roman world. As ever, the Jew at once attracted and repelled.

'The diffusion of Judaism throughout the Graeco-Roman world,' says Th. Reinach,[1] 'could not but call forth vigorous resistance, especially in those parts where the Greek language and Greek civilization prevailed. Speaking broadly, the middle classes in the Greek cities were not favourably disposed towards the Jews. Their religious and racial peculiarities; their undisguised contempt of the Hellenic cults, pageants, and gymnastic displays—in short, of all that constituted the very essence of a Grecian city; perhaps, also, a secret apprehension that they might develop into commercial competitors; and, finally, the efficacy of their religious propagandism—all contributed to the unpopularity of these newcomers.'

It is easy to over-rate the extent to which Judaism was Hellenized in the Graeco-Roman world. In spite of all outside influence and pressure there was an element in Judaism that obstinately refused to be absorbed. This was fundamental and, in the last resort, determinative.

To assert this is not to deny that Judaism possessed great assimilative power. This, in fact, characterized Hebrew religion from the first. Even Ezra's work was stimulated by Persian influences, and the Priestly Code embodies many Babylonian elements. Yet, in spite of its power of assimilation Judaism obstinately remained Jewish. It dominated, and was not dominated by, the foreign elements. The exclusive spirit of Pharisaism performed a necessary office—it conserved and intensified

[1] *ut supra.*

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the truly Jewish character of the religion generally. This power of absorbing and making its own so much that was new, far from being a source of weakness, is a sign of power. It characterized Judaism in its most vigorous phase—it is indeed the essential characteristic of a religion that is capable of becoming a world-religion. So far as the Rabbinical Judaism which consolidated itself in the Second century of our era succeeded in cutting itself off from outside influences and isolating Judaism, it thereby reduced its vital forces. The rôle which it might have filled was handed over to Christianity.

III

What was it in Judaism that gave it its distinctive and inalienable character? What was the fundamental factor that made and kept it unmistakeably Jewish? If this question had been asked of any contemporary Jew, we venture to think he would not have been in much doubt as to the reply. He would have pointed to the Jewish doctrine of God—the *one* God, Lord of Heaven and Earth—as revealed in Moses and the Prophets. Moreover, it was the ethical monotheism of the Hebrew prophets, with its burning sense of Jehovah's righteousness, holiness, and ethical requirement, and its passionate hatred of idolatry in all its forms and associations—it was this kind of monotheism, and not the speculative and nebulous monotheistic theories of Greek philosophers, that our Jew would have meant. And he would have been right. A glance at the Jewish-Alexandrine apologetic literature, which is made as Greek in form as it can possibly be, is enough to prove this. If we take, for instance, the Jewish parts of the Sibylline oracles, behind the elaborately constructed Greek verses, modelled upon those of the traditional Sibyl, what do we find? The poems are full of exhortations to the heathen world to accept belief in the one God, whose chosen people is the Jews, and to lead moral lives in accordance with the ethical code of the divine Law.

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This is how Dr. S. Krauss [1] describes the character and contents of these productions:

'She [the Sibyl] is fully conscious of her divine mission, which is to be "the light of the heathen," "preparing the path for man." She circulates the divine code of ethics, and explains the ancient history of the Jews to the Gentiles, whom she familiarizes with monotheism, retaining some of the concepts of Greek mythology merely to lend some degree of familiarity to her instruction. She lashes the wickedness of the heathen, describes the impending divine judgement, and the coming Messianic period, and dwells on the sublime mission of the Jewish people, for whom is reserved a future of splendour and sanctity, despite the shame which has been its lot. Special stress is laid on the most attractive ethical laws of Judaism, since these alone could be used for a successful propaganda among the Gentiles. . . . [These poems are] essentially national and nomistic, in so far as they are Jewish. Even the Messianic time is inconceivable without the Temple, sacrificial worship, and the law. Despite this the pagan Greeks are nowhere urged to observe the Law; they are asked merely to lead moral lives and to recognize the one God.'

In spite of its Greek form, nothing could be more intensely Jewish. The fervent spirit of the Jewish missionary is on fire with the conviction that in preaching ethical monotheism he has something to offer the Gentile world, which is infinitely precious, and which it cannot find elsewhere.

Dr. Inge, however, seems inclined to question this insistence upon ethical monotheism as characteristic of post-Exilic Judaism. He says [2]:

'The distinctive feature of the Jewish religion is not, as is often supposed, its monotheism. Hebrew religion in its golden age was monolatry rather than monotheism; and when Jahveh became more strictly "the only God," the cult of intermediate beings came in, and restored a quasi-polytheism. The distinctive feature in Jewish faith is its historical and teleological character. The God of the Jew is not natural law. If the idea of necessary causation ever forced itself upon his mind,

[1] Article 'Sibyl' in *Jewish Encyclopaedia*, xi 320.
[2] *Outspoken Essays* ('St. Paul'), p. 215.

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he at once gave it the form of predestination. The whole of history is an unfolding of the divine purpose; and so history as a whole has for the Jew an importance which it never had for a Greek thinker, nor for the Hellenised Jew Philo. The Hebrew idea of God is dynamic and ethical; it is therefore rooted in the idea of Time.'

The last sentence is profoundly true—the Hebrew idea of God *is* essentially 'dynamic and ethical'; it is rooted in the idea of Time, because God is conceived of as essentially personal; and the teleological conception of history is fundamental. Only all this at once removes it poles asunder from anything Hellenic, and invests it with its perennial power and appeal. But when Dr. Inge says that in the later Judaism (*i.e.* the Judaism of the post-Exilic Jewish Church) 'the cult of intermediate beings came in and restored a quasi-polytheism,' he is distorting the picture in a way which can hardly be justified. It is true that post-exilic Judaism held a 'transcendental' view of God; but this by no means meant that communion with God was difficult or remote, or could only be mediated through some intermediate angelic agency. Such a passage as the well-known one from the latter part of the Book of Isaiah (lvii 15) is alone sufficient to refute this idea—*For thus saith the high and lofty One that inhabiteth eternity, whose name is Holy: I dwell in the high and holy place, with him also that is of a contrite and humble spirit, to revive the spirit of the humble, and to revive the spirit of the contrite ones.*

Where in the Psalms—that mirror of the piety of the post-Exilic Church—is it suggested that God is not nigh to the penitent, or that communion with Him is dependent upon angelic mediators? In some of the latest of the Psalms—*e.g.* Ps. cxxxiv 8—where the divine transcendence is most strongly expressed, this is followed in the same breath by the assertion of God's immediate accessibility to the penitent. The 'quasi-polytheism' of which Dr. Inge speaks cannot be discovered here; nor can it be detected in the liturgical forms used in the public worship of the synagogue. The hierarchy of angelic beings to

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which he refers is to be found in certain parts of the apocalyptic literature—but even here there is no suggestion of 'quasi-polytheism.' The very idea of worshipping an angel would have been abhorrent to a Jew.[1] Nothing was more characteristic of the later Judaism than the assertion of the unity and uniqueness of God. This was expressed in a formula (the *Shema*) which every Jew knew by heart, which the martyr died uttering with his last breath (R. Akiba), and which every pious Jew aspired to make his last utterance in death.

Together with this deep-seated conviction about the unity of God went a passionate detestation of idolatry in all its forms. Dr. Inge speaks of idolatry, as denounced by St. Paul following 'the customary line of Jewish apologetic,' as 'an aid to worship which is quite innocent and natural in some peoples, but which the Jews never understood.' Can it be said that idolatry as the Jews met with it in pagan Greek life in the First and Second centuries was ever free from degrading and immoral associations? In its pure and 'innocent' form where could it be found in the Graeco-Roman world?

* * * *

Ethical monotheism, then, remains as the supreme characteristic and achievement of Hebrew religion. It is the basis on which both the later Judaism and Christianity have been built; and to it we owe the most fundamental and characteristic ideas of Christianity and Christian civilization, including the idea of Progress. These points have been admirably brought out by Dr. Matthews in the Boyle Lectures[2] for 1920. Dr. Matthews' argument should be read and studied as a whole, if full justice is to be done to it. But the following passages will serve to illustrate the points we have just referred to:

'Hebrew religion is the history of the working out of a thorough-going ethical Monotheism. The process may be traced in detail from the affirmation by the earliest prophets that Jahveh

[1] *Cf.* Rev. xxii 8 f.

[2] *Studies in Christian Philosophy.*

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demands righteousness rather than ritual to the culmination of the conception in the great vision of the Deutero-Isaiah of a Universal God who is the source of righteousness and the Judge of the whole earth. The problems with which Hebrew religious thought grapples are those which arise from the moral aspect of the world, particularly the apparent difficulty of reconciling the facts of daily life and history with belief in a righteous Creator and Ruler of the world. By the year 350 B.C. this ethical Monotheism had been established in all essential particulars.'[1]

'Hebrew religion is the supreme and unique example of one type of religious evolution . . . it represents the only line of development which does not end in losing the concept of God altogether in some vague notion of Being or the order of the Universe.'[2]

. . . 'The fundamental affirmations of Christianity are those which are derived from the prophetic idea of God and His relation with men.'[3]

IV

Our previous argument has led us to affirm the fundamental place of the Jewish element both in Hellenized Judaism and in historical Christianity. It remains to discuss the place of Hellenism in Christianity, and first in the Christian writings of the New Testament. In this connexion Dr. Inge, as usual, makes large claims for Hellenism. He says[4]:

'There is . . . an assumption, which we find in such learned writers as Harnack and Hatch, that the Hellenic element in Christianity is an accretion which transformed the new religion from its original purity, and half paganised Europe again. They would like to prove that underneath Catholicism was a primitive Protestantism, which owed nothing to Greece.

'The truth is that the Church was half Greek from the first, though . . . the original Gospel was not. St. Paul was a Jew of the Dispersion, not of Palestine, and the Christianity to which he was converted was the Christianity of Stephen, not of James, the Lord's brother. His later epistles are steeped in the phraseology of the Greek mysteries. The Epistle to the Hebrews and

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 50.
[2] *Op. cit.* p. 51.
[3] *Op. cit.* p. 51.
[4] *The Legacy of Greece*, p. 32 f.

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the Fourth Gospel are unintelligible without some knowledge of Philo, whose theology is more Greek than Jewish.'

Later in the same essay Dr. Inge quotes Harnack's dictum that 'in the earliest Christian writings, apart from Paul, Luke, and John,' he cannot find any considerable trace of Greek influence. 'The real influx of Greek thought and life,' he says, began about 130. Dr. Inge remarks that 'the exception is so important as to make this statement of little or no value.'[1]

Dr. Inge does admit that in the teaching of Christ as set forth in the Synoptic Gospels 'no Hellenic influence can be traced. . . . There is not even any sign of the Hellenized Judaism which for us is represented by his contemporary Philo.' He adds, however:

'But neither is it possible to call the Gospel Jewish, except with many qualifications. Christ came before his countrymen as a prophet; he deliberately placed himself in the line of the prophetic tradition. . . . The Gospel was, as St. Paul said, a new creation.'[2]

The teaching of Christ is, of course, profoundly original, but it is also fundamentally Jewish. It is saturated with the spirit of the Old Testament, uses Jewish terminology and Jewish literary forms (*e.g.* parallelism in poetic discourse), and, in fact, could only have been spoken by one who had been trained and was steeped in a Jewish atmosphere. There is nothing more Jewish in the New Testament than the Sermon on the Mount. There are obviously parts of the New Testament literature where the Greek element is more marked than the purely Jewish. This is most clearly evident when the diction is considered. Some of the Greek of the New Testament can properly be described as 'Jewish' Greek; and on the other hand we meet with Greek which is the authentic speech of Hellas. Much of the Greek of the Gospels can only be described as Greek written by men who thought in a Semitic language. This applies to the Greek of the Fourth Gospel and of the Johannine Epistles. It can only have been written by

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 35. [2] *Op. cit.* p. 42 f.

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an Aramaic-speaking Jew—indeed Dr. C. F. Burney, in his recent striking book, *The Aramaic Origin of the Fourth Gospel*, has contended that the Greek is simply a translation of an original Aramaic document. The linguistic proofs advanced by him are extraordinarily strong, and have been presented with the most ample and thorough scholarship. If they do not absolutely suffice to convince us that an Aramaic original underlies our present Gospel, they at any rate afford convincing proof that the Greek is that of a Jew whose mother-language was Aramaic, who thought in Aramaic, and had never acquired (as St. Paul acquired) a thorough mastery of the Greek language. It is obvious that the Greek of the Johannine Apocalypse is also that of a Semitic writer who used Greek as a foreign language. On the other hand, St. Luke writes the language with the facility of a trained and educated Greek, though he seems occasionally to be translating from Semitic documents (*e.g.* in the first two chapters of the Gospel), and at other times uses Greek material which has a decided Jewish colouring. The First Gospel, again, though its compiler could write quite good Greek, embodies in the discourse-material a great deal that ultimately goes back to a Semitic original. It is only when we come to the Pauline letters that we can say, without any deduction, that we meet with 'real Greek—not translated Aramaic like the sayings of Jesus.' It is this fact that makes St. Paul, to use the words of Wilamowitz-Möllendorf, 'a classic of Hellenism. Now at last, at last, one can hear in Greek the utterance of an inner experience, real and living.' [1]

Several distinguished scholars who have made a special study of Hellenistic Greek, and more particularly of popular Greek as made known in the vast amount of new material brought to light in the Egyptian papyri, have tried to shew that 'many constructions and usages, both in the LXX and New Testament, which were formerly supposed to reflect Semitic influence, are really nothing more than ordinary phenomena of the Κοινή language.' In other words the Greek of the LXX and of the New Testament

[1] Quoted in *Hellenism and Christianity* (E. Bevan), p. 71 f.

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is simply popular Greek, and not specially 'Jewish' Greek at all. On this point Dr. Burney has made some apposite remarks. He says [1]:

This 'reaction against the theory of Semitic influence upon Biblical Greek has been pushed too far. The fact is surely not without significance that practically the whole of the new material upon which we base our knowledge of the Κοινή comes from Egypt, where there existed large colonies of Jews whose knowledge of Greek was undoubtedly influenced by the translation-Greek of the LXX, and who may not unreasonably be suspected of having influenced in some degree the character of Egyptian Κοινή.' [2]

Long ago Dr. Siegfried remarked [3]:

'The real Hellenes . . . could not understand the Greek of the Bible, for it was intermixed with many Hebrew expressions, and entirely new meanings were at times given to Greek phrases.'

Doubtless the converts who came over from the Greek world, and attached themselves as σεβόμενοι to the synagogues of the Diaspora, gradually adapted themselves to the Jewish atmosphere and Jewish point of view. They would have been helped by the Graeco-Jewish propaganda literature.

In the light of the considerations that have been advanced above, considerable deductions will have to be made from the exceptions allowed by Harnack to his statement about the earliest Christian writings being free from 'any considerable traces of Greek influence.' He allows no Hellenic influence of a pronounced kind in the writings of 'Paul, Luke, and John.' In the case of the Lukan writings, as we have seen, there is a considerable amount of material which is either translated from Semitic documents, or has a pronounced Semitic (Hebraic) colouring.[4] This applies

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 4.

[2] *Cf.* also Swete, *Apocalypse*, second edition (Macmillan, 1907), p. cxxiv, n. 1 (cited by Dr. Burney).

[3] Article 'Hellenism' in *Jewish Encyclopaedia*, vi 337.

[4] On the 'Hebraisms' in St. Luke, cf. Burney, *op. cit.* pp. 8 ff.

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also to the first twelve chapters of the Acts.[1] As regards the Johannine writings, and especially the Fourth Gospel, it is sufficient here to say that Jewish scholars, who have approached the consideration of the subject with no special bias, have been deeply impressed with the intensely Jewish character of the writing. Dr. Abelson, for example, speaking of the Fourth Gospel, says it 'is the work of one who was thoroughly saturated with the Jewish Apocalyptic as well as the Palestinian Rabbinic teachings of the First century C.E., and being saturated with these teachings, one of his objects was to demonstrate that a belief in the angelic lore of the Jews, as well as the prevalent ideas about God's Shekinah and "Word" does not in any degree imply dualism of Deity. Judaism's foremost truth that "God is One" is an unassailable stronghold.'[2] Similar testimony to its intensely Jewish and Palestinian character has been given by Güdemann, Rabbi Klein, and Abrahams, while illustrations, drawn from the early Rabbinic literature to shew how Jewish the phraseology and ideas are, have been provided in abundance by Schlatter in his striking *brochure*—too little known to New Testament scholars—*Die Sprache und Heimat des Vierten Evangelisten* (1902).[3]

One remark of his may be quoted in this connexion: 'Greek and Semitic forms of speech (*Sprachformen*) lie so far apart that only the born Semite can write an Aramaised form of Greek. If such conformation is in evidence in the language of John, then he can have been no Ephesian nor Alexandrian. The view that such an one might by skilful effort invest his words with a Palestinian colouring must be reckoned an impossibility,

[1] *Cf.* Torrey, *Composition and Date of Acts* (Harvard Theol. Studies i). (Cambridge, Mass. 1916.)

[2] *The Immanence of God in Rabbinical Literature* (London: Macmillan, 1912), p. 165.

[3] In *Church and Synagogue*, Jan. 1909, pp. 15 ff., the writer of this article called attention to Schlatter's book, and gave an extended list of examples, based upon his work, 'Jewish Illustrations of the New Testament: Some Jewish Affinities of the Phraseology of the Fourth Gospel.' More recently Dr. Burney has noticed the same work (*Aramaic Origin of Fourth Gospel*, p. 2 f. *n.*).

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because nobody can write naturally in a Semitic strain who does not think and speak as a Semite.' He concludes that the writer of the Gospel was a Palestinian who thought and spoke in Aramaic, and only acquired his Greek in the course of his missionary work.

The case for a real influx of genuine Hellenism into the New Testament writings must rest, then, upon St. Paul. St. Paul was a Jew who spoke and wrote Greek not as a foreign idiom, but with a mastery and facility which carried him at times to the highest flights of eloquence. Dr. Inge sums up the matter well [1] as follows:

'His [Paul's] Greek is neither correct nor elegant. His eloquence is of the kind which proceeds from intense conviction, and from a thorough knowledge of Old Testament prophecy and psalmody—no bad preparation for a religious teacher. If at times he argued like a Rabbi, these frigid debates were as acceptable to ancient Jews as they are to modern Scotsmen. And when he takes fire, as he deals with some vital truth which he has lived as well as learned and taught, he establishes his right to be called what he never aimed at being—a writer of genius. Such passages as 1 Cor. xiii, Phil. ii, Rom. viii, rank among the finest compositions in later Greek literature. Regarded merely as a piece of poetical prose, 1 Cor. xiii is finer than anything that had been written in the Greek language since the great Attic prose-writers. And if this was dictated impromptu, similar outbursts of splendid eloquence were probably frequent in his mission-preaching. Their effect must have been overwhelming.'

When we ask ourselves how far Hellenism had penetrated into the inner mind and being of St. Paul, we touch on a problem full of complicated issues which it is impossible adequately to discuss in a few paragraphs at the end of an article. The present writer can only say that in his opinion St. Paul was, as he himself states, a member of a strict Jewish family, which, though living in Tarsus, carefully preserved its strict Jewish traditions and manner of living. He probably inherited Aramaic as his mother-speech—a fact which would account for his ability to speak fluently in public in the Aramaic language, as recorded in

[1] *Outspoken Essays* ('St. Paul'), p. 220 f.

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the Acts. No doubt he also spoke the 'Koine,' like other Jews of the Diaspora. In fact he was bilingual. He went to Jerusalem, probably as a youth, and there received a Rabbinic training in the famous Pharisaic school presided over by Gamaliel. Here he remained for some years, in fact till the crisis of his conversion. Zahn has plausibly conjectured that the Apostle's departure from Jerusalem to Tarsus, some little time after his conversion, brought him into close contact with the Greek life of that city, and even enabled him to take a course of studies at its famous university which gave him a closer acquaintance with Greek life and thought. This, of course, is pure conjecture. It seems clear, however, that he spent a considerable time in Tarsus, probably amounting to some years, subsequent to his conversion. If the date of the conversion is fixed approximately at A.D. 33, the visit to Jerusalem described in Acts ix 26 ff. will fall in A.D. 36, which was followed by the return to Tarsus referred to in Acts ix 30. Twelve years later (*c.* A.D. 48) the Apostle is still at Tarsus, and is brought from thence by Barnabas according to Acts xi 25. It is not improbable that during these years the Apostle made Tarsus his headquarters, and, perhaps from this base, evangelized the neighbouring district of Syria and Cilicia.

The influence of Tarsus on the Apostle's life and outlook is an element that has to be reckoned with. It was here, doubtless, that he acquired his knowledge of Greek. But though he could undoubtedly speak and read the Κοινή when he left Tarsus as a lad—say at the age of fifteen—it is very doubtful whether he had received any schooling in Greek culture. The period of contact with Greek thought—and then only with Jewish-Hellenistic thought and literature, not with classical Greek culture—seems to have come later. The quotations in Acts xvii and the knowledge implied of Greek philosophy do not amount to very much.

We conclude, then, that the Apostle belonged to a strict Jewish Pharisaic family living in Tarsus. Though he early acquired a knowledge of the Κοινή he was an

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Aramaic-speaking Jew. He received a Rabbinic training in Jerusalem, where he spent some years. After his conversion he spent some (possibly twelve) years in Tarsus, and then, perhaps, studied the Jewish-Hellenistic literature, and came into contact with Jewish-Hellenistic thought.

He thus, unlike the ordinary Greek-speaking Diaspora-Jew, had an intimate knowledge both of Palestinian and Diaspora Judaism (including the languages). This will help to explain his extraordinary many-sidedness, his capacity to put himself *en rapport* with his environment whether inside or outside Palestine. Writing to Greek-speaking Christians he naturally uses the Greek Bible of the Diaspora-synagogues, which was recognized as authoritative Scripture in these circles. This in no wise implies that he was unacquainted with the Hebrew Scriptures. The fact that he sometimes argues like a Rabbi, at other times speaks rather in a Greek strain, is explained by his training. But fundamentally he remains a Jew, whose categories of thought are rather Rabbinic and Palestinian, than purely Jewish-Hellenistic. In fact, there is an extraordinary contrast between St. Paul and Philo. For the great themes with which the Apostle deals—the problems of sin, the Fall, Election, the wrath, long-suffering, and mercy of God, the prerogative of Israel, the significance of the Law, the temporal and the eternal Jerusalem, the prospect of dying or surviving to the Parousia, the tribulation of the times of the End, and the Judgement—we must turn to the most Rabbinic of the Palestinian Apocalypses, 4 Ezra (2 Esdras); it will be useless to turn to Philo for any real parallels.

Dr. Inge admits that in his earliest epistles the Apostle is in touch with 'Pharisaic tradition.' But he rapidly outgrew these 'naive' conceptions of his earlier period.

'In the central group the Christology is far more complex. Besides the Pharisaic Messiah, and the records of the historical Jesus of Nazareth, we have now to reckon with the Jewish-Alexandrian idea of the generic, archetypal man, which is unintelligible without reference to the Platonic philosophy.

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Philo is here a great help towards understanding one of the most difficult parts of the Apostle's teaching.'[1]

Dr. Inge takes for granted that the idea of the 'archetypal man' can only be explained by reference to the Platonic philosophy and Jewish-Alexandrine speculation. He apparently ignores the fact that it had already had a long history before Philo in Palestinian Apocalyptic. The idea of the 'cosmic' man probably underlies the figure of one 'like a Son of Man' in Dan. vii 14, and can be traced through the Similitudes of 1 Enoch down to 4 Ezra (xiii). Before it was expressed in Daniel it had been part of a very old Semitic tradition.[2] It also had a long and elaborate later development in Jewish mystical thought. Whatever influence the Platonic philosophical construction of this idea may have had at different stages of the development, it was indirect, and not fundamental. Dr. Inge, however, thinks the Apostle's development proceeded much further still. He writes[3]:

'The third group of the Epistles—Philippians, Colossians, and Ephesians—are steeped in ideas which belong to Greek philosophy and the Greek mystery-religions. It would be impossible to translate them into any Eastern language. The Rabbinical disputes with the Jews about justification and election have disappeared; the danger ahead is now from theosophy and the barbarised Platonism which was afterwards matured to Gnosticism. The teaching is even more Christocentric than before; and the catholic doctrine of the Church as the body of Christ is more prominent than individualistic mysticism. The cosmology is thoroughly Johannine, and only awaits the name of the Logos.'

The suggestion, apparently, behind all these assertions is that St. Paul's theology gradually became completely Hellenized. This question has been a matter of keen debate between scholars of different schools. The position

[1] *Outspoken Essays*, p. 224.

[2] *Cf.* Gressmann, *Der Ursprung der Israelisch-jüdischen Eschatologie*, pp. 349–358.

[3] *Outspoken Essays*, p. 225.

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assumed by Dr. Inge seems to have been largely influenced by that of Pfleiderer. Pfleiderer, for instance, argued strongly that the earlier 'crude' Pauline eschatology was gradually Hellenized and 'spiritualized.' Are we to believe that St. Paul ever really abandoned the doctrine of the resurrection of the body? These contentions have been subjected to devastating criticism by Kabisch and Gunkel, who approach the consideration of the subject with a real insight into the Jewish and oriental antecedents. The extreme Hellenizers seem incapable of doing this, or of treating the Jewish element with sympathy and insight.

Dr. Inge, for instance, in the extract just quoted speaks of 'theosophy and barbarised Platonism,' glossing over the fact that this largely consisted of oriental and Jewish elements, the purely Greek element being comparatively small.

It may be doubted, also, whether St. Paul was ever really influenced in his thought by the mystery religions. His thought and that of the mysteries move in two different worlds. This has been well brought out by Professor H. A. A. Kennedy, whose work Dr. Inge occasionally quotes with approval. For instance, Professor Kennedy writes [1]:

'There is no true analogy between the New Testament idea of a fellowship in the sufferings of Christ and that ritual sympathy with the goddesses who mourned the loss of Osiris and Attis, or with the woes of those deified beings themselves. In the former, self-sacrificing devotion which shrinks from no hardship is the core of the experience. The latter is the result of sensuous impressions more or less artificially produced.'

St. Paul's mysticism is thoroughly ethical in character. The Cross is central. To quote Professor Kennedy again:

'Even if we were bold enough to assert, with some scholars, on the basis of the very meagre extant evidence, that the initiates

[1] 'St. Paul and the Central Conceptions of the Mystery Religions,' *Expositor*, Nov. 1912 (since republished with other articles in book-form).

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in the mystic cults regarded themselves as having died with the divine personages whose restoration to life they celebrated, it is perfectly obvious that the death of which St. Paul speaks is something wholly different. It is exclusively a death to sin, and its correlative is a life to holiness in the most ethical sense conceivable.

'The ceremonial dedication to a deity whose ritual, based on the revival of life in the world of nature, suggests the soul-kindling prospect of a life beyond the grave, could very naturally be described as a dying to the ignorant past, and the entrance on a new life of hope. But it requires an unusually daring imagination to fill these terms in the mystery-cults with the profound ethical content which they held for St. Paul. We admit a certain kinship in the imagery, but this imagery has been the common property of mystics and philosophers and preachers throughout the ages.'

St. Paul undoubtedly uses terms which are characteristic of the terminology of the mystery-religions, just as he uses occasionally Stoic technical terms. But in both cases the language is charged with a new meaning and new content.

But the really decisive proof that St. Paul's theology was fundamentally Jewish and not Hellenic or Hellenized is to be found in the fact that in the sub-apostolic age and subsequently, when Greek thought really did exercise a decisive influence upon Christianity, the Pauline theology failed to be understood, and exercised no real influence. It was only partially re-discovered by St. Augustine, and later by the Reformers. Dr. Inge refers to this view, which has been worked out by a long succession of distinguished scholars, among whom is Harnack, somewhat scornfully as an attempt to discover a 'primitive Protestantism' behind the old Catholicism. We should prefer to describe it as a return to Hebrew truth and reality which ought to be a permanently vitalizing element of our religion, an essential element which cannot ultimately be eliminated. To recover this element, and make it possible to hold together the two factors, the Hebrew and the Greek, in stable equilibrium, is the special problem that

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confronts scientific theology in our age. Possibly the bridge may be built by Christian Philosophy.[1]

V

'If we were to consider those elements in the environment of early Christianity which belonged to the classical tradition of Greek civilization, to the tradition cultivated in literary circles and in the schools, the tradition which the old-fashioned scholar was apt to take as completely representative of the first-century world, Stoicism would be the element of prime importance for the Christian Church. For in Stoicism the mind of antiquity had not only reached in some respects its highest expression, but that expression had become popular in a way unparalleled in the history of any later school. The Stoic missionary, preaching the self-sufficiency of virtue in a threadbare cloak at the street corners, had been one of the typical figures of a Greek town for many generations before St. Paul.'

So writes Mr. Edwyn Bevan in his most recent book.[2]

[1] Dr. Sanday (*The Oracles of God*, pp. 150 ff.) devotes an appendix to illustrating from recent criticism 'the defective apprehension of the Old Testament in the early Church.' He quotes from Ritschl, von Engelhardt, Harnack, and Siegfried. A very valuable discussion is contained in von Engelhardt's work on *The Christianity of Justin*, where the author shews how the 'degeneration of Justin's conception of certain sides of Christian truth is due to his antecedents.' Dr. Sanday quotes the following passage from this scholar's work: 'In all directions Justin proves to be the key to the understanding of the course which the Church took in its evolution. From his writings alone can it be ascertained what is the origin of that peculiar form of Christianity which meets us in different degrees in the Apostolic Fathers; and only through the analysis of the modes of his Christian thinking can we get at the beginning of the so-called Old-Catholicism and of the later Greek theology. The legal turn of Old-Catholic Christianity, the fluctuations of Ante-Nicene Christology and of the Logos-doctrine, and lastly the one-sided reference of σωτηρία or redemption to the imparting of eternal life in the sense of immortality, find their explanations in the confusion which is demonstrable in Justin of doctrines and ideas which are either specifically Christian or the products of Revelation generally with the religious and moral ideas of Greek and Pagan culture.'

[2] *Hellenism and Christianity*, p. 72 f.

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Dr. Inge makes claims for Stoicism in its significance for historical Christianity of a far more sweeping character. He says [1]:

'Early Christian philosophy was mainly Platonic; early Christian ethics (as exemplified especially in writers like Ambrose) were mainly Stoical. There had been a considerable fusion of Plato and the Stoa among the Neoplatonists, so that it was easy for the two to flourish together. Augustine banished Stoical ethics from the Church, and they were revived only at the Reformation. Calvinism is simply baptized Stoicism; it is logically pantheistic, since it acknowledges only one effective will in the universe . . . Puritanism was not at all like Judaism, in spite of its fondness for the Old Testament; it was very like Stoicism.'

It is worth while to inquire, in view of these claims, what exactly Christianity owes to Stoicism, and how the relation between the two systems is to be envisaged. Obviously in a brief space only a rough and inadequate answer can be attempted.

In *Stoics and Sceptics* Mr. Edwyn Bevan has brilliantly sketched the genesis and teaching of the Stoic school of philosophers. The founder of the school was, apparently, a Phoenician, 'of a race whose language was almost identical with Hebrew' and Semitic. It is curious to notice that while 'Babylon, Tyre, Sidon, Carthage, reared some of his most illustrious successors,' and 'Cilicia, Phrygia, Rhodes were the homes of others,' 'not a single Stoic of any name was a native of Greece proper.'

Commenting on this fact Dr. Lightfoot observes [2]:

'To Eastern affinities Stoicism was without doubt largely indebted for the features which distinguished it from other schools of Greek philosophy. To this fact may be ascribed the intense moral earnestness which was its most honourable characteristic. If the later philosophers generally, as distinguished from the earlier, busied themselves with ethics rather than metaphysics, with the Stoics this was the one absorbing passion. The contrast between the light reckless gaiety of the

[1] *Legacy*, p. 37.

[2] 'St. Paul and Seneca' (commentary on *Philippians*), p. 273.

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Hellenic spirit and the stern, unbending, almost fanatical moralism of the followers of Zeno is as complete as could well be imagined. The ever active conscience, which is the glory, and the proud self-consciousness, which is the reproach, of the Stoic school are alike alien to the temper of ancient Greece. Stoicism breathes rather the religious atmosphere of the East which fostered on the one hand the inspired devotion of a David or an Isaiah, and on the other the self-mortification and self-righteousness of an Egyptian therapeute or an Indian fakir.'

Mr. Bevan thinks that while Zeno's 'message was Hellenic, his tone of voice was that of the prophet. He had something positive to say, something he wished men to believe. . . . His teaching was essentially dogmatic, authoritative. . . . If men received it, it was not because they were convinced in a cold intellectual way, but because behind his affirmations there was a tremendous personal force, because something deep in their own hearts rose up to bear witness to the things he affirmed. It was the way of faith.' [1]

The Greek rationalistic philosophy had destroyed all the old sanctions. 'Even the ordinary man in Fifth-century Athens became aware that clever people no longer believed in his old gods and his old standards of right and wrong.' In face of this situation, created by 'a general break-up of tradition,' Platonism was helpless. It was 'too fine-drawn, too abstruse, too tentative.' Something stronger was needed; this was found in Stoicism which, to use Mr. Bevan's words,[2]

'was a system put together hastily, violently, to meet a desperate emergency. Some ring-wall must be built against chaos. High over the place where Zeno talked could be descried the wall, built generations before, under the terror of a Persian attack, built in haste of the materials which lay to hand, the drums of columns fitted together, just as they were, with the more regular stones. That heroic wall still looks over the roofs of modern Athens. To Zeno it might have been a parable of his own teaching.'

When Christianity first entered the Greek world,

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 22 f. [2] *Op. cit.* p. 32 f.

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Stoicism had passed through a long history. Though in its origin it appears, as we have seen, to be linked with the East, its systematic development was carried out in the schools of Greece, in this respect, as Lightfoot has pointed out, affording a curious parallel to the progress of the Christian Church.

'The Schools of Athens and of Tarsus did for Stoicism the same work which was accomplished for the doctrines of the Gospel by the controversial writings of the Greek Fathers and the authoritative decrees of the Greek Councils. Zeno and Chrysippus and Panaetius are the counterparts of an Origen, an Athanasius, or a Basil.'[1]

Through the Cynic preachers of righteousness it had carried out a popular propaganda which had deeply impressed the masses of the Greek world. It had made a profound impression upon the public conscience. Perhaps the most striking evidence of this is the fact that it had created a new set of ethical terms.

'It is difficult to estimate, and perhaps not very easy to overrate,' says Lightfoot, 'the extent to which Stoic philosophy had leavened the moral vocabulary of the civilized world at the time of the Christian era. To take a single instance: the most important of moral terms, the crowning triumph of ethical nomenclature, *συνείδησις*, *conscientia*, the internal, absolute, supreme judge of individual action, if not struck in the mint of the Stoics, at all events became current coin through their influence. To a great extent, therefore, the general diffusion of Stoic language would lead to its adoption by the first teachers of Christianity.'[2]

Stoicism was thus a real preparation for Christianity. It was governed by a great ideal, it was marked by high ethical power, and it produced a few great men of noble character. It impressed the conscience of the Greek and Roman world. But its ethics were not Christian—it was a creed of despair and acquiescence, and it despised all the Christian virtues that depend upon the affirmation 'God is love.' It had no belief in Progress, and its outlook on

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 276. [2] *Op. cit.* p. 303.

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the world was dark and forbidding—removed poles asunder from that of the Christian. It totally lacked the dynamic which carried Christianity forward and made it a religion of moving power for mankind. If Christianity largely absorbed its ethical terminology it invested the terms with an entirely new content and new values.

It is easy to speak, as the Dean of St. Paul's speaks, of the ethics of certain types of organized Christianity as 'baptized Stoicism.' But the baptism has made all the difference. There has been in consequence of it a transvaluation of values.

'Suppose'—says a former Professor of Moral Philosophy at St. Andrews[1]—'a cultivated Athenian youth in the first Christian century—who had been educated in the Academic or Stoical Philosophy, and had consistently practised the virtues of these systems—to have embraced Christianity on conviction, what would happen? The old virtues of his Academic or Stoical novitiate would not be uprooted or extinguished. He would continue to practise them, but they would immediately undergo transformation. It is possible that for a time they would have no special interest to him, because of the new attraction he had found in Christianity; but he could never despise them if his life had been either noble or genuine before. . . . The old virtues would be displaced, but not destroyed; and the Christian Ethic came, to the disciples of earlier systems, "not to destroy, but to fulfil"—in other words to evoke the good it found, and to transfigure it by its alliance with other truths which it disclosed, and the fresh life it unfolded.' . . . 'While, therefore, he would be conscious of debts—spreading over a wide area, and reaching him from many sources—he would know in particular that his life had been touched to new and to fine issues by the incoming of the Christian Ethic. Although he had never seen its Founder, the influence of his personality would be felt in many ways, creating new thoughts, feelings, and actions, while it recreated old ones.'

When Christianity first emerged into the Graeco-Roman world, it was, as presented in the missionary preaching of St. Paul, as we have seen, by no means 'Hellenized' in

[1] Dr. William Knight, *The Christian Ethic* (1893), p. 63 f.

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the same sense and the same degree as was the case later. Its victorious advance and rapid diffusion in the sub-Apostolic Age and subsequently inevitably meant that the process of Hellenization went deeper. The impact of Greek ideas and Greek culture was so enormous that it is not to be wondered at if complete Hellenization seemed to be inevitable. Once again the Hellenic flood was rising and threatened to engulf the old Hebrew foundations, and wash them away. But this did not happen.

It did not happen when in the Second century Hellenism, in the sadly mixed and adulterated form of 'Hellenistic theology,' threatened to overwhelm the Christian system.

Mr. Edwyn Bevan has well remarked [1]:

'Even at first sight the Gospel must have presented in some ways a striking contrast to "Hellenistic theology." It must have seemed such a simplification. Instead of the enormous apparatus of mystical words and sacramental practices, to believe that, in order to conquer all possible terrors of the unknown, the whole range of ghostly enemies, one needed only to know Jesus! It must have been like the lifting off of a burden to say *I believe in one God, Maker of heaven and earth.*

'Christ had left His community indissolubly attached to its spiritual progenitors of the old Israel. There was something in the Hebraic element . . . in Christianity . . . which saved it from being carried away by the Hellenistic current. The Christian could never look with the Gnostic's abhorrence upon the earth and all the conditions of bodily life; to pray continually *Thy will be done on earth as it is in Heaven*—that alone set him on the side of the Hebrew Prophets and at variance with a theology for which the earth was incurably bad, and escape from it the whole of salvation.

'Perhaps few books seem less ethereal than *Ecclesistiacus* in its sober-going morality, its pattern of ordered family life, the strong earth-treading tradition of the Hebrews. And it may seem surprising that a Christian mystic like Clement of Alexandria should draw his quotations from this very book with notable frequency. We may see, however, that while the Gnostic was wishing to fly forthwith above the stars, it was just a tradition of domestic pieties which kept a Christian

[1] *Hellenism and Christianity*, p. 87 f.

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(who also regarded himself as a stranger and pilgrim in this world) content to discharge meantime the business of life and submit himself to laws which were not the Devil's but God's.'

The great influx of Greek ideas threatened to overwhelm the original Hebrew element in historic Christianity. But it was clearly impossible to dislodge the Scriptures of the Old Testament, which had been the Bible of Christ and the Apostles, from their historic position as sacred Scripture. And yet Greek thought had great difficulty in reconciling these books with its own thought-categories. Hence the adoption of, or rather extension of, the method of allegorizing, by which the literal meaning of the text could be dissipated. Still, in spite of this partial suppression, it was the Old Testament, as Harnack says, that prevented the complete Hellenization of Christianity.

The Old Testament was only partly re-discovered at the Reformation. Its complete re-discovery and reconstruction on a historic basis is the work of modern critical scholarship, which has set a new problem to the Church.

Once again, as more than once in her history before, the Church is confronted with urgent problems of reconstruction— in theology, in philosophy, in apologetic.

If she is true to her own historic past she will rebuild on the old Hebraic foundations of 'the apostles and prophets' a structure, firmly foundationed, strong and indestructible. On the old foundations will arise a noble building, which shall combine in one glorious whole the genius and contributions of Jew and Greek and many another, wrought into one organic unity—one splendid Temple of Christ.

G. H. Box.

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ART. VII.—THE CATHOLICISM OF THE FUTURE.

1. *What the Churches stand for.* Being a Series of Seven Lectures by E. G. SELWYN, M.A., A. E. GARVIE, M.A., D.D., EDWARD GRUBB, M.A., CLEMENT F. ROGERS, M.A., C. RYDER SMITH, B.A., D.D., P. T. THOMSON, M.A., and D. C. MACGREGOR, M.A., D.D. (London: Humphrey Milford, 1922.)
2. *Christian Unity: Its Principles and Possibilities.* Being a Report of the Committee on the War and the Religious Outlook. (New York: Association Press. 1921.)
3. *Church Unity.* Being the Report of a Joint Conference held at Lambeth Palace, together with a Preliminary Statement by the Archbishops of Canterbury and York and the Moderator of the Federal Council of the Evangelical Free Churches. (London: S.P.C.K. 1922.)
4. *Impasse or Opportunity.* By MALCOLM SPENCER, M.A. (London: Student Christian Movement. 1922.)
5. *Proceedings of the Eleventh General Council of the Alliance of Reformed Churches holding the Presbyterian System,* held at Pittsburg, 1921. (Edinburgh: Office of the Alliance, 44 Queen Street.)

NOTHING is more remarkable in the Reunion movement than the way in which the grounds of its urgency have shifted. In England, for instance, through long stretches of years, the unity of the Church was regarded as of vital consequence to the unity of the State, and to the civil and political peace of the commonwealth. Protestant churches united, or tried to unite, as a barrier against the encroachments, political not less than theological, of the Roman Communion. More recently, the loss of energy and waste of money occasioned by the overlapping activities of competing churches have superseded the earlier motives; but

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in our own day a motive has emerged which goes incomparably deeper than any of these, and which carries within it the guarantee of the great destination to which the churches are moving. It is that only through a united Church can God adequately express Himself to the world; only a united Church can attain to that larger experience of Christ for which, consciously or unconsciously, humanity is craving. 'The unity of Christians is important, not simply because of what it enables us to do, but of what it helps us to express.' [1] 'The deepest impulse to the larger union for which the Christian spirit is seeking is the necessity of such a union as the condition of a further experience of Christ by the Church, and a fuller expression of Christ to the world.' [2]

It will be remembered that this fundamental aspect of the matter was emphasized at the Lambeth Conference. 'The Faith cannot be adequately apprehended,' say the Bishops in their appeal to all Christian people, 'and the battle of the Kingdom cannot be worthily fought while the body is divided and is thus unable to grow up into the fulness of the life of Christ.' It is, moreover, from without as well as from within the Church's life that this pressure is increasingly felt. A world weary and distraught cries for an adequate presentation of the Christian message. Only a united Church can supply it. This motive is equally modern and fundamental. 'Appeals for the union of churches to hasten the evangelisation of the world or to avoid the waste of men and money through the over-lapping of denominational work are not heard before the latter part of the Nineteenth century.' [3]

The stress of these modern motives for reunion of course arises in large measure from the Great War and its aftermath. The second of the books mentioned at the head of this article is itself a symptom of this. The American Committee to which it owes its origin was constituted 'as an expression of the conviction that the war had laid upon the churches the duty of the most thorough

[1] *Christian Unity: its Principles and Possibilities*, p. 8.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 327. [3] *Ibid.* p. 227.

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self-examination,' and was appointed 'to consider the state of religion as revealed or affected by the war, with special reference to the duty and opportunity of the churches.' For us, however, and in these days, the stress arises more from the state of affairs since the war. The paganism of a post-war period is no new phenomenon in history, but its extent is in this case proportioned by the convulsion which introduced it. The world-suffering of the war has bred doubts of spiritual realities. The continued dominance of the Christian ideal—if, indeed, it ever was dominant—in community-life on the largest or the smallest scale is seriously in question.

'We are on the brink of a mortal struggle between the secularist and the religious interpretations of human nature and human duty, in which the very continuance of Christianity in any coherent and morally effective form will be brought into debate, and those principles of human intercourse which are the indispensable substructures of any genuinely civilized society will be challenged.'[1]

The new internationalism hesitates on the brink of the future. Will it step onward and upward to a new level of sympathy and good will, or will it fall back into the well-worn rut of the 'balance of power,' and begin afresh the miserable process of preparation for the next war? This is pre-eminently a case where the community which represents Christ should make its voice heard. But there is no common Christian conscience in the matter, nor any instrument by which such a conscience or conviction could be expressed. The whole industrial order is confronted with a like tremendous choice. On the quest of a more Christian order—with the energy and self-denial which is involved—depends, in the main, the progress and prosperity of commerce. Where is the Christian witness which alone can supply alike the ideal and the motive power to reach it? In so far as it is forthcoming at all, it comes from isolated groups and individuals. From the Christian Society, as a whole, there is, and can be, none. It is

[1] Bishop of Durham, *Anglicanism*, p. xxxvi.

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obvious that the fundamentals of society, and in particular the institution of marriage, will soon be (to use the common phrase) in the melting-pot. The foundations will be cast down. Is there a Catholic Church ready, as she was in the Fifth century, to rebuild them on a more solid basis? There is a Catholic Church, but she is so broken, so dis-membered, that as a united society she is wholly incompetent for the task.

Here, again, there comes upon the scene a fresh and far-reaching motive. In a conference held in Philadelphia in 1918, for the express purpose of promoting the organic union of the Churches as opposed to mere federation, and attended by the representatives of nineteen communions, a plan was promulgated containing a phrase which is in itself full of the utmost significance. Certain arrangements (it is suggested) shall come into force for closer co-operation, '*as the interests of the Kingdom of God may require.*'[1] At once we find ourselves in a region of thought and activity far transcending the outlook of any one church, whether Catholic or Protestant—a region where denominational interests do not exist, where secondary aspects of the question fade out of sight, but where the primary compulsions towards a reunited Christendom are seen in all their naked urgency. After all it was this motive which originally consolidated the Catholic Church; which, at the Reformation, broke it up; and which now must reunite it. With paganism surging without and heresy fermenting within, the Church was compelled to strengthen its bulwarks, define its boundaries, formulate its faith, and hoist its standard. The alternative was submergence in the flood. Only thus could the treasures of Christ for the world be preserved intact. The maintenance and consolidation of the Church, united and equipped for its campaign of love and hope, was a primary interest of the Kingdom of God. To many of the more thoughtful men in a later age it appeared far otherwise. All too solidly entrenched behind her battlements, and with her spiritual senses dulled by the prevailing atmosphere of worldliness

[1] *Christian Unity*, p. 157.

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and corruption, the situation in the eyes of some of her own noblest sons was reversed. So far from promoting the interests of the Kingdom of God, she was threatening them. Even then any menace against her unity was looked upon with horror and dislike. It was only when, so far at least as the citadel of Western Christendom was concerned, she definitely refused to put her own house in order, that more drastic measures were contemplated. It is a commonplace to point out that there are aspects of the Reformation which are exceedingly ugly. But there can be no doubt that scores of the most spiritually minded men of that day compelled themselves to acquiesce in breaks and shocks which in happier times they would have utterly refused to contemplate, simply because they believed that the interests of the Kingdom of God were at stake.

The fact is that whenever the thought and behaviour of the Church—in its official aspect—have fallen below the level of the best conscience of Christendom, there and then disunion has set in. At once the more sensitive spirits have begun to despair of the society, and to cast about in their minds for one which still more adequately fulfils the ideals to which in their consciences they are committed. Accordingly, it is quite certain that there have been times in the history of the Church when disunion, hateful as it is, has been a symptom, not of death, but of life. The wine of the Gospel, ever new, has been too strong for the old bottles. On the other hand, the times are never so ripe for reunion as when the Church, in its various branches and sections, awakes to its great ideal, and, filled with penitence for its failure to reach it, is moved by a mighty longing to be more conformable to the Spirit of Him who created it and more adaptable as His instrument in the re-making of mankind. To such an hour, it would seem, we have now come. There may be those, indeed, who, sceptical of institutional religion, and hopeless of organized Christianity, would separate the interests of the Kingdom of God from any renewal of the Church as such; but to those who believe in a Divine Society, and who find themselves in a world where (humanly speaking) no cause can

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prosper without association and organization, the conviction can hardly be refused that the spiritual power of the Church is now a prime interest of the Kingdom of God, and that that power can be neither attained nor exercised fully until the breaches are healed and members can function again as one body.

Never, it may safely be asserted, has the divine discontent in the Church been so deep or so wide-spread, particularly in regard to Reunion, as it is at the beginning of the Twentieth century. The distinguished Army commander who predicted a great future for the Church of England because it is so critical of itself, put his finger on a symptom which is obvious far beyond the borders of our own communion. And this discontent is not vague and undefined. It is no mere regret for failures in the past; it is rather a widespread and growing hunger for a larger and truer Catholicism. If there have been times when men have wished to be less Catholic, this is not one of them. Catholicism, it is felt, is indestructible and indispensable. To regain it, where necessary to reconstruct it, to bring to it the best contribution that each communion can make—this is the yearning which, sometimes implicit, sometimes more explicit, makes itself felt on every hand. The merely denominational outlook is slowly but surely receding. Men feel that whatever justification there may have been for an exclusive denominationalism in the past, there is none in the present. In words addressed to a gathering representative of the entire Presbyterian churches of the world, 'What was a historical necessity in the past may become a grievous sin in the present.'[1] It is not that men are losing interest in or attaching less importance to the particular doctrinal position or ecclesiastical polity emphasized by the various denominations. It is that the whole point of view is altering, and the 'treasures of faith and order' possessed by any given communion are looked upon less as differentiations from the Church of the past than as contributions to the Church of the future. Among

[1] *Report of the General Council of the Alliance of Churches holding the Presbyterian System* (Pittsburg, 1921), p. 80.

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the younger Nonconformists in England this new and hopeful attitude is very marked.

'This way of thinking is begetting in us a new habit of mind. We are coming to suppose, as a matter of course, that the things in other churches which once seemed to us merely strange, or even alien, are not simply permissible or even valuable to others, but may actually prove to contain a core of absolute goodness and truth which we cannot afford to be without. We have learned that this may be true of the very beliefs and practices which at first we took to be the flat contradictions of our own most cherished thoughts and ways.'[1]

And this process and point of view is reciprocal. If it first found official and prominent expression at the Lambeth Conference, it is not less manifest in the Joint Conference which has been held since. An obvious example may be quoted.

'In view of the place which the Council of Presbyters and the Congregation of the faithful had in the constitution of the early Church, and the preservation of these elements of presbyteral and congregational order in large sections of Christendom, we agree that they should be maintained with a representative and constitutional Episcopate as permanent elements in the order and life of the United Church.'[2]

It is widely and increasingly realized that God being what He is, and man being what he is, the methods of approach from the one to the other must be almost infinitely various, and that Christians must learn to appreciate ways of approach with which, temperamentally it may be, or in consequence of their upbringing, they have but little sympathy. We think that in his lecture on the Church of England Mr. Rogers is a little inclined to lose sight of this. In discussing, for example, the differences (which are neither few nor slight) between Puritanism and sacramental Christianity, he instances the method of

[1] Malcolm Spencer, *Impasse or Opportunity* (Student Christian Movement), p. 37.

[2] *Report of a Joint Conference held at Lambeth Palace* (S.P.C.K.), p. 7.

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extemporary prayer. 'For us,' he says, 'it seems to be not a prayer but a sermon.' Everyone knows the kind of utterance to which he refers. Yet it would be a mistake to suppose that Anglicans do not use or cannot appreciate extemporary prayer. Mr. Malcolm Spencer informs us that he has 'learned as much about free prayer from Anglicans as from Free Churchmen,' and that when he was the travelling secretary of the Student Christian Movement, he 'found High Church colleges in which there was more of it than in the Free Church colleges visited in the same period.'[1] This new attitude towards the different 'treasures of faith and order' implies, of course, an acid test. For the question at once arises in regard to any particular denominational emphasis on doctrine or polity, Is this a 'treasure' which must at all costs be preserved, or is it a relic of a historical situation long since passed away, and which now therefore ought to be discarded? And, further, if these 'treasures' are capable of incorporation in a united Church, is there any need to maintain a separate communion to guard them? And, again, if there are 'treasures' which are incapable of incorporation in a united Church, does not the suspicion arise that they are not vital to the Catholic Family, and therefore not worth a separate organization to conserve them? Obviously these questions will have to be faced, are being faced, in the light of the situation in the primitive Church, in a renewed and more careful scrutiny of the periods of disruption, and in view of those powerful considerations of our own day to which I have already referred. And the work will have to be done with the conscientious accuracy with which many of our scholars have made us familiar.[2] It is a little disconcerting to note the prevalence and the persistence of the supposition that the churches in apostolic and sub-apostolic days were independent congregational entities, none of them being responsible to any outside authority for its doctrine or polity. Dr. Garvie, in his admirable

[1] *Impasse or Opportunity*, p. 45.

[2] *E.g.* the collection of Essays on *The Church and the Ministry* edited by Dr. Swete. (Macmillan, 2nd edition, 1921.)

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paper on Congregationalism, seems to lend countenance to this when he speaks of the 'absolute autonomy of the local congregation' as being a 'literal imitation of the apostolic churches.'[1] On the other hand, he quotes and endorses Sohm, whose verdict, of course, looks in precisely the opposite direction.[2]

It is too often assumed as axiomatic that this total independence of the local congregations in doctrine and polity has the support of the New Testament and the practice of the sub-apostolic age. Possibly it is this, in part, which draws from Dr. Henson his caustic allusion to the 'improvised polities (of some Christian bodies) based on ill-understood texts from the Bible.'[3] The fact is, of course, that the witness of the Early Church, in documents and in practice, is wholly on the other side. The only thing which separated the local churches of St. Paul's and St. John's day was distance, not differences of doctrine or polity. Differences of opinion and of outlook there were indeed; false teaching was not unknown; the tendency for Christians to group themselves round favourite leaders shewed itself early enough. But the essential thing about the Early Church and the early churches is that the latter regarded themselves as locally representative of the former. The churches were not self-contained spiritual entities, but members of one Body, in organic connexion with one another, holding the same doctrine, acknowledging the same authority, living the same life. The notion of a group-church, existing to emphasize some particular aspect of the faith, or some particular form of polity, and claiming an equal status with the Mother Church, was unknown and undreamt of for centuries.[4] We emphasize this by way of underlining the necessity of carefulness in the investigation of primitive precedents in the study of the past to which, in their co-operative endeavour for reunion, all the churches are called. An impartial investigation of

[1] *What the Churches stand for*, p. 50. [2] *Ibid.* p. 51.

[3] *Anglicanism*, p. 96.

[4] See a candid discussion of this point in *The Constructive Quarterly*, September 1921, article 'Are we Churches?'

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the past unlocks many doors of which prejudice (or, as Bunyan would have said, Mr. Prejudice) keeps the key. The Anglican has to admit, for instance, that his version of episcopacy is not without its defects when submitted to a primitive standard [1]; that with him mainly lies, in the persons of his spiritual ancestors, the responsibility for the separate existence of the Wesleyan body; that a little more patience in Laud and a less vindictive mind in the Restoration Parlimaent might have in large measure stopped at its source the poison of bitterness and division with which English Christianity has been infected. On the other hand, it transpires, on investigation, that 'the violence of the Commonwealth was the real cause of the vindictive procedures of the Restoration' [2]; that the ancestors of the modern Congregationalists, as Dr. Garvie points out, 'did not leave the Church of England in the interests of a particular polity,' and therefore, presumably, their descendants need not remain for all time in separation in order to maintain that polity; that the Methodists constructed for themselves a church and ministry in flat contradiction to the lifelong convictions of him whose inspiration was their *raison d'être*, and who 'never gave way to anyone but God' [3]; that the Baptist emphasis on the necessity of a personal response to Christ on the part of every one of His members is now accepted everywhere, and, furthermore, that it involved them in a narrow individualism alien alike to New Testament churchmanship and to the prevailing movements of thought in our own day; that Presbyterianism was in the main a reaction against a state of affairs—a chief symptom of which was 'prelacy'—which no longer exists. The truth is that an investigation of the past discloses the fact that the foundations of separation have been completely undermined, and that valid reasons for the continuance of it must be found, if they can be found, in the present and the future.

That this conclusion is making itself felt is obvious on

[1] *Lambeth Conference Report* (S.P.C.K.), p. 135.
[2] *Anglicanism*, p. 96.
[3] *What the Churches stand for*, p. 63.

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every hand. Over wide tracts of church life at home and abroad a new breeze is blowing; a craving to remodel the Church more primitively, more comprehensively, more Catholic-ly. 'Wanted, a Catholic Church' is a cry in which the yearnings of thousands can be suitably summed up. This breeze blows strongly when members of various churches meet together for spiritual purposes on terms of perfect equality, as, for instance, at the well-known conferences of the Student Movement. It is probably the inspiration of experiments, crude as some of them may be, as, for example, 'the Community Church' in the United States. This is a church which seeks to minister to all the religious interests of a community, gathering to its fellowship and its service all the Christians of the community, of whatever name or characteristics.[1]

'Communities have learned that it is not only easier but more Christlike to maintain in a small population one church which tolerates within itself every variety of Christian attainment and experience than it is to maintain and tolerate different churches each of which exists for a different type. Spiritual agreements can be more readily secured among groups of Christians meeting together than among separated groups.'[2]

This does not mean a vague undenominationalism.

'The most secure and satisfactory way . . . is for a community church to be connected with a single denomination.' . . . 'The present tendency toward unity in local communities . . . seems toward that kind of unity which embraces Christians of diverse types within the fellowship of a single church, directly related to one of the denominations, but broad enough in sympathy and in ministry to meet the needs of the entire community.'[3]

This is in conformity with the conclusion which is reached by the American writers on a review of the whole field.

'For good or for evil, the church consciousness—that is, loyalty to the historic institutions of the Christian religion—has too large a place in the experience of most earnestly religious

[1] *Christian Unity*, p. 102.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 103. [3] *Ibid.* p. 107.

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people to give promise of success to any plan which does not fully recognize it.' [1]

We are not surprised, therefore, to learn that not the least hopeful of all the reunion movements in the United States is the 'movement toward organic union' which found expression in two important conferences at Philadelphia in 1918 and 1920. This, too, it will be remembered, is the objective of the World Conference on Faith and Order, which, originating in the States, has attracted so much attention throughout Christendom.

It is not too much to say, we believe, that some of the foundations of this truer, deeper, larger, Catholic Church of the future are visible in outline in the remarkable Report of the Joint Conference held at Lambeth during the last year.[2] A narrowly individualistic and congregational view of the Church is there unanimously abandoned, and this is the real crux of the matter. A reasonable use of the Creeds is unanimously accepted. The way is indicated towards a Catholic ministry, which, while maintaining its indispensable connexion with the past, embodies within it those true ministerial 'treasures' upon which the greater separated bodies put so much value, and which ought never to be lacking in a soundly Catholic order. This is confirmed by the striking and encouraging fact that when the representatives of the various churches make a statement of what they stand for, they become instinctively Catholic. The great fundamental truths come into the foreground, and the denominational emphasis recedes. This is most happily apparent in the volume of lectures with which (in part) this article is concerned. Take, for instance, the statement with which the Baptist representative concludes his lecture:

'If I were asked what the Baptists stand for, my answer in a few words would be this. They stand for the gospel of God's grace through Jesus Christ our Lord. They stand for a Love which, through the Cross, redeems and saves the sinful.

[1] *Christian Unity*, p. 125. [2] *Church Unity* (S.P.C.K.).

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They stand for a spirit of Power that renews the spiritual energies of the soul and enables it to live the life risen with Christ. They stand for a spiritual interpretation of Christianity and therefore a spiritual membership of the Christian Church. They stand for the freedom of the single soul, and the directness of his access to God, and the indefeasible rights of his independent spiritual manhood. They stand for ethical religion, measuring it by personal rather than communal holiness. They stand for the union which organic relation to Christ gives to all who love Him in sincerity and truth. They stand for ideals of pity and service imbibed from union with Him who, though He was rich, yet for our sakes became poor. They stand for a salvation which is spiritual or it is nothing; for a spiritual order of manhood and a kingdom whose laws and motives and sanctions are spiritual, based on the inward and direct relation of man to God.' [1]

One rubs one's eyes on reading such a statement. If this be true, then why should such a church remain in separation? Do other churches *not* stand for this? Though in one or two sentences the emphasis might be put somewhat differently, the statement—so far as it goes—is Catholic from first to last. It is true that the corporate and sacramental side of the church's life is left out. But there is nothing in that side in the smallest degree incompatible with the great foundation truths of the statement. Similarly the Methodist lecturer speaks as follows: for Methodism

'a church is primarily a company of people who share a common experience of God in Christ. Wesley defined the society as a company of men having the form, and seeking the power, of Godliness. . . . Methodism asks only one question of any man who wishes to share its membership, Do you want to live the Christian life? . . . While it asks no creed of its *members*, it does ask the consent of its *ministers* to the Evangelical faith as set forth in the New Testament. The Methodist ministry has a common gospel. And the Methodist people accept the Apostles' Creed and the Nicene Creed without difficulty because those Creeds epitomize the teaching of the New Testament on the subjects of which they treat.' [2]

[1] *What the Churches stand for*, pp. 100–101. [2] *Ibid.* pp. 66, 67.

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Is this attitude one which, *apart from the history of the past*, could conceivably justify a great company of Christians in remaining aloof from their parent stock? The crucial question with Methodists in regard to questions of polity, as Dr. Ryder Smith points out, is Will this arrangement or that change 'serve the Kingdom of Christ'? We are confronted again, in fact, with the paramount consideration of the interests of the Kingdom of God. It is good to read that Methodists, like many others, are well aware of the conclusion to which that consideration leads. 'Methodists are coming to see that a united church is far more likely to serve the Kingdom of God than a disunited one.'[1]

And the Presbyterian:

'If I am asked what is the special witness or aim of the churches of the Presbyterian order, I should reply that we endeavour to stand for an Evangelical Creed, a free and scriptural church polity, and for the thorough training of aspirants for the Holy Ministry in order to the preaching of the Gospel of Christ and the edifying of His Body.'[2]

Does such a position demand a separate church?

Nor is the Congregational position, doctrinally, though it expressly rejects creeds as such, sensibly different from these.

'There may have been individual Congregationalists who tended towards Unitarianism, but the Congregational polity implies a Trinitarian faith in God as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Without the reality of the presence of Christ and the operation of His Spirit as the source and security of the continuity of the Church, Congregationalism has no meaning. . . . The insistence on personal faith in Jesus Christ as Saviour and Lord keeps Congregational ministers and churches united as no common creed has or can. I am confident that Congregationalism stands to-day for a Liberal Evangelicalism, which preserves the permanent and universal substance of the Christian Gospel, while adapting its expression to the changing needs of the age.'[3]

[1] *What the Churches stand for*, p. 66.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 112.
[3] Dr. Garvie, *op. cit.* pp. 52, 54.

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These statements when taken together are little short of amazing. Even when due allowance is made for the generous eagerness of the speakers to emphasize points of agreement rather than those of difference, and having regard to other passages in the lectures where differences, particularly in matters of the ministry, are frankly discussed, the fact remains that when the speakers approach anything like a formal statement of what their churches stand for, they leave the sectarian wholly in the background and mount into a Catholic atmosphere; for the truths which they emphasize, though they have at some periods been more prominent than at others, are part and parcel of our Catholic heritage. Hardly a word in these statements suggests the shadow of a reason for maintaining vast blocks of Christians in severance from one another. If what each church stands for is, in the main, some aspect of a true Catholicity, then let them take steps to stand together without delay. We do not minimize the difficulties. There are in every church inert masses of lethargic Christians.

'The body of separatist or immobile or distrustful spirits which must be reckoned with is immense. Some for the sake of conscience, some from conviction, and some from lethargy, are set against all forms of interdenominational union.' [1]

The persistency of the denominational outlook must not be under-rated.

'Resolved, that the Northern Baptist convention, while maintaining fraternal relations with evangelical denominations in extending the influence of the Gospel of Jesus Christ, does not believe that organic union with other denominations is possible. It therefore declines to send delegates to the proposed council.' [2]

This resolution was passed as lately as 1919, and by the representatives of a very large denomination in the United States. In happy contrast is the attitude of the English Nonconformists, as expressed in the joint statement on the Lambeth Appeal issued by their representatives, in

[1] *Christian Unity*, p. 146. [2] *Ibid.* p. 74.

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which it is abundantly clear that organic union is the goal to which they look. We are never allowed to forget, too, that the natural man in every church envisages the united Church as built on the lines to which he is himself accustomed, with not over-much room for outsiders. None the less this endeavour to envisage the larger Catholic Church of the future is one which every worker for reunion must make. This is a time to see visions and dream dreams. As we have seen, a large, deep, true Catholicism is what the world needs and the Church craves. Those churches in Christendom which most prize the treasures which this great name connotes have a grave responsibility to do all in their power to help, and nothing to hinder, its development; for develop it can and will, unless God's dealings in grace are to be inferior to His workings in nature. For the Church is an organism rather than an organization. Its divine life is always calling for new adaptations to new surroundings. It can assimilate differences by a Spirit-guided selection. Its structure is capable of fresh and larger comprehensions. Only when its members cling to effete forms or worn-out methods is the development—in this or that direction—arrested. Let them respond to the Spirit, and the movement is resumed. It is such a response, humble and fearless, to which the Body is now impelled. For the impending and imperative enterprise is nothing less than the re-uniting of all that is true, permanent, Spirit-inspired, in Catholicism and in Protestantism. When that happens it will be an event far greater than their severance, for each great scheme of faith and order will come bringing with it the experience of God and His grace gained during its separation, and also with those blemishes and exaggerations which, if they had been exposed to painful but healthful contact with the opposite tendencies within the same society, would never have been developed. For the over-emphasis which a society develops in isolation brings its own punishment. This point is well put by Mr. Malcolm Spencer, whose unassuming book shews a more sympathetic understanding of the Anglican position than any other Nonconformist work of

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our day.[1] The truth is that Christendom cannot afford to continue with a number of churches whose emphasis, each on its own tenets, goes uncorrected by the presence in the same society of groups of Christians whose point of view is profoundly different. This correction is made, of course, on a small scale, within each body, as its own groups rub against each other. But the time is upon us for this process to take place on a far larger scale; to include within one Catholic Church every reasonable variety of temperament and outlook—objective and subjective, quietist and ritualist, those who stand for order and those who stand for freedom. Such differences are seen now to be not contradictory but complementary. The books with which we are concerned abound with evidences of this.

There is no real contradiction between the sacramentalism of the Catholic and the 'experience' of the Methodist; between the Quaker's dependence on the inner light and the Catholic's insistence on the validity of human reason when enlightened by the Spirit of God; between the brotherly co-operation of presbyters in the administration of the Church and an episcopacy which is modelled on primitive lines; between the Baptist emphasis on personal responsibility and the objective corporate life of the Church. In each case *both are needed.* In no case will they yield the ultimate truth or produce their best fruit until they are seen in combination. *The synthesis is there.* God will reveal it to the Church when her eyes are enlightened by penitence and faith.

It is true of the affairs of churches as of men, that there is a tide which taken at the flood leads on to fortune. This, we believe, is such a moment. Never since the Reformation has Catholicism had such a chance. Protestantism (in the common sense of the word) has had its day and borne its witness. So has a merely mediaeval Catholicism, and to try to resuscitate it is only beating the air. But a sane and spiritual Catholicism, such as is described by Mr. Selwyn,[2] and filled out by all that is

[1] *Impasse or Opportunity*, pp. 42, 43.
[2] *What the Churches stand for*, p. 11 ff.

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true in the more subjective Christian groups—this has the power to capture the future. The Church at large, and the Church of England in particular, is in the mood to be Catholic (which, in one sense, of course, she is already). Upon the Church of England must of necessity lie the main responsibility of leading the way to that greater Catholicism. For this high task she is not without equipment. In her very foundation she combines the two strains of a Celtic subjectivism, and its capacity for emotion, with a Roman sense of law and order. Aidan, as well as Augustine, watched over her beginnings.[1] At the convulsion of the Reformation she sought to combine the objective and the orderly with a large measure of freedom and with the newly awakened sense of individual responsibility, and by no means without success. At the same time she has always treasured that love of truth and sound learning which is utterly indispensable in any reunited church of the future. In Casaubon's words : here (in England) 'the study of antiquity flourishes together with zeal for the truth.' It is hardly too much to say that on the kind of Catholicism developed in the English Church of the future depend issues of the highest moment for the cause of reunion. A Catholicism with any chance of leadership will have to be beaten out from the contact of the various groups of which she is composed. If coalescence cannot begin here it is scarcely likely to do so in larger circles. We may be thankful for the signs that it is beginning.

It requires no great genius, certainly no outstanding qualities of intellect, to make a passable imitation of Latin Catholicism. But something far bigger than this is required. Just as the Protestantism of the English Church was always *sui generis*, so must be our Catholicism. But we must go further. It must be a Catholicism more primitive yet more modern, more comprehensive and more Christlike than any that Christendom has seen. This is a time of transition, of experiments—there is a good side to the so-called 'anarchy' in the Church. But transition to what?

[1] See "*Anglicanism*, p. 3.

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Obviously a peculiar opportunity is opening before that group which claims the high epithet of Anglo-Catholic. The Church, and to some extent the nation, watches to see in what direction it will use the large influence which its earnestness and devotion have secured for it. Where will it lead? It is certain that any tendency to identify Catholicism with a re-galvanized mediaevalism, or with mere Latinism, or with clerical professionalism, will simply provoke another reaction. And we have had enough of reactions in the English Church. On the other hand, if the group, with its splendid enthusiasm, is willing to learn, and learn from the present as well as the past, willing to believe in the contemporary guidance of the Holy Spirit, willing to guide the newly-awakened interest in things devotional, liturgical, aesthetic, in wise and fruitful channels, it might make a contribution to English Church life, and to the future of Christendom, of immeasurable value and potency. And, indeed, there are welcome signs of this. After all, it is of spiritual forces that we are speaking, and on spiritual forces we depend. 'Of this, at any rate, I am convinced,' says Mr. Selwyn, 'that whether we seek a strong apologetic against unbelief, or a real measure of reunion among Christians, it is in connexion with the Holy Spirit that we shall find it.' We need a larger experience of that corporate guidance of the Spirit into truth and action which is evidently a commonplace in the Society of Friends.

'If the difference of view is acute, and opinion seems almost equally divided, it frequently happens that someone asks for a time of quiet prayer that the will of God may be known. After this it is often found that some way out of the difficulty presents itself, in which all can unite; or, if not, the matter is postponed, and no decision is taken. The method may be thought slow and cumbrous, but it does succeed, sometimes in a very wonderful way, in harmonizing conflicting views, and in yielding a sense of *corporate* guidance which transcends, though it in no way abrogates, the guidance of the individual.'[1]

THEODORE PETRIBURG:

[1] *What the Churches stand for*, p. 80.

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MR. BOSANQUET ON CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY.

The Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy. By BERNARD BOSANQUET. (Macmillan. 1921.) 8s. 6*d*. net.

THE extremes whose meeting Mr. Bosanquet describes in this most interesting book are the 'neo-idealism' of the Italian philosophers Croce and Gentile and the 'neo-realism' of the six contributors to the American manifesto bearing that title, and of Professor Alexander in the Gifford Lectures discussed in the number of this Review for January last. As was there pointed out, these two currents of contemporary speculation, although diametrically opposed in their attitude towards the question of the relation between the knowing mind and its object which divides 'idealism' from 'realism,' yet agree in their recognition of the reality of Time. To quote Mr. Bosanquet's words[1]: 'in both alike . . . we have the actual and ultimate reality of Time, progress to infinity, as the fundamental character of the real, and with these inevitably (what I suspect to be a deep-lying motive in both) the specifically ethical and non-religious attitude, for which, to quote the old humanistic watch-word and paradox, "the end is progress."' Against both alike Mr. Bosanquet (who had lately in the suggestive little book noticed in our issue for July 1921 explained 'what,' in his view 'Religion is') has come forward as the champion of Religion against a type of doctrine which either substitutes Morality for Religion, or at least so subordinates Religion to Morality as to miss the characteristic quality which essentially distinguishes it from Morality—its apprehension, namely, as an actual and eternal reality, of the Good which for Morality remains something yet to be realized.

In his first chapter, on 'Mind and its Objects,' Mr. Bosanquet points out that, even in dealing with the problem in respect of which they appear as diametrically opposed to one another, the two lines of thought exhibit 'a convergence on the conception of mind as consisting of what it does and experiences.' He notes

[1] P. viii.

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also here that philosophers of both schools are ready to abandon belief in the immortality of particular souls, although for opposite reasons: the extreme realists, because the mind is known always as a quality of some individual thing, finite in space and time; the extreme idealists on the other hand because there are for them no individual subjects underlying the one spiritual activity which is manifested in all thoughts and volitions, as well in those which I call mine as in those which you call yours. Mr. Bosanquet has indeed no particular quarrel with either group of thinkers for abandoning a belief which he does not himself hold; as an idealist, he cannot indeed admit the extreme realists' reason for this abandonment; but he would agree with that put forward by the extreme idealists, if only these last would not identify (as Croce and Gentile seem to do) the one spiritual activity of which they speak with the thoughts and volitions of empirical individuals apart from an Absolute Spirit revealed not only in history but in nature also; if they would but leave room for a 'nature,' such as that of which Wordsworth and Meredith are the prophets, whereby 'minds are carried out of themselves and made the vehicle of a spirit which they do *not* individually create and confer, but from which collectively they receive instruction and inspiration.'[1] But this the Italian 'idealists' seem less willing to do than such a 'realist' as Professor Alexander, who can dwell upon 'our kinship with the stellar universe,' and appeal in illustration to Meredith's *Meditation under Stars*.[2] And we are accordingly not surprised to find in Professor Alexander an emphatic recognition of the reality of a religious sentiment, an 'instinctive appetite or demand for God' distinct from the sense of moral value, to which we have nothing corresponding in Croce and Gentile with their confidence in human progress and perfectibility as 'the empirical and external representation of the immanent eternal victory of spirit over nature,' exclusive of any acknowledgment of the sovereignty of Spirit as an ever-present reality in God, not merely something in process of achievement by man. Despite the affinity (fully recognized by Mr. Bosanquet) between the Italian philosophers' insistence on progress and Professor Alexander's doctrine of God as existing always as a *nisus* in the universe towards a higher quality of existence than has yet appeared, never as a being here and now actual, Mr. Bosanquet rightly sees in Professor Alexander a thinker

[1] P. 61. [2] P. 62.

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whose position as regards the relation of Religion to Morality is far nearer to his own than the position of the 'idealists' Croce and Gentile.

The 'logical root' of the 'one-sided preference for the ethical as distinct from the religious attitude, which is the heart of what is most superficial and most characteristic in modern progressism and "ethical culture,"'[1] Mr. Bosanquet finds in a failure to do justice to the implications of so simple and familiar a truth as that '7 + 5 = 12,' and accordingly he gives this formula as a title to what may be regarded as the central chapter of the book before us. For in '7 + 5 = 12' we have, he would have us recognize, a 'synthetic determination' which is 'ever new,' 'at once inexhaustible and necessary,'[2] and therefore, for all who grasp its significance, disproving once for all the assumptions, now so often lightly made, that necessity and novelty are incompatible, that to affirm difference we must deny identity, that refusal to admit the ultimate reality of Time is to commit ourselves, in William James' famous phrase, to a 'block universe.'

Both 'neo-realists' and 'neo-idealists,' so Mr. Bosanquet insists, in the conviction which they share that a 'block universe' can only be avoided by asserting the reality of progress in Time, not merely as taking place within the universe but as qualifying the universe itself, join also in 'the repudiation of any view which can affirm a perfection in the universe apprehensible through religious experience and philosophical speculation, not limited to the series of temporal events.'[3] Hence they prefer 'a moral to a religious attitude, an attitude of meliorism and conflict to one of religious faith.'[4] The 'neo-idealists' actually 'repudiate in principle' the 'independent root of religion, over and above the demand of moral law, in the sense of an emotion which demands a something which can be worshipped.'[5] This one 'neo-realist' at least, Professor Alexander, admits and even emphasizes; but it is hard to think that the unrealizable object which his system provides for this emotion is adequate to its satisfaction; and there is in any case an obvious difficulty in seeing how the recognition of any object which would be adequate to its satisfaction can be reconciled with the refusal to admit the existence of any being which is not still in the making but now already from all eternity perfect.

Such a being, however, is of course the Absolute of Mr. Bosanquet's philosophy; and he everywhere claims that in

[1] P. 100. [2] P. 113. [3] P. 121.
[4] P. 164. [5] P. 167.

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the worship of this Absolute the religious instinct finds at last its true and adequate object. There are, however, many who will demur to this claim. They will oscillate between dissatisfaction with any God not infinitely and eternally perfect and an uneasy feeling that, notwithstanding all that Mr. Bosanquet can say to the contrary, his doctrine, if considered in itself, unadorned by his grave and serious eloquence, charged as that is with the associations of a religious tradition much of which he would reject, must rob the moral struggles of men of the earnestness belonging to conflicts whose issue is doubtful, and deprive their highest aspirations of the sustenance which faith in a glory to be revealed hereafter can alone supply, and without which the hope that, despite all disappointments, 'springs eternal in the human breast' must at last wither away. Or they will fall back upon a more familiar teaching which seems to speak now the language of the one alternative, now of the other, without suggesting that they are mutually irreconcilable.

The Christian religion has always maintained both sides of the antithesis here presented to us. In its doctrine of the Trinity it has represented the divine life as an eternal process, not in Time, nor subject to change or contingency, yet 'ever new,' at least in the sense in which Mr. Bosanquet uses the expression of the 'synthetic determinations' whereof '7 + 5 = 12' is a humble instance. In its doctrine of Predestination again it is on the side of Mr. Bosanquet in his subordination of history to a unity, apprehended by philosophy and religion, which has itself no history, against Bergson's announcement of a future with 'open doors' and Croce's denial of any reality transcending the historical process and consequently of any need either for religion or for metaphysics as traditionally understood. Nor is this aspect of Christianity merely added to its original teaching in consequence of the contamination of the latter by philosophical speculation. In its earliest and simplest form its conception of the Divine Father and Creator and its reliance on prophecy involve the same conviction of the reality of an eternally pre-existent wisdom and goodness and of the necessity imposed thereby upon the historical process as was afterwards expressed in the theological doctrines to which reference has been made.

On the other hand in none of the great religions of the world has so much stress been laid as in Christianity on the importance of faith in certain historical happenings; in none has more stress been laid on the individual's hope of a blessed

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immortality; in none has morality been more decisively made an indispensable feature of the religious life. With respect to the first of these points, it would probably be true to say that the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation and of its extension in the life of the Church, the Spirit-bearing Society, is valued by Mr. Bosanquet only as (to quote words of his on p. 122) 'the recognition of the human-divine spirit in the communal life,' which, he tells us, 'is the golden thread which links Plato to St. Paul, and St. Paul to modern thought.' It is equivalent for him to the doctrine that organized human society is the mediator by conscious membership in which we first enter on that path of transcendence of the limits of our finite individuality which culminates in the religious man's consciousness of union with God and the philosopher's of the immanence in his own experience of the absolute and universal life. The unique supremacy assigned in Christian piety to the historical personality and life of Jesus and the immense importance attached by Christian sentiment to the ultimate fate of every individual soul probably appear to him to be elements of secondary and transitory value in the religious tradition of the Church. Yet it will not be denied that a Christianity with these factors omitted could hardly be recognized as identical with the religion historically called by that name. It is, perhaps, less easy to be sure how Mr. Bosanquet would regard the last of the characteristic features of Christianity mentioned above—its insistence on the inseparableness (not identity) of religion and morality. But perhaps, in view of certain observations (in another work than that now before us) which suggest that he looks upon attempts to convert believers in the other great religions of the world to Christianity as now discredited among educated and intelligent Christians, we may conjecture that he does not fully recognize the extent of the difference in this respect between Christianity and some, at any rate, of the other great religions which are still extant and influential in the world to-day. And consequently he probably does not do full justice to the measure of truth contained in the doubtless one-sided view of Christianity as a purely ethical creed, a statement of which by Gentile he criticizes on p. 121.

It may be urged that Christianity does but set side by side two ultimately incompatible accounts of the nature of the universe, between which a philosophy which would be thoroughgoing and honest must make up its mind. The mere juxtaposition of mutually antagonistic and irreconcilable conceptions

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is none the more satisfactory because it has acquired sacredness from familiarity and (as when we sing

Verbum supernum prodiens,
Nec Patris linquens dexteram)

can clothe itself in solemn and sonorous language.

Christian theologians should welcome criticism of this kind. It is their business to explore the mysteries of their religion and never to be content with taking refuge in an *O altitudo* without anxiously putting to themselves the question what, if anything, they *mean* by their paradoxes. For it is only too easy to mistake nonsense for profundity. Philosophers of Mr. Bosanquet's school would probably hesitate to assert that there was no more than nonsense in the paradox now under consideration; they would rather say that the mistake made by theologians was in supposing that two sorts of language appropriate to different levels of intellectual apprehension or religious experience, both of which are rightly embraced within the Christian community, can be properly put side by side, as though they were to be taken as equally expressive of the highest attainable truth. But against this it may be reasonably argued that what has fitted Christianity, above the other great religions of the world, to be the religion of the most progressive peoples, is that it has not merely given a place to morality and to history among the shadows and images of the divine reality, but has established them, through its doctrine of the Incarnation of God in Jesus Christ, in the very heart of that reality. That this however constitutes a problem for philosophical theology, the duty of further elucidating which still lies before it, may be and should be admitted. It is indeed admitted in the memorable lines at the end of Dante's *Paradiso*:

'Qual è 'l geometra, che tutto s'affige
Per misurar lo cerchio, e non ritrova
Pensando quel principio ond' egli indige;
Tale era io a quella vista nuova;
Veder voleva, come si convenne
L' imago al cerchio, e come vi s'indova;
Ma non eran da ciò le proprie penne,
Se non che la mia mente fu percossa
Da un fulgore, in che sua voglia venne.
All' alta fantasia qui mancò possa;
Ma già volgeva il mio disiro e il velle,
Si come rota ch' egualmente è mossa,
L' amor che move il sole e l' altre stelle.'

C. C. J. WEBB.

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A NEW INQUIRY INTO THE BELIEF IN GOD AND IMMORTALITY.

The Belief in God and Immortality. A Psychological, Anthropological and Statistical Study. By JAMES H. LEUBA, Professor of Psychology in Byrn Mawr College, U.S.A. (Chicago and London: The Open Court Publishing Company. 1921.) 12*s.* 6*d.* net.

PROFESSOR LEUBA of Bryn Mawr College, U.S.A., himself a Swiss, has done some good work in Psychology of Religion. In the present volume he combines somewhat heterogeneous matter. It contains a conspectus of the rise and development of the belief in Immortality, in two great stages, 'Primary' and 'Modern'; a discussion of some principal arguments for it, and an estimate of the results of recent scientific or quasi-scientific methods under the title of 'Psychical research.' As these areas are traversed in 170 small pages there is scarcely material for criticism, and we shall not attempt that here. The other half of the book offers fresh interest. It contains the results of a statistical inquiry into two beliefs: in personal Deity and in personal survival after death. As to the former we do not find a result of any definite interest: the scope and content of the idea of Deity is too varied to bring it within range of comparative statistics. Professor Leuba strove to get his correspondents to come together in a single meaning, but we cannot say that he succeeded.

It is different with the question of Immortality. By reducing the idea to that of 'continuance after death of the consciousness of personal identity' (p. viii) Mr. Leuba was able to set a clearly cut subject of inquiry, and this section constitutes the chief interest of the book.

There are two inquiries. B is amongst students of both sexes in an American College of high rank (not named); C is amongst intellectuals of a mature age. Two different methods were employed: to the students the question was put without preparation, and they answered it off-hand at a single sitting: to the intellectuals it was presented in writing, and they could give their answers after leisurely introspection in the quiet of

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their own studies. This difference is important, as we shall note presently.

B. The replies of the students give the following results:

First year: 80 per cent. reported themselves as holding the belief; 4 as dubious; and 16 as not holding it.
Second year: 76; not given; not given.
Third year: 60; 8; 32.
Fourth year: 70; 6; 24.

There is an almost steady decline as student life proceeds: the irregularity of the position of the Third year being assigned to an unusual degree of intellectual ability in the students of that year, testified to by their teachers.

The further inquiry as to having a *Desire* for a future life shews that this prevails more widely than the belief, as 25 per cent. of the disbelievers retained the desire.

It is of interest to note that about half of the students who retained the belief had given some attention to the subject before the question was put to them, and had some reasons to offer; amongst them, the inference from intelligent Supreme Cause, psycho-physical manifestations, and recorded declarations of inner experiences, were the principal.

C. The intellectuals. This inquiry was addressed (1) to 1000 scientific persons in two sets of 500 each taken by chance from over 5500, together with 375 Professors of History, 197 Sociologists, and 107 Psychologists. Mr. Leuba's method of selection was ingeniously devised and carefully carried out. For science he took the 5500 names in the volume *American Men of Science*; for the other special studies, the registered teachers and researchers in those subjects. The large science list would contain many non-professional persons, of course, but they may be taken as all of some competence in the intellectual field. The sub-groups in Science were Mathematics and Physics (together), and Biology. The inquiry did not go to scholars or men of letters. The Philosophers were tried, but alas! they proved to be not amenable to the professor's endeavour to get them into order: 'a disconcertingly large number returned blanks; and, what was worse, in several instances the comments accompanying certain marked questions, especially A 1 (belief in personal Deity), shewed that the same markings could not be taken to express in all cases the same view' (p. 269). So the Philosophers have to be left without bearing their testimony.

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Some points of interest in the answers collected are these: (i) taking Science and History together the believers in Future Life, in the limited sense above-mentioned, are 51·8 per cent. of those who replied; (ii) those who retain the desire are 73 per cent., of whom half express intensity in the desire; (iii) on making a distinction between those of lesser or greater eminence there is a decrease in the latter category; (iv) the psychologists fall to 20 per cent. with ⅓ of the rest retaining the desire; (v) the Sociologists are 55 per cent., the Historians 51 per cent. The very low proportion of the psychologists suggests, we suppose, that a concentration upon only so much of the nature and life of mind as purely scientific method can deal with, tends to fill out a picture of mind which absorbs attention without containing the moral and idealist features which science cannot include.

Professor Leuba's inquiries are, we think, the best devised which have as yet been undertaken, and the results are both interesting and important. But in forming an estimate of their value we must take into account such considerations as the following.

As to the students: they have responded to a sudden appeal to discover their beliefs and desires as to an object-matter of the greatest importance to themselves and to humanity. Now, to expect quite definite results from a single brief introspection is to have a very naive conception of the structure of the mind. It is to ignore its complexity, the result of long processes of building up; the fact that at any particular moment the part of the stream which flows on the surface is but small in comparison with the underlying ranges of subconsciousness and unconsciousness; the limited range of the span or focus of the present experience, and the impossibility of inferring from absence from that span at any particular moment the absence from the mind altogether; the unlikelihood of conscious effort being successful in penetrating to the inner recesses which are more frequently accessible only to the probing of non-voluntary presentation such as Browning's sunset touch or chorus in Euripides. And further, the variations in the phases of experience which come into the focus at different times; and the way in which any train of appearances in it depends upon what comes up first, with its influence upon what will follow, especially in young minds; and the varying degrees of accessibility of the deposits of past experience and their amenability to recall. We would not go so far as to regard these considerations as removing all value from the results of an inquiry answered by the students in their unpreparedness and

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their limitation to a single introspection; but they prevent our taking the figures simply at their face-values. The same students might at other times find their introspection give different results. Still, the statistical method, as thus applied, by its multiplication of instances avails to a considerable extent in correcting individual variations and leaves us with an important amount of information.

With regard to the evidence from the intellectuals in maturity of mental development and with opportunity of giving the results of more than a single introspection: we may take these as competent reporters as to what beliefs and desires have obtained important place in their minds. For them it was more possible to call into review those which have won persistence, or which, though once held, have passed out of sight, expelled by counter-beliefs or abandoned by desuetude. And they may have been able to discern the difference between some which, though returned, lie otiose and those which are effective forces in their thinking and their wishes.

Of those with whom we are dealing, it is to be observed that they are in the position of having their minds orientated objectively, preoccupied with strong intellectual interests and in particular areas. Their science or their history is replete with occupation for their thought; they derive deep enjoyment from the satisfactions which come from increase of knowledge, though in quite special fields, and from the frequent rewards of successful effort in their investigations. Upon them there is not the pressure towards looking beyond the present which is felt by those to whom the present is either a conflict or a vacuity or possibly a misery. We should not ask a man who is running a race what are his thoughts or wishes as to some remoter possibility. Few such minds as those of these eminent persons are sufficiently disengaged to give much play to interests in problems which, though of great moment in a general way, are disconnected with the absorbing claims of a fully occupied intellectual present. And this satisfaction with present occupations of the mind is likely to increase as eminence is attained.

Further we note that these respondents to Mr. Leuba's inquiry, though not celibates of the cloister, live a good deal sheltered from the buffets of the world in comparison with the mass of mankind. They are not among the failures in the struggle for a livelihood, for example, or the fatal successes in the race for wealth; many no doubt have endured losses, and some even calamities, in their families and friendships, but it

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is not likely that as a whole their voices come to us from the furnaces of adversity and affliction.

Even for these intellectuals we are disposed to attach considerably greater value to the testimonies to the retention of desire for future life than to that of the belief, as Mr. Leuba himself also seems to be (p. 284). In the belief there is a presumption that their intellectual ability enables them to be specially competent judges as to reasons offered for or against it. It is on this account that they are called into court as witnesses, not because of any expectation that they will have specially valuable reports to make from their several particular areas of study. But the desire depends upon more factors of personality than the belief: upon their own private interests and responsibilities, their domestic affections and humanistic sentiments. Hence we are in no way surprised to find the desire remaining in many minds from which the belief has been evicted or has faded away.

In reference to both inquiries let it be remembered that they refer to the question of a future life only in a skeleton form—bare continuance in conscious identity. But the idea itself as a vital and effective idée-force needs much more than this: *quality* of life enters into it. It is the thought of a better life: with freedom from many obstructions, defects, limitations and perversions; a deeper range of affections; a progress towards ideals: these invest the idea with the qualities which really touch the central fibres of the moral and spiritual personality. It is only fair to Mr. Leuba to say that he himself distinguishes the modern belief from the primitive forms by referring to moral factors.

But the exclusion of these qualities from the idea as limited in the question actually put is a serious restriction of the value of the answers which are laid before us.

The volume closes with Mr. Leuba's estimate of the *utility* of the belief. His own judgement is that it costs more than it is worth. As against Emerson's verdict that its loss would lead to a moral paralysis creeping over us, Mr. Leuba argues that the loss would lead to positive gain. Too many unsettled questions are raised for us to enter on a criticism here. We would refer the reader to the paper in the volume entitled *The Faith and the War* (Macmillan), by Professor A. E. Taylor, which appears to us to be the best conspectus of the whole subject that has been produced in the abundant outflow of recent years, in Britain at least. And further to the Part III. of Baron von Hügel's *Eternal Life* (T. and T. Clark). This profound study

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closes with a resonant note of conviction: 'Religion, in its fullest development, essentially requires not only this our little space of earthly years, but a life beyond. . . . Only an Eternal Life already begun and truly known in part here, though fully to be achieved and completely to be understood hereafter, corresponds to the deepest longings of man's spirit as touched by the prevenient Spirit, God.'

A. CALDECOTT.

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SHORT NOTICES.

Biblical Studies.

The Evolution of the New Testament. By J. E. Symes. (John Murray. 1921.) 18*s.*

Mr. Symes' posthumous book provides an interesting popular Introduction to the New Testament. His object, he tells us, in the Preface, 'has been to bring out those points concerning each book upon which modern critics have reached something like agreement; and when no such agreement has been reached to indicate the nature of the problems on which disagreement exists, the grounds for the conclusions at which' he has 'arrived, and the degree of doubt with which such conclusions are held.' He also provides readable analyses of the various books, and excellent short bibliographies. Mr. Symes' interest in the New Testament is ethical rather than theological, and he has little understanding of the mind of such writers as St. Paul and the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews. It is indeed a strange paraphrase of St. Paul's argument for Gentile liberty to say that 'If the law of God revealed in Christ Jesus was the one thing needful, then the Judaic system could not be really essential.' There are other comments nearly as wide of the mark, and equally revealing as to the writer's standpoint. He suggests, for example, that the words, 'No man speaking in the Spirit of God saith, Jesus is anathema,' are perhaps 'directed against those who, while glorifying the invisible Christ, disparage the Peasant of Nazareth.' But the critical work shews very wide reading, with much common sense, and independent judgement. Particularly good is the discussion of the problem presented by the Fourth Gospel. The book ends with chapters dealing with the books which just failed to secure a place in the New Testament, and with the Canon and Text.

The Problem of the Pastoral Epistles. By P. N. Harrison, M.A., D.D. (Oxford University Press. 1921.) 12*s.* 6*d.* net.

This is a contribution of the first importance to New Testament criticism. We doubt whether there has ever been a discussion

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of the language of the Pastoral Epistles to compare with it in fullness and clearness and impressiveness of statement. Mr. Harrison's thesis is that the Pastoral Epistles are not as a whole the work of St. Paul; but have been built up, upon the basis of real fragments of his correspondence, by an earnest Paulinist of the Second century. Not only do they contain a vast number of non-Pauline words, many of which are found nowhere else in the New Testament; not only is the use of particles and prepositions different; but, even when the words are Pauline, they are often used in a way that is not his. It is true that a great number of Pauline phrases are found, but even these are seen to be used slavishly, as a copyist would use them. The ten authentic Pauline Epistles are 'found to maintain among themselves a close and unmistakable family likeness. They form a clearly defined series; and the actual variations among them keep within certain limits, and are obedient to certain laws. The Pastorals refuse utterly to be brought within or near this series, and at every point exceed their limits and break these laws.' Moreover, the language is the language of the Second century. 'One word in every four throughout the Pastorals . . . while foreign so far as we know to the vocabulary of Paul, is now proved to form part of the working vocabulary of Christian writers between the years A.D. 95 and 170.' It is upon this linguistic argument that Mr. Harrison's pains have been chiefly spent, though subordinate arguments are not altogether neglected; and we have nothing but admiration for the way in which he has accomplished his task. Though he speaks of sifting 'many bushels of the dryest sand that ever drifted,' there is not a dull page in the book, till we reach the necessary lists of words in the Appendices; and the commentary on the Pauline fragments shews a warm and deep appreciation of St. Paul. Most valuable features of the work are the diagrams and the text of the Pastoral Epistles given at the end of the book. Here words which do not occur in the ten Pauline Epistles are printed in red, Pauline phrases are underlined, and the fragments which are held to be genuine are written in Uncials.

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Divorce.

Divorce in the New Testament. A Reply to Dr. Charles. By G. H. Box, D.D., and Charles Gore, D.D. (S.P.C.K. 1921.) 2*s.* net.

This little book is an admirable reply to Dr. Charles. Its chief feature is a complete refutation of the one important argument which Dr. Charles produced. To deal seriously with most of his arguments is to break a butterfly upon the wheel; Dr. Box and Dr. Gore have here an easy task, though they perform it very well. But Dr. Charles produced one argument of which this could not justly be said. He urged that our Lord's words can nowhere refer to remarriage after divorce for adultery, since adultery was punished by death, and the case could not arise. Now even if Dr. Charles were right about this, it would not establish the conclusion he desires. The Gospels of St. Mark and St. Luke were intended for the Gentile world, where adultery was certainly not punished by death, and the teaching contained in them could not possibly be there interpreted as excluding the case of adultery. But Dr. Box seems to shew quite conclusively that Dr. Charles is wrong in the central assertion upon which his argument depends. 'Divorce for adultery, confessed or proved, was normal legal procedure in the time of Christ'; and, as Dr. Israel Abrahams says, 'It is not probable that the death penalty for adultery was inflicted at all in the age of Jesus.' Capital punishment, indeed, for any offence was rare in the later days of the Jewish Commonwealth, and of capital punishment for adultery only one example is known, and that under most exceptional circumstances. Our Lord's words must therefore be taken in their natural sense, as disallowing divorce with liberty to remarry. There is much else of interest in this little book, though it deals not with the problem of divorce as a whole, but with Dr. Charles' arguments. It should be supplemented by Dr. Gore's 'The Question of Divorce' by those who have not time for fuller discussions of the evidence.

What did Christ Teach about Divorce? By F. H. Chase, Bishop of Ely. (S.P.C.K. 1921.) 1*s.* 6*d.* net.

The Bishop of Ely's book, like that previously noticed, deals with Dr. Charles' views, and in some respects criticizes them similarly; but it is intended as a 'fairly complete discussion of our Lord's teaching' on divorce. It shews the scholarly care in dealing

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with points of detail which we expect from the Bishop of Ely and contains much that is valuable. The great defect is that it treats the language of Scripture with far too little regard to the wider considerations by which it must be understood. The Bishop fully admits that St. Mark, St. Luke, and St. Paul agree that our Lord taught the indissolubility of marriage; and argues with much force against Dr. Charles, that the narrative of St. Matt. xix 3ff. is dependent upon that of St. Mark x 2ff., while St. Matt. v 31f. and St. Mark xvi 18 find a common source in Q. Yet he fails to draw the obvious conclusion (which even Dr. Charles accepts) that the well-known 'exceptive clauses' in St. Matthew's Gospel are no words of our Lord, and suggests that they may have come from a trustworthy source. Such a treatment of the problem ignores the historical background. These exceptive clauses are no trifling additions; interpreted as the Bishop interprets them, they are in flat contradiction to the older authorities on the very point which is most important. The Gentile Churches would have derived their knowledge of our Lord's teaching from St. Paul, and from the Gospels of St. Mark and St. Luke before St. Matthew's Gospel reached them; they were taught that Christian marriage was indissoluble. How could such a witness have been borne and accepted in the corrupt world of the Roman Empire, without entire conviction as to the Lord's teaching? It is true, as the Bishop urges, that the Church from the Second century onwards has accepted St. Matthew's Gospel as authoritative; but its mind on this subject would have been formed before it did so, and there is no evidence that it found the teaching of this Gospel inconsistent with its previous mind. Probably the 'exceptive clauses' were universally interpreted, as they seem to have been by Hermas, as sanctioning the putting away of a wife for unchastity, but not any so-called remarriage during her lifetime. Indeed, this interpretation is probably correct. The compiler of the Gospel feared that the text both of St. Mark and of Q (as we have it in St. Luke) might give the impression that in no case might a Christian man put away his wife; and that would be very bad moral theology. An act of *μοιχεία* he ought to forgive on repentance; but, if his wife were persistently guilty of *πορνεία*, he ought to put her away. The exceptive clauses were probably intended simply to guard against this misinterpretation. The compiler wrote as a member of the Church, where the strictness of our Lord's teaching was well known; and, as far as our evidence goes, it was centuries before anyone supposed his Gospel to

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sanction remarriage after divorce. Of course, if we read St. Matthew's Gospel without reference to the historical background, difficulty arises; but the compiler could not anticipate such a method of dealing with it. Again, in interpreting our Lord's words, the Bishop never seems to consider the consequences to which his interpretation leads, as a relevant consideration. Plainly, to allow divorce, with liberty of remarriage, for adultery, and for no other cause, is to make adultery, or the pretence of it, the one gate to freedom for those unhappily married. Is it possible that the wisdom of the Lord could have given such a rule? We do not misunderstand the Bishop of Ely. What lies behind his little book is a reverent caution, an extreme unwillingness to run the risk of going beyond our Lord's words. But we cannot disguise the fact that his absorption in minute points of scholarship to the neglect of wider considerations has led him to the abandonment of the one view of marriage which is at once Christian, historical, and capable of being intelligibly stated and defended. We grudge him to the opponents very much.

Early Christian History.

The Doctrine of the Twelve Apostles. Translated into English by the late Charles Bigg, D.D. With a new Introduction and Revised Notes by A. J. Maclean, D.D. (S.P.C.K. 1922.) 3*s.* 6*d.* net.

It seldom falls to the lot of a scholar to have his work edited after his death by a scholar of equal eminence who while preserving his notes expresses point by point his reasons for disagreement on questions vital to the original theory. In the case before us the result is greatly beneficial to students, for it would have been a real pity if Dr. Bigg's work had been allowed to fall into neglect merely because his view that the Didache should be placed in the Fourth century has failed to win the assent of other scholars. And the work before us in its composite form derives an additional importance from the fact that it is subsequent to, and able to make use of, Dr. Armitage Robinson's 'Donnellan Lectures,' and represents an independent judgement, with the data there collected before the editor, both upon them and upon the Dean of Wells' conclusions. In regard to the latter it seems to the reviewer that the Bishop of Moray's view that the Two Ways as found in the Didache is not dependent on the Epistle of Barnabas must prevail unless stronger

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evidence can be produced on the other side, and it is hard to see where it is to come from. The other part of the theory that the Didache represents not a picture of the life of the Church as it ever existed anywhere, but an imaginative picture of what someone later supposed that it might have been like, would be much more difficult to accept were it not for the fact that at any rate apart from the Didache, we do not know from other sources of any place of which we can say with certainty that such a condition of things did exist. Yet it is not at all impossible that it may represent the life of some community originally derived from Antioch, and isolated from the rest of the Christian world in the same way as were the Judaeo-Christian communities which remained after the return from Pella. The Bishop of Moray's Introduction of thirty-eight pages, including a select bibliography, is a little piece of work of permanent value. In the valuable notes the only drawback is that the student who has not read Dr. Bigg's original work will not always see, at first at any rate, where the Bishop of Moray's additions really begin, except where there is reference to works written later than Dr. Bigg's book.

Practical and Devotional Theology.

Christ the Life of the Soul. Spiritual Conferences by the Right Reverend D. C. Marmion, Abbot of Maredsous Abbey. With prefaces by Cardinals Mercier and Bourne and a letter of approbation from Pope Benedict XV. (London and Edinburgh: Sands. 1922.) 12*s.* 6*d.* net.

Fifteen editions in four years have been printed of the French text of these thirteen conferences on the economy of the divine designs, and the foundation of the Christian life, in its double aspect of a death unto sin, and a life unto holiness. The present translation, by a well-known English writer, a nun of Tyburn convent, appears to the author to preserve his fundamental thoughts with great fidelity. The abbot's object has been to fix the eyes and hearts of his readers on the Lord Jesus Christ and on His word, as the Alpha and Omega of all sanctity, to deliver God's message in His own words, according to the divine simplicity of His plans, in the conviction that such a delivery of the divine message can produce wonders of sanctity to-day as in the first age. All who accept the Nicene Christology as interpreted in the history, the system and the worship of the Universal

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Church, will be most grateful to the abbot for his faithfulness in the presentation of the Gospel of the living Christ. He sets his assenting seal to the great document of Christendom, and every fresh testimony to the living power of Christ is welcome to those who know in whom they believe. We have not for a long time seen a better companion volume for the devotional study of the New Testament, and the conferences are much enriched by quotations from the Fathers, the Schoolmen, and the lives of the Saints. They contain also a particularly clear statement of those matters which are distinctive of the Roman Catholic system, such as the place assigned to the Blessed Virgin Mother in modern devotion. We have noticed a few misprints—she for the, Fathel for Father, recieve for receive—and occasionally a word or a phrase has been used which obscures the abbot's meaning for a general reader. There are many beautiful passages which we should like to quote. We must content ourselves with the concluding prayer, and the quotation from St. Augustine's Sermons, which sum up the teaching of the book which really amounts to the saying of Saint Paul and Saint Ambrose that Christ is all to the Christian :—

'O Christ Jesus, Incarnate Word, Son of Mary, come and live in Thy servants with Thy Spirit of holiness, the fulness of Thy power, the reality of Thy virtues, the perfection of Thy ways, the communication of Thy mysteries, and overcome all hostile powers by Thy Spirit to the glory of the Father. Amen.'

'Deus Christus patria est quo imus,
Homo Christus via est qua imus.'

In such prayers, and in many other ways the abbot has often reminded us of the moral reflections of Quesnel and of the *Vita Christi* of Ludolphus of Saxony.

The Gospel of the Manhood. By the Reverend J. H. SKRINE, D.D. (London: Skeffington and Son. 1922.) 5s. net.

EVERY serious answer to the question 'What think ye of Christ?' deserves serious consideration, and we read and re-read Dr. Skrine's appeal 'to all Catholics and Modernists' with grave interest and attention, as his earnestness and the importance of the subject alike demand. Writing in the spirit of the Baconian science, Dr. Skrine pleads that we can claim to know so much of the fact of the Incarnation as can be measured by human experience, and 'What more there is of the being of Christ than this, what the manner was of His pre-existence "before the

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world began," what relations He now holds to the Final Reality which we call God and which Jesus named "My Father," what it is to Him to sit at the Right Hand—this is what we do not know, but conjecture.' A doctrine of the Incarnation which formulates such experiences of mankind is here called the Gospel of the Manhood. Dr. Skrine tells us that he believes 'that Jesus was divine as Paul and as John (of that Gospel) believed it, and on the self-same evidence as they.' Again he believes that 'not the Manhood was taken into God, but the Man.' He regards the phrases 'two natures in one person' and 'the manhood taken into God' as 'fleshless abstractions,' as 'phantoms of the theatre, ill-founded theorizing of philosophers.' The clause 'who came down from heaven' seems to him to be an 'anthropomorphism coined by the psychologic childhood of the Church and now explaining nothing.' When he would figure to himself the atonement by which the Christ takes away the sin of the world (Dr. Skrine we observe does not here use the past tense) he puts aside all the old similitudes of ransom and propitiation and substitution, as 'blurring and distorting images,' although our Lord Himself said that the Son of Man came to give His life as a ransom for many. The Resurrection is explained by the phenomenon of the 'wraith,' which 'presents us with an hypothesis of the Resurrection fact which unifies and elucidates the perplexing phenomena of the Forty Days incomparably better than the hypotheses hitherto offered.' Dr. Skrine is so much helped himself by this 'reconstruction' (that marvellous and elastic word) that he exclaims 'how inadequate now, and almost I had said artificial, is the old theologic' (or as some might say, Pauline) 'account of the Resurrection as the miracle which proved the divinity of Christ and accredited the apostleship of those who saw it.' Dr. Skrine holds that the Creed plainly does not affirm a reanimation of the fleshly body of Christ crucified. But the fact that the tomb was empty on the Easter morning has to be explained, and is explained to the general satisfaction of Christendom by the rising of that body into the immortal condition of the resurrection. A reader may well ask, Are we to believe that the body of the Crucified passed into corruption? And if so, what of the victory over death? These questions ought to be faced and plainly answered. By the criterion of 'life received from the belief,' Dr. Skrine infers that the Virgin Birth, the manner of the Lord's birth, is indifferent to faith. It may be that much more of the life of the Christian depends upon the acceptance of the truth of the fact than Dr.

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Skrine supposes. However, he sees that a good deal of re-interpretation of the unchanged letter of the creed will be necessary, if it is to be repeated in the words of old. But perhaps the repetition of the creed will be regarded by some as undesirable if it contains words of 'some logical value but no religious helpfulness,' although Dr. Skrine is sure that we 'must keep the ancient symbol.' He draws attention to the bearing of his interpretation of the Creed upon several topics of modern Church affairs, such as episcopacy in relation to reunion, the ministry of women, and the re-evangelisation of England. We shall not quote from Dr. Skrine's chapters on these points. His material here is a superstructure built upon his treatment of the creed. And we trust that we have said enough about that to illustrate his point of view, and to lead our readers to examine the details by which he supports his argument. He will not suppose himself likely to gain the assent of those who have always believed that the manhood of Christ is fully recognized in the Gospel according to Saint John and in the Nicene Creed and the *Quicunque Vult*, as much as by Dr. Skrine, and while they have held the doctrine of the Incarnation as expounded by Saint Athanasius and Saint Cyril, they have understood that the manhood of Christ is now the channel of divine grace and the way of approach to the Father as clearly as Dr. Skrine himself understands. And he will perhaps be even less likely to suppose that he will win any measure of general assent to his treatment of episcopacy and the Eucharist. In saying this, we heartily recognize his tone of earnestness and sincerity. But those who have tasted the old wine of the faith of Christendom will not straightway desire new, for they are sure that the old is better. They must regard the 'new' as 'another' Gospel.

Redemption from this World, or The Supernatural in Christianity. By Professor A. G. Hogg, M.A. Cunningham Lectures for 1921. (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark. 1922.) 7*s.* 6*d.* net.

A bold challenge is given in these lectures to the popular attitude of the modern mind, in which the idea of the miraculous involved in Christianity is treated as beneath serious discussion, and to be adduced, as Croce says, only as an illustration of defunct and superseded conceptions by anti-theological prejudice. Professor Hogg maintains that the supernatural is a permanent factor in practical Christianity, and the inspiration of faith. He regards miracles, or special providences, not so much as events, as deeds,

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and the inward experience of the supernatural as an experience of release, of a disburdened conscience, of reinforced energies, of clouds rolled away, of the impossible becoming possible. Such a point of view leads him to dwell upon the New Testament idea of redemption from this world through the approach of the Kingdom of God, in which Christ makes all things new, and the Christian gains experience of acceptance with God, liberty, and life on a plane of new possibilities. The Professor borrows his title from a phrase used by Kaftan, and means by it that the Christian is redeemed from the world of the worldly wise into the world of the childlike, the new world set before men in the life and whole redeeming work of the Personality described in the Gospel narrative. In His kingdom, foretold by Jewish apocalyptic writings, and announced by the Baptist as at hand, all things are possible to him that believeth, as he passes into a fearless life of fellowship with Christ in ever fresh adventures of faith. This is an invigorating treatment of a subject which lies very close to the heart of Christianity, to the victory that overcometh the world, and a distinctly useful contribution to the study of the miraculous element of Christianity, a vital and inseparable element, as the Church believes.

Christ and the Kingdom of God. By Professor S. H. Hooke, M.A. Second and enlarged edition. (London: Student Christian Movement. 1922.) 4*s.* net.

The Student Christian Movement, which like the modern broadcast system of sermon diffusion seems to be as undenominational and vague as possible, is undoubtedly exercising a very wide influence, and we trust an influence on the whole, in the direction of much good, upon an immense number of inquiring and groping minds. They are men who in Mr. Glover's phrase would 'give anything' to know whether Christ was God, or Man, or what the words mean which say that God was in Christ and that He died to bring us to God. Professor Hooke's 'Studies,' now including a chapter on the Synoptic problem and an appendix on the title 'Son of Man,' are intended for such inquirers. The workings of the Kingdom of God are traced out in the Synoptic narrative of our Lord's life, in its four divisions of (i) preparation for the ministry and (ii–iv) its three stages which culminate in the Passion. In omitting the record of the Nativity, in concluding with the Cross, and only making the slightest references to the Resurrection as drawing 'all its significance' from the

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Cross, and in severing St. John's narrative from the Synoptic Gospels, Professor Hooke is led to speak of our Lord as an individual man, and to use language, for example in speaking of the Temptation, which illustrates the great danger of isolating one nature of the Incarnate Son and Word of God. Nowhere is the reality of the manhood of Christ more emphasized than in the writings of Saint John. Nowhere is fuller weight given to both aspects of the incarnate life than in the magnificent balance of the expressions of the mind of St. Athanasius. Professor Hooke's questions at the head of each 'Study' are samples of those which will occur to such thoughtful students as those whom he desires to help. But when we read the study itself which gives a line of thought along which some kind of answer may be found, we often find the material very thin, and likely to leave the student still uncertain, still groping. However, Professor Hogg in the book reviewed above gratefully acknowledges the helpful stimulus derived from the book, although he has been seldom able to agree with its conclusions.

Education.

Our Hellenic Heritage. By H. R. James, M.A. (Vol. I. Macmillan and Co.) 6*s.* net.

Mr. James has produced a school manual which we can cordially recommend. Though in places the style is unattractive, the subject-matter is good and up to date. The author frankly gives up the cause of the Greek language as lost (p. viii), but he asks himself if Greek cannot in some way be kept as a school subject. In this, the first of two volumes which he has planned, he gives 'just so much of the elements of Greek legend and history as should be the possession of everyone born into the civilization which we call European.' The second volume will deal with the art and literature of the Fifth century B.C. The volume before us contains an analysis of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, together with the setting of the Trojan war, and introductory chapters on Greek geography and religion. Chapter VI is a clear summary of the discoveries at Ilium and Mycenae, associated with the name of Schliemann. We have only two points to criticize here: first, the reference to Sir A. Evans' work in Crete might be expanded; secondly, the analysis of the *Odyssey* is not on the scale of that of the *Iliad*, but much fuller; some of the quotations

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from Butcher and Lang's translation might have been omitted. Mr. James plainly does not agree with those of us who have long ago discarded the preciosity of Butcher and Lang, to seek perhaps in vain for a translation of Homer which shall be simple and natural. The second part of the book contains the struggle with Persia, with introductory chapters on the Ionians and Dorians, the contrast of Sparta and Athens, and the clash of Persia and Lydia, of which we read in Herodotus, book I. The maps and pictures which illustrate the text are good: particularly attractive are the pictures of lake Pheneos (p. 32) and of Sparta (p. 225). The indications of travel in Greece add greatly to the interest of the narrative; more particularly Mr. James makes us wish to go to Marathon and Thermopylae.

It is quite clear that the author is right in his main contention: there is still a place in our overcrowded curricula for Homer and the history of Greece. No history cycle in boys' or girls' secondary schools should be devoid of this subject. And, as Mr. James points out, it may lead one or two students on to the original language. We look forward with interest to his second volume: it is clear that he is competent to deal with Greek culture. His reading is wide, and his conclusions sensible. Perhaps we may without incurring the charge of cavilling make one or two suggestions: p. 35: how does the second line in the quotation scan? p. 50: there should be a note on Polydectes. He is not explained till p. 52. p. 96: the beautiful part played by Hermes in *Iliad* xxiv might have been indicated. p. 132: the problem of Ithaca referred to on p. 362 would naturally be mentioned here. p. 199: how did Telemachus drive from Pylos to Sparta? did he go through the Langada? to ask such a question is to answer it, but it is worth asking, as it throws a light on the authorship of Homer. p. 210: a reference to Corinth and Corcyra should be added. p. 211: is there not something wrong with the picture of Olympia? p. 212: is not the stadium mentioned at Delphi? p. 272: it should be specified whose account is referred to in note 1. p. 292: attention should be called to the speculations of Delbrück as to the numbers engaged on either side at Marathon. p. 319: a note might be added explaining 'the globe.' p. 355: the three French lines look rather odd without a reference to p. 353, *n.* 2.

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General Literature.

Collected Poems with Autobiographical and Critical Fragments. By Frederic W. H. Myers, edited by his wife Eveleen Myers. (Macmillan. 1921.) 12s. net.

Briefly and quietly the poet's life is told in the opening fragment: an inward life, the meaning of which is illuminated by a beautiful photograph (by Mrs. Myers) as frontispiece and is then unfolded in the poems. *Belisarius* and the early poems shew the wondrous boy, Virgilian from his seventh year, and the youth drinking a happy faith from the classic writers of Rome and Hellas. That contentment shrinks and makes room for a Christian conversion which lives for us in *Saint Paul*, a great poem; its popularity witnesses to the secret fire which vivifies the literality of English religion. More profoundly remarkable is *Saint John the Baptist* which marks transition to a second disillusionment expressed intensely in *Translation of Faith*, a vision at the Vatican council of 1870 which might all but be called tremendous. Then through Henry Sidgwick the hope began to dawn of 'scientific assurance of unseen things'; and though science loitered, spiritual conviction came and came serenely. If it were only for his intimacy with Henry Sidgwick, a mutually strengthening affection between two rarely sincere and intellectual souls, Frederic Myers' prose and poetry would be worth knowing:

> 'That temple by great thoughts upbuilt
> Was void and steadfast, cold and fair;
> No wine was on its altar spilt,
> A God unknown was worshipped there.'

But the poet's warmer utterance expressed the heart of both, and their pursuit of scientific assurance was a serious and soaring passion:

> 'If thou wouldst have high God thy soul assure
> That she herself shall as herself endure,
> Shall in no alien semblance, thine and wise,
> Fulfill her and be young in Paradise,
> One way I know; forget, forswear, disdain
> Thine own best hopes, thine utmost loss and gain,
> Till when at last thou scarce rememberest now
> If on the earth be such a man as thou,

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Nor hast one thought of self-surrender,—no,
For self is none remaining to forego,—
If ever, then shall strong persuasion fall
That in thy giving thou hast gained thine all,
Given the poor present, gained the boundless scope,
And kept thee virgin for the further hope.

* * * * *

Ah, friend, I have not said it: who shall tell
In wavering words the hope unspeakable?'

and in tune with that:

'The breath that passes man and God between,
When ere the end comes is the end begun,
And the One Soul has flown into the One.'

The more abstract and intellectual the better are these poems on the whole. The lyrics with sweet girl-names may have made perfect music in the garden of their birth, but fail a little in strange ears. They have rememberable felicities but it is in pieces like *High tide at midnight* that thought rings true, sometimes majestical:

'A voice of moving and of marching seas

* * * * *

My merged life in the living ocean-stream
And soul environing of shadowy sea.'

This is a book to pray with, where 'God to silent hearts is present silently.'

The Fugitive. By RABINDRANATH TAGORE. (Macmillan. 1921.) 7*s.* 6*d.* net.

Creative Unity. By RABINDRANATH TAGORE. (Macmillan. 1922.) 7*s.* 6*d.* net.

The Fugitive is a poem in rythmic English: dramatic episodes and translations from Indian folksongs are interspersed: the whole tells of the soul's journey to the one supreme Soul, the Beloved.

'Darkly you sweep on, Eternal Fugitive, round whose bodiless rush stagnant space frets into eddying bubbles of light.
Is your heart lost to the Lover calling you across his immeasurable loneliness?

. . . . . .

'The tide runs high, the wind blows, the boat dances like thine own desire, my heart!
Leave the hoard on the shore and sail over the unfathomed dark towards limitless light.

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'We came hither together, friend, and now at the cross-roads I stop to bid you farewell.
Your path is wide and straight before you, but my call comes up by ways from the unknown,
I shall follow wind and cloud; I shall follow the stars to where day breaks behind the hills; I shall follow lovers who, as they walk, twine their days on a single thread of song, "I love."'

For the search—though some refuse it—goes on in the actual world. The Beloved half reveals himself in everyday forms, as of the woman in the boat:

'From the shadows of the opposite shore the boat crosses with a woman at the helm.
I cry to her, "Come to my island coiled round with hungry water, and take away my year's harvest."
She comes, and takes all that I have to the last grain; I ask her to take me.
But she says, "No"—the boat is laden with my gift and no room is left for me.'

Hence the poem is full of quiet and stormy scenes of nature, of little pictures of village life, of sympathy with simple people's joy and sorrow. Now there is exultation in communion nearly attained: then disappointment and 'nothing at all' in all that happens. But all the way the soul is learning. The vanity of nature proves to be its homeliness; love is tried and sifted into abnegation of self, into sacrifice:

'I ask no reward for the songs I sang you. I shall be content if they live through the night, until Dawn, like a shepherd-maiden, calls away the stars, in alarm at the sun.
But there were moments when you sang your songs to me, and as my pride knows, my Poet, you will ever remember that I listened and lost my heart.'

'I am poured forth in living notes of joy and sorrow by your breath.
Mornings and evenings in summer and in rains, I am fashioned to music.
Should I be wholly spent in some flight of song, I shall not grieve, the tune is so dear to me.
My heart is a flute he has played on. If ever it fall into other hands let him fling it away.

'I am the boat, you are the sea, and also the boatman.
Though you never make the shore, though you let me sink, why should I be foolish and afraid?
Is reaching the shore a greater prize than losing myself with you?
If you are only the haven, as they say, then what is the sea?'

The two last of these three stanzas are translations from the songs of a religious sect of poor country people, the Bauls.

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These translations are the best things in a book which nevertheless rings true throughout: Tagore himself is too diffuse, too luxuriant with epithets and analogies. Only it must be remembered that his philosophy of All is One makes analogy a real argument. The philosophy (best learned from the autobiography of his father, Maharshi Devendranath Tagore) is applied in *Creative Unity* to the problems of to-day. *Creative Unity* explains *The Fugitive*: *The Fugitive* pictures the Spirit which is the impulse and hope in *Creative Unity*.

Ancient India learned in the forests union with the Infinite in men and in nature and beyond both: to be One, not to possess, is the Indian goal. The Northmen of Europe fought and subdued the sea: to conquer and to hold, to subdue nature, to organize people into nation for efficiency, is the European ambition. This ambition found its greatness, not in its 'marvellous training of intellect' so much as in 'its spirit of service devoted to the welfare of man.' But of late this has degenerated into a passion for success, commercial gain, imperial domination. Hence war and war's worse sequel, the 'barbarism' which is 'the simplicity of a superficial life . . . bewildering in its surface adornments and complexities, but it lacks the ideal to impart to it the depth of moral responsibility.'

Tagore writes in love not in hate. He reveres Western energy and science and sturdy liberty. He desires the East to learn these. He would weld East with West. But he knows that the East also has that to give for lack of which the West is ruining the world. And he writes with earnestness as though at the eleventh hour. The sixth chapter, 'The Modern Age,' might be compared with the epilogue to Papini's *Storia di Cristo*, in which Papini calls on Christ to come and save while yet there is time; calls on men to receive Christ while yet there is time.

'I know I am crying in the wilderness when I raise the voice of warning; and while the West is busy with its organization of a machine-made peace, it will still continue to nourish by its iniquities the underground forces of earthquake in the Eastern continent. . . . Two prophecies about the world's salvation are cherished in the hearts of the two great religions of the world. . . . One of these religions has for its meditation the image of the Buddha who is to come, Maitreya, the Buddha of love; and he is to bring peace. The other religion waits for the coming of Christ. For Christ preached peace when he preached love, when he preached the oneness of the Father with the brothers who are many. And this was the truth of peace. Christ never held that peace was the best policy. For policy is not truth. The calculation of self-

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interest can never successfully fight the irrational force of passion —the passion which is the perversion of love, and which can only be set right by the truth of love. . . . It is political and commercial egoism which is the evil harbinger of war. By different combinations it changes its shape and dimensions but not its nature. This egoism is still held sacred, and made a religion; and such a religion, by a mere change of temple, and by new committees of priests, will never save mankind. We must know that, as, through science and commerce, the realization of the unity of the material world gives us power, so the realization of the great spiritual Unity of Man alone can give us peace.'

We know this. But we cannot act it out. Are we afraid? Are we afraid of one another? Or is it that we are afraid of the easiness of words like 'ideal'; and so become afraid of what they signify; as of a league of nations, which might be a new committee of priests to purify the religion? Relax the strain for a moment. Take a holiday and listen again:

'The one abiding ideal in the religious life of India has been *Mukti*, the deliverance of man's soul from the grip of self, its communion with the Infinite Soul through its union in *ánanda* with the universe. This is the spiritual truth and beauty of our attitude towards our surroundings, our conscious relationship with the Infinite, and the lasting power of the Eternal in the passing moments of our life. . . . He only has freedom who ideally loves freedom himself and is glad to extend it to others.'

Is not that well said? and this better still?—'Come unto me, all ye that labour and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest. Take my yoke upon you, and learn of me; for I am meek and lowly of heart: and ye shall find rest unto your souls. For my yoke is easy and my burden is light.'

Words, words: facts are too complicated for such cures: nations cannot deal together thus. 'Therefore,' says Tagore, 'I do not put my faith in institutions, but in the individuals all over the world who think clearly, feel nobly, and act rightly, thus becoming the channels of moral truth. Our moral ideas do not work with chisels and hammers. Like trees, they spread their roots in the soil and their branches in the sky, without consulting any architect for their plans.'

I have reason to believe. By STEPHEN PAGET. (Macmillan. 1921.) 5s. net.

WISE without clever tricks; kind to all sorts and conditions of men; proud of his father; loyal to the king; Mr. Paget always has the quiet good gift to give of happiness. 'These essays are not worth dedicating to anybody,' is his witty dedica-

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tion, but it is the good temper of it that puts us in good temper. This time he has an essay on How to write a Life, very fit for all to read who mean to write that heavenly kind of book. True to his advice therein he crowds the title-page of this little volume with a long quotation; which stands like a clef to the *Andante* he has here composed on the Victorian age. For that is the general theme of these essays; one of them actually bears that heading. The best is on 'The Water-Babies.' It could not be better done. It will set us all reading 'The Water-Babies' again. It will tempt some of the new generation, in spite of the warning, 'If you did not come before 1890, much of it will seem to you rubbish. If you did not come before 1910, have nothing to do with it: read something else.' But, 'why does not somebody write The new Water-Babies?' No, no: somebody would make a mess of that.

Tramping with a Poet in the Rockies. By STEPHEN GRAHAM. With thirty-eight emblems by VERNON HILL. (Macmillan. 1922.) 8*s.* 6*d.* net.

VACHEL LINDSAY is the poet, a 'rebel against vulgarity, materialism, and the modern artificial way of life.' He lives—so far as he has a settled abode—at Springfield, Illinois; and there Mr. Graham joined him last summer, and they tramped together to the Rockies and to Canada; and this volume is a record of their holiday. The short chapters were mostly written as letters for the New York *Evening Post*, and have the tang of lively journalism. Mountain, forest, river, rain, wind, sun, privation, courage, high spirits, simple song, and wisdom striking the lyre crosswise; the Socratic figure of the poet, the longer legs of Mr. Graham, but chiefly his affection for his friend—these are elements in the constitution of the tale.

The best criticism of these letters will be seen in the emblems which Mr. Hill has drawn for each of them. He has understood the poetry of them, and has given it imaginative shape with the skill of a draughtsman disciplined to successful abstraction: his line is beautiful, and the mind of the reader quietly deepens as he dwells on these designs.

Four Biblical Plays: Joseph and his Brothers; Passover-Night; The Last Passover-Night; Saul and Stephen. By W. H. T. GAIRDNER. (S.P.C.K. 1921.) 5*s.* net.

A CERTAIN H.M. Inspector used to tell of a country school in which the children were accustomed to act everything they

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learned. They learned by acting. They shewed what they had learned by better acting. And they pleased the Inspector very much. Reading this book we muse of that school.

The clear practical ingenious directions for dressing the actors with which it begins, the delight in line and colour, rouse interest at once. Already you imagine keen happy children preparing for their play. You turn the page, more hopefully perhaps than you opened the book, and begin to read the dialogue. And you are not disappointed. The drama has motion. The people live. The issue matters. There is a swing and freedom about it all; yet no loose language. At a very few points perhaps academicians just begin to be anxious: is something going to be sentimental? In the last two plays there is no slightest fear of that mistake. The last of all is impressive throughout. It might be wished that in the Lord's command to Saul the incisive word of Acts ix 6 had been kept: 'Arise and enter the city, and it shall be told thee what thou must (not shalt) do.'

'This little book is intended for study and devotional reading. The acting rights are vested in the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, which as at present advised does not intend to grant permission for dramatic representations.' This note to 'The Last Passover-Night' is perhaps a survival from the first separate publication, and for that play is quite proper: the restriction enhances its effect. But it would be a pity not to act the first and last plays.

Periodicals.

The Journal of Theological Studies (Vol. XXIII. No. 92. July 1922. Milford). M. Bessières: 'La Tradition manuscrite de la correspondance de S. Basile,' VI. J. Auzeuch: 'M. l'abbé Marius Bessières, professeur à l'École Sainte-croix (Paris)' (Obituary Notice). F. J. Badcock: 'The Old Roman Creed.' J. W. Tyrer: 'The Prayer of St. Polycarp and its concluding Doxology' (with added note by Dr. Brightman). H. A. Wilson: 'The Reconstruction of Hadrian's Sacramentary' (reviews Lietzmann, *Das Sacramentarium Gregorianum*). F. S. Marsh: 'A New Fragment of the Gospel (?) of Bartholomew.' E. A. Lowe: 'On the African Origin of the Codex Palatinus of the Gospels (*e*).' G. R. Driver: 'Notes on Hebrew Lexicography.' F. E. B[rightman]: 'St. Innocent I *De Nominibus Recitandis*.' F. C. Burkitt: 'Souter *Pelagius's Expositions of Thirteen Epistles of St. Paul*, I.'; 'H. J. White *Novum Testamentum Latine. Ep. ad Corinthios I.*' H. L. Jackson: 'Schütz *Apostel und Jünger*.' W. E. Barnes: 'Burney *The Aramaic Origin of the Fourth Gospel*'; 'Ball *The Book of Job*'; 'Luzzi *La Bibbia tradotta . . . e*

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annotata.' C. A. Scott: 'F. J. F. Jackson and K. Lake *The Acts of the Apostles*, II.' G. L. Marriott: 'A. J. Mason *Fifty Spiritual Homilies of St. Macarius the Egyptian*' (very critical). E. J. Rapson: 'Sir C. Eliot *Hinduism and Buddhism*, I–III' ('No better introduction to the study of Eastern religions can be recommended'). G. C. Richards: 'Moulton and Howard *Grammar of N.T. Greek*, II 2 *Accidence.*' C. J. Ball: 'Roeder and Mercer *Short Egyptian Grammar.*' J. F. B[ethune] B[aker]: 'Tixeront *Handbook of Patrology* and *History of Dogmas*, I–III' (English translations).

The Pilgrim (Vol. II. No. 4. July 1922. Longmans). W. M. Pryke: 'The New Testament and International Brotherhood.' H. A. S.: 'The Socialisation of Credit. A Reply.' C. E. Hudson: 'On Some Aspects of Herd Instinct.' G. C. Binyon: 'Some Principles of Symbolism.' C. A. Alington: 'A New Commination Service.' G. W. Brownfield: 'The Eternal Sacrifice.' E. Shillito: '"The Long Pursuit"' (Thoughts upon a Metaphor of the Mystics). Bishop of Manchester: 'Has Europe a Future?' 'Sir H. Jones *A Faith that Enquires.*' 'E. E. Thomas *Lotze's Theory of Reality.*' 'Foakes-Jackson *Introduction to the History of Christianity* (A.D. 590–1314).' 'Henson *Anglicanism.*' 'M. Spencer *Impasse or Opportunity?*' 'Somervell *A Short History of Our Religion.*' 'Sanders *Bossuet.*' 'Temple *Life of Bp. Percival.*' 'Bayne (ed.) *Life of Fisher.*' 'Schweitzer *On the Edge of the Primeval Forest.*' 'Lyttelton *Letters on Education.*' 'Laski *The Foundation of Sovereignty*' (very critical). 'Hobson *Incentives in the New Industrial Order.*' 'Angell *The Press and the Organisation of Society.*'

The London Quarterly Review (No. 275. July 1922. Epworth Press, 25–35 City Road, E.C. 1). W. Lock: 'The Fourth Gospel.' Judge M. M. Bodkin, K.C.: 'The Appeal of the Supernatural.' W. T. Davison: 'The Faith of a Philosopher.' C. Kernahan: 'Joseph Compton-Rickett.' R. W. Harding: 'Is a Creed necessary or desirable?' T. H. S. Escott: 'Post-war English as she is spoke.' (The late) F. W. Orde Ward: 'The Gospel with Wings.' J. Telford: 'V. A. Wilson *Queen Elizabeth's Maids of Honour.*' V. Taylor: 'Was there a First Gospel according to St. Luke?' J. Telford: 'Belloc *Europe and the Faith.*' H. M. Wiener: 'The Reunions of Israel and Judah.' 'Foakes-Jackson *Introduction to the History of Christianity*, A.D. 590–1314.' 'Jackson and Lake *The Acts of the Apostles*, II.' 'Kidd *History of the Church to* A.D. 461.' 'Abbott-Smith *Manual Greek Lexicon of the N.T.*' 'R. G. Moulton *Modern Reader's Bible for Schools. The Old Testament.*' 'Lockyer *Paul, Luther, Wesley.*' 'Symes *The Evolution of the N.T.*' 'Burney *The Gospel in the O.T.*' 'Skrine *The Gospel of the Manhood.*' 'Lee *The Social Implications of Christianity.*' 'Livingstone (ed.) *The Legacy of Greece.*' 'Williamson *Short History of British Expansion.*' 'Bryce *International Relations.*' 'Inge *The Victorian Age.*' 'Graham *Tramping with a Poet in the Rockies.*' 'Reade *Johnsonian Gleanings*, III.' '*Oxford University Press*, 1468–1921.' 'Bishop *My Moorland Patients.*' 'Barnes *Bishop Barlow and Anglican Orders.*' 'Murry *The Problem of Style.*' 'Matz *The Inns and Taverns of Pickwick.*' 'Hardy *Late Lyrics.*'

The Churchman (Vol. XXXVI. No. 3. July 1922. London: 82 Victoria Street, S.W. 1). W. H. Griffith Thomas: 'The Doctrine of the Bible.' T. A. Gurney: 'The Pathway to Reunion.' S. R. Cambie: 'The Canadian Revision. Some Notes and Observations.' [ ]Morrow: 'The Moral Battlefields of Missionary Enterprise.' T. W. Gilbert: 'Cromwell's Government.' W. J. L. Sheppard: 'The Advantages of Non-Church-going.' A. W. Greenup: 'Megillath Taanite. "Scroll of Fasting." Englished, for the first time, from the Aramaic and the Hebrew, IX–XI.' 'Page *Schwartz of Tangore.*' S. R. C[arpenter]: 'Scott *The Message of Hosea*'; 'Bp. of Peterborough *Interpreters of God.*'

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E. H. B[lakeney]: 'Jackson and Lake *Acts of the Apostles*, II.' 'Wingman *Stories and Sunshine in South Africa.*' *'Letters and Poems of Bp. Moule.'* 'Sterrett *Modernism in Religion.*' 'C. E. Douglas *The Redemption of the Body*' (critical).

The Journal of Religion (Vol. II. Nos. 4–5. July–September 1922. Chicago University Press). P. Hutchinson: 'The Conservative Reaction in China.' E. L. Schaub: 'The Present Status of the Psychology of Religion.' G. Cross: 'The Motive of Theology.' W. M. Tippy: 'The Value of the Social Survey for Religion.' K. J. Saunders: 'Sketches of Buddhism as a Living Religion.' E. S. Brightman: 'W. K. Wright *A Student's Philosophy of Religion.*' J. P. Deane: 'E. F. Scott *The New Testament To-day*'; 'Moffatt *The Approach to the N.T.*' S. J. Case: 'Farnell *Greek Hero Cults and Ideas of Immortality.*' September. E. W. Lyman: 'The Rationality of Belief in the Reality of God.' K. [J.] Saunders: 'The Passing of Paternalism in Missions.' H. F. Ward: 'Social Science and Religion.' S. G. Inman: 'The Religious Approach to the Latin-American Mind.' C. S. Patton: 'Did Jesus call Himself the Son of Man?' A. M. Sanford: 'Theological Doctrines and Social Progress.' A. S. Woodburne: 'Can India's Caste System survive in Modern Life?' A. E. Haydon: 'Canney *Encyclopedia of Religions.*' A. R. Gordon: 'J. M. P. Smith *The Religion of the Psalms.*' J. M. P. Smith: 'Duhm *Die Psalmen erklärt.*' K. Fullerton: 'Peters *Bible and Spade.*' G. B. Smith: 'Cross *Creative Christianity.*'

The Princeton Theological Review (Vol. XX. No. 3. July 1922. Princeton University Press). C. E. Macartney: 'The Heroism of the Ministry in the Hour of Christianity's Peril.' R. C. Pitzer: 'The Psychic Phenomena of Mysticism.' C. M. Mackay: 'The City and the Sanctuary (Ezekiel xlviii).' B. F. Paist, jr.: 'Peter Martyr and the Colloquy of Poissy,' III. H. E. Dosker: 'Herman Bavinck.' B. C. Steiner: 'The Mind of Man.' G. Henderson: 'The Name and Titles of Christ. "The Name which is above every Name."' F. P. Ramsay: 'McDowall *Beauty and the Beast*' (unfavourable). W. H. Johnson: 'Mathews and Smith *A Dictionary of Religion and Ethics*'; 'Rolt *The Spiritual Body*'; 'Ferrero *The Ruin of the Ancient Civilisation and the Triumph of Christianity*' ('brilliantly written'). W. B. Greene, jr.: 'Carrington *Christian Apologetics of the Second Century*'; 'Pym *Psychology and the Christian Life.*' J. G. Machen: 'St. John Parry *The Pastoral Epistles*'; 'M. Jones *The Four Gospels*'; 'Foxell *The Temptation of Jesus.*' C. F. Deininger: 'Arnold-Forster *The Hymn Book of the Church or the Growth of the Psalter.*' O. T. Allis: 'R. W. Rogers *Great Characters of the O.T.*' (4 pp.); 'H. T. Fowler *Great Leaders of Hebrew History.*' F. W. Loetscher: 'Chiminelli *Bibliografia della Storia Riforma Religioso in Italia.*' C. W. Hodge: 'Stephan *Glaubenslehre*' (4 pp.). C. E. Macartney: '*Painted Windows. Studies in Religious Personality*' ('Of those treated Gore, Inge, Jacks, Royden, Booth, and Orchard are well known to American readers; but such men as Father Knox, Canon Barnes, and Bishop Temple are not even names on this side'). J. R. Smith: 'Oman *The Paradox of the World.*' D. B. Tomkins: 'A. C. Wyckoff *The Non-Sense of Christian Science.*'

Theology (Vol. V. Nos. 26–7. August–September 1922. S.P.C.K.) E. G. Selwyn: (1) 'Haldane *The Philosophy of Humanism*'; (2) 'A Study of John Bunyan.' C. P. S. Clarke: 'Maintenance of the Clergy in the Early Church.' W. Lockton: 'The Martyrdom of St. John.' D. C. Somervell: '"Sub Obtentu Religionis."' M. Moore: 'Plato and Sir Thomas More.' A. E. Taylor: 'Harris *Creeds or No Creeds*' (critical). F. J. Foakes-Jackson: 'Ferrar *The Demonstratio Evangelica of Eusebius.*' R. P. Roseveare: 'A. A. King *Holy Unction.*' 'Temple *Life of Bp. Percival.*' 'M. Scott *The Message of Hosea.*' 'Charles *Lectures on the Apocalypse.*' 'Abbott-Smith *Manual Greek Lexicon of*

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the N.T.' September. Bishop of Ripon: 'The Gospel and the Creed.' E. G. Selwyn: 'The Supernatural.' J. K. Mozley: 'The Person of our Lord.' J. J. G. Stockley: 'The Catholic Church.' G. W. Hockley and G. C. Rawlinson: 'The Hearing of Confessions.' L. S. Thornton, C.R.: 'Sacramental Religion.' W. J. Sparrow Simpson: 'The Sacraments of the Church.' S. R. P. Moulsdale: 'The Eucharistic Sacrifice.' H. P. Bull, S.S.J.E.: 'Christ and the Soul. I. Conversion.' M. R. Carpenter-Garnier: 'Christ and the Soul. II. Prayer.' H. H. Slesser: 'Christ and Society.' J. H. Baxter: 'Franses *Die Werke des hl. Quodvultdeus Bischofs von Karthago* († 453).' C. L. Feltoe: 'Pridie *The Spiritual Gifts.*' 'Ponsonby *Lynchmere and Shulbrede Priory.*' A. Oakley: 'Tissot *The Interior Life.*' 'McAfee *The Christian Faith and the New Day.*'

The Modern Churchman (Vol. XII. Nos. 4–5. July–August 1922. Oxford: Basil Blackwell). K. Saunders: 'Christianity and the Religions of Asia.' H. Rashdall: 'Some Plain Words to Bp. Gore. III. Bp. Gore and St. Thomas Aquinas.' A. T. W. Dowding: 'Moffatt *The Approach to the N.T.*' J. C. Hardwick: 'Harris *Creeds or No Creeds.*' (very critical); 'Hubbard *Self-Training in Mysticism.*' W. M. Pryke: 'A. E. J. Rawlinson *Studies in Historical Christianity.*' Ven. B. Potter: 'Is Modernism Christian?' August. Ven. B. Potter: 'The Anglican and Eastern Churches.' E. C. Dewick: 'Some Modern Problems of the Mission Field. IV. Missions and Politics.' A. Fawkes: 'Our Partners in the Other Ship.' S. McComb: 'The Christian Religion and Miracle.' F. E. Powell: 'Modernism and the Bible.' W. M. Pryke: 'Mackintosh *The Divine Initiative*'; 'Lee *The Social Implications of Christianity*'; 'Pym *Psychology and the Christian Life.*' J. C. H[ardwick]: 'Sterrett *Modernism in Religion*'; 'J. A. Faulkner *Modernism and the Christian Faith*'; 'Nolloth (ed.) *The Christian Faith.*' P. Gardner: 'Creeds or No Creeds.'

The Expository Times (Vol. XXXIII. Nos. 10–12. July–September 1922. T. and T. Clark). C. J. Gadd: 'Thirty Years' Progress in Assyriology.' Rendel Harris: 'Pindar and St. Paul.' R. H. Strachan: '"The Man borne of Four." A Study in Spiritual Healing.' J. Hastings: 'Harris *Creeds or No Creeds.*' 'Kidd *History of the Christian Church to* A.D. 461.' '*Cambridge History of India*, I.' 'Souter *Pelagius's Expositions of Thirteen Epistles of St. Paul.*' 'Chadwick *Social Life in the Days of Piers Plowman.*' 'Boylan *Thott, the Hermes of Egypt.*' A. H. Sayce: 'Naville *La Haute Critique dans la Pentateuque.*' W. D. Niven: 'P. W. Schmidt *Der strophische Aufbau des Gesamttextes der vier Evangelien.*' 'C. D. Williams *The Prophetic Ministry for To-day.*' W. F. Howard: '1 Cor. iv 6. Exegesis or Emendation?' August. W. J. Ferrar: 'Modernism and the Person of Christ.' A. Deissmann: '"Friend, wherefore art thou come?"' Lt.-Col. L. A. Waddell: 'The Chaldee Father-God and the Pillar of Cloud.' H. J. Wotherspoon: 'The Church as an Ethical Society.' A. Guillaume: '*The Peshitta Syriac N.T.*' L. Gautier: 'Gideon and his Men.' C. J. Ritchie: 'Joshua and the Miracle of the Sun.' A. W. Wotherspoon: 'Note on St. John xvi 10.' H. D. Lockett: 'Salvation and Loss.' A. Taylor: 'The Old Paths' (Jer. vi 16).' A. O. Standen: 'The Parable of Dives and Lazarus and Enoch 22.' W. G. White: '"Thy Kingdom come."' J. Hastings: 'Macnaghten *Émile Coué*'; 'Welch *The Visions of the End*'; 'Hogg *Redemption from this World.*' '*Life of James Cameron Lees.*' 'Brill *Fundamental Conceptions of Psychoanalysis.*' 'Barnes *Bp. Barlow and Anglican Orders.*' 'J. H. Hutton *The Sema Nagas.*' 'Wirgman *Storm and Sunshine in S. Africa.*' H. R. Mackintosh: 'Holl *Luther.*' 'W. Brown *Suggestion and Mental Analysis*' ('A Scholar's finest work'). 'Hardy *Late Lyrics and Earlier.*' September. C. J. Cadoux: 'The Early Christian Church in Egypt.' A. J. Gossip: 'A Beginning.'

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S. Tonkin: 'The Psychology of the Twelve.' J. Hastings: 'Skinner *Prophecy and Religion.*' 'Croce *The Poetry of Dante.*' 'Ragg *St. Luke.*' 'Peters *Bible and Spade.*' 'Heffer *Apology and Polemic in the N.T.*' '*The Spirit of St. Jane Francis de Chantal.*' 'Lee *The Social Implications of Christianity*' ('much wisdom').

The English Historical Review (Vol. XXXVII. No. 147. July 1922. Longmans). H. M. Chew: 'Scutage under Edward I.' A. F. Pollard: 'Council, Star Chamber, and Privy Council under the Tudors. I. The Council.' C. L. Kingsford: 'The Highland Forts in the "Forty-Five."' G. Unwin: 'The Transition to the Factory System,' II. C. H. Haskins: '"King Harold's Books."' C. W. Previté-Orton: 'Annales Radingenses Posteriores, 1135–1264' (from MS St. John's Coll., Camb., No. 22). J. Wake: 'Communitas Villae.' M. R. James: 'Twelve Medieval Ghost Stories' (From MS Brit. Mus. Royal, 15A xx). P. Van Dyke: 'The Mission of Cardinal Pole to enforce the Deposition against Henry VIII' (From MS Vatican. Varia Misc. Arm. II 49). J. Tait: '*Texte u. Forschungen zur Englischen Kulturgeschichte*'; 'Jeayes *Court Rolls of Colchester*, I, 1310–52.' J. H. Round: 'Foster *Final Concords of the County of Lincoln.*' C. C. J. Webb: 'Vansteenberghe *Nicolas de Cues* (1401–64).' K. H. Vickers: 'Reid *The King's Council in the North.*' G. Davies: 'Notestein and Relf's *Commons Debates for* 1629.' Sir A. W. Ward: 'H. Ritter von Sebik *Wallenstein's Ende*' (5 pp.). W. F. Reddaway: 'Lusvald *Struensee.*' E. H. Parker: 'Cordier *Histoire Générale de la Chine.*' D. S. Margoliouth: 'Aiyangar *South India and her Muhammadan Invaders*' (laudatory). P. E. Roberts: 'Irvine *The Later Mughals.*' R. L. Poole: 'Warner and Gilson *Catalogue of Western MSS in the Old Royal and King's Collections*' (7½ pp. of considerable importance). H. H. E. Crasber: 'James *Latin MSS in the John Rylands Library.*' 'Bouchier *Short History of Antioch.*' F. M. P[owicke]: '*Mediaeval Contributions to Modern Civilisation.*' A. L. P[oole]: '*Toll Englands Beziehungen zu den Niederlanden bis* 1154' ('valuable contribution to English history'). 'Bayne (ed.) *The Life of Fisher.*' 'Pollen *The Counter-Reformation in Scotland.*' 'Sanders *Bossuet.*' 'Lavisse *Histoire de la France Contemporaine*, VIII.' 'Edmundson *History of Holland.*' C. J[ohnson]: 'Poole *The Beginning of the Year in the Middle Ages.*'

The Quarterly Review (No. 472. July 1922. John Murray). H. E. Luxmoore: 'Edmond Warre.' H. W. C. Davis: 'The Conference of Paris.' John Freeman: 'The Work of Walter de la Mare.' H. C. Luke: 'Cities of Transcaucasia.' S. L. Bensusan: 'Education and Research in Agriculture.' J. Middleton Murry: 'M. Marcel Proust: A New Sensibility.' The Rt. Hon. Sir John N. Jordan, G.C.I.E.: 'The Washington Conference and Far East Questions.' Horatio Brown: 'British Students at Padua.' Sir Valentine Chirol: 'The Outlook in India.' Dr. E. J. Dillon: 'Mexico and World Reconstruction.' 'International Relations.' F. A. W. Gisborne: 'Australia Infelix: The Problem of the Northern Territory.' 'Ireland.'

Revue Biblique (Vol. XXXI. No. 3. July 1922. Paris: Lecoffre-Gabalda). M. J. Lagrange: 'L'Évangile selon les Hébreux,' II. Dom A. Wilmart: 'Smaragde et le Psautier.' H. Vincent: 'Néby Samouil' (beautifully illustrated). P. Dhorme: 'Le Désert de la Mer (Isaïe xxi).' F. M. Abel: 'La Géographie sacrée chez S. Cyrille d'Alexandrie.' M. J. Lagrange: 'La Seconde Parole d'Oxyrhinque.' J. Creten: 'La Pâque des Samaritains' (illustrated). E. Jacquier: 'Goguel *Le Livre des Actes*' (6½ pp. favourable). F. M. Abel: 'Harrison *Problem of the Pastoral Epistles.*' P. Dhorme: 'Wordsworth-White *Novum Testamentum Latine*: *Epistula ad Corinthios Prima*' ('L'éditeur se surpasse lui-même'); 'E. Meyer *Ursprung u. Anfänge des Christentums*, I–II'; 'Vouaux *Les Actes de Pierre*'; 'Budge *Cuneiform Texts*, XXXVI';

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'Weber *Keilinschrifturkunden aus Boghazkôi*'; 'Legrain *Empreintes de Cachets Élamites*'; 'Cruveilhier *Les Principaux Résultats des nouvelles Fouilles de Suse*'; 'Contenau *La Civilisation assyro-babylonienne.*' 'Frazer *Adonis* (traduction française).' 'Dussaud *Les Origines cananéennes du sacrifice israëlite.*' 'Zammit *Third Report on the Hal-Tarxien Excavations*' (4 pp. with Plan).

Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique (Vol. XVIII. Nos. 2–3. April–July 1922. Louvain: 40 rue de Namur). L. van der Essen: 'Alfred Cauchie (1860–1922). L'Initiateur, Le Savant, L'Homme' (with Portrait).' A. Pelzer: 'Les 51 Articles de Guillaume Occam censurés en Avignon en 1326.' J. de Ghellinck: 'Un Évêque bibliophile au XIV^e^ Siècle—Richard Aungerville de Bury (1345). Contribution à l'Histoire de la Littérature et des Bibliothèques mediévales,' I. E. Tobac: 'Lagrange *L'Évangile selon S. Luc*' (10 pp.). Dom G. Aubourg: 'St. John Parry *The Pastoral Epistles*' (4½ pp.). J. Lebon: 'Bardenhewer *Geschichte der altkirchlichen Litteratur*, I–III'; 'Monceaux *S. Cyprien*'; 'Bardy *S. Athanase*'; 'Feder *S. Hilarii Pictaviensis Opera*, IV.' J. Flamion: 'Delehaye *Les Passions des Martyrs et les Genres littéraires*'; 'Delehaye *À travers trois siècles. L'Œuvre des Bollandistes.*' J. Forget: 'Neyron *Le Gouvernement de l'Église*'; 'Vaccari *S. Girolamo.*' Dom P. Chauvin: 'Inge *Philosophy of Plotinus*' (6½ pp. 'Un livre comme celui du doyen Inge est un grave symptôme du danger présent, et cette voix séductrice qui chante les jouissances de l'*amor intellectualis* troublera bien des âmes avides de réalisations spirituelles'). M. Jacquin: 'Boyer *L'Idée de Vérité dans la Philosophie de S. Augustin.*' L. Marcellin: 'Berlière *L'Ordre monastique des Origines aux XII^e^ siècle*' ('une œuvre de vulgarisation très documentée'). G. Mollat: 'Parisot *Histoire de Lorraine*, I.' Dom P. de Puniet: 'Lietzmann *Das Sacramentarium Gregorianum.*' H. Nelis: 'Prou *Recueil des Actes des Rois de Provence* (855–928).' Dom Guilloreau: 'Schaudel *Les Comtes de Salm et l'Abbaye de Senones aux XII^e^ et XIII^e^ siècles.*' F. Casolini: 'Facchinetti *S. Francesco d'Assisi nella storia, nella legenda, nell'arte*' ('Un livre de science, d'art, de vaste érudition et cependant plein de simplicité et d'une lecture facile et agréable'). R. Maere: 'Schippers *Die Stiftendenkmäler der Abteikirche Maria-Laach im XIII. Jahrhundert.*' M. Jacquin: 'Löhr *Beiträge zur Geschichte des Kölner Dominikaner-Klosters im Mittelalter.*' F. Callaey: 'Bierbaum *Bettelorden und Weltgeistlichkeit an der Universität Paris. Texte u. Untersuchungen zum literarischen Armuts- und Exemtionsstreit* (1255–72).' R. M. Martin: 'Grabmann *Die echten Schriften des hl. Thomas von Aquin.*' P. M. Schaff: 'Morçay *S. Antonin de Florence*, 1389–1459.' A. Janssen: 'Schauerte *Die Busslehre des Joannes Eck.*' M. Viller: 'Hunter *The Teaching of Calvin.*' M. Piette: 'Rodocanachi *La Réforme en Italie*, I–II.' R. Michel: 'Romier *Les Origines politiques des Guerres de Religion*, I–II (1547–59)' (favourable). F. Bonnard: 'Paschini *Un Amico de Cardinale Polo: Alvise Priuli*' ('une monographie agréable et très distinguée'). H. Lamiroy: 'Stewart *The "Provincial Letters" of Blaise Pascal.*' C. Terlinden: 'Lavisse *Histoire de France contemporaine*, I (1789–92).'

Teologisk Tidsskrift (Vol. III. No. 2. 1922. Copenhagen: G. E. C. Gad). B. Kornerup: 'Studier over Peder Hersleb som Praedikant.' H. Mosbech: 'Paulus' Lehre om Loven.' E. Rodhe: 'Svenska Kirkan 1921.' A. Bentzen: 'Kegel *Die Kultusreformation des Esra*'; 'Laqueur *Der Jüdische Historiker Flavius Josephus*' (6 pp.) F. Torm: 'Lohmeyer *Soziale Fragen im Urchristentum*'; 'F. Hauck *Die Stellung des Urchristentums zu Arbeit und Geld.*' H. Haar: 'Lorenzen *De Danske Helligaandsklostres Bygningshistorie*; *De Danske Franciskanerklostres Bygningshistorie*; *De Danske Dominikanerklostres Bygningshistorie.*' V. Lindegaard-Petersen: 'Fulliquet *Les Problèmes d'Outretombe*'; 'Monod *Vers Dieu*'; 'Doumergue *Le Caractère de Calvin.*'

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Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche (N. F. Vol. III. No. 4. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck). Professor Haering: 'Ist unsere Sündhaftigkeit unsere persönliche Schuld?' R. Otto: 'Zum Verhältnisse von mystischer und gläubiger Frömmigkeit.' R. Paulus: 'Geschichtliche und übergeschichtliche Grundlagen des Glaubens. Eine Studie zum Christusproblem in der heutigen Theologie.' J. Wendland: 'Wobbermin *Das Wesen der Religion.*'

The Hindustan Review (Vol. XLV. No. 273. June 1922. Calcutta: 48 Bowbazar Street). S. N. Singh: 'Indian India.' P. K. A. Narayan: 'The Conflict of Cultures in India.' M. Macdonagh: 'The Drafting of Acts of Parliament' (amusing). J. S. Gupta: 'Child and Maternity Welfare.' R. K. Paul: 'The Preternatural in Shakespeare.' Reviews.

The Christian East (Vol. III. No. 2. July 1922. S.P.C.K.). 'The E.C.U. Declaration' (with translations in Greek, Russian, Serb, Rouman and Latin). 'The Metropoly of Thyatira. Letter from the Oecumenical Patriarch.' Prince I. Dadeshkeliani: 'The Autocephaly of the Orthodox Church of Georgia.' 'The Orthodox Church in Rhodes.' G. R. Woodward: 'Hymns of the Greek Church, IV. July to September' (translated). N. Glubokovsky: 'The Patriarch and Clergy of Russia under the Bolsheviks.' Hakluyt Egerton: 'The "Turkish" Orthodox Church.' 'American Letter.' 'Jerusalem Letter.'

The International Review of Missions (Vol. XI. No. 43. July 1922. London: Edinburgh House, Eaton Gate, S.W.). 'The Missionary Significance of the last Ten Years: A Survey. III. In Korea (by Bishop H. Welch); IV. In the Philippines (by Dr. F. C. Laubach).' E. D. Burton: 'Christian Education in China.' J. H. Ritson: 'The Bible—An Unfettered Missionary.' K. Saunders: 'Fa-hian in Lanka (*c.* A.D. 400)' (Poem). E. D. Soper: 'The Study of Religion in the Training of Missionaries.' J. E. Lundahl: 'Missionary Co-operation in Sweden.' G. A. G[ollock]: 'Problems of Work as seen by Fifty Missionaries.' K. S. Latourette: 'The Missionary Awakening among Roman Catholics in the United States.' A. B. Keith: 'Chirol *India Old and New.*' W. B. Selbie: 'Schweitzer *On the Edge of the Primeval Forest.*' N. Leys: 'J. Roscoe *Twenty-five Years in E. Africa* and *The Soul of Central Africa*'; 'D. Campbell *In the Heart of Bantuland*'; 'Claridge *Wild Bush Tribes of Tropical Africa.*' S. Cave: 'M. M. Underhill *The Hindu Religious Year*'; 'Fraser and Edwards *Life and Teaching of Tukaram.*' W. H. Rees: 'Cordier *Histoire générale de la Chine . . . jusqu'à la Chute de la Dynastie mandchoue.*' L. Hodous: 'Mathews and Smith *A Dictionary of Religion and Ethics*' (in one Volume). M. Westling: 'Lundahl *Vähldsmissionen.*' W. S. Page: 'Cave *Introduction to the Study of some Living Religions of the East.*' F. Lenwood: 'Higginbotham *The Gospel and the Plow*' (laudatory); 'P. J. Maclagan *The Gospel and its Working.*' E. Stock: 'W. O. Carver *Syllabus of Lectures on the Outlines of the History of Christian Missions.*' G. A. G[ollock]: 'Young *Christianity and Civilization in the South Pacific.*'

The Church Missionary Review (Vol. LXXIII. No. 839. September 1922. C.M.S.) Right Rev. J. E. C. Welldon: 'The Case for the Severance of Church and State in India.' Right Rev. E. H. M. Waller: 'The Diocesanization of the Work of the C.M.S.' P. A. Smith: 'Two Races in Korea.' Right Rev. J. Hind: 'The China National Christian Conference.' W. H. Elwin: 'Work among Chinese Students in Tokyo and Elsewhere.' C. F. Harford: 'Missions and the African Liquor Traffic.' J. R. Orr: 'Education in Kenya Colony.' 'Eastern Notes.' Sir H. H. Johnston: 'Crabtree *The Prefix System of Bantu.*' J. du Plessis: 'Mackintosh *The New Zambesi Trail.*' H. Katayama: 'Shaw *Japan in Transition.*' W. D. P. Hill: 'Underhill *The Hindu Religious Year.*'

The East and the West (Vol. XX. No. 79. July 1922. S.P.G.)

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G. Aspland: 'China and Opium to-day.' A. Crosthwaite: 'A Conference of the Depressed Classes in India.' A. S. Cripps: 'The Dispossession of the African.' R. P. Wilder: 'The Student Volunteers of N. America.' G. Callaway, S.S.J.E.: '"That which is according to custom"' (The Si-Xosa equivalent of Is. lxi 8). E. C. West: 'A Mission of Help to India.' Ven. F. W. Martin: 'The Place of the Anglo-Indian in the Church of India.' 'Sketches in an Up-country Hospital in India.' '*The Cambridge History of India*, I.' 'Kawakami *What Japan thinks.*' 'Roscoe *The Soul of Central Africa.*' 'Wirgman *Storm and Sunshine in S. Africa.*' '*The Cambridge Mediaeval History*, III.' 'M. M. Wood *Glimpses of Persia*' (favourable).

Books Received.

The more important will be noticed in Articles and Short Notices as space permits.

Biblical and Kindred Studies.

Burkitt, F. C.—*Ecclesiastes rendered into English verse.* Pp. 32. (S.P.C.K.) 1*s.* 6*d.* cloth, 6*d.* paper.

Clapton, E.—*Our Lord's Questions from the Old Testament: Being lists of the Quotations and Allusions.* With short chapters on the use and value of the O.T. Scriptures, and an Appendix on the Septuagint and the Vulgate. Pp. 72. (Skeffington and Son.) 1*s.* 6*d.* net.

Clay, A. T.—*A Hebrew Deluge Story in Cuneiform, and other epic fragments in the Pierpont Morgan Library.* 'Yale Oriental Series. Researches,' Volume v 3. Pp. 100. (Oxford University Press.) 7*s.* 6*d.* net.

Harden, J. M.—*Psalterium Iuxta Hebraeos Hieronymi.* Edited with Introduction and Apparatus Criticus. Pp. xxxii + 196. (S.P.C.K.) 10*s.* net.

Mordell, Phineas.—*The Origin of Letters and Numerals. According to the Sefer Yetsirah.* Pp. 72. (Philadelphia: P. Mordell.) 2 dollars.

Politeyan, J.—*New Testament Archaeology. Discoveries from the Nile to the Tiber.* With Foreword by the Very Reverend Henry Wace, D.D., Dean of Canterbury. Pp. x + 258. (Elliot Stock.) 6*s.* net.

Robinson, T. H.—*St. Mark's Life of Jesus.* With Foreword by Prof. James Moffatt, D.D., D.Litt. Pp. 134. (Student Christian Movement.) 4*s.* net (in paper cover, 2*s.* 6*d.* net).

Williams, A. Lukyn.—*Ecclesiastes in the Revised Version.* With introduction and notes. Pp. lvi + 184. (Cambridge University Press.) 6*s.* net.

Metaphysics and Philosophy of Religion.

Carter, H. C.—*Auto-Suggestion and Religion.* Pp. 32. (Cambridge: Heffer.) 1*s.* net.

Champneys, A. C.—'*A Different Gospel which is not another Gospel.*' Foreword on Science and Miracles by F. A. Dixey, M.D., F.R.S. Pp. x + 154. (Bell.) 3*s.* 6*d.* net.

Dougall, Lily and Emmet, C. W.—*The Lord of Thought. A Study of the Problems which confronted Jesus Christ and the Solution He offered.* Pp. vii + 324. (Student Christian Movement.) 12*s.* 6*d.* net.

Drown, E. S.—*The Creative Christ: A Study of the Incarnation in Terms of Modern Thought.* Pp. 168. (Hodder and Stoughton, Ltd.) 6*s.* net.

Glover, T. R.—*Progress in Religion to the Christian Era.* Pp. viii + 346. (Student Christian Movement.) 10*s.* 6*d.* net.

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JAMES, A. G.—*Personal Immortality. An Enquiry into the Christian Doctrine of a Future Life.* Pp. 148. (Student Christian Movement.) 3*s.* 6*d.* net.

LUCE, A. A.—*Bergson's Doctrine of Intuition.* 'Donnellan Lectures,' 1921. Pp. vi + 122. (S.P.C.K.) 4*s.* 6*d.* net.

DOGMATIC THEOLOGY.

HALL, F. J.—*Eschatology. Indexes.* The Concluding Volume of the series 'Dogmatic Theology.' Pp. xiv + 324. (Longmans.) 9*s.* net.

PRACTICAL AND DEVOTIONAL THEOLOGY.

BALK, C. G.—*Life is Growth. Thoughts on the Problem and Purpose of the Individual Life.* Pp. xxxii + 356. (R. Scott.) 5*s.* net.

DAVEY, J. E.—*Our Faith in God through Jesus Christ: Four Apologetic addresses.* Pp. 140. (Student Christian Movement.) 3*s.* 6*d.* net (in paper cover, 2*s.* 6*d.* net).

HARVEY, T. E.—*A Wayfarer's Faith: Aspects of the Common Basis of Religious Life.* Pp. viii + 156. (Wells Gardner.) 2*s.* 6*d.* net.

KEEBLE, S. E.—*Christian Responsibility for the Social Order.* 'Fernley Lecture.' Pp. 306. (Epworth Press.) 6*s.* net.

PEMBERTON, J. C.—*A Suffering Messiah: A Study in Christian Origins.* Pp. 16. (R. Scott.) 1*s.* net.

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'Christian Life, Faith and Thought. Being the First Part of the Book of Christian Discipline of the Religious Society of Friends in Great Britain. Pp. 150. (The Friends' Bookshop, 140 Bishopsgate, E.C.) 1*s.* net.

'Feed My Lambs': A Service for Infants. By A Woman Messenger of the Diocese of Ely. Pp. 28. (Cambridge: Heffer.) 9*d.* net.

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Homiletics.

Charter, H. J.—*A Manual for Preachers.* Pp. 80. (Christian Literature Society for India.) 1*s.* 6*d.* net.

History and Archaeology.

Bridge, F. M.—*Princes of Wales.* With 20 illustrations, most of them reproduced from engravings, prints and photographs in the collection of Royal Portraits in the Library at Windsor Castle. Pp. xii + 356. (W. Deane and Son: Year Book Press.) 8*s.* 6*d.* net.

Davies, G.—*A Student's Guide to the Manuscripts relating to English History in the Seventeenth Century in the Bodleian Library.* 'Helps for Students of History,' No. 47. Pp. 32. (S.P.C.K.) 1*s.*

Dearmer, P.—*Fifty Pictures of Gothic Altars.* Selected and described. Pp. 212. (Mowbray, A. R. and Co., Ltd.) 21*s.* net. Originally issued in 1910 as Alcuin Club Collection X, this volume is now re-published by agreement with the Alcuin Club.

Jenkins, Claude.—*The Monastic Chronicler and the Early School of St. Albans.* A Lecture. Pp. iv + 98. (S.P.C.K.) 3*s.* 6*d.* net.

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Rivers, W. H. R.—*History and Ethnology.* 'Helps for Students of History,' No. 48. Pp. 32. (S.P.C.K.) 6*d.*

Tomlinson, E. M.—*A History of The Minories, London.* With thirteen illustrations. Pp. xvi + 418. (John Murray.) 7*s.* 6*d.* net.

Missionary Studies.

Lofthouse, J.—*A Thousand Miles from a Post Office, or Twenty Years' Life and Travel in the Hudson's Bay Regions.* With a Preface by the Archbishop of Canterbury. With Illustrations. Pp. viii + 184. (S.P.C.K.) 6*s.* net.

Shaw, Loretta L.—*Japan in Transition.* With Foreword by the Rev. C. M. Williams. Pp. viii + 126. (C.M.S.) 2*s.* 6*d.*

Miscellaneous.

Austen, W. A. E.—*Fabric and Finance: A Popular Guide to the Structure and Endowments of the Church of England, and to the Solution of the Problem of Voluntary Offerings.* Pp. vi + 72. (S.P.C.K.) 1*s.* 6*d.* net.

Browne, Sir Thomas. *Religio Medici.* Edited by W. Murison, M.A. Pp. xxvi + 272. (Cambridge University Press.) 4*s.* 6*d.* net.

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Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, Manchester. Vol. VII. No. 1. July 1922. Pp. 1–168. (Manchester: The University Press.) 2*s.* net.

Hundred and Eighteenth Report of the British and Foreign Bible Society for the year ending March MCMXXII.—With Appendix and a list of Subscribers and Benefactors. Pp. xx + 383 + 214. (Bible House, 146 Queen Victoria Street.) 1*s.* to non-subscribers.

Struggle and Trials of the Magyar Reformed Church in Transylvania under the Roumanian Heel. Issued by the Foreign Churches' Committee of the Hungarian Reformed Synodus with the support of the Popular Literary Society. Pp. 20. (Budapest: Viktor Hornyanszky.)

The Dropsie College for Hebrew and Cognate Learning Register, 1922–23. Pp. 32. (Philadelphia.)

Var Kyrka: Fran Början av Tyugonde Arhundradet Periodvis Skildrad. Utgiven genam Svenska Kyrkans Diakonistyrelse, III. Tiden 1916–1920. Pp. viii + 492. (Stockholm: Svenska Kyrkans Diakonistyrelses Bokförlag.) Häft. *Kr.* 12; Kloth, *Kr.* 15.

Voices on the Wind: An Anthology of Contemporary Verse. With a Preface by E. F. WRIGHT. Pp. 188. (London: Merton Press.) 3*s.* 6*d.*

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CONTENTS:

PAGE

I. THE NATURAL VOICE. By the Rev. CLEMENT F. ROGERS, Professor of Pastoral Theology, King's College, London 201

II. MINIMUM CONDITIONS OF INTERCOMMUNION. By the Rev. T. A. LACEY, Canon of Worcester . . 219

III. MINIMUM CONDITIONS OF INTERCOMMUNION: SOME COMMENTS ON CANON LACEY'S ARTICLE. By the Rev. VERNON BARTLET, D.D., Mansfield College, Oxford 227

IV. SOME MORALS OF ESCHATOLOGY. By the Rev. N. E. EGERTON SWANN 237

V. MODERN CRITICISM AND THE PROPHETIC LITERATURE OF THE OLD TESTAMENT. By the Rev. THEODORE H. ROBINSON, D.D. . . . 250

VI. THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE. By the Rev. L. W. GRENSTED, B.D., Egerton Hall, Manchester 281

VII. SOME EARLY GOSPEL SOURCES. By the Rev. A. BEVIL BROWNE 302

A THIRTEENTH-CENTURY CORONATION RUBRIC. By Miss HOPE ALLEN 335

THOMAS HARDY AND THE POETIC MIND. By A. W. REED, Reader in English, King's College, London 342

SHORT NOTICES 348

INDEX TO VOL. XCV 391

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Art. I.—THE NATURAL VOICE.

1. *Worship and Music.* By the Venerable G. Gardner, Mus.Bac., Archdeacon of Aston. (London: S.P.C.K. 1918.)

2. *Church Music. A Practical Handbook.* By Sydney H. Nicholson, M.A., Mus.Bac., Organist and Master of the Choristers, Westminster Abbey. (London: The Faith Press. 1919.)

3. *The Complete Organist.* By Harvey Grace. (London: Grant Richards. 1920.)

4. *The Organization and Training of Parish Choirs.* By Francis T. Kennard. 'Handbooks of Church Music.' (Published by the Proprietors of *Musical Opinion.* Chichester Chambers, Chancery Lane, London, W.C. 2. 1920.)

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THERE is a very widespread dissatisfaction to-day with the state of our Church Music. This is felt not only by musicians, and in respect to the higher branches of the art, but no less by the mass of the people, even if their dissatisfaction is not expressed in terms of musical criticism. Their complaint is about the fundamental song of the Church (for to them 'music' means singing), about the simple use of the voice on which all the rest is based.

I

On the one side they hear most extraordinary noises which are called 'intoning.' It seems to them (as indeed it generally is) unnatural and affected. They think of Tennyson's 'snowy-banded, dilettante, delicate-handed priest' as a creature only slightly less odious than poor Maud's cad of a lover. They hear simple words contorted and mispronounced, and normal voices strangled in the throat.[1] Moreover, they find it impossible to join in the Creed and the prayers; the pitch is too high. The responses and the Amens are dragged out to such a length that they lose all meaning.

On the other side they hear an unseemly mumble which makes what is said quite inaudible; or else everything is uttered in a conversational tone as if the officiant were making a series of remarks of a quite casual nature to a friend, as though, to quote Mr. Spectator's correspondent, there were no 'very great difference between reading a

[1] Children also notice it. 'What's that funny noise?' said the little son of a friend of mine when for the first time he went to church and heard the parson begin to intone.

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prayer and a gazette'[1]; and when the people join in, they do so not 'gently and pausably' as George Herbert enjoined,[2] but 'in a huddling and slubbering fashion' such as he forbad, and the result is that 'confused murmur in the congregation' to which the Puritans took exception at the Savoy Conference in 1661,[3] just as it had been 'utterly misliked' by those of Hooker's generation.[4]

The remedy of the Puritans was to silence the people, to turn the Litany into one long prayer, to eliminate the

[1] No. 147. 'There is certainly a very great difference between the reading of a prayer and a gazette, which I beg of you to inform a set of readers, who affect, forsooth, a certain gentleman-like familiarity of tone, and mend the language as they go on, crying, instead of "pardoneth and absolveth," "pardons and absolves." . . . This indifferency seems to me to arise from the endeavour of avoiding the imputation of cant and the false notion of it.'

[2] *A Priest to the Temple, or the Country Parson*, ch. vi. 'The Parson praying': 'Every one, man and child, answering aloud both Amen, and all the other answers, which are on the clerk's and people's part to answer; which answers also are to be done, not in a huddling or slubbering fashion, gaping or scratching the head, or spitting even in the midst of their answer, but gently and pausably, thinking what they say.'

[3] Cardwell's *History of Conferences*, p. 305 (Oxford, 1840), chapter vii. *Documents connected with the Conference at the Savoy.* V. The Exceptions against the Book of Common Prayer. 'That the repetitions, and responsals of the clerk and people, and the alternate reading of psalms and hymns which cause a confused murmur in the congregation, whereby what is read is less intelligible, and therefore unedifying, may be omitted.'

The Bishops replied that devotion 'is apt to freeze or sleep, or flat in a long continued prayer or form: it is necessary therefore for the edifying of us therein to be often called upon and awakened by frequent Amens, to be excited and stirred up by mutual exultations, provocations, petitions, holy contentions and strivings. . . . For this purpose alternate reading repetitions and responsals are far better than a long tedious prayer' (p. 339).

[4] *Ecclesiastical Polity*, Book V, ch. xxxvi: 'The people's custom to repeat anything after the minister they utterly mislike.' Thomas Cartwright had objected that 'not only the time is unprofitably wasted and a confused noise of the people, one speaking after another, caused, but an opinion bred in their heads that those only be prayers which they pronounce with their own mouths after the minister.'

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responses as 'short cuts and shreddings,' and to lengthen the collects 'to render them more sensible and affecting.'[1] The common remedy to-day is nearly as bad. On all sides, in episcopal gatherings, in the daily press, in the publications of musical reformers, we find a demand for less intoning and a greater use of 'the natural voice.'

The supposed remedy will simply emphasize both the faults that are complained of. It will leave intoning unreformed, and as it goes from bad to worse, we shall be in danger of losing altogether that which has been restored to our services at the cost of so much pains and trouble. It will accentuate the contrast of 'saying' and 'singing,' breaking up the sense of unity and continuity in our services, and bringing in grotesque and comic effects of sudden alterations in the use of the voice, which are recognized features of music-hall 'humour,' effective, no doubt, in a 'comic song with "Spoken" in it,' such as Sloppy entertained Mrs. Betty Higden and the minders with,[2] but entirely out of place in Divine Worship

It is our old trouble of not thinking things out, of not getting clear what we mean by the words we use. We have not asked ourselves what we mean by 'natural.'

For, obviously, it is not in the least natural to speak in a loud voice, in a large building, before a crowd of people, and in long-drawn-out, dignified sentences. And though, as Bishop Butler said of conversation, 'it is of the very nature of it that the discourse be mutual,'[3] it is not of its nature that it should be by the measured versicle and response of the Prayer Book any more than by the formal *stichomuthia* of Greek tragedy. This is a fact which is, of course, perfectly well known to actors, whose aim we all know is, as it were, to hold a mirror up to Nature. There is the same danger of rant, of tricks, of conventions on the stage as in church. 'The beginner,' writes Mr. Louis Calvert,

'is often told by the director not to strain and shout, but to "speak naturally," and then when he does speak naturally, he

[1] Cardwell, *Conferences*, p. 430.

[2] Charles Dickens, *Our Mutual Friend*, ch. xvi 'Persons and Things in General.'

[3] Sermon IV, *Upon the Government of the Tongue.*

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is told that he cannot be heard. This is a baffling paradox, and one which everyone who takes up stage work is likely to meet sooner or later. As a matter of fact, the natural speaking voice is of little or no use on the stage, and neither is the shout. The secret of it is that a man should so train his voice that he has the range and the pitch that is necessary, but also the technique and the control which enable him to seem to speak naturally.' [1]

It is a complaint against a modern school of actors that they despise voice production so that you cannot hear a word they say.

In other words you have to appear natural. You have to think of the effect on your audience. In real life it is natural for a roomful of people to be all talking together; on the stage it seems quite natural for them to talk one by one. 'The business of art,' say the authors of the Government Report on *The Teaching of English in England*,[2] 'is not to be natural, but to seem so. It is not in fact natural that Macbeth should talk in blank verse. But when Shakespeare chooses he can make it seem quite natural.' What is wanted in utterance is perfect correspondence with conditions. The balance of speech and occasion must be kept true. The natural voice that we want in church is the highly artificial product which comes from the exact raising of the scale of ordinary language to suit the particular need, but it must be produced so easily and spontaneously as to seem natural.

But there is a still deeper fault in the popular demand for 'the natural voice.' It implies a contrast of nature and art. 'An opinion has long been prevalent,' wrote Bacon, 'that art is something different from nature and things artificial from things natural'; [3] and this opinion still prevails. People think that speaking is natural and singing something unnatural. The result is disastrous to both. Speech remains with the mass of men ugly and slovenly, indistinct because they will not trouble to move their lips, jerky

[1] *Problems of the Actor* (Simpkin, Marshall, 1919), p. 43.

[2] § 298, p. 325.

[3] *De Augmentis Scientiarum*, Book II, ch. ii. *Cf.* Sir Thomas Browne, *Religio Medici*, Part I, Sec. xvi. 'In brief all things are artificial; for Nature is the art of God.'

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because they will not exert themselves to fill their lungs, nasal because they are too slack to open their throats, unintelligent because they have never listened for, or practised, the variations of stress and pitch which give expression to pathos and emotion. And singing is regarded as an accomplishment. It becomes self-conscious and over-elaborated. It is the prerogative of a few. The words become inaudible or are even deliberately mispronounced. Wind is made to rhyme with 'lined' and 'fear' with 'see 'er.' The result is that sensible English people remain content to be considered unmusical and think they cannot sing. All this is reproduced in church with, it is hardly too much to say, disaster to religion. 'Church Music,' wrote Jeremy Collier,

'must have no voluntary Maggots, no military Tattoos, no light and galliardizing notes. Religious harmony must be moving but noble withall; grave, solemn, and seraphic; fit for a martyr to play and an angel to hear,'[1]

but we cannot pretend that we have either purged our service of what he objected to or attained his ideal, while the foolish saying of the philistine Caesar 'on the irregularity of tone in one who read before him': 'Do you read or sing? If you sing, you sing very ill' is still quoted as a clever saying by would-be reformers to-day. Whereas the remedy, of course, is, first, to make our everyday speech artistic and musical: to rescue from misuse and degradation the fair forms and melodious cadences of our gentle English tongue, to see to it that each in its wide realm has that which gives the charm inherent in a voice clear-cut and sympathetic, to secure to all the power to express in words through subtle tones and by inflexions that ring true, the inner feelings and varied passions of the man within.

And we want to make singing natural; to bring music—for again be it said, for the mass of men music is song—into our daily life and into the life of all, to make it not a luxury, still less a mere accomplishment, a thing apart, but a thing

[1] *Essays on Moral Subjects: Of Music*, quoted in J. H. Overton's *Life in the English Church*, 1660–1714 (Longmans, 1885), p. 187.

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that is woven into the warp of common duties and everyday tasks, piercing things else dead with inbreathed sense. But for this end the 'Blest Pair of Sirens, Voice and Verse,' must wed their divine sounds in church as well as outside.

II

The prime remedy for the faults in our Church Music is to make our everyday English speech musical. Till we do this the false idea will remain that there is something essentially different between speaking and singing, that one is natural and the other artificial. Our singing and intoning will be unnatural and people will clamour for the 'natural voice' in church, meaning thereby something ugly and inartistic.

We must begin our work on the basis of our daily intercourse. We must always take trouble to speak our best. Dr. Johnson used to say, writes Boswell, 'that he made it a constant rule to talk as well as he could, both as to sentiment and expression, by which means what had been originally effort became familiar and easy.'[1] If we do this, good speech will be that which is natural to us. We shall realize how different shades of meaning can be conveyed by varying emphasis and intonation. We shall, in reading, learn how to get the full meaning out of what is written. By mastering the exact use of our organs, both those used for clear articulation and those for resonance and quality, we shall get the power of expressing fully just what we want to express. We shall learn in speech to play on our voices as on an instrument, and, having learned, shall do it naturally and without thinking of the process or attracting the attention of others to it. The clergy should, in the course of their training, study the elements of phonetics, read poetry in class, recite from a stage in a big room, and learn above all to speak with an open throat, and on the lower registers of the voice.

Then, having learned to use our voices, we should learn to restrain them in church. The clergy should learn first

[1] Mar. 30, 1782.

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how to exert their vocal powers to the full, and then how to hold them back. This will give a feeling of naturalness and ease. They will find it unnecessary to shout if their voices are resonant and clear. They should learn to cut out of their voices, when reading the Lessons, much of the personal character and peculiarities that are permissible in the pulpit; to get rid, when saying the prayers, of much individual emphasis and interpretation that is in place when reading the Lessons. They should learn that you must go slower in unfamiliar passages, and in those that change from day to day, such as the Gospels and Lessons, while familiar unchanging parts can be read quite quickly, without any suggestion of hurry or gabble if the articulation is distinct and the quality clear. They are leading the devotions of the people, and must therefore learn to speak in an even, impersonal voice, like good clear print, if they are not to seem unnatural, casual or eccentric.

But there is a further problem, that of Common Prayer. In common worship, individual differences are to be sunk and all are to unite like the souls Dante heard sing in Purgatory as with one voice.[1] Therefore the officiant has to get the congregation to do as he does. They need to learn to speak up as worshipping God, and to speak together as united in worship. They should say the words together with musical voices, all on one note. This will come quite naturally. If you listen you will find that an ordinary congregation, speaking together, will do so on low C, B, B flat, or even A. A Welsh congregation accustomed, as they are, to speak with a fuller tone, will take a slightly higher note. So will children, as can be heard in any school when they say the multiplication table together. The priest should therefore give the lead, pitching his voice a little lower, for their sakes, than he would naturally do if speaking out

[1] *Purgatorio*, Canto xvi 20.

> 'Una parola in tutti era ed un modo,
> Si che parea tra esse ogni concordia,'
> (through all the choir
> One voice, one measure ran, that perfect seemed
> The concord of their song.)

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alone. The Amens similarly should be said as part of the prayer they follow. The priest should keep his voice even and the others will join in spontaneously. By dropping his voice as if the sentence ended with the words 'world without end,' he can easily reduce a whole congregation first to mumbling, and then to silence.

Further, the congregation must learn to keep together in rhythm as well as pitch. This they will do of their own accord if the low note natural to their voices is taken, for there is a no less natural rhythm in every English sentence. False emphasis on wrong words, which choir boys are often taught at much pains to give under colour of 'pronouncing your little words,' will disappear. The priest must be careful not to cut in with his sentence before the congregation have finished theirs. He must suggest the right pace and give the lead in correct natural phrasing.

This, it will be found as a rule, will come quite spontaneously, especially if there are a few leaders in the congregation who understand, and are alert and attentive. If the priest's voice is too high pitched (and there are natural tenors), they must listen for the natural note of the congregation (generally about low B flat), and a slight emphasis on the note will bring them all together. A few will persistently continue to speak both out of tune and out of time, pitching their voices a little below the others, cutting in before them and gabbling or dragging on after the rest in spite of all you can do, sometimes upsetting the unison of a whole congregation, as a singer that drags the time or sings out of tune will upset a whole choir. Certain traditional tricks and mispronunciations may refuse to disappear. Congregations will often continue to say 'WAS crucified' (implying that someone has just contradicted the fact), or 'THE communion OF saints' (very common where there is high-pitched unnatural intoning), so a little explanation and, if possible, a few practices may be desirable. But once learned, the right way of speaking together on a natural low note will remain as the normal practice.

Then the congregation is ready to sing together. The transition can be made imperceptibly. They have been

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speaking musically; now they sing articulately. As they pass from saying the Lord's Prayer on low A to singing the response to 'O Lord, open thou our lips,' there is no need for an organ to boom out a note. The priest just raises his voice a little in pitch and slightly emphasizes the element of musical tone, singing the versicle on B flat or wherever may seem natural. The service is now being sung.

When once the transition is made there should be no going back. If the Psalms cannot be chanted it is perhaps better to keep to the low natural note of unison speaking. In old days, even up to the middle of the Seventeenth century the Lessons were chanted,[1] but if that is not possible now, the same quality of speech should be used for the Venite and for the Psalms. To go back to a speaking voice in the Creed is an anti-climax. To say a Collect after singing the versicles and responses, or, worse, for the priest to say a versicle or prayer and the choir to respond by chanting an Amen in an entirely different key, is to make a serious dislocation of emotional pitch.[2]

Then the inflexion of the responses can be added, corresponding as they do to the natural drop in our intonation at the end of our sentences. The natural phrasing should be preserved without any lengthening of the final syllables. They should be sung without organ accompaniment, unless the organist can really restrain himself to accompany and not to drown. But as a rule the moment a congregation

[1] E. Cardwell, *History of Conferences*, p. 315. The Puritans objected at the Savoy Conference to the Rubric 'In such places where they do sing, there shall the Lessons be sung, in a plain tune, and likewise the Epistle and Gospel,' conceiving 'that the distinct reading of them with an audible voice tends more to the edification of the church.' To which the Bishops replied (p. 351): 'The rubric directs only such singing as is after the manner of distinct reading, and we never heard of any inconvenience thereby, and therefore conceive this demand to be needless.'

[2] Addison, *Spectator*, No. 29: 'But however this Italian method of acting in recitativo might appear at first hearing, I cannot but think it more just than that which prevailed in our English opera before this innovation, the transition from air to recitative music being more natural than the passing from a song to plain and ordinary speaking, which was the common method in Purcell's operas.'

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hears an organ it becomes artificial and begins to mispronounce and lay emphasis on wrong words. Old associations are too strong. The traditional unreality of phrasing even tends to return the moment the note is pitched too high; and G is too high for most men. F, the fifth above the natural B flat taken for the opening versicle, is as high as most men will sing. E or even E flat is far better. I have repeatedly found that men who can intone well on F, or with care on G, become hopelessly artificial and 'parsonic' directly they try to intone on A. The last response before the Collect should, of course, not be sung slowly. It is the preparation for the prayer that follows.

From singing the Creed, the Lord's Prayer, and the responses, it is but one step to intoning the Collects with inflexions at the end of each period, and to singing the Sursum Corda and prefaces, the Litany and its refrains; and from this to the plainsong chanting of the Psalms is but one more.[1] People are afraid of the term Plainsong, and certainly in its more elaborate forms, and as frequently sung, it is hardly likely to become very popular. But for chanting of rhythmical prose like that of the Psalms, it is the most natural and suitable form of simple music. We Englishmen who have so easily recognized the place of recitative in Oratorio should find no difficulty in applying the principles of natural musical phrasing to liturgical common prayer.

Hear what Sir Edward Tylor, one of our most learned anthropologists says, basing his statements on a wide knowledge of mankind:

'To read or recite poetry as we moderns do is to alter its nature, for the purpose of poetry was to be chanted. But this

[1] Bingham speaks of the plain-song chanting of his day (1720), *Antiquities of the Christian Church*, Book xiv, ch. i, 15. 'As to the voice or pronunciation used in singing, it was of two sorts, the plain song, and the more artificial and elaborate tuning of the voice to a greater variety of sounds and measures. The plain song was only with a little gentle inflection, and agreeable turn of the voice, with a proper accent, not much different from reading, and much resembling the musical way of reading the Psalms now in our cathedral churches.'

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very chanting or singing grew out of talking. On listening carefully to the talk going on around us, we may observe that it does not run on in an unchanged monotone, but that all sentences are intoned to an imperfect tune, a rise and fall of pitch marking the phrases, distinguishing question and answer, and touching emphatic words with a musical accent. . . When speech becomes solemn or impassioned it passes more and more into natural chanting, which at devotional meetings may be heard nearly passing into a distinct tune. The intoning in churches arose from the same natural utterance of religious feeling, but in course of time became fixed by custom, and was forced into the regular intervals of the musical scale. So the artificial recitative of the opera is a modern musical working up of what has come down by tradition of the ancient tragic declamation, which once swayed the listening throng of the Greek theatre.'[1]

And hear what the great Saint Augustine[2] said, who endorsed what the great saint of Alexandria had ordered, and was in turn himself quoted by Rabanus Maurus and approved of by Hooker:

'That seems to me the safer way which I remember has often been told me of Athanasius the Bishop of Alexandria, who made the reader of the psalms chant with just that slight inflexion of the voice that he seemed more like one speaking than singing (*ut pronuncianti vicinior esset quam canenti*).'

That is what we want—to make our speech more like song, and our song more like speech.

III

The popular demand for the use of 'the natural voice' in church, by which too often is meant something unmusical

[1] *Anthropology* (Macmillan, 1881), chapter xii, 'Arts of Pleasure,' p. 290.

[2] Confessions, Book x, ch. xxxiii 50. 'Tutiusque mihi videtur quod de Alexandrino episcopo Athanasio saepi mihi dictum commemini, qui tam modico flexu vocis faciebat sonare lectorem psalmi, ut pronuntianti vicinior esset quam canenti.' Quoted from Rabanus Maurus, *De Instit. Cleric.* ii, 48, by Hooker, *Eccles. Pol.* Book v, ch. xxxviii, 3. He, in turn, seems to have quoted it from Isidore of Seville, *De Eccl. Off.* v 3.

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and inartistic, is bound up with the popular belief that singing is something unnatural, and art something apart from daily life. It is not enough, therefore, to bring music into our speech; we want also to bring the naturalness of our every-day language into our ideas of song.

But here we are met at once by the immense forces of bad tradition. Directly people begin to try to sing, the idea that it is something unnatural makes them do all sorts of strange things. They tighten the muscles of their throats; they screw up their faces, and raise their eyebrows or else frown with all their might; they bring in all sorts of affectations of speech; they substitute wrong vowels because they are supposed to be more musical. They announce their intentions of singing songs of 'Are-aby' and of 'Chearrming' you to a 'teee-rr,' and even express their longing for 'the touch of a varnished hand'!

The same thing happens too often when they sing in church. The bad tricks of the concert stage are introduced into the chancel, with the addition of a few that seem to be exclusively ecclesiastical. Little words are emphasized till you think that 'ifs' and 'ands' ARE something like pots and pans, they ring out so. This was heard in the theatre in Addison's day, who says he was entertained with many a melodious 'the,'[1] but it would seem to be only in church that men would sing about 'THE forgiveness OF sins,' or lengthen out the first (short) syllable of 'Amen' and the second of 'upon,' till they are hardly recognizable as English words. Or else the idea seems to be that singing is something very difficult, and that unless you are quite an exceptional person you must be silent.[2]

[1] *Spectator*, No. 18. 'I have known the word "and" pursued through the whole gamut, have been entertained with many a melodious "the," and have heard the most beautiful graces, quavers, and divisions bestowed upon "then," "for," and "from" to the eternal honour of our English particles.'

[2] I have found among our students at King's College that about 80 per cent. can sing the service quite well, while of the remaining 20 per cent., ten can sing, but need more practice to keep in tune when singing alone, while the rest, I am convinced, could learn, though it would take some time, so unused are they to listening to

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Moreover this bad tradition is stereotyped in customs of choirs and organists. The unnatural head voice of boys is systematically developed. I have even heard a choir, the boys of which were made to sing all their vowels as near as possible to 'oo' as being a more musical sound, so that at the end of each prayer they always sang 'oo moo.' Or the silence of the congregation leads organists to crash out the sounds of their loudest stops 'to give support to the voices.' Both faults come from the false idea that singing is something unnatural and that the mass of people cannot sing.[1]

The first step, then, is to bring back Church Music to the people. We must begin with the popular element, namely the hymn. We must get them out of the heavy, unintelligent, dragging, 'note by note' singing that we so often hear. We must work to restore a sense of rhythm. We must stop the tiresome practice of singing *rallentando* at the end of each verse, as if the singing of four lines left us exhausted. This means that we must have congregational practices. Without them there is a deadlock. People do not like hymns they do not know. The hymns they know have grown stale.

Perhaps at first it will be as well to learn plenty of triple

the sounds they hear round them and to controlling the muscles of their throats. Of course these men have been exercising their voices both in reading and singing, and have been hearing others read and sing in Chapel during some six or more terms.

[1] Wesley was of opinion that everyone could sing. *Works*, vol. viii, p. 306, quoted in Tyerman's *Life*, vol. i, p. 398: 'Suit the tune to the words. Avoid complex tunes which it is scarcely possible to sing with devotion. Repeating the same words so often, especially while another repeats different words, shocks all common sense, necessarily brings in dead formality, and has no more religion than a Lancashire hornpipe. Sing no anthems. Do not suffer the people to sing too slow. . . . Let the women constantly sing their parts alone. Let no man sing with them unless he understands the notes he sings and sings the bass as it is pricked down in the book. Introduce no new tunes till they are perfect in the old. Let no organ be placed anywhere till proposed in the conference. Recommend our tune book everywhere, and if you cannot sing yourself, choose a person or two in each place to pitch the tune for you. Exhort everyone in the congregation to sing, not one in ten only.'

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time tunes, which insist on being taken rhythmically. There are many fine compositions of the Eighteenth century which are full of flowing melody. Many of these are familiar in a debased form, such, for instance, as 'Mt. Ephraim,' the true form of which can be found in the *English Hymnal*, No. 196. Many of the Welsh tunes, too, insist on being sung with a feeling of movement. Then it will be well to get back our familiar old psalm tunes to their original form with long notes at the beginning and end of the lines. This will at once get life and variety into tunes such as, for instance, 'O God, our Help in Ages past,' which, I suppose, most of us have felt to be heavy and dead as usually sung.

Then we shall choose fine old tunes with strong melodies, German Chorales and Swiss Psalm-tunes. These will not be so popular at once. We have got so used to little trivial ballad-like tunes of four lines that at first they will seem difficult and heavy. But soon the greater variety of eight-line or irregular metres will begin to be felt, allowing, as they do, of stronger musical structure with phrase answering phrase. They will be found to wear well, and people will begin to be dissatisfied with the mere common measure hymn. Four verses at most, more often three, sometimes only two, will be found enough. The hymn will be then sung as a whole. Contrasts in singing between verse and verse will suggest themselves naturally. The second verse will, perhaps, be sung softly, or unaccompanied, according to the nature of the words. In Welsh hymns, and the Welsh have a certain feeling for hymnody that other nations often lack, few of the hymns have more than three verses, and many are single stanzas. If these are felt not to be enough, it is an old custom for them to repeat the last half of the final verse, and the usual structure of a Welsh hymn tune lends itself to this practice.

But four-line hymns, even in common measure, need not be discarded. When the congregation has learned to think of a hymn as a whole, and to care for tunes that do not merely depend on the colour of their harmony for their interest, these can be practised. But they are much harder to sing well, as almost the whole interpretation of them lies

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in the phrasing which it is difficult for a congregation to render together, and varies in each verse. All depends on an intelligent and quick appreciation of the meaning of the words. They will have to be read over together first. Line must succeed line without a pause when the sense requires it, and verse must follow verse. Great liberties will have to be taken with the time in single notes. We shall know when the composition of the hymn as a whole has been grasped, as the tiresome *rallentando* at the end of each verse will disappear of itself, and people will cease to sing 'Amen' indiscriminately at the end of every hymn, realizing that it alone has fitness after a doxology.

Congregational practices will clear the way for other reforms. Many thoughtful people are doubtful whether the introduction of boy choirs that we owe to the Oxford Movement was not, after all, a mistake. They were right and natural in our cathedrals where there were regular choir schools in which the daily services were part of the normal life of all, and undoubtedly the music of our great English School was written for boys' voices. But it does not follow that that music is at all suitable for parish and congregational worship. It is not certain that it is a good thing to work ordinary choir boys so hard as they are worked. Unsympathetic people say we are exploiting cheap labour, and it surely is a matter of grave concern that so much of the rendering of our services is entrusted to immature and generally uneducated children. At any rate, congregational practices will help to relieve the strain put upon them, and to restore the balance between what may be called 'art' music rendered by a choir, and popular music sung by all.

It will also make it possible for the organ to be subdued. Organists are often unfairly blamed. Impossible things are expected of them. Frequently the only course open to them is to pull out the stops and drag the singers on, or to cover the deficiencies of the choir by noise. But it is none the less very distressing. The moment people begin to practice without an instrument, their voices improve in tone. They do not need to shout. They do not drag the time. They rely on themselves and on one another. As

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someone once said to me after such a practice, they begin to realize that they are playing on their voices as on an instrument. Then the organist can confine himself to real accompanying. He can play as softly as he likes, and will find he can hardly play too softly. He can take his hand off the keys for a time. The congregation do not depend on him, and will continue to sing. This probably means having a conductor at services as well as at practices, but why not? It is found necessary in all great concert or opera work, and there is nothing irreverent in what conduces to more worthy worship. It also means a low pitch for our hymns as well as for our chants and responses.[1]

The hymns must be sung in unison at first, as must the liturgical part of the service. But when the congregation has learned to sing with rhythm and not note by note, there is no reason why they should not sing in harmony. But the same feeling for rhythm must be kept in the singing of the parts. For this purpose, good contrapuntally harmonized hymns should be chosen. The men should be encouraged to sit together, basses in one part and tenors in another. It is not only in Wales that people can sing in harmony, as those who have tried the experiment know. It only wants books with the music, and a few leaders. When practices are once established, several parishes could combine for what the Welsh call a *Cymanfa Ganu*, a good united hymn-singing of tunes already practised and learned.

Then from the congregation a choir could be selected—a choir of church people who put worship first. It would begin by just leading the rest. Then it might sing faux-bourdons to the hymns or harmonized settings to the alternate verses of the versicles. All kinds of skilled music might be rendered, and new forms developed. But this is another question. The point is that such music must develop out of the religious needs and customs of a worshipping people.

[1] Even in the *English Hymnal* most of the hymns are pitched too high for the ordinary congregation—at least for the men in it. We find it necessary at King's College to transpose half of them. There is a transposed edition of *Hymns Ancient and Modern.*

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IV

The question is urgent. The dulness and unattractiveness, what people vaguely call the 'respectability,' of our services is largely a question of music. Men are being alienated by the high pitch of our chanting, which prevents their joining in it, as well as by the 'parsonic' voice it produces.

On the other hand, what an immense gain it will be if men can learn to realize the beauty of our mother tongue in daily life; what a help it will be in the interpretation of literature, what a satisfaction in the exercise of corporate speech! The Church will be providing a training in singing which will give a depth to worship and make it an activity of art, a thing of beauty. Men will sing praises with understanding when their true instincts are not thwarted and contradicted by false conventions belying the meaning of what is sung in the worship of God.

CLEMENT F. ROGERS.

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ART. II.—MINIMUM CONDITIONS OF INTER-COMMUNION.

Conference of Bishops of the Anglican Communion, holden at Lambeth Palace, July 5 to August 7, 1920. Encyclical Letter from the Bishops with the Resolutions and Reports. (London: S.P.C.K. 1920.)

[This article and the one which follows it were written for *The Constructive Quarterly*, and are published by the courtesy of Mr. Silas McBee, its Editor, as part of the series of discussions of Reunion Problems from different points of view, which have appeared in our pages.—EDITORS, C.Q.R.]

THE connexion between the unity of the Christian Church and a common participation of the Lord's Table is sufficiently obvious. St. Paul put it at the highest when he wrote to the Corinthians, 'Since there is one bread, we being many are one body, for we all partake of the one bread.' But we are not to infer that this common participation makes us one. That is effected rather by the one baptism, and by the bond of peace in which we labour to maintain the unity of the Spirit. The Eucharist is but one element in that endeavour, and the common participation is rather a consequence than a cause of our unity, as it is also a public manifestation thereof. The Eucharist is not happily called, as in a well-known hymn, the 'sacrament of unity'; for in the language of St. Cyprian, from whom the phrase was borrowed, the episcopate is the *sacramentum unitatis*, holding together in one society the members of the Church resident in a certain place, and also holding together by mutual intercourse the groups of Christians dispersed throughout the world. This episcopate has fallen away from Cyprian's ideal, and the Eucharist cannot be said to have taken its place; both,

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indeed, have developed divisive tendencies. It is only when these tendencies have been overcome that union can be achieved. But it remains true that union is not achieved until Christians can meet together, without hindrance, at the Lord's Table.

It is of considerable importance, therefore, to consider what are the necessary conditions of common participation; and in the present divided state of Christendom each group has to consider this apart. If proposals of union are made to us, or by us to others, one thing that must be determined is the manner of celebrating the Lord's Supper. That complete uniformity should be required is out of the question. There never has been such uniformity, and it is not desirable. But some details of the celebration are necessary, and some others are so expedient that we have no right to dispense with them. There must be bread and wine and an appropriate benediction. To use the words of St. Paul, the bread which we break and the cup which we bless are of the essence of the Eucharist. But more than these bare elements must be required. To quote St. Paul again, things must be done decently and in order. This may be illustrated by an incident which has occurred within my knowledge. Many years ago, a priest who found himself on a Sunday in a remote Alpine inn, far away from any church, procured a plate and a glass, some bread and some wine, and went out with two companions into the mountains, where in his rough tweed suit he celebrated the Holy Communion, a flat rock serving for an altar; the plate and the glass, to prevent their return to profane uses, were afterwards thrown into a deep lake. Whatever we may think of the legitimacy of this, it was unquestionably a valid sacramental act, and I have no doubt that it was done with the utmost reverence and devotion; but I think we should not entertain proposals of union with people who would normally celebrate the Lord's Supper in such a fashion. We should consider it lacking in decency.

No proposals of union are at present being urged, but there are some that we may have in view as possible, and

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it is well to consider among ourselves some things that we should have to press if these proposals were made.

In the first place, there is the material of the sacrament to be considered. We shall not follow the bad example of some Greeks in the Eleventh century and insist on either leavened or unleavened bread; but must we insist on wheaten bread? The question is not urgent here in England, where nothing else is likely to be used; but one has heard of bread-fruit or rice cakes or cassava bread being put forward as a sufficient substitute in tropical missions. The plea that 'bread' means the ordinary diet of the people, consecrated to this excellent mystery, is not to be despised. Neither can we set aside, without good reason, the argument that loaves of barley were commonly used in the days of the Gospel, and that our Lord may possibly have instituted the Eucharist in such bread. But there is a reason for the exclusive use of wheaten bread which seems to me irresistible. It has been required with insistence throughout the history of the Church, and there seems to be no evidence of any other material being allowed. There is, indeed, a strong current of opinion, to say no more, that nothing else will suffice. In face of this, innovation does not seem to be permissible. The excellent principle known as tutiorism demands the use of that which is certainly known to be sufficient, and the exclusion of that about which there may be a doubt.

The cup must contain wine. I think there is no dispute about this anywhere. The *Aquarii* of the Third and Fourth centuries were mere eccentrics, who effected no lodgment in the Catholic Church. But a definition may be needed. Tropical missions, again, are said to have used something called 'date-wine,' as being the only thing of the kind easily procured. But what our Lord blessed was 'the fruit of the vine,' and we have no right to tolerate anything else. There may be more difficulty about what is called 'unfermented wine.' There are precedents for the use of freshly expressed grape juice, which is acknowledged to be sufficient. But this cannot be procured except at the time of vintage, and it seems to be

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established that the expressed juice cannot be prevented from fermenting except by an application of heat or an admixture of chemicals which will have the effect of denaturing it, so that it can no longer properly be called wine. The use of natural wine seems to be obligatory.

These elements must be blessed. There are three records of the institution: that of St. Mark, reproduced almost exactly in St. Matthew; that of St. Paul; and the rather confused account given by St. Luke. In the first the two conceptions of blessing (εὐλογεῖν) and thanksgiving (εὐχαριστεῖν) are prominent, the one being applied to the bread and the other to the cup. St. Paul speaks only of thanksgiving in relation to the bread; and describes the cup as treated 'in like manner' (ὡσαύτως); but he supplements this in a neighbouring passage by a reference to 'the cup of blessing which we bless.' St. Luke mentions only thanksgiving. All three speak also with emphasis of the breaking of the bread. This connexion of blessing and thanksgiving, together with the breaking of the bread, has been constant in the practice of the Church. It is secured by the incorporation of the blessing of the bread and wine into a prayer of thanksgiving normally introduced by the greeting 'Lift up your hearts' or its equivalent. The recitation of a record of the institution, with or without amplification, precedes or follows the blessing; and the breaking of the bread, with more or less of solemnity, follows in sufficiently close connexion.

So much of detail seems to be indispensable, and no more. We must certainly require a decent measure of solemnity, but we cannot regulate the particulars; they have varied widely in the practice of the Church, and even greater variations may be tolerable. We may ourselves highly value the assumption of a special vesture by the celebrant, but in view of the known practice of the first three or four Christian centuries we cannot pretend that anything of the kind is necessary. We do value very highly the liturgical framework in which the essential act has been enshrined, the sequence of prayers and lections and hymns; but these have been, and are, too various in the practice of the Church to be regarded as even approxi-

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mately essential. We may blame those who depart very far in these particulars from the tradition which we have received, but we can hardly, on that account alone, refuse intercommunion with them. We may value still more the possession of set forms for the rendering of the essential act itself, such as that which is significantly called in the Roman rite the *Canon* of the Mass; but we must remember that more than three hundred years elapsed before such set forms were firmly established, during which the celebrant enjoyed a gradually diminishing freedom to fill up the bare outline of the Eucharistic prayer at his discretion. We may blame those who hark back to this dangerous freedom, which experience taught the Church to circumscribe; but it is a long step from such blame to a refusal of communion.

I set aside all questions of doctrine, or of practice regarded as bearing witness to doctrine. Orthodoxy, a right judgement in respect of faith and morality, should certainly be made a condition of intercommunion; but I am dealing only with one department of practice in the Christian religion, and I assume the orthodoxy of any whose case has to be considered. There remains, however, one question which is intimately connected with doctrine, and not easily disentangled. But it is possible to treat it from the standpoint of practice, and this I shall try to do.

The Eucharist must be celebrated in a certain way. By whom? It is the question that most of all provokes antagonism. It must be faced.

The analogy of baptism may suggest that any Christian is capable of doing this. It is agreed that he can baptize; that in case of emergency he ought to baptize. In controversy with the Donatists, St. Augustine established the principle that heretics and schismatics, no less than Catholic Christians, have this power; if what Christ commanded is done, the purpose of Christ is effected. The Western Church followed St. Augustine without reserve; the Eastern Churches have never adopted the whole of his teaching in principle, but they act upon it by what is called 'economy.'

Why should not the sacrament of the Lord's Supper come under this rule? If it does, consider the case of those

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young Methodist soldiers, heard of during the war, who got some bread and wine in the trench, and with simple piety recalling the liturgical words partook thereof. They would make not only a good spiritual communion—that we cannot doubt—but also a sacramental communion. One would like to believe it. I do not know how to prove the negative. But could we act on this supposition as a basis of intercommunion? Could we enter into union with a group of Christians having no ordered ministry for this purpose, and recognizing the right of any individual member so to act?

For lack of evidence we cannot say positively that any such ministry existed in the days of the Apostles. In the canonical books of the New Testament there is nothing inconsistent with the hypothesis that any member of the Church was competent to bless the Eucharist. There is evidence of an ordered ministry, but there is nothing to shew that this function was reserved to that ministry. Neither is there anything inconsistent with such reservation. St. Paul asks of one speaking with a 'tongue,' and therefore unintelligibly to many of those present: 'If thou bless with the spirit, how shall he that filleth the place of the ungifted say the Amen at thy thanksgiving?' He is probably referring to the Eucharistic function, and he certainly seems to be addressing all and sundry; but this cannot be affirmed with any confidence. If the function were reserved, we might expect to find it mentioned among the spiritual gifts which St. Paul more than once enumerates, and still more probably in the Pastoral Epistles; but, on the other hand, it may have belonged so obviously to the part of the pastor, episcopus, or presbyter presiding in the assembly—as Justin Martyr was to put it a hundred years later—that no special mention of it was required. We can only say, in sum, that no evidence is available from the Apostolic age. But it soon begins to accumulate.

We have the explicit statement of St. Ignatius[1] that no Eucharist is valid (*βεβαία*) except that which is celebrated by the bishop or his delegate. The nature of this delegation does not yet appear, but by the end of the

[1] *Smyrn.* 3.

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Second century there is sufficient evidence to shew that in the Catholic Church the only substitute for the bishop is a presbyter. Tertullian had passed over to Montanism when he said that in the absence of bishop or presbyter a layman could minister any sacrament, and the special characteristics of Montanism underlie the remark. From this time onward an uniform practice prevails. Orthodox Christians and heretics agree in it. Only in the most eccentric and obscure sects is there any variation.

It should be observed that this strict reservation of the Eucharistic function to bishops and presbyters does not necessarily imply that others have not the power of blessing. It may have been so determined only on the ground of discipline. There was a like reservation of the ministry of baptism, but with an important difference. In the case of baptism, which has an abiding effect and may not be repeated, it was necessary to decide whether an irregular ministration of the sacrament was effective. This being affirmed, the toleration, and even the allowance, of baptism by a layman in times of emergency followed from the assumption of its supreme necessity. But in the case of the Eucharist no question of this kind could arise, and it has never been the custom of the Church to determine questions except where a solution is practically and urgently required. For the moment we may leave the reservation as a matter of discipline.

On the same footing we may put the rule that a man can become bishop or presbyter only by ordination at the hands of a bishop. For many centuries there is but one outstanding exception, whether in the Catholic Church or among heretics. Documents of the Third century, commonly known as the Canons of Hippolytus and the Church Orders, say that a man who has stood firm in persecution, surviving imprisonment or torture, may be ranked immediately in the presbyterate; his confession is equivalent to ordination. Other texts reduce the privilege, giving the confessor only a special right to be ordained. There is no further evidence, and it is a suspicious circumstance that the correspondence of St. Cyprian, which

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deals largely with the ambitions and the occasional insubordination of the confessors, affords no hint of any such privilege. It is of theoretic interest, indicating that the requirement of ordination may be rather disciplinary than doctrinal; but it is doubtful and of no practical importance. Other apparent exceptions to the rule have not stood the test of historical criticism.

Theoretic also is the question whether presbyters, equally with bishops, have the power of ordaining. It has been debated since the days of St. Jerome. The affirmation is supported by the practice which joins them with the bishop in the imposition of hands, by the apparent identification of the two titles in the writings of the First century, and by the strong current of theological opinion which refuses to recognize the episcopate as a distinct order in the sacred ministry. But in practice there is no trace of ordination by presbyters without a bishop, until it was undertaken, perhaps by the Waldensians of the Thirteenth century, certainly by Protestants and Reformed in the Sixteenth century. Therefore, in accordance with the principle of tutiorism already mentioned, it seems to me impossible to accept such ordination as sufficient.

The conclusion is that we have no right to enter into communion with any group of Christians who allow the celebration of the Lord's Supper by one who has not received ordination at the hands of a bishop. There are some things in respect of which innovation is not permissible without the general consent of the whole Church; and this, I should say, is one of them.

I have tried to put these requirements at the lowest. To insist on anything which may hinder the union of Christians is to assume a grave responsibility. Nothing, therefore, should be pressed which does not seem to be of strict obligation. I have tried to ascertain what we must regard as obligatory in connexion with a sacrament of which all the members of an united Church should be able to participate without hindrance and without hesitation.

T. A. Lacey.

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ART. III.—MINIMUM CONDITIONS OF INTERCOMMUNION: SOME COMMENTS ON CANON LACEY'S ARTICLE.

I WELCOME the opportunity to define my relation to the minimum conditions of inter-communion at the Lord's Table between those of episcopal and non-episcopal traditions, laid down so moderately by Canon Lacey. For by so doing I hope to be able to shew, first, how far Evangelical Protestants who have caught something of the vision of Catholic or all-inclusive Christian Unity in the Church, as it inspires the Lambeth Appeal, can already go conscientiously to meet such an approach from the Anglo-Catholic side; and next, what positive and constructive elements in their faith towards God and their loyalty to 'the mind of Christ' have still to be satisfied, ere they can whole-heartedly clasp hands in a concordat that shall exemplify that 'mutual deference to one another's consciences' which is one of the notes of true Christian love and the recognition of which helps to make that Appeal so epoch-making. Our two papers, then, will afford a contrast in perspective, or in relative emphasis on religious values which probably both of us recognize to some degree as having a rightful place in the full Christian Gospel, when applied to the changing conditions of historical Christianity.

Dr. Lacey's very first paragraph affords a case of such contrasted emphasis. In urging, quite rightly, that 'common participation of the Lord's Table' is an effect, before it is an enhancing cause, of Christian unity, he goes on to say that we are made one 'rather by the one baptism, and by the bond of peace in which we labour to maintain the unity of the Spirit. The Eucharist is but one element in that endeavour.' Now I should say that the true Biblical emphasis would rather be, 'by the one Lord, and one faith' in Him as such—of which the rite of baptism in His Name

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is the overt Church symbol—and by the experience of the Spirit-baptism, which it was and is our Lord's special prerogative to mediate to us. The one Lordship and the one Spirit-consciousness of unity in Christ, the Head of the Body, is that which gives meaning and reality alike to the one baptism and the breaking of the one Bread of Thanksgiving or Eucharist. And the same Biblical emphasis would lead me to regard the Eucharist as entitled, according to Christ's teaching and values, to be styled the 'sacrament of unity' in the everyday life of the Christian Society, rather than the episcopate, as the human ministry of Christ's sacrament of union with Himself and with fellow-members of His mystic Body. The other emphasis is Cyprian's, as Dr. Lacey reminds us; but the Evangelical Churchman always aims consciously at going behind a disciple's emphasis, and even that of the majority of Christ's disciples in the past, to that of the Master.

The episcopate, even that rather late organ of more comprehensive unity, the diocesan episcopate—an episcopate over bishops of the primitive type—can well be allowed a high value as 'holding together in one society the members of the Church resident in a certain place, and also holding together by mutual intercourse the groups of Christians dispersed throughout the world.' But at best it is a relative value, measured by Christ's own emphasis, or rather lack of emphasis, on matters moving in the sphere of organization, and so by the standards of Evangelical Christianity. Next, when Dr. Lacey goes on to say 'the Episcopate has fallen away from Cyprian's ideal, and the Eucharist cannot be said to have taken its place: both, indeed, have developed divisive tendencies,' one can only echo 'Amen.' Further, if one asks Why? the answer that occurs to me is the old one of a wrong perspective or emphasis, which subordinates 'one faith' in the 'one Lord' to its sacramental or institutional expression, in Eucharist or Episcopate, and the grace supposed to be inherent in these *per se* through a certain line of celebration or succession. In any case 'it is only when those divisive tendencies' in what are in idea means to unity 'have been overcome,

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that union can be achieved. But it remains true that union is not achieved until Christians can meet together, without hindrance, at the Lord's Table.' On what conditions, then, can this come about?

I

The first thing 'that must be determined is the manner of celebrating the Lord's Supper.' Here Mr. Lacey at once sets aside the notion of complete uniformity. 'But some details' of mode 'are necessary, and some others are so expedient that we have no right to dispense with them.' This latter class will be the real *crux* of the problem: for about the essentials, as he goes on to state them, there need be little difficulty. 'Bread and wine and an appropriate benediction,' these are the simple requisites according to the Master's own example; in other words, appropriate symbols and a form of benediction giving them their sacramental meaning for faith. I put it so, because it seems to me that this sets in its true light and perspective the casuistry touching the exact kind of 'bread' or daily food (as 'the loaf' was to Jesus and His circle) which Dr. Lacey raises *à propos* of the possible use of 'bread-fruit or rice-cakes or cassava-bread' on various mission-fields. Who can doubt that Jesus would have used any one of these, instead of the wheaten or barley loaf He actually used, had it been the staple form of 'the bread of life' on the table before Him in the upper chamber? I cannot, then, concur that virtually uniform adherence to the use of wheaten bread in the known past of the Church, until quite recent times, must needs exclude the use of other forms of bread-food where the former is unobtainable or so hard to obtain as to hinder the free celebration of the sacrament of the Lord's Table. The consideration of solidarity of feeling with the whole Church, in space and time, should enter in very largely, so as to make all Christians use every reasonable effort to preserve this psychological link of unity in worship with the Church Catholic. But it is pushing 'the excellent principle known as tutiorism,' or greater security, too far, to employ it to 'demand the

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exclusion of that (material element) about which there may be a doubt.' That is to demand a right for 'weak' consciences to bring into bondage those 'strong' in 'faith,' or assured conviction as to their Lord's approval, in the face of Paul's ruling to the contrary in Rom. xiv. All that the 'weak' in such a case are entitled to ask for is the reciprocal application of Christ's law of Love, their scruples not being 'judged' uncharitably by those so using their own 'liberty in the Lord,' but on the contrary being considered, as far as possible, when they themselves are present and wishful to communicate. To go beyond this, as Mr. Lacey suggests, would be to turn 'tutiorism' into a new 'legalism,' much after the manner of those Jewish Christians, with very real traditional scruples based on a Divine Law not formally set aside by Christ, who demanded that certain sacred dietary rules should be observed in table-fellowship even by their Gentile brethren in Christ. In both cases fidelity to the letter of precedent and usage, pleading its own as 'the safer way,' is in fact made to over-ride the liberty of the Spirit in loyalty to the Lord's intention, expressed originally under particular conditions only, according to the contingency of all things human. So long as the symbolism is adequately preserved, so long is the liberty of the Christian spirit within its rights in applying its Lord's mind, *mutatis mutandis*, to fresh conditions.

The above principle of due maintenance of the symbolism of a sacramental element, which is the Evangelic rather than legal type of fidelity in such matters, bears also upon the casuistry of the Cup. This Mr. Lacey discusses as regards the use, on the one hand, of unfermented wine—which is no less fitly symbolic than fermented—and, on the other, of water, which as obviously sacrifices an essential element in the symbolism, *viz.* visible similarity of 'the blood of the vine' to that of the human body,[1] itself the vehicle of bodily life. Thus only

[1] On no valid sacramental theory, Catholic or Protestant, can one uphold Canon Lacey's objection to the 'denatured' state of unfermented wine.

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on the principle of a ritual legalism alien to the spirit of Christ and His Gospel could one conclude that 'the use of natural wine seems to be obligatory.' But, after all, such cases of conscience as to the elements of the Eucharist are of little real practical moment for our present purpose, save as also raising the main issues of standpoint and emphasis which emerge more directly in the weightier matters yet to be discussed.

As to the essential nature of Benediction of the elements with Prayer, there is in principle nothing of moment in Mr. Lacey's statement which I cannot heartily accept: and I am glad that he limits the 'indispensable' under this head to so little. He has strong feelings as to 'the pity of it,' that many depart so far in certain particulars from the Catholic liturgic tradition. But he faces honestly and bravely the facts of the variety and gradual development of the various 'Catholic' liturgical types, in view of the 'more than three hundred years before such set forms were firmly established, during which the celebrant enjoyed a gradually diminishing freedom to fill up the bare outline of the Eucharistic prayer at his discretion.' For himself he seems to sympathize with those who 'blame those who hark back to this dangerous freedom, which experience taught the Church to circumscribe.' Personally I cannot imagine such a sentiment falling from the lips of the Church's Lord, the Christ of the Gospels. But in any case that feeling (which the Lambeth Appeal does not appear quite to share) does not in Mr. Lacey's eyes warrant 'a refusal of communion' to those who do not think circumscription of freedom in religious expression (including freedom to use *all* the fruits of the Church's growing experience in such devotional expression) a desirable form of Christian development, but the opposite. And so, as representing those communions which are free in principle and in practice to use all the garnered wealth of the Church's past in their Eucharistic ministry, I am well content that Mr. Lacey here goes as far as he does in Eucharistic toleration, on that ground of 'mutual deference to one another's consciences' which the Lambeth Appeal rightly

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points to as that wherein we must find 'the bond of peace' in unity amid variety.

II

The next question is, By whom must the Eucharist be administered? Canon Lacey rightly begins by facing 'the analogy of baptism,' which 'may suggest that any Christian is capable of doing this. It is agreed that he can baptize; that in case of emergency he ought to baptize.' And in spite of all that he urges in the negative, I cannot see why, not only on Christ's own teaching as to the nature of ministry among His disciples, but also in reason and sound Church theory, the Lord's Supper should not come under the rule followed by the Church, particularly the Western Church, in the case of baptism. As confirming this view, namely that the validity of 'heretical' or 'schismatical' baptism and Eucharist stands and falls together, it is pertinent to cite the remarkably thoroughgoing way in which the Report of the Constantinople 1920 Delegation to Lambeth, made to 'The Most Reverend and Holy Synod' of Constantinople, and officially published in September 1921 (English translation in *The Christian East*, vol. iii. No. 1, S.P.C.K.), refuses to accept the validity even of 'Baptism administered by English (*i.e.* Anglican) priests.' The question is not, as Mr. Lacey puts it, 'Could we (Anglicans) enter into union with a group of Christians having no ordered ministry for the purpose, and recognizing the right of any individual member so to act?' It is whether Mr. Lacey and his friends can enter into union with a group of Christians having an ordered ministry, regularly commissioned to perform the Eucharist, and other acts of a representative character, as the appointed organ of the group's corporate life as a part of the Church of Christ, yet acting under a commission not given through a bishop in the Catholic sense.

Relative to this question, Mr. Lacey's discussion touching the existence of a prophetic freedom for Eucharistic prayer by any member of an apostolic church, at the date when Paul wrote 1 Cor. xiv, and probably for a good time

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after in certain regions at least, is almost superfluous.[1] It is enough for our common purpose to consider the Eucharistic ministry expressing the corporate authority of a church-group, and the question whether 'non-episcopal' churches to-day possess any such 'ministry. Here I submit, with all possible emphasis, that they *do*, in essentially the sense emphasized by Ignatius, the great exponent of high claims for the primitive type of bishop or local church pastor—a congregational bishop, in fact, and no more (save as regards the civil or territorial area from which his congregation was gathered). He dwells upon the divinely approved office of the one bishop as the centre of unity in the one flock with which he stands in habitual personal relations, and as its natural link of practical unity with sister local churches of the Church universal.[2] Nowhere does Ignatius connect the authority of a bishop, for the ministry either of the Word or of Sacraments, with ordination. He regards each bishop as divinely chosen by God, who bestows the necessary personal gifts as He will; the Church's part is that of spiritual recognition of God's manifest choice in the above sense, a recognition which seems at that date to have taken effect in 'appointment' (*cf.* 1 Clem. 44) by the natural leaders and representatives of its corporate consciousness, its official 'Elders' or presbyters. As thus empowered by Divine gift and calling from above, and by the Church's commission ratifying it among men, the local chief pastor or bishop was the normal organ of each church's Eucharistic prayer, unless need arose for him to act by deputy through one of his colleagues in the presbyteral order. This would occur with a frequency proportionate to the increase of the local

[1] My own judgement on the historical question is that his *non liquet* verdict, 'We can only say, in sum, that no evidence is available from the Apostolic age,' clear enough to settle it, is altogether too cautious, even on the data as most fairly presented by Canon Lacey himself.

[2] This was the only other essential unit of corporate life in the Apostolic and sub-Apostolic ages. There were no such officers as bishops in the sense of 'episcopacy' to-day, *viz.* diocesan episcopacy of the mediaeval type.

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or city church under a single presiding presbyter or 'president,' as Justin Martyr styles a bishop. But in all the above, when we look behind names to things, as the historian must ever do, there is nothing as yet which goes beyond essential congregationalism, and its type of episcopate and pastoral commission. Nor even when the participation of neighbouring congregational bishops in the solemn institution or ordination of a bishop by and in a sister church became a regular custom, was this alien to the ideal of modern Congregationalism, any more than of Presbyterianism or Methodism, so long as that participation was not 'as of necessity' but as symbol of the spiritual solidarity of the Church Catholic.

When, again, Mr. Lacey observes that 'strict reservation of the Eucharistic function to bishops and presbyters,' in the early Second-century sense of the distinction between the two offices, 'does not necessarily imply that others have not the power of blessing,' I gladly echo his words. 'It may have been determined only on the ground of discipline': and on that ground most non-episcopalians are willing to adhere to the restriction in normal cases, each according to their own modern equivalent offices for 'bishop' and 'presbyter.' But when he goes on to allege a contrast in this matter between baptism and Eucharist respectively, they would demur. We must deny Scriptural and really Primitive warrant to the distinction drawn, on the score of the 'supreme necessity' of the former as compared with the latter. So far as both rites are corporate acts covered by a commission at all, anyone surely requires as representative an authorization to perform the more definitively decisive sacramental act of baptism as to perform the less crucial act of Eucharistic ministry. If irregularity or defect in the ecclesiastical status of Christ's minister in baptism (especially on the Anglo-Catholic doctrine of baptismal re-birth) does not render the efficacy of the sacrament precarious, if only the form and matter be correct, it is inconsistent to regard and treat as precarious or 'invalid' a Eucharist administered in due form (as Mr. Lacey himself defines it), and in good faith, simply because the ecclesiastical com-

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mission under which a minister functions lacks the relatively late method of Catholic episcopal ordination. The distinction which Catholicism, especially in the West, has here drawn since the middle of the Third century, does not seem one which the Church is authorized to add 'as a matter of discipline' to the teaching of its Lord and of His Apostles on the subject.

Finally, it is on the same footing, *i.e.* 'a matter of discipline' in the Catholic Church, that Mr. Lacey is content to put 'the rule that a man can become bishop or presbyter only by ordination at the hands of a bishop.' As already argued, there is really a deep ambiguity in the use of terms here. The real issue is whether the meaning of the term 'bishop' proper to Catholicism only after the Second or Third century, and in some ways far later, is to oust from recognition as authorized ministers for the Churchly acts of Eucharist and ordination, those pastors or 'bishops' (of the Ignatian type) who have not been ordained episcopally in the later sense, but only in the earlier. For this latter is claimed to be true of all regular ministries to-day of the Congregational and Presbyterian variety. Here there is no need for going into any doubtful disputation about the bearing of the earliest 'Church Orders' (of the Third and Fourth centuries)—as to which the last word has not yet been said. But one must firmly question Mr. Lacey's broad assertion that 'in practice there is no trace of ordination by presbyters without a bishop' in the ancient Church. Bishop John Wordsworth in his *Ministry of Grace* and many other Anglican scholars have held and still hold the opposite view. However, as Mr. Lacey puts forward his *non possumus*, against accepting non-episcopal ordination (in his sense, not the Ignatian) as sufficient, on the score simply of church discipline during the bulk of the Catholic centuries, one is really confronted with nothing more than the principle of high expediency. Anglicans, he concludes, 'have no right' to depart from the now immemorial Catholic discipline on so important a matter 'without the general consent of the whole Church.' I take it that this means the whole episcopally organized Church, including the Roman branch, with its radical

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innovation, the Papacy, according to Eastern and Anglican standards of Catholic discipline. Going back, then, as Evangelical Christians are bound to do, behind the one or the other historically developed and therefore relative discipline, to the only absolute authority in Christianity, the Church's Head, as reflected in the Gospels and the Apostolic writings, one must reply that Anglicans 'have no right' to lay down any condition of intercommunion between themselves and the disciples of the One Lord, theirs and ours, additional to those which He himself has personally authorized. That is a far more serious 'innovation' *in principle* than any breach of formal or institutional continuity which may mar the historic solidarity of modern non-episcopal Church groups with groups which have retained the later Catholic type of episcopate. It is, too, surely a most grave and significant fact that the common retention of this type of ministerial office has not saved the Episcopal groups from mutual schism, even at the Lord's Table; whereas the non-episcopal groups enjoy mutual communion with each other, and would fain extend this to the episcopal also.

Accordingly we submit that, in order to secure a more truly Catholic communion, we must all, Anglicans and others alike, lay more stress upon unity in the Gospel of Christ, a unity rooted in loyalty of faith and obedience towards Christ as Lord, because God manifest in a human personality, than upon anything so *religiously* relative and secondary as any particular historical form of the Church's ministry. In this sphere we hold that nothing can, according to the mind of Christ, be 'of strict obligation.' Nevertheless, in order that 'all the members' of Christ should be able outwardly, as well as inwardly, 'to participate without hindrance and without hesitation' in the one Lord's Table, the non-episcopal groups might consent, as an act of loving deference for the traditional Catholic conscience in their brethren, to mutual re-commissioning *relative to a greater approximation to a truly Catholic Church*, if only it were really mutual in the deference shewn to conscience on both sides.

VERNON BARTLET.

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ART. IV.—SOME MORALS OF ESCHATOLOGY.

1. *The Eschatology of Jesus.* By H. LATIMER JACKSON, D.D. (London: Macmillan. 1913.)
2. *The Beginnings of Christianity*, Part I, vol. i. Ed. F. J. FOAKES JACKSON and KIRSOPP LAKE. (London: Macmillan. 1920.)
3. *The Historic Christ.* By the Rev. B. H. STREETER. In *Foundations*, ed. Streeter. (London: Macmillan. 1912.)
4. *Christologies Ancient and Modern.* By W. SANDAY, D.D. (Oxford: at the Clarendon Press. 1910.)
5. *Christ and the Creeds.* Special number of *The Modern Churchman.* (Oxford: Blackwell. 1921.)
6. *Belief in God.* By the Rt. Rev. CHARLES GORE. (London: John Murray. 1921.)
7. *The Lord of Thought.* By LILY DOUGALL and C. W. EMMET. (London: Student Christian Movement. 1922.)

THE *enfant terrible* has his uses in theology as in all other departments of life. To Schweitzer and to his English followers we stand much indebted for having forced to an issue certain questions as to the interpretation of the Gospels. Our understanding of these documents can hardly be the same as if these radicals of criticism had never written. Yet it is evident that but little of their actual conclusions will permanently stand. The very characteristic which Schweitzer claimed as triumphantly vindicating his position is, in fact, its sufficient condemnation. It is 'consequent'; that is all that need be said about it. The man who is 'consequent' about anything, be it psycho-analysis or social reconstruction, no less than if it is eschatology, is always wrong, and as a rule dangerously

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wrong. Because such writers as Harnack have unduly minimized the part played by eschatology in our Lord's outlook, it does not follow that His every thought was entirely dominated by this, or that every saying of His must somehow have an eschatological interpretation forced on it. It remains, that it is difficult to escape the conclusion that He was profoundly impressed by the sense of a terrific crisis, a supernatural baring of God's arm, to come in the future, and apparently in the fairly near future. Nor, it would seem, can this be eliminated from His teaching without profoundly affecting its true significance. To this extent the eschatological view is accepted by practically all critics, moderate and extreme (the Rev. C. W. Emmet in his latest views is an important exception). It is accepted too by almost all theologians who keep any touch with modern intellectual requirements, including some of such unimpeachable orthodoxy as Bishop Gore.

If then this eschatology is accepted (subject to whatever *cautela* as to its precise interpretation) at its face value, it necessarily compels us to emphasize, after a fashion very alien to the mind of Nineteenth-century Liberalism, the supernatural and transcendent element in our Lord's outlook. Further, this is in the closest manner bound up with an inexpressibly momentous significance attaching to His own Person. If we are to take His eschatology seriously at all, we seem compelled to recognize in His earthly career a unique and supreme act of God in history; in short, we must needs accept the whole substance at least of the orthodox doctrine of the Incarnation. On the other hand, when this side of His outlook and teaching is rejected, or its significance deliberately minimized, the impressiveness and dynamic of His Personality is incalculably diminished. It is difficult then to present His Divinity convincingly; there is an inevitable tendency towards reducing Him to no more than a particularly prominent religious leader. The line between Him and other teachers becomes so much blurred that it is difficult to detect it with any certainty. This comes out strikingly

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in some of the papers read at the Cambridge Conference of Modern Churchmen last year.

There are three ways of escaping the challenge presented by the eschatological interpretation of the Gospels. One may boldly say that the only Christ on record is evidently a God and not a real man at all; and therefore, while leaving the Gospel-picture uncriticized, may set it down as a pure myth. Or, accepting the historicity of the portrait, one may hold that an idea on which He laid the most solemn emphasis was nothing but pure and simple delusion; and this appears to be the meaning of the extreme school of eschatologists. If that was so, it is difficult to see how He could have succeeded in founding the Christian religion. The latter evidently cannot have owed much to such a Founder, and might indeed get on quite as well without Him. Thus we might, for all practical purposes, just as well accept the Christ-myth theory at once. The third plan is to whittle away by criticism all the most impracticably supernatural elements in the Synoptic Jesus, and to insist that the Gospels are saturated through and through with later theological reflection. But this method requires so much elimination that, in the end, hardly anything is left on which we can rely with confidence; we find ourselves separated by but the shadow of a shade from the full Christ-myth view. The school of Dr. Foakes Jackson and Professor Kirsopp Lake appear to approximate to this by a combination of both methods of approach.

I

We must then squarely face the doubt, which inevitably suggests itself, whether our Lord was not after all the victim of a delusion in this matter. If we cannot so allay this as to satisfy thoroughly our intellect, a paralyzing uncertainty will be constantly undermining the very foundations of our faith.

Did our Lord then, as extreme anti-eschatologists have sometimes expressed it, 'go about saying that the world was coming to an end, when it was not'? Here,

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I think, we at once find relief in the fact that He seems at times to associate the destruction of Jerusalem very closely with His own Parousia. I am quite unable to see any sound reason, on grounds of criticism, for assuming that all the allusions to the former must date from after the event. As a whole, they seem to be woven as thoroughly into the very texture of the Gospels as any other element. I cannot even see any reason for rejecting wholesale the 'little Apocalypse,' with the light-hearted confidence with which this is commonly done by critics. The parable of the fig-tree seems singularly in the authentic manner of our Lord, and it is very closely implicated with the main bulk of this Apocalypse. Our Lord, then, at times at any rate, would appear to have treated the destruction of Jerusalem as, in some sort, an instalment of His coming. The Parousia in fact resolves itself, in these passages, into a series of crises. It is true, no doubt, that the future was very much foreshortened for our Lord's human mind. It is a characteristic of prophetic vision that it always does thus foreshorten the future. The verity of the Incarnation would seem naturally to involve that this should have occurred in His case too, as in that of other prophets. It is surely clear from His whole manner of speaking that He did not, as man, actually contemplate the spreading out of this series of catastrophes over millenniums or even centuries. Since He Himself declared that He did not know of that day or hour, that need be no difficulty to us. He evidently did not intend to teach anything dogmatically as to the date of the Parousia.

On the other hand, His confidence that an overwhelming crisis could not be very long delayed apparently revealed itself repeatedly in His utterances. The 'consequent' school, however, greatly exaggerate on this head. They assume as verbally exact the sayings which appear to admit of only the shortest interim; and they go on to infer with rigid logic that a perfectly definite anticipation that the crash would come 'within a few months' invariably kept full and unshaken possession of our Lord's mind. But, if He was to have a human mind at all, it

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must, in such matters, have worked very much as ours do. What more natural than that a general sense of living 'in the last days,' a standing conviction that the end could not be very long delayed, should have possessed Him? On this basis, He would have His changing moods and His fluctuating expectations. The words, 'I beheld Satan as lightning fall from heaven,' may most naturally be taken as a confident anticipation of an early triumph for the cause of the Kingdom. They may have been spoken at a time when He was profoundly impressed by the extent to which 'the common people heard Him gladly.' Surely, we may imagine Him feeling, the harvest will soon be ripe; the time will have come for God to interpose with a dramatic miracle on a cosmic scale, and to gather His elect into the Kingdom. 'It must be just at hand now,' may He not have said to Himself? 'Surely the time cannot be more than a few months more.' In such a mood He might well have declared, 'Verily I say unto you, ye shall not have gone through the cities of Israel till the Son of Man be come'—a saying which, as the late Dr. Sanday shewed,[1] it is extremely difficult to account for, if it was not a genuine *logion*. At other times He may have been far more doubtful, and anticipated that the crisis might well be delayed for decades. I do not think that His various utterances, taken one with another, can be held to imply more than that the cataclysm would take place within the lifetime of many of that generation —within, let us say, some forty years. And within forty years or slightly more there did come the very event which He Himself would seem to have regarded as the first decisive crash of the Parousia. On the mere point of fact as to the imminence of the cataclysm He spoke truly.

Yet here, as it seems to me, we cannot deny a certain element of mistake. I do not think that Bishop Gore faces this issue in a completely satisfactory way. He lays down that for our Lord the destruction of Jerusalem was, after the manner of the prophets, 'thrown on the background'[2] of a

[1] *Hibbert Journal*, No. 37, p. 107.

[2] Gore, *Belief in God*, p. 91.

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final cosmic catastrophe. Well and good; but the prophets do, beyond any question, continually represent the particular political crisis which they are expecting, as leading on rapidly and directly to this cosmic consummation. They most certainly did not anticipate an interval of thousands of years. Does Bishop Gore deny that this holds good for our Lord as man? If so, I can see no real meaning in this language about 'throwing on the background.' Yet the Bishop seems expressly to deny that He made any mistake whatever in the matter. He would appear to be so much afraid of the theological consequences of the admission, that he shrinks from admitting even to himself what to many will seem the inevitable implication of his view. Yet, if our Lord was right, even in regard to the date so far as He definitely committed Himself, in the practical warning which He gave to the Jews of His time, what does it matter that He revealed incidentally that He did anticipate a further sequel to the contemporary crisis, in which anticipation subsequent history has not borne Him out? Such an entirely innocent and practically harmless mistake casts no reflection whatever on the value of His teaching or on His claim to an infallible spiritual insight.

II

But, in a far deeper sense, He was right. He delivered exactly the message which that generation needed. It could hardly have been conveyed to them otherwise than through the sacramental vehicle of the eschatological symbolism. For, what was the situation? The Gospel was packed with dynamic ideas of a profoundly revolutionary kind. It meant a terrific 'transvaluation of all values'—a sensational reversal of accepted standards. It was indeed calculated, if put into force, to 'turn the world upside down' in a most startling fashion. But it was precisely not the business of the first Christians to revolutionize the world of their time. The task to which they were called was that of founding the Catholic Church. It was necessary for them to concentrate on the eternal

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and spiritual verities of the Gospel, which alone could form the foundation or supply the sustenance of the Church. It must be left for the Church of each succeeding generation to find specific applications of those principles to such practical problems as might be of peculiar urgency for the time. It would have been fatal had Christianity, at its inception, become identified with any particular secular programme. But further, had the primitive Christians embarked on revolution, their whole movement would have been instantly stamped out in blood, and the name of Jesus Christ might well have been heard of no more. If then they were to carry out their divinely appointed task, it was imperative that they should conduct themselves as 'the quiet in the land.' Here was a paradoxical requirement indeed! These people were simply bursting with an intensely revolutionary view of life, and yet they must not be, in any practical sense, revolutionaries; else they would have destroyed the very basis for the permanent influence in the world of the eternal verities which they had to proclaim.

The situation was exactly met, and apparently could only have been met, by the eschatological message. Our Lord had left them with a fervent expectation that a mighty deliverance from God would certainly come within the lives of some of them, and might at any time happen to-morrow morning. To that conviction almost every page of the New Testament bears witness. The present world then with all its tribulations and injustices was passing away. It was God's business to 'help them to right that suffer wrong,' and He would certainly do it. The great business of Christians was to prepare themselves, and to warn others to prepare, for the Day of the Lord. It was not for them to concern themselves overmuch with the affairs of this world, or to attach much importance to its good or ill fortune. The best plan was for each to remain contentedly in whatever state of life he found himself.

We see throughout the New Testament how this belief did actually serve to calm and steady the revolutionary aspirations of the 'people of the Way.' The Apocalypse,

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for instance, is a violent denunciation of the Roman Empire such as any imperial official would naturally and justifiably have treated as seditious; yet there is no actual sedition in it. In its fiercest passages it always throws the responsibility for vengeance on God; it will have recourse to no more carnal weapon than the invoking of the great and longed-for baring of His arm. Similarly St. James, at the height of a tirade against the rich couched in language of a vehemence suitable to the wildest stirrer-up of revolt, suddenly breaks off with 'Be patient therefore, brethren, unto the coming of the Lord.'

In all this, it is true, there was a large element of illusion. The part played by indispensably necessary illusion in the progress of true religion would form an interesting subject for a lengthy work. Clearly it was by the providential ordering of God that the first Christians cherished this conviction of the nearness of the Parousia. It was the most vivid and practically effective form under which they could grasp certain truths which were peculiarly necessary for them in their time and circumstances. They were not mistaken in putting their whole trust in God; in resting assured that His purpose of loving faithfulness stands firm, and that human shortsightedness and passion constantly prompt us to courses quite alien to His purpose; in distrusting carnal weapons and rash short-cuts; in holding to it that eternal and spiritual values are greater far than temporal and material values. If it was our Lord's eschatology—and probably that only—which enabled them to hold fast these saving beliefs, then indeed that was certainly no delusion; it was the deepest historical sanity.

III

But has this eschatology still any meaning for us? Surely, yes. It constitutes the most intransigent challenge to the ordinary modern idea of 'progress.' It deliberately flouts all light-hearted hopes of an easy, straight-away advance towards perfection. It insists that progress is neither uniform, universal, nor fated. And it utterly

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denies that *real* progress (or perhaps we had better say, improvement) is ever the more or less inevitable evolution of what is already given in the past; it reminds us that it is from above—that it is heaven-descended. The whole idea of the Kingdom of God is intensely—almost violently—supernatural. It is a pattern laid up in the heavens. And, in so far as from time to time some approach to it is manifested on earth, this comes about through a breaking in of the eternal order into 'this world.' It is true, no doubt, that such a breaking in may often be going forward steadily and unobtrusively through the quiet influence of the Spirit stealing from heart to heart. In very large part, therefore, the extension of the Kingdom is 'evolutionary,' provided we do not think of 'evolution' as a mere automatic and impersonal process—provided we always think of God as a constantly active agent in it. But that is very far from being the whole story. 'Evolution,' however understood, most emphatically does not exhaust the truth about history. Eschatology enforces the very necessary complement to all evolutionary ideas—the truth that the coming of the Kingdom is apt to involve, again and again, all manner of crashes, crises, and cataclysms.

In any case, if we would help forward the coming of the Kingdom, we must 'lift up our hearts'; we must seek to be united to God in Christ; we must aspire to have our souls continuously rooted in the 'other' or 'yonder' world, to be living for, and in a manner already *in*, that 'other' world.

But can we, even so—if we accept the eschatological view—speak of our being called to 'build' or 'set up' the Kingdom? And if not, is not the heart of all the most ardent Christianity of our own day destroyed?

Here comes in the helpfulness of another vein in our Lord's teaching, which 'consequent' eschatologists have striven in vain to explain away. Some of His sayings it requires altogether too violent a *tour de force* to compress under the eschatological rubric. In certain parables, for instance—such as that of the seed growing secretly—and

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in some of His other utterances (particularly in the words 'The Kingdom of God is within you' or 'in the midst of you') our Lord indicates that, in the ethical and spiritual attitude which fitted men to enter into the Kingdom—to be among those 'taken,' and not among those 'left'—when it should be revealed, He saw already the promise and potency—in some sense, even the actual beginning—of that Kingdom. Hence in the growth of this type of life among men we are to see the Kingdom in gradual process of establishment. It *is* an extension of this idea, but only a very slight one—it is but a dotting of the i's and crossing of the t's of our Lord's teaching—to say that we are definitely called to the task of actively labouring for the establishment of the Kingdom. This further development (for such it is) of the Gospel teaching on the subject is called for by the lessons which God has since been teaching men through His revelation in the subsequent history of the world. He has shewn us that the Kingdom was not destined to come in fullness of power in one final crash in the fairly near future. Instead of that, an indefinite vista of future history is opened before us. We see the process of the coming in of the Kingdom protracted beyond the grasp of our imagination, with incidental crises innumerable. Evidently it is God's plan to use men as His agents in founding the Kingdom. Its establishment is a process wrought out within mankind, not an external scene-shifting on the stage of the universe. But yet it is a task that men can only effectively carry out, if feeling themselves upheld and borne forward in it by the mighty forces of the eternal order swooping down, as it were, upon them and laying hold of them. All such God-inspired and God-aided efforts do actually produce material for the fabric of the Kingdom. Hence it is strictly true to say that the Church is called to 'set up the Kingdom of God on earth.'

IV

Now from this task of building the Kingdom we can certainly not omit the more special work of christianizing

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the collective life of society. It is precisely what is best and most deeply religious in the spirit of our time, which rejects with contempt any religion that has nothing to say in regard to the agonizings of the contemporary world towards a nobler social and international order. Yet we cannot find any *direct* warrant in the New Testament for such social enthusiasms. Neither our Lord nor His disciples were actually themselves social reformers. But they laid down principles which would necessarily lead their followers amidst the changed circumstances of later ages to make direct attacks on unrighteous social institutions. It would be grotesque to maintain that Wilberforce was mistaken in finding in the New Testament the inspiration and warrant for his crusade against slavery. We go, in fact, to the New Testament for permanent principles in this field; not, to any great extent, for practical applications. Every generation of the Church has its particular historical mission. The chief outward expression of the Gospel for our time must needs be the establishment of a Christian order of society, and eschatology cannot diminish our conviction that the Gospel is essentially a social one through and through. Professor Morgan has put the case well:—

'Notwithstanding the fact that in the teaching both of Jesus and His apostles the State, the city, and the family retire into the background, and such interests as concern art, science, literature receive no recognition whatever, human beings are far from being thought of as isolated units whose sole or chief business is to make sure of their place in the future world. They are members of a Kingdom—the Kingdom of heaven. And while this Kingdom is regarded as lying beyond the clouds, there is no attempt at an imaginary construction of it, or at an adjustment of morality to new and ideal conditions. Its righteousness is the righteousness that obtains here on earth. What really happens is that there is a concentration of interest on those relationships that are universally human, and that the ethico-religious ideal becomes the one object of pursuit. That men are brethren, the children of the Father in heaven, this appears as the one all-determining social fact. On this fact every social duty is based—that men live together in peace,

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that no one injure another or use him for his own selfish ends, that they treat one another with generosity and kindness and find their greatness in being servants of all. If the State disappears as the object of devotion and sacrifice, another and a larger object comes into view, the realization of the divine purpose with our race, the bringing in of the Kingdom. In the service of this cause it is required that a man, in the vivid language of Jesus, be ready to hate his father and mother, yea and his own life also. . . . One dare assert that the Church bound men together by closer and deeper ties of faith and love and elicited a purer devotion, a nobler service, a more uncalculating sacrifice than any State, ancient or modern, has ever done.'[1]

It is for the Church of our day to concentrate this devotion, service and sacrifice onto the peculiarly urgent problems of the present.

But, right in the heart of this social message of the Gospel, the eschatological note conveys a warning against that over-secularization of outlook, to grave danger of which the social enthusiast is always exposed. That note continually reminds us that, while our moral and spiritual achievements do enter into the perfect Kingdom that is finally to be revealed and are an actual condition of its consummation, yet the ultimate fulfilment cannot be on our present plane of being. Between the noblest fruit of human life on earth and the consummated Kingdom there remains a gap—a gap that can only be bridged by what we are compelled to think of as an 'act of God.' The Kingdom belongs essentially to the 'other' world.

To me it seems that such ideas, far from weakening, immensely strengthen the inspiration and driving-power which the concept of the Kingdom can contribute to the cause of social righteousness. That concept is a vision which ever hovers over the world of men, drawing us mightily onwards and upwards. It ever lies far out beyond our utmost achievements—at any rate, on earth. But that is involved in the very nature of an ideal. If this were not so, our vision would be proved far too poor a

[1] Morgan, *The Religion and Theology of Paul*, pp. 194–195.

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thing to serve as an ideal at all. But to feel that our true citizenship is in heaven, that our permanent life is there, that a higher order of reality with its own inexorable standards of righteousness is open to us, that we are lifted up above the common level of life with its meanness and pettiness, that we are irresistibly driven on and mightily backed up by all the powers of that eternal world, by 'angels and archangels and all the company of heaven'—what, more than this, can make the meekest of us terrible to the great ones of this world, when they transgress with a high hand?

N. E. EGERTON SWANN.

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ART. V.—MODERN CRITICISM AND THE PROPHETIC LITERATURE OF THE OLD TESTAMENT.

1. *The Prophets of the Old Testament.* By G. H. A. VON EWALD. English translation of the second edition. (London: Williams and Norgate. 1875.)
2. *Prophets and Prophecy in Israel.* By A. KUENEN. English translation. (London: 1877.)
3. *Grundzüge des Rhythmus, des Vers- und Strophenbau in der hebräischen Poesie.* Von J. LEY. (Halle: 1875.)
4. *Reste arabischen Heidentums.* Von J. WELLHAUSEN. (Berlin: 1887, 1897.)
5. *The Religion of the Semites.* By W. ROBERTSON SMITH. Second edition. (London: A. and C. Black. 1894.)
6. *Old Testament Prophecy.* By A. B. DAVIDSON. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark. 1903.)
7. *Die Propheten in ihren ursprunglichen Form.* Von D. H. MÜLLER. (Wien: Hölder. 1896.)
8. *Criticism of Systems of Hebrew Metre.* By W. H. COBB. (Oxford: at the University Press. 1901.)
9. *Metrische Studien.* Von E. SIEVERS. (Leipzig: B. G. Teubner. 1901.)
10. *Jeremias Metrik.* Von F. GIESEBRECHT. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck u. Ruprecht. 1905.)
11. *Forms of Hebrew Poetry.* By G. BUCHANAN GRAY. (London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1915.)
12. *Prophecy and Religion.* By J. SKINNER. (Cambridge: University Press. 1922.)

FROM the end of the Eighteenth century to the end of the Nineteenth, the attention of Old Testament students was

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directed in the main to the Hexateuch. There its work seems in a large measure to have been accomplished. Whilst the genuinely scientific mind would never claim that its hypotheses were final, and would even welcome their overthrow if the ends of truth could be thereby the more firmly secured, it does appear as if the critical conclusions reached on this branch of Old Testament study were likely to prove stable. The main outlines are accepted by practically every modern critic. The analysis of the first six books into four main sources is generally admitted. It is further significant that this agreement extends not only to the existence of the four sources but in large measure to their composition. The differences in the assignment of verses to J, E and P, for instance, are very slight indeed, particularly in Genesis, and the variations between Carpenter and Harford-Battersby, Addis, Ball and others are insignificant. There are points on which doubts have been raised—the possibility of accurate detailed analysis of JE in Exodus and Numbers, the date of Deuteronomy, the independent existence of the narrative portions of P—but these are all matters of detail, and do not affect the broad conclusions. The general analysis and the chronological order of the documents are hardly likely to be questioned for generations to come.

Just as the Nineteenth century saw the development of the study of the Hexateuch, so the Twentieth promises changes almost amounting to a revolution in the criticism of the Prophetic literature. This does not mean that no useful work was done before the end of the last century, or that the Prophets were neglected. Modern criticism of the Book of Isaiah, for instance, dates back to the Eighteenth century, for scholars like Döderlein (1775) and Eichhorn (1780–83) already saw the clear line of division between the end of ch. xxxix and the beginning of ch. xl. Recognized by Koppe and Gesenius, the composite character of the book was also described by Ewald. His *Die Propheten des alten Bundes* (1840) not only admitted the post-exilic origin of chs. xl–lxvi, but also the independent authorship of chs. xxiv–xxvii and of xv–xvi. For half a century his

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views held the field, and, except for minor details, dominated the criticism of this book. In 1892, however, Duhm's *Commentary* secured general acceptance of the view that the 'Second Isaiah' must be further subdivided,[1] the point of separation being made at the end of ch. lv. In other prophetic books also, Ewald marked the limit of progress till near the end of the century. An instance is the familiar analysis of the Book of Zechariah. As early as 1644 Grotius assigned at least a part of chs. ix–xiv to the age of Alexander, and another portion to the Maccabean period. Others, *e.g.* Joseph Mede (1653), Newcome (1785), and Bertholdt (1814), placed chs. ix–xiv before the Exile, while accepting the difference in authorship. Again, no important advance had been made in the study of this book since Ewald.

It was in the Eighteenth century, too, that the literary character of the prophetic books was first recognized. It has become fashionable to regard profound scholarship as a modern phenomenon, originating in Germany and largely confined to that country. To such an impression a study of the work of Robert Lowth should prove a useful antidote. For sheer learning in matters Hebraic he has rarely been surpassed, and had in addition supreme qualities of insight and imagination. With all his knowledge he was entirely free from pedantry, and his *De Sacra Poesi Hebraeorum Praelectiones*, delivered by him as Professor of Poetry before the University of Oxford, form one of the most important contributions to Old Testament study that have ever been issued. There are few other volumes in all the literature dealing with Old Testament subjects to which the term 'epoch-making' so fully applies. Lowth was the first to see that the essence of the form of Hebrew poetry lies in parallelism; in other words, its rhythm is primarily a balance of thought rather than of sound. Later

[1] Stade and Kuenen were in some respects pioneers of this view, and G. A. Smith (1890) recognized the composite character of the book, though he did not isolate chs. xl–lv. Indeed, he treats liv 1–lvi 8 as a single group in three sections, all of which are exilic.

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scholars modified his views to the extent of further subdividing his three types of parallelism (Briggs recognizes six types), but this is only a minor development, and on this particular side of poetic form no real advance was made till the publication of Gray's *Forms of Hebrew Poetry* in 1915.[1]

Of less importance than the discovery of Parallelism, though still profoundly significant, is Lowth's recognition of the fact that the prophetic books of the Old Testament were in large measure poetical in form. Here, again, he has been followed with hardly a dissentient voice (König and Rothstein are prominent living exceptions) by later scholarship. Practically every commentary of importance recognizes the fact, and where such commentaries are accompanied by independent translations the arrangement is frequently such as to shew the poetic lines. This is true of some volumes of the *Handkommentar zum alten Testament* (the other important modern German series, the *Kurzer Handkommentar* does not contain a formal translation), of the International Critical Commentaries[2] and of isolated volumes like Cornill's Jeremiah and Box's Isaiah. Unfortunately the revisers of the English Bible did not see their way to follow this practice, but such volumes of translation as have been issued by Professor J. E. McFadyen give an excellent example of the correct method. To appreciate the modern position on the Prophets, it is necessary to sketch in outline the growth of our knowledge of the form of Hebrew poetry.

After Lowth the next important development in the study of Hebrew was the discovery of the 'strophe.' It dates from the publication of an article in *Studien und Kritiken* for 1831 by Köster, who found that Hebrew Poetry could be divided into symmetrical sections just as

[1] I cannot refrain from a reference to the irreparable loss that Old Testament scholarship has sustained in the death of Dr. G. Buchanan Gray, who passed away suddenly on November 2, 1922. At my request he had, with characteristic generosity, read this article in MS., and I had his assurance that his own views were throughout adequately and correctly presented.—T. H. R.

[2] Harper's *Amos and Hosea* is an exception.

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Greek lyrics are divided into strophes and antistrophes. They lacked, of course, the metrical correspondence that appears in Greek poetry, for the metrical (as distinct from the strophic) basis of Hebrew poetry is a theory which belongs to the end of the Nineteenth century. The correspondence was purely numerical. Köster observed that many Hebrew poems fell into paragraphs which contained varying numbers of verses. The divisions between the paragraphs might be indicated in a number of ways, the most obvious of which was the presence of a refrain at the beginning or end, or even in the middle of a paragraph. Psalms xlii–xliii form a good example of a poem in three such strophes. The strophes of a given poem might contain the same number of verses. If the number varied, as it usually did, the strophes were always arranged symmetrically. Thus a poem of twenty verses might fall into strophes of 5, 5, 5, 5 or 6, 4, 4, 6 or 3, 7, 3, 7 verses.

Later scholars saw that the verse-divisions were somewhat artificial, and that the true unit was the poetical line which might not exactly correspond with the verse. This is the form in which strophic structure is now generally recognized. An attempt at further development was made by D. H. Müller,[1] who laid down three principles which he called Responsion, Concatenation, and Inclusion. The first consists in the appearance of the same word or words in the same place in two or perhaps three strophes, a sort of parallelism of strophes. The second is the appearance of a similar expression at the end of one strophe and the beginning of the next, and the third the presence of identical (or nearly identical) phrases at the beginning and end of the same strophe. Cobb[2] has given an admirable account of the theory, and a perusal of Müller's own work in this direction makes one feel that Cobb's criticism is restrained, lenient, and even generous. Müller has found very little following anywhere,[3] and practically none in the application of his theory to the prophetic books.

[1] *Die Propheten in ihren ursprunglichen Form*, 1896, *Strophenbau und Responsion* 1898. [2] *Criticism of Systems of Hebrew Metre*, 1901.
[3] Rubens, Zenner, and Condamin are exceptions.

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The third main step in the development of Hebrew metrical theory was the recognition of a real metre within the line itself. This had been suggested by the mediaeval Rabbi Azariah, and Lowth mentioned it sympathetically, though, as he found it involved too many irregularities, he was unable to adopt it. The idea of conjectural emendation does not seem to have appealed to him, and whilst such a theory actually involves far fewer excisions and additions *metri gratia* than is commonly supposed, it does demand some alterations of the text for which there is no evidence in MSS or Versions. It reappeared in an article published in 1857 by Peters entitled *Psalmen in der Urgestalt*,[1] but this seems to have passed unnoticed (a common fate for magazine articles), and the theory took no serious hold on the world of scholarship till the publication of Ley's *Grundzüge des Rhythmus*[2] in 1875. Developed and improved by the work of scholars like Sievers and Briggs (who had their strong points as well as their weak ones; Briggs' extravagances, in particular, are due far more to his strophic than to his metric theory), it may be seen in its generally accepted shape in Gray's *Forms of Hebrew Poetry*. Further developments beyond Gray's position are still possible, but the main outline of Hebrew metrical theory may now be held to be established.

The modern view rests fundamentally on the same basis as Lowth's parallelism—a 'balance' or 'echo' of thought.[3] Such a balance necessarily involves some correspondence of words. The immense strength of the 'tone' or accent in Hebrew gives to any regular arrangement of significant words a regular arrangement of accents, or 'stresses' or 'beats.' Thus a line of Hebrew poetry is seen to consist of two or sometimes of three parts. In each part the words are more closely associated with one another than they are with those of the next part. There is thus a break (technically called a 'caesura') in the rhythm between the two parts *which always corresponds to some break,*

[1] In the *Zeitschrift der deutsch. Morgenländ. Gesellschaft.*

[2] *Cf.* also his *Leitfaden der Metrik der hebraischen Poesie*, 1887.

[3] The terms are Gray's; see *op. cit.*

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however slight, in the sense. Frequently, but not always, the second part repeats the idea of the first, *e.g.*:

> The earth is the LORD's and the fulness thereof;
> The world, and they that dwell therein.
> (Ps. xxiv 1.)

This is one of the simpler forms of parallelism. But a reference to the Hebrew text shews that the half-lines balance phonetically as well as logically. Each has three 'stresses,' on 'earth,' 'LORD's,' and 'fulness,' in the first half, and on 'world,' 'dwell,' and 'therein,' in the second. Such a line is sometimes called a 'trimeter couplet,' but the more usual indication to-day is simply in figures, and it would be described as '3 : 3.' The following 'metres' are those generally recognized: 3 : 3, 2 : 2 : 2, 3 : 2, 2 : 2. More rarely 2 : 3 and 4 : 3, or even 3 : 4 appear, and sometimes 3 : 3 : 3.

One point is still debated. Must a poem have the same metre throughout? Are metres always 'level' or may they be 'mixed'? Whilst both views have their adherents, the work of Sievers[1] and Gray seems to have made it clear that 'mixture' is possible, and indeed usual, to a limited extent. It seems that 3 : 3, 2 : 2 : 2, and occasionally 3 : 3 : 3 may alternate within the same poem, and similarly 3 : 2, 2 : 3 and 2 : 2. Other mixtures, *e.g.* the presence of a 3 : 3 line in a poem mainly 3 : 2, are probably due to textual corruption. But these are comparatively rare.[2]

This sketch of the modern theory of Hebrew poetic form is necessary to an understanding of the general position at the end of the Nineteenth century, for practically all study of the prophetic books takes it into serious account. But the critical mind has been at work in other directions, and has seen that in most cases it is impossible to assign

[1] *Metrische Studien*, 1901.

[2] In over sixty 'hexameter' oracles in the Book of Jeremiah a 'pentameter' line only occurs eight times, and a 'tetrameter' twice. In nearly a hundred 'pentameter' oracles in the same book there are sixteen instances of 3 : 3 and ten of 2 : 2 : 2. There are about three times as many other places where an irregularity in the M.T. can be corrected by the LXX.

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the whole of the book to the Prophet whose name it bears. The conspicuous cases of Isaiah and Zechariah have already been noted. But Ezekiel and Haggai are the only two whose 'integrity' has been generally admitted, though the textual phenomena of the LXX have led Kraetschmar to develop a theory involving a considerable growth in the Book of Ezekiel. Large sections of the Book of Jeremiah are assigned to some intimate contemporary of the Prophet, usually Baruch. Other portions are relegated to a later generation. Thus Schwally, in an article which appeared[1] in 1888, denied the Jeremianic authorship of chapters xlvi–li *in toto*. Though there has been a tendency to react against this judgement in respect to one or two sections (*cf.* the views of Erbt, Cornill, and Peake), there are portions of these chapters (*e.g.* l–li) whose 'originality' no one would seriously maintain to-day. Ch. x 1–16, again, is generally admitted to be post-exilic, and though Duhm's drastic surgery has found little support, there are many other short passages or phrases classed as 'interpolations,' or 'glosses.' Amongst the Twelve, too, Haggai alone has escaped the critical knife. The sections in Hosea which hold out the promise of a brighter future, or which refer to Judah, are attributed to an 'editor's' desire to tone down a gloomy picture, though protests are still raised against the 'excision' of such sections as xiv 2–10. Joel, it is true, has generally been held to be a unity, in spite of attempts made by Vernes and Rothstein to separate chs. i–ii from iii–iv. Amos has been subjected to the same kind of treatment as Hosea, though the protest against the excisions has not been so strongly marked, and there are few scholars to-day who maintain the originality of the oracle against Judah (ii 4–5) or the optimistic conclusion (iv 8b–15) of the present book. Obadiah is already so short as to be incapable of much further curtailment, but is suspected of 'interpolation,' *e.g.* in v. 8. The Psalm in Jonah is generally recognized as a 'later insertion.' Micah's work is not held to extend beyond ch. iii of the book which bears his name, except possibly for a few isolated

[1] In the *Zeitschrift für die Alttestamentliche Wissenschaft.*

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verses in the later chapters. The Psalms with which the Books of Nahum and Habakkuk open and close respectively are commonly regarded as 'secondary,' and Zeph. iii 8ff is usually assigned to a period much later than the end of the Seventh century. Even in 'Malachi,' there are one or two 'interpolations,' the most generally admitted being ii 11–12.

There was, then, no lack of careful study and of critical acumen. Students differ amongst themselves, of course, on matters of detail, but there is a considerable amount of agreement as to general results. There is still more unity in the general outlook and method, in the background of thought. Practically all regard the Prophet as being primarily a preacher of righteousness. It is admitted, especially in the case of the pre-exilic Prophets, that the man's first method was to proclaim to an audience of his own contemporaries the truth which he had received. But that truth, being of God, had an eternal as well as an occasional import. This the Prophet realized, and sought to secure by recording his words for future generations (*cf.* Is. xxx 8). Accordingly he prepared a book, writing down the prophecies as he had delivered them. Sometimes the material he thus employed was actually the MS of his own 'sermons'—'sermon' is a word which admirably suggests the whole background—or notes prepared for those sermons before delivery. Sometimes the 'author' relied on his memory of what he had said, and did little more than reproduce the substance. He then 'published' —again a significant word—the whole volume, usually after his retirement from the public ministry of the Word. It would as time went on be copied and re-copied. The ancient East was never scrupulous in such matters, and from time to time a copyist would exceed his normal functions. Occasionally he would become an 'Editor' or 'Redactor,' and would 'insert' passages which he thought suitable to the context he was transcribing. (It may be remarked that it is the *unsuitability* of such 'interpolations' to their context which is normally the only guide to their detection, a somewhat severe but perhaps deserved

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comment on the literary intelligence of the 'Editors.') Such redaction is supposed to have been especially characteristic of men who had the style and outlook of Deuteronomy. Further, an editor was liable to append passages which he thought necessary to correct an unduly pessimistic tone in the Prophet, or to add a recognition of some important truth, frequently eschatological, which the original author had failed to bring out.

The removal of these accretions frequently revealed a complex and highly artistic literary production. To quote a recent writer who belongs critically to the Nineteenth rather than to the Twentieth century:

'The Book of Hosea is not merely a prophecy, it is a poem, and a very beautiful poem. This fact disposes of many theories as to its production. It is quite impossible to suppose that its final form issued from any other hands than those of the Prophet himself, and it is extremely improbable in the presence of so regular an arrangement and correspondence between stanza and stanza that the substantial accuracy of the Hebrew text can be regarded as doubtful.'[1]

This citation may be accepted as not unfairly summarizing what we may call the Nineteenth-century position. It finds its fullest expression in the work of Harper, whose *Commentary on Amos and Hosea* (1910)[2] is a monument of detailed and massive scholarship. His views on the structure of the books with which he deals may be gathered from the Commentary, but are still more evident in a series of articles which appeared in the *American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literature* in 1900 and 1904, presumably representing the critical basis for his text of Hosea and Amos. His influence and outlook appear to be still dominant in America, and he is followed in criticism by Powis Smith, Bewer, Ward, and Mitchell, the scholars responsible for the rest of the Twelve in the series.

[1] Melville Scott, *The Message of Hosea*, 1921. The fact that the present writer dissents largely from Dr. Scott's critical views does not imply disapproval of his aesthetic judgement, or a failure to appreciate the spiritual sympathy with which he approaches his task.

[2] 'International Critical Commentary.'

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This general view of the structure of the prophetic books goes back at least as far as Ewald. He thought of them as being composed of long sections, each of which was more or less of a poem in itself. Thus he found twenty-three such sections in the Book of Jeremiah, and included the last eight chapters of Hosea in a single one. Each of these sections was strophic in character. The strophes might be short, consisting of from two to six verses, or they might be longer, containing from seven to nine. In the latter case the longer strophe could usually be subdivided into smaller ones, though in such cases as Amos i–ii the small strophes were quite independent of one another. The idea of an artificial product, which was the work of the Prophet himself, persisted throughout the century. Even as late as 1904 a scholar like Marti can state his belief that Hosea not merely wrote down his oracles but composed a book divided into sections, each one being a poem in itself. In most cases these poems, which are roughly of the length of a chapter each, are strophic in structure, though the strophes are very short, usually containing only a pair of lines. The same position, generally speaking, was accepted by Duhm in his treatment of the Book of Jeremiah (1901), though in his great Commentary on Isaiah he had adopted an entirely different view. His adherence to the older view in the case of Jeremiah was probably due to the belief, still general, that the book of prophecies dictated to Baruch formed the nucleus of the present Book of Jeremiah. He assumes that Jeremiah wrote only in the 'Pentameter rhythm,' and that his prophetic poems were built up of two-line strophes. This metrical theory is responsible for the most striking weaknesses of Duhm's work on Jeremiah. Cornill (1905), dealing with the same book, assigns a great deal more than Duhm to the original Prophet (he describes Duhm's work as a thunderstorm which purified the air!), but doubled the length of the strophe. This involves him in yet greater difficulties, and not a few of his readers will feel that this is the one serious blemish on one of the most valuable Commentaries of modern times.

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Except in the case of Isaiah, then, at the end of the Nineteenth century, the prophetic books were still regarded as being, apart from additions and interpolations, the definite literary work of the men whose names they bore. The studies of the last few years are tending more and more to throw doubt on the whole position. This does not mean that the 'originality' of the books or of sections in them is more drastically criticized, but a new view is being formulated of the way in which these things came to be written down and compiled.

The reader of almost any book on a Prophet is struck at once by the number of extremely modern terms that meet him. He is called a 'preacher,' his utterances are 'sermons,' he 'publishes' his book, and it suffers later from the attentions of 'editors.' All this is in a sense perfectly natural. One of the great contributions made by that rediscovery of the Bible which men call the Higher Criticism was that it brought home to us the extraordinarily modern tone of much that the Prophets had to say, and the striking suitability of their message for our own age. This is, of course, inevitable, when once it is realized that their function was the statement of eternal truth. For, allowing for local and temporal differences, the demands made by God on man are as unchangeable as His own nature. It is, then, only to be expected that men, in trying to explain the Prophet and his work, should make use of terms which are current amongst their contemporaries. Had Amos or Jeremiah appeared in our time, they would have preached sermons and published books—at least so one may fairly conjecture. The picture which the Nineteenth-century scholar drew for himself was conditioned to a large extent by the circumstances of that century. No doubt this was unconscious, and was largely due to ignorance of the ancient East. Even the modern East presents problems which are only partially felt by those who have spent many years there, and are never suspected at all by others. Archaeology and Comparative Religion are studies in which enormous advance has been made in the last thirty years. Even to-day we feel that we are only

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at the beginning of such investigations, and we look to the Twentieth century to throw a great flood of light on the mind of the ancient world. But we are at the beginning, and the Nineteenth century had hardly reached that point. It is possible for us now to make some attempt at cultivating a real historical sympathy, and to try to look at God and man, at life and the world, through the eyes of men who lived twenty-five centuries ago in Palestine.

This period may be said to begin with the publication of Wellhausen's *Reste arabischen Heidentums* (1887) and Robertson Smith's *Religion of the Semites* (1889). Both did extremely valuable work on the Prophets, but did it in the main from the general point of view which had been established and accepted since the time of Ewald. Though they, and still more, perhaps, Goldziher, did make important contributions to the study of the psychology of prophecy and other conditions of the oracular utterance, it was only the publication of Hölscher's *Die Propheten* in 1914 which gave definite shape to the more modern view.

Prophets and prophecy play a large part in the history of Israel from the conquest of Canaan onwards. Deborah has the title 'Prophetess.' In Samuel's day (though he himself was a Seer rather than a Prophet) such men lived in companies and were not held in very high esteem. From time to time they appear throughout the story of the monarchy, and by the middle of the Ninth century they form communities of their own and are an important element in the population. So strong is their hold on the people that not merely are Elijah and Elisha conspicuous in their direct dealings with the kings, but a generation later the prophetic party works a revolution which has for its aim the suppression of the worship of the foreign Baal. The Nineteenth century placed a high value on them and their work. Their communities were described as 'schools of the Prophets,' and even to-day it is a surprise to some readers to find that this is not a Biblical phrase, but an interpretation of the Hebrew expression 'sons of the Prophets,' which, of course, is capable of a very different explanation. These communities were pictured as settlements rather like

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the larger mediaeval monasteries, except for the fact that celibacy was not enforced. It was supposed that members of the community devoted themselves to lives of study and meditation, and a large amount of literary activity was ascribed to them. It was, indeed, in these 'schools of the Prophets' that men conjectured that the earlier narratives of the Hexateuch were written. So far as the present writer is aware, no deliberate attempt was ever made to describe either the community or its life, but one gets an impression of quiet and studious piety, with occasional excursions into the hurly-burly of public life on the part of one or two bolder spirits, which did not interfere with the general atmosphere of academic peace.[1]

By the end of the century it was realized that such a picture did not describe the prophets of the days of Samuel, at any rate. The company of Prophets who came down the hill to meet Saul at Gibeah were of a very different character. They were quite clearly subject to a peculiar psychological state which led to various kinds of extravagant activity. They were wild and violent ecstatics, whose limbs and muscles seemed to have passed beyond their own control. The dance with which they were associated was suspected of being the same thing as the wild leaping of the Prophets of Baal. Further it was observed that in one instance at least, that of the Prophet who stirred Jehu to revolt, the man was called a madman by those who saw him. At the same time Saul's most violent fits of raving were called, not madness, but prophecy (1 Sam. xviii 10). Clearly, then, ancient Israel did not distinguish prophecy from other forms of insanity.[2] Parallels were

[1] I trust that I have here done no injustice to writers of the Nineteenth century. As I say, I do not know of any direct description, but the ordinary references in the Histories of Israel call before me some such picture as I have sketched. A. B. Davidson (who does not adopt the earlier view) describes it similarly, *Old Testament Prophecy*, pp. 300–1.

[2] This is not intended to mean that every lunatic was regarded as a prophet! But ecstatic prophecy was looked on as similar in origin and symptoms to some forms of mental disease.

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sought elsewhere, and the prophets in their companies were compared to the wilder dervishes of Islam. It was soon seen also that these manifestations were not confined to Semitic peoples, but were to be found practically all over the Mediterranean world in the period of the Roman Empire. Many of the Greek oracles were of the same type, and there were bands of strolling priests of Isis and of the great Asiatic Mother-goddess to be found in every country. In all cases, however, it seemed possible ultimately to trace back the phenomena to Asia Minor or to Syria.[1]

With this wild ecstatic behaviour there went also in most cases an experience which we may call 'second sight.' That is to say, the person affected became conscious of two worlds, one that of his ordinary life, and the other one which was beyond the experience or appreciation of those who were round about him. He could see things happening which others could not see, and he could hear sounds to which all other ears were deaf. A good illustration is furnished by the case of Elisha's servant at Dothan, where this gift of sight is conferred on him at the request of his master. Another is the story which Micaiah tells to Ahab and Jehoshaphat, of the scene in the heavenly court where Yahweh lays a trap for Ahab and entices him to his ruin through the lips of his Prophets. Both the ecstatic behaviour and the power of second sight were universally attributed to the actual possession of the man concerned by the 'breath' or 'spirit' of Yahweh, and there seem to have been technical terms which were applied to the phenomena.

As far as the prophets before Amos were concerned, these facts were to a large extent recognized before the end of the Nineteenth century. Thus Marti says:

'These Nebiim—"Prophets"—had their place in the service of Yahweh, as once similar bands had appeared in the land

[1] *Cf.* Hölscher, *Die Propheten*, 1914. T. H. Robinson, in the *Classical Quarterly* for October 1917, 'Baal in Hellas,' in the *Interpreter* for July 1917, 'Prolegomena to the Study of the Prophets,' and the *Expositor* for March 1921, 'The Ecstatic Element in Hebrew Prophecy.' Also G. A. Barton, *Religion of Israel*, pp. 83 *ff.*

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as Nebiim of Baal. They flung themselves by music and dancing into ecstatic excitement, and trooped through the country to inspire the people for Yahweh, and to inflame their patriotism.' [1]

Wellhausen and Smend take the same view. Indeed, the facts are too clear to be ignored, when once the natural prejudice to associating such manifestations with true religion has been overcome. At the same time there was a strong feeling—and in most quarters there still is such a feeling—that the Prophets whose words have been preserved for us in the Old Testament were men of another type. It was felt that their message was too pure and holy a thing to be contaminated with the methods of the old Baal-Prophets, and the impression of sober truth which their writings produced seemed to make it impossible that such utterances should have been the product of the wild ecstatic ravings of the earlier 'Nebi'im.' A very fair illustration of the normal explanation of the facts may be seen in A. B. Davidson's account of the ecstasy.[2] He believes that there were various forms of experience through which the Prophet passed. In some cases there was no excitation at all. In others the ecstasy might appear, though in very different grades, ranging from mental abstraction—almost 'absent-mindedness'—to the waking trance and even to the dream.

The weakness of such a position as Davidson's is that it fails to account for the muscular activities which appear so prominently in the accounts of the earlier Nebi'im. Perhaps an earlier generation did not clearly recognize them. For they are often summed up in the word 'dance,' and to the modern mind the term is apt to imply set figures deliberately invented and often laboriously learnt. Now whatever the Prophets of Gibeah did, we may take it for granted that their movements were not those of a Minuet or of the Lancers. That they moved in some sort of rhythm seems certain, but that the movements themselves were prearranged or concerted may be strongly suspected.

[1] *Geschichte der israelitischen Religion*, 1907, p. 96.

[2] See especially ch. ix of Davidson's posthumous work, *Old Testament Prophecy*.

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Writhing of the body, contortions of the muscles, frantic waving and jerking of the arms and legs, these are probably nearer to the actual facts.

The next step was to attribute the same kind of experience to the Canonical Prophets. Difficulties and objections to this view have already been suggested, and it must be admitted that at present they seem to be very strong. But at the same time there are certain considerations which are beyond dispute. One is the very simple fact that the Canonical Prophets were called Prophets. If Amaziah mistook Amos for an ordinary Nabi', it is clear that he bore some resemblance to men to whom the word was normally applied. The epithet 'madman' is used by implication of Jeremiah. There is some reason for believing that to their contemporaries the Canonical Prophets were only distinguished from the popular Nebi'im by the content of their message. This is borne out by the record of their experiences itself. As Gray remarks,[1] Isaiah's call came to him in an ecstatic vision. The trances to which Ezekiel was subject can be paralleled elsewhere in connection with the prophetic ecstasy. The symbolic action which is recorded of Isaiah, Jeremiah and Ezekiel is characteristic of the same state. Some of the prophetic oracles exhibit a vividness which is best explained by the fact that they are actual experiences, as real to the subject of them as those of the ordinary working world. Isaiah, at least, had no doubt that he had *seen* Yahweh, and the same remark may be made of Amos, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel. It should be added that we may very reasonably doubt whether the Prophets would have dared to give such a message as theirs unless they had received some unmistakable sign or warrant of its divine origin. Men universally believed that the ecstatic was inspired by God to see what he saw and to hear what he heard—true or false—and here was the guarantee that a man needed for the utterance of truths so striking and unpopular as those enunciated by the Canonical Prophets. And it may be held to be almost certain that apart from such a guarantee no prophet

[1] On Is. ch. vi.

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would have been allowed to live after the proclamation of his message. At no time would an oriental in the position of Amaziah have refrained from cutting the throat of an Amos unless the latter had been under some sort of *tabu*. The acquittal of Jeremiah by the secular authorities (Jer. xxvi) on the ground that he had spoken in the name of Yahweh is most significant in this connexion. So also is the story of the means adopted by his enemies during the siege of Jerusalem in order to silence him.

There thus seem to be strong grounds for the theory developed by Hölscher, whose *Die Propheten* (1914) is the most thorough exposition of the view sketched above.[1] But it should be frankly stated that it is very far from being generally accepted in this country, and appears to have taken no hold on American scholarship whatever. Thus Buttenwieser[2] holds strongly to the older view, and will admit no ecstatic element in the Canonical Prophets whatever. On the other hand both Duhm and Cornill agree that there must have been some 'absolutely unmistakable objective criterion whereby divine revelations could be recognized as such.'[3] Marti and Duhm, again, are quite clear as to the sense of another personality which the Prophet carried with him.[4] This is represented as being either the person who spoke to him, or the person within him who was the recipient of revelation. One recalls the statement of Saul to Samuel, that he should become 'another man.' Bertholet is even clearer[5]; Kraetschmar, however, regards Ezekiel's ecstasy as a symptom of disease, and follows Giesebrecht in holding the development of such phenomena in his case to be a sign of decline from the purer type of prophecy current before the Exile.[6]

[1] An earlier statement of the position was Stade's. *Cf. Z.A.T.W.*, 1903, pp. 157 *ff. Biblische Theologie des alten Testaments*, p. 208 (cited by Buttenwieser).

[2] *Prophets of Israel*, 1914, esp. pp. 136, 151, 161.

[3] On Jer. xlii 7. The language is Cornill's, but Duhm's is very similar. It is curious that neither commits himself to an attempt to describe the criterion.

[4] On Is. xxi 6, with reference also to Zechariah.

[5] On Ez. i 3.

[6] *Das Buch Ezekiel*, Intr. p. vi.

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We have thus three main types of view current to-day. There is the older one which still survives in some quarters, which denies that there was any real ecstasy at all in the case of the Canonical Prophets. There is also the extreme view, typified by Hölscher, but held as yet by comparatively few scholars. It is, however, gaining ground in this country, and has recently received very strong support from its adoption by Dr. Skinner.[1] Intermediate between these two are those who accept a partial or an occasional ecstasy. Thus Dr. Gray, whilst stating explicitly that the experience recorded in Is. vi is ecstatic, would probably deny that *all* Isaiah's oracles were dependent on this condition. And there seems to be a general feeling that in the case of the Canonical Prophets the ecstasy lacked the wilder manifestations which it had in the Nebi'im. This means, of course, a partial and not a complete ecstasy, and whilst the point does not affect the general outlook and exegesis of the Prophets, Dr. Skinner seems to be right in pointing out that Jeremiah had 'no *psychological* test by which true prophecy can be distinguished from false.'[2] It may well be true that as time went on the more extravagant features of prophetic behaviour disappeared, but if so they disappeared at an equal rate in the ordinary Nabi, and in the Canonical Prophet.

Whilst, as has just been remarked, the theory that all the prophetic utterances had their origin in ecstasy has not yet commanded the general assent of British scholarship, there seems little doubt that it will ultimately do so. There will, of course, be modifications. The gradual fading of its more startling forms of expression may be admitted, but it is worth noting that the view which will probably hold the field is the exact opposite of Giesebrecht's, noted above. As the ecstasy declines in intensity, it would seem that prophecy declines in value and originality. Much of the objection disappears when it is realized that the theory is not one of a purely mechanical inspiration, in which the Prophet is unconscious, nor is it even contended

[1] *Prophecy and Religion* (1922), esp. pp. 10 *ff.*

[2] *Op. cit.* p. 194.

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that his utterances were not the expression of his own opinion. All that is suggested is the machinery which led to the actual delivery of the message and to some extent gave it its form. Thoughts may have been long in the mind of a Prophet which he would never dare to utter unless and until he had the divine sanction, warrant and guarantee, which came to him in the ecstatic experience. When that warrant reached him, it appeared in the form of sights or sounds, appealing only to his second consciousness, and thus determined the actual shape which his words were to take.

If the oracles which have been handed down to us were the description of what the Prophet had seen or heard in the ecstatic state, then so far as they are concerned there was no room for an elaborate literary structure. Moreover, the experiences seem to have been of short duration, and the account given of them would not be long. It is at this point that a recognition of the ecstatic element affects exegesis. In place of the long 'sermons,' we have now to deal with brief and incisive utterances, delivered at different times and under different circumstances. These would be written down, sometimes by the Prophet himself, but oftener by others, perhaps after a considerable interval. They would be gradually collected by persons who wished to have by them some record of what an individual Prophet had said. In some cases there were anonymous oracles which collectors would include in their little booklets, and thus ascribe to one or other of the well-known Prophets. In some cases such 'floating' oracles would be adopted by more than one collector. Evidence of this is to be seen in the fact that from time to time the same oracle appears in different books. The older explanation was that these were copied by one Prophet from the published work of another. But this will not cover such cases as the presence of the same oracle in Jer. vi 22–25, and l 41–43. It will be noted that in the latter passage the oracle has been mutilated and has been altered to suit Babylon. This illustrates the perils, both intentional and accidental, to which these

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oracles were exposed in course of transmission before they found a harbour in some larger volume.

There are, of course, cases in which longer and more artificial passages appear. Three books, those of Ezekiel, Haggai and Zechariah,[1] are entirely of this type,[2] and there is a good deal of similar matter in Jeremiah. All except a few fairly long poems in Ezekiel are in prose, and all are in the first person. In all cases except Jeremiah, dates are occasionally attached to the sections. It is these books and passages which one most readily suspects of having been compiled by the Prophet himself, or, in the case of the more isolated sections, of having been committed to writing by him, though even so, the substance of the message was probably perceived by the Prophet in the ecstatic state. But it does not seem likely that the collections of the short poetic oracles were made by him.

The first book in which this has been generally recognized is the Book of Isaiah. From the time of Duhm's Commentary (1892) onwards, it has been generally admitted that this book consists of a number of collections of oracles, and that the Prophet himself was responsible for the writing and arrangement of little more than a portion of what is contained in chs. xxviii–xxx. Such, at least, is the view held by Duhm, Marti, and Kennett,[3] though Gray appears to allow to the Prophet a much wider literary activity. The presence of such small collections of oracles within the larger volume is less evident in other books, though it has been recognized in the case of Jeremiah. Indeed, there are unmistakable evidences of such collections, especially in the oracles against the foreign nations, who are dealt with in chs. xlvi–li.[4] The Twelve are for the most part too short to exhibit traces of such a process,

[1] *Cf.* Kennett, *Composition of the Book of Isaiah*, pp. 5–7.

[2] The reference is, of course, only to the original Book of Zechariah, comprising chs. i–viii of the Canonical Book.

[3] *Composition of the Book of Isaiah*, esp. pp. 5–7, 39–42.

[4] *Cf.* T. H. Robinson in the *J.T.S.* for January and April 1918, on 'The Structure of Jeremiah l, li,' and in the *Expositor* for July 1920, on 'The Structure of the Book of Jeremiah.'

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but it is possible that we have in the Book of Hosea two such collections, the first of which is very short and comprises only chs. i and ii. In one other case, that of the Book of Obadiah, we have quite clearly a collection of such oracles all concerned with Edom.[1]

It is quite obvious that such a view of the structure of the prophetic books is inevitable for students who believe that the ecstatic element played a large part in the actual deliverance of the oracles. But it is quite possible for scholars who deny, or at least suspect, the ecstasy to accept the newer critical position. An important paper was read before the Society for Old Testament Study in January 1921 by Professor W. B. Stevenson, on *Isaiah xl–lv viewed as a Collection of Prophetic Utterances*. Dr. Stevenson entirely rejects the ecstatic view, but holds strongly that these chapters consist of a collection of oracles which were originally independent, but have been woven into a whole by a later compiler. This is particularly important, because of all prophetic collections this is the one which has most strongly stamped upon it the impression of being a continuous whole, in which the material follows the chronological order of events. So much is this so that Rothstein, who denies the existence of poetry elsewhere in the Prophets, regards this as a great epic of the fall of Babylon.

One of the questions which immediately face the student is that of deciding where one oracle ends and the next begins. There are several criteria which may be used. In a good many cases the phrase 'Thus saith the Lord' is prefixed to an oracle. No doubt this is sometimes due to textual corruption, but where it occurs in the original text it practically always serves as the compiler's indication of the beginning of a new oracle. In the same way the phrase, 'Saith the Lord'—more literally 'the oracle of Yahweh'—occurs at the end of the oracle, though this is even more often textually doubtful than the former. Still, it must have been used in some places, and where it is original it certainly marks the close of the individual

[1] *Cf.* T. H. Robinson in the *J.T.S.* for July 1916, on 'The Structure of the Book of Obadiah.'

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section, a kind of signature vouching for the authenticity and inspiration of the passage under which it stands. Another criterion may be seen in a change of subject. In normal cases the oracle deals only with a single thought or metaphor, and when this gives place to another, we may be fairly sure that we are in a different section. The third point to be considered is the metrical one. It is quite obvious that in the very short oracles of which our prophetic books are composed, there is no room for any strophic structure beyond the simple couplet or pair of lines. There are one or two exceptions, such as Is. ix 7–x 4+v 26–29, where the occurrence of a refrain makes the strophic organization obvious, and possibly Am. i–ii. At the same time the artificial appearance of these poems may possibly be due to a compiler, a theory which would explain the appearance of later material within the whole. But the metrical character remains unchanged throughout the oracle, and where the metre can be identified with certainty, a change from one of the regular rhythms (or combinations of rhythms) to another may be held always to imply movement from one oracle to another.

This composite character of the prophetic matter has been more and more realized. We may take as an illustration Is. i.[1] Duhm makes the following analysis: 'The first small collection, ch. i, contains the speech v. 2–17, the two sayings v. 18–20, the poem v. 21–26 with the addition in v. 28f. and the fragment v. 29–31.' It may be noted that Duhm especially calls attention to the close connection between vv. 9 and 10. He regards v. 18 as entirely independent of vv. 19f, and suggests that the last section is the conclusion of a longer poem. Marti practically agrees with Duhm, but admits the possibility and even the probability of another division after v. 9. Gray insists on the division at the end of v. 9 and calls attention to the changes in metrical character at the end of vv. 3 and 16b.

[1] Delitzsch may be cited as an exponent of the older view. He speaks of the whole chapter as a single 'address,' though he recognizes pauses after vv. 9 and 20. Dillman's treatment is somewhat similar.

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He does not, however, clearly separate v. 4 from v. 3, or 16c from 16b, though a break in the latter case appears in his translation. Cheyne finds seven sections, with breaks after vv. 4, 9, 17, 20, 26, and 28.

Let us now glance at the passage with the criteria already mentioned in mind. Vv. 2–3 are in a hexameter rhythm, the first line being 2 : 2 : 2 and the rest 3 : 3. They deal with Israel's faithlessness from Yahweh's point of view, and draw the contrast between the animal who knows his master and the child who deserts or neglects his father. The prevailing rhythm of vv. 4–9, when relieved of one or two textual additions, is 2 : 2, with possible 3 : 2 or 2 : 3 lines. Also the subject is not quite that of the preceding verses, for it is a description of the sufferings of Israel, sufferings which result from her sin. Vv. 10–16b are a denunciation of ritual and sacrifice, the rhythm being mainly 3 : 2, with a markedly different type of parallelism from the preceding passage; 16c ('Cease to do evil') —17 form an exhortation to social morality whose form suggests that of the 'māshāl,' and whose rhythm and parallelism recall those of vv. 4–8. V. 18 is the great invitation. Its first line is 2 : 2, and the other two are 3 : 2. Vv. 19–20 are again of the 'māshāl' type, and the rhythm is 2 : 2, v. 20 closing with a kind of 'signature,' 'for the mouth of Yahweh hath spoken it.' This is similar to the 'Oracle of Yahweh' signature, though not, of course, identical with it. Vv. 21–26 form a typical 'dirge,' whose prevailing rhythm is 3 : 2, though there are several hexameter lines which may be due to textual corruption. Vv. 27f are clearly an appendix thereto. Vv. 29–31 again stand apart, being a denunciation of the worship which was connected with certain old Canaanite symbols. The rhythm of the first two verses is 2 : 2, that of v. 31, 3 : 2. We have, then, no less than eight separate and independent oracular pieces, which owe their combination to a compiler. Further, it may be noted that most of them have received minor accretions, and that one of them has had two whole verses appended to it. In this latter case, at any rate, it is natural to suspect that the addition was made before

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the oracle was included in the collection, *i.e.* before the collection was formed.

We may take another illustration from Jer. iv 5–31. Duhm (1901) makes the whole section a part of the collection of 'Scythian Songs,' differing from those which appear in chs. v and vi in the fact that they originated in Anathoth before Jeremiah was compelled to flee to Jerusalem. He finds five separate songs, vv. 5–8, 11b–18, 19–21, 23–26, and 29–31, attributing the remaining verses to an editor. Erbt (1902) finds the following divisions: vv. 5–8, 10, 11–12, 13, 15–17a, 19–21, 23–26, 29–30, 31, and attributes the rest to an editor. Giesebrecht[1] (1905) analyzes the passage into vv. 5–8, 9–10, 11–14, 15–21, 27–28, 29–31. Vv. 22–26 are 'without discernible metre, and on other grounds to be regarded as spurious'—surely the most extraordinary judgement that was ever passed on that marvellous passage! Cornill (1905) seems to regard the whole as a continuous passage, divided into his ordinary four-line stanzas, though he recognizes that vv. 23–26 have a more majestic rhythm than the rest. Peake (1910) appears to follow Cornill. Skinner (1922) speaks of a 'selection of short poetic effusions.' These are vv. 5b–8, 13–14, 15–17, 19–21, 23–26, 29, 30–31, while he doubtfully assigns v. 10 as an isolated fragment to another period than the rest. It will be seen that Skinner's analysis is practically identical with Erbt's, except that he does not appear to include vv. 11–12 amongst the original oracles of Jeremiah.

We now turn to the text itself. Vv. 5–8 utter a warning to flee from some coming enemy. The rhythm is predominantly 3 : 2. Vv. 9–10 are in prose. There is a short comparison of the enemy to a sirocco in vv. 11b–12, with the same rhythm as vv. 5–8. Vv. 13–14 describe the advance of cavalry, and 14b is clearly a conclusion. The rhythm is the same. Vv. 15–17 tell of the swift

[1] *Jeremias Metrik.* Curiously enough he takes little account of the metre in his Commentary, where he divides the whole chapter into three, vv. 3–10, 11–18, 19–26, remarking that each section may be further divided into two, with a seventh stanza in 27–31.

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approach of the enemy—again a similar rhythm, though the 2 : 2 seems to predominate over the 3 : 2. V. 18 is an exhortation to repentance—the first suggestion in this section that Israel's misfortunes are due to her sin, and as v. 17 ends with 'the Oracle of Yahweh,' v. 18 is almost certainly an isolated 3 : 2 couplet. Vv. 19–21 are the cry of the Prophet's own heart, in 3 : 2 or 2 : 2 lines. V. 22 has the same rhythm, and again clearly stands alone. Vv. 23–26 form the great vision of chaos, and exhibit the rare but stately 4 : 3 rhythm. Vv. 27–28 have the 'thus saith the Lord' before it, and are in 3 : 3. The following verse, 29, describes the flight of the country folk before the enemy, with the same rhythm as the preceding, but differentiated by its subject. Vv. 30–31, on the other hand, give a general description of the sufferings of Judah, and their rhythm is the pentameter.

These two examples, taken at random from two books which have received a good deal of attention in the last thirty years, will suffice to shew the general position of the Twentieth-century student on the subject of the structure of the prophetic books. No doubt there remains yet much to be done. The methods of the compilers of the smaller collections deserve a far more thorough study than they have yet received. One or two points are already clear. One is the habit of grouping together oracles which are concerned with foreign peoples. Duhm has a great deal to say in criticism of the dullness and the repetitions in the 'Oracle against Babylon,' in Jer. l, li. One need not be suspected of wishing to defend the Jeremianic authorship of these chapters if one remarks that this criticism on their style and literary value is absolutely beside the point. The chapters do not form 'an oracle,' but a collection of oracles and oracular fragments. Many of them, no doubt, are repetitions of commonplace phrases, but there are one or two which seem to have a really high artistic merit. There is a vigour in the image of the hammer in l 23, and there is a genuine pathos in the picture of Babylon as an incurable invalid in li 7–9. Collections of this kind of oracle seem to have been made by such Prophets as

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compiled their own work—Ezekiel is a case in point. But similar collections occur in Isaiah, Jeremiah, Amos, and possibly Zephaniah. It is noticeable that they nearly always contain sections which cannot be attributed to the Prophet under whose name they are now current. This fact indicates the tendency of the compilers to gather into their little booklets anything that seemed to be of the same general type.

Another feature of the work of the compilers is their habit of linking oracles to one another because of some link-word or phrase that they had in common.[1] We may refer again to Is. i. As we saw, the two oracles in vv. 2–3 and 4–9 probably had nothing in common originally. But the former of these two is concerned with children, and children are spoken of in v. 4. So the compiler placed them side by side. V. 9 closed with a mention of Sodom, and v. 10 gives that name to Judah. It can hardly be doubted that in these two cases the presence of these 'link-words' was responsible for the juxtaposition of the oracles, though there are necessarily a number of instances in which they do not occur.

In one instance at least there seems to have been a real understanding of the historical situation, and a desire to arrange the oracles in chronological order. This is the case of Is. xl–lv, where the actual course of events can be traced by the reader through the whole collection. There are passages which cannot be assigned to any definite point in the story, and which must have been included by the compiler on other grounds. Such are the famous 'Servant Songs,' on whose origin and original application

[1] I may perhaps be forgiven for mentioning the work of the late Rev. R. A. Aytoun, of Birmingham, whose early death was one of the most serious losses Old Testament scholarship in this country has sustained in recent years. He had studied very thoroughly the oracular collections with a view to ascertaining the habits and methods of the compilers, but unfortunately none of his work in this direction was found to be in a form suitable for publication. I have reason to believe that valuable work has been done by at least one distinguished living scholar, and we may yet hope for an exhaustive discussion of the subject.—T. H. R.

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no sort of unanimity has yet been reached. There are a few other cases in which a similar attempt has been made at chronological sequence; instances may perhaps be seen in some of the Isaiah collections.

The realization of the actual conditions of the transmission of the words of the Prophets has inevitably made a considerable difference both to criticism and to exegesis. The last generation used to speak a good deal of 'interpolation,' and whilst we recognized the fact that a large number of marginal glosses would inevitably be incorporated in the text, some of us wondered how it was that 'redactors' should often have chosen places so unsuitable for the insertion of their later material. It is noticeable that a number of these 'interpolations'—quite easily recognizable as coming from another author than the Prophet responsible for the majority of the oracles in the book—appear at the end of sections or booklets. And even where they occur in the middle of such collections, their presence is easily understood on the hypothesis that the work of bringing the separate oracles together was done by someone who was not necessarily a literary expert, and was far more anxious to secure the perpetuation of an inspired message than to honour the memory of a particular individual. As Canon Kennett remarks: 'We must never lose sight of the fact that the compilers of the books of the Prophets were actuated not by any archaeological interest in the sayings of holy men of old, but by a desire to provide spiritual edification for their own time.'[1]

One of the reasons which used to be advanced for rejecting the originality of passages was that they 'interrupted the connexion' between what preceded them and what followed them. This argument is no longer normally valid. In most cases there was no connexion between the two separated passages. This does not mean the rejection of other arguments which tend to shew the spuriousness of such sections, but there will be a number of instances in which this was always the strongest reason for excision. Thus it is claimed that Hos. xii 4b–7 interrupts

[1] *Composition of the Book of Isaiah*, p. 83.

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the connexion between vv. 4a and 8 (Harper, citing Nowack as concurring). Other reasons are advanced for the rejection of the verses in question, and they may still be valid. But, as a matter of fact, there is no real original connexion between vv. 4b and 8. The oracle which closes with v. 4 has a hexameter rhythm, whilst that which begins with v. 8, though not absolutely regular in the present state of the text, is more probably 3 : 2 than anything else. The disputed verses are in fact an expansion of the original oracle which had probably been made before the compiler placed the two side by side. Again, Harper regards Am. v 8–9 as an interpolation which breaks in between vv. 7 and 10. There is nothing whatever in the two verses themselves which makes them unsuitable in the mouth of Amos, and there is no necessary connexion between vv. 7 and 10. Both seem to be isolated fragments. It is further unlikely that v. 11 was originally attached to v. 10 (as Harper's strophic theory requires), inasmuch as the rhythm of v. 10 is clearly 3 : 3, whilst that of 11–12a is equally clearly 3 : 2. Another illustration may be taken from Mi. i 2–9, where most critical editors [1] cut out v. 7 on the ground that it interrupts the connexion between vv. 6 and 8. It does, if it be held proved that there was an original connexion between those two verses. But the prevailing rhythm of vv. 2–6 is 3 : 2, that of v. 8 unmistakably 3 : 3, and whereas in vv. 2–6 Yahweh speaks, in v. 8 it is the Prophet. The most pronounced anthropomorphism would hardly represent Yahweh as going barefoot and naked in token of mourning! V. 7 might well be the conclusion of the first oracle, for it does not fit in at all badly with the threat of destruction, but the Prophet's lament in v. 8 (and 9? [2]) was once an independent item, which a collector not unnaturally thought suitable to the occasion. Some adherents of the newer school may possibly propose fewer excisions than the older one,[3] though a good many will feel rather

[1] *E.g.* Marti and Powis Smith. Nowack recognizes that the break comes after v. 7.

[2] The rhythm of v. 9 is doubtful, and conjectural emendation is necessary if it is to be reduced to any recognized metrical form.

[3] *Cf.* Gray, *Isaiah* (Int. Crit. Comm.) pp. lvi–lix.

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more uncertainty as to the personal identity of the author of any particular oracle.

We are thus carried back to a time when the oracles of the Prophets were written, possibly after a long history in oral tradition, on separate scraps and in isolated fragments. We have a vision of eager and devout men, who accepted the words of the great teachers of Israel as coming from the very presence of God, and as possessing a value for themselves and for all time. In their search for truth they gathered here a brief oracular lyric and there a mutilated fragment, and as best they could they put them together. Tradition, oral or written, ascribed a large proportion of these to one or other of a small group of men. Their names were known, and certain details of the personal lives of two or three. Gradually, especially in the cases of those who were best known to history, the smaller collections were combined into larger ones—much as the Psalter grew—and so by slow degrees reached the form which they have to-day. But much of what has been handed down to us is strictly anonymous, and may have owed its preservation to the accident of its being included in a larger collection. Some of the noblest of all prophetic utterances occur in such isolated and nameless fragments. The spiritual life of the Jewish and Christian world would have been the poorer without such passages as Is. ii 2–4 (= Mi. iv 1–4) and Mi. vi 6–8, and the identity of the human media through whom they were given is lost to us for ever.

Yet we cannot regret this. Profoundly valuable as are the personalities of an Isaiah, a Jeremiah, an Ezekiel, a Hosea, or an Amos, no true critic would ever dare to limit the activity of the Spirit of God in the revelation of His will and character. Beside the message itself the messenger is insignificant. The newer study has served to bring home to us the sense of a wider scope and a broader field for the play of divine inspiration. Those of us who believe in the continued presence and working of God in the world will welcome a recognition of the facts, and will see the development of a supreme plan and purpose, not merely in the actual deliverance of the prophetic oracles, but in the process of selection and to some extent the arrangement

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which has handed them down to us. The instruments are human, but the truth they transmit is divine. It may be that the pen has slipped and sputtered from time to time, and it may be that it is of cruder type and make than we had thought, but such a discovery will only sharpen our determination to decipher its script. It becomes increasingly true to our eyes that God, 'who in these last days hath spoken unto us by his Son,' also 'at sundry times and in divers manners spake unto our fathers by the Prophets.'

THEODORE H. ROBINSON.

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ART. VI.—THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE.

1. *Psychopathology of Everyday Life.* By S. FREUD. (London: T. Fisher Unwin.)
2. *Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis.* By the same. (London: G. Allen and Unwin Ltd. 1922.)
3. *Analytical Psychology.* By C. G. JUNG. Second edition. (London: Baillière, Tindall and Cox. 1917.)
4. *Psychology of the Unconscious.* By the same. (London: Kegan Paul. 1921.)
5. *Introduction to Social Psychology.* By W. MCDOUGALL. Fifteenth edition. (London: Methuen. 1920.)
6. *The Foundations of Character.* By A. F. SHAND. Second edition. (London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd. 1920.)
7. *Instinct and the Unconscious.* By W. H. R. RIVERS. (Cambridge: University Press. 1920.)
8. *Suggestion and Auto-Suggestion.* By C. BAUDOUIN. Sixth edition. (London: G. Allen and Unwin Ltd. 1922.)
9. *Suggestion and Mental Analysis.* By WILLIAM BROWN. (London: University of London Press.)
10. *Psychology and Psychotherapy.* By the same. (London: Arnold. 1922.)
11. *The New Psychology and its Relation to Life.* By A. G. TANSLEY. Sixth edition. (London: G. Allen and Unwin Ltd. 1922.)

And other Works.

THERE is no doubt at all that the New Psychology must be taken seriously, though it is by no means an easy matter to discover exactly what the New Psychology is. That

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the New Psychology exists we have not only Mr. Tansley's assurance, but the witness of the whole Press, daily and weekly, serious and comic. Public interest has been stirred in no mean degree. The recent output of books upon psychology in all its branches is enormous. It is clear enough that something is afoot, but even those who are more than casual readers may well be excused a little perplexity as to its real nature. There are far too many books being written and it is difficult to pick out those which make any serious contribution to knowledge. Some at least of the writers would have done well if they had sat down to think before they sat down to write. We should be grateful to Mr. Tansley for his courageous attempt to survey the field. Without his book it would be a chaos indeed.

Yet, as we have said, the New Psychology must be taken seriously, and not least by those who are concerned for the progress of religious thought and practice. There can be no question that we are now being faced with the third, perhaps the final, phase of the debate between 'science' and 'religion.' To many minds the New Psychology comes with an apparent explanation of the experiences which we specially term religious. God, we are told, is to be explained by the principle of Projection; the religious sanctions are merely a distortion of the Herd-Sentiment; doctrine is a huge screen of Rationalization whereby these fantasies, so useful for the ordering of human life, are guarded from the over-curious scrutiny of the critic.

As a plain matter of fact the New Psychology has not altered the ultimate metaphysical situation at all. The old questions remain and the various answers remain. For practically none of the almost innumerable writers concerned, with one or two honourable exceptions, *e.g.* Dr. William Brown, shews any appreciation of the fact that metaphysical questions exist and that description and explanation are two very different things indeed. When this is realized the debate will be over. The conflict between religion and science will be seen to be unreal,

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and each will be allowed to claim the whole of existence for its undisputed sphere. Meanwhile the situation badly needs clarifying. To that end we must first of all attempt to define the New Psychology, and this is no very simple matter.

We may start by contrasting it with the psychology of the past. Mediaeval psychology is, of course, frankly a branch of theology. The existence of the soul is assumed and the problems of psychology are the problems of its origin, its sinful condition, and its ultimate destiny. It is with the work of Descartes and Locke that modern psychology emerges, in the attempt to analyze and to classify the contents of the human mind. Dr. Aveling has amplified this theme in his recent inaugural lecture,[1] and it is unnecessary to go over the same ground again, except to notice one or two particular points.

In the first place the older psychology identified the contents of mind with those of consciousness. The ideas or qualities of which it spoke were always ideas or qualities of which some mind or other was aware. This assumption led to a whole series of difficulties, familiar to the student of philosophy. Of these the most important for our purpose are two: (*a*) those connected with the existence of 'innate ideas' in the mind, a hypothesis rendered necessary by the apparent (and too lightly assumed) uniformity in the experience of different people, but one which proved wholly incapable of resisting the solvent criticism of Berkeley and Hume; and (*b*) those connected with the linking together of ideas in more or less constant series or groups.

The discussion of these two sets of problems gave rise to important developments in psychological inquiry. The quest for 'innate ideas,' or rather the assumption that something of the kind must exist, is directly linked with the system of 'faculty-psychology,' resting upon the belief that there are in the mind certain innate faculties, common to mankind and forming the basis of different types of behaviour and of experience. The failure of the faculty-psychology was due mainly to its lack of what it would

[1] *Church Quarterly Review*, April 1922.

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have termed the 'critical faculty.' It was only too easy to devise hypothetical faculties to account for anything and everything in life. The assumption, for example, of a religious or an artistic faculty was perilously easy to make, and useful enough for the apologists, but it explained nothing whatever. To postulate a religious faculty tells us nothing at all about the existence of God. It is merely a facile shelving of a problem. Least of all does the faculty-psychology explain itself. It can tell us neither the origin of the faculties which it assumes nor what they may be when they are not actually in use.

Somewhat similar criticisms hold in the case of the other main development, the association psychology, which, indeed, becomes painfully aware in Hume of its own deficiencies. This psychology is, in fact, frankly descriptive. It tells us that ideas, memories, mental images, have a tendency to grouping by association, through similarity, contiguity, and other relating factors, and that the occurrence in consciousness of any member of such a group has a tendency to bring the other members into consciousness too. This, of course, is mere description. Again, nothing is explained. The dynamic of the process remains completely shrouded in mystery. And again we have the cardinal difficulty. What is an idea when it is not present to consciousness, a memory when it is not being recalled? And where are they stored? These two developments of psychology remain of importance to-day, the former, vastly amended, in the modern theory of the instincts, and the latter, hardly changed at all in principle but enormously complicated and elaborated, in the recent remarkable explorations of psycho-analysis.

In the second place it is significant that the older psychology concerned itself solely with the normal mind, making the serious assumption that it knew what a normal mind was. The extravagances and irrelevancies of mental life were simply set on one side as meaningless for the understanding whether of mind or of reality. The dreams, fears, and obsessions of so-called normal people were classed with the more obvious vagaries of the lunatic as possessing

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no significance for scientific thought. And this is perhaps one of the main reasons why psychology remained for so long a science of the few. The man in the street is not greatly interested in the normal and ordinary. That he takes for granted. But the abnormal, whether in himself or in others, is a matter for fear or worship. He has always known that dreams contain strange revelations for those who can read them, that lunatics and witches have access to realms of reality inaccessible to ordinary men. If the psychologist took more interest in systems of ideas and systems of nerves than in visions and ghosts and black magic, so much the worse for him. The man in the street took very little interest in the psychologist.

In contrasting the New Psychology with the Old we may start from this last point. Its first and most obvious feature is its immense comprehensiveness. Its motto might well be *Nihil humani alienum a me puto.* It is, in fact, much more rigorous and more scientific than the earlier systems. The new era dawns with the work of Galton, who began the investigation of the more curious corners of normal minds by calling attention to such phenomena as number-forms and colour-hearing. This line of investigation was carried to great lengths by William James, who deserves in many respects to be called the founder of the New Psychology. It is significant too that in William James we find psychology associated with pragmatism, a philosophy so empirical as to be a very denial of metaphysic. The whole tendency of the New Psychology has been empirical and pragmatic. It has opened its arms to so many facts that it is in some danger of being mastered by them, a danger conspicuous, for example, in Jung's *Psychology of the Unconscious*, in which there are indeed *multa non multum.*

The line of inquiry opened up by Galton led to great developments in the study of abnormal minds. The investigations of Charcot and Janet into the phenomena of hysteria, with its extreme case of double consciousness or co-consciousness, and its treatment by hypnosis, brought the whole field of the abnormal, up to the extremest limits

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of insanity, within the scope of psychology. And this quickly reacted upon the psychology of normal minds. Methods of mental analysis elaborated by Breuer, Freud, and Jung, at first simply as means of diagnosis and treatment, were soon seen to be capable of the very widest application.

It was at this point that the man in the street awoke to sudden and intense interest. The New Psychology had come to the things which seemed to him curious, irrelevant and yet important. It talked about his mental lapses, his obsessions, his weaknesses (and those of his friends), and, most exciting of all, his dreams. He had often had dreams and had always thought that they meant something. And so he bought Freud's *Traumdeutung* and read it with avidity. It is true that he shut it up with a snap before he had got very far, saying that whatever his dreams meant, he was quite sure that they didn't mean *that*, but his interest was awake all the same, and has remained awake.

The interest was further stimulated by the very remarkable cures which have resulted from this new knowledge. This has been very largely a result of the War, when the phenomenon conveniently but inaccurately known as shell-shock, and the very dramatic cures which often took place, caught the public imagination. Many quite ordinary folk found themselves or their immediate friends very abnormal indeed, and then cured almost as it seemed by magic. The possibilities of mental disturbance and mental re-adjustment, with their equivalents in the physical sphere, seemed almost unlimited. The age of miracles had come again.

And thus the key to the interest in the New Psychology which is everywhere displayed to-day is to be found in the catholicity of its range. The man in the street at last suspects that psychology has something to say to him, and something that is new. It will not merely repeat what every normal man knows, or thinks he knows, about himself. It lets light into the dark corners. It explains things that are queer. And often, for those who are pre-

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pared to be honest with themselves, it can be uncommonly useful.

It is perhaps relevant here to notice that there is now a still Newer Psychology, and that the man in the street is not interested in it at all. The quaint theory known as Behaviourism, which to the philosopher presents the phenomenon, not unknown in philosophical circles, of persistently standing upon its logical head, is a reversion again to the more familiar types of psychology, in that it presents us with an interpretation of normal life. It is quite true that this interpretation is bizarre enough, since it persistently ignores the conscious element in consciousness, and, indeed, asserts that consciousness is something which it palpably and tangibly is not. But this interests only the few. For ordinary folk it does not matter whether they are standing on their logical heads or not, provided that their material feet stand firm on mother earth.

The second main feature of the New Psychology is that it applies the scientific principle of Cause and Effect rigorously throughout the whole of this wide range of mental phenomena. This has been called the principle of *Psychical Determinism*, and its effect is that mind is now treated exactly as science in general has hitherto treated matter. Mental phenomena are regarded as involved in a system of causal relationships. This principle is the key to Freud's whole system. It should be noted at the outset that no attempt is made (just as no attempt is made by materialists) to criticize the concept of cause. Since the time of Aristotle four totally distinct kinds of cause have been known, and a little attempt at clear thinking as to the relationship between material, efficient, and final causes might have gone far to illuminate Freud's own system, and have prevented him and Jung from coming, psychologically speaking, to blows with one another. It is really here, and not in its somewhat over-advertized emphasis on sex, that the Freudian psychology is dangerous. It threatens us with a mental determinism just as destructive as the materialistic determinism which is so rapidly breaking down to-day.

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What Freud does is simply to take the old Association psychology without criticism, and to work it out in new and simply amazing detail. Only one thing was necessary in order to make this possible, and that was to discard the time-honoured assumption that mind and consciousness are terms of equal range. In various quarters there had been growing up a belief in what F. W. H. Myers called the subliminal self. This subconscious self or mind, as it is more often termed, has been in practice little more than a dumping-ground for unsolved problems. The philosophers are extremely discontented about it, and with good reason enough. Nevertheless, for the present it is certainly a most convenient hypothesis. It provides room for those innumerable vanished links, for the housing of memories, for all the dislocations and discontinuities which made the Association theory so difficult. In Freud's hands the subconscious takes form, and its several regions, the fore-conscious, the secondary unconscious, and the primary unconscious, are charted out. In general his theory may be summed up as a theory of 'Censorship.' He regards life as resting upon the great primary impulses or 'Libido.' These alone provide the energy of life, and it is with energy derived from the *libido* that all mental elements, ideas, or memories, are invested. The task of the censor is to fit these primary impulses for ordinary civilized life and to harmonize them with one another. This is made possible by sublimation, which permits the transference of energy along lines of association to mental elements or ideas which give rise to activities socially permissible and in harmony with the general life tendencies of the individual concerned. Failure in any part of this task results in neurosis, and the Freudian analysts assert that the disentangling of the complex associations involved in such a case will in itself make a cure possible. The *libido* itself will work out a new life-structure, if sufficient opportunity be given. Probably this is but a small part of the truth, as indeed the later Freudian emphasis on the importance of 'Transference' would seem to indicate.

The whole Freudian scheme is unquestionably a great

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piece of creative insight, and it has formed the basis not only of much subsequent theorizing, but of a development of psycho-therapy of which the success is sufficient warrant for our respect. It is open to criticism in many points of detail, which need not trouble us, and in two or three more serious matters.

The most important of these from the popular point of view has been the wholly disproportionate emphasis upon the sex impulse as the source of almost all if not all neuroses. To some extent this criticism is valid enough, and it has been strongly supported by the long series of war-neuroses, due, in great part, to failure in connexion with the impulse of fear and the self-preservative impulses in general. It should, however, be noted that the criticism is in part due to misunderstanding, and, in fact, to Freud's own rather unfortunate use of terms. When he speaks of the sex impulse he is not, as a rule, thinking of it in its developed adult form. He is thinking rather of those primitive tendencies of infantile life which are built up later into the sexual impulse. It is only through this later connexion that they can be called in any strict sense sexual. It is Freud's critics, and not Freud, that fall into the error of regarding children as miniature adults. Nevertheless it is true that Freud greatly over-emphasizes the sole significance of the sexual and what might be termed the proto-sexual aspects of life. Neurosis can probably result from faulty development or repression of any of the primary impulses.

In his later work at least Freud recognizes clearly enough the importance of the disorders that may arise through an introversion of the impulses that converge upon the ego. It is true that he gives even this a sexual turn by relating it to Narcissism, but it is significant that the disorders of this type, dementia praecox and paranoia, defy his analysis and prove practically unapproachable along his line of treatment. It would seem that the philosopher is right and that the mystery of the ego is not to be solved by any analysis of its states. And where the fundamental unity of the ego itself is the seat of the

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disorder, as probably in all of us it is to some extent a seat of disorder, the remedy is not by psycho-analysis. Perhaps there is no remedy save the Holy Spirit, and indeed some of the results of modern psychotherapy suggest very strongly that in many cases no fundamental cure is possible except a spiritual cure. And spiritual healing is by no means the same thing as mental healing, though they are often enough confused.

A second criticism of the Freudian system is that it is as yet far too much involved in detail. Too much material is being published and in far too many instances the facts of the cases are very insufficiently ascertained and recorded. Very often in reading the literature we have the feeling that the interpretations given rest on very insufficient evidence, and that in some cases at least the mentality of the analyst accounts for his results nearly as much as that of his patients. If the analysts agreed it would be a simpler matter for the outsider to accept their results.

But the main criticism of the Freudian system is that which has emerged in his controversy with Jung and the Zurich school. Here we have psychology itself challenging his fundamental canon of Psychical determinism. This criticism is not that of a philosopher or of a theologian. Jung's *Psychology of the Unconscious* is amply sufficient to prove that he is neither. It comes from one of the most successful and thorough-going of analytical psychologists, and one as well qualified to speak from actual experience as Freud himself. Jung's fundamental conception is of the *libido* or primary life-impulse as in itself constructive and creative. In his analytical work he looks not only to the past, to infantile traumata which have influenced and distorted the mental development, but to the tendencies, the forward reference, of the primary impulses. He seeks to cure his patients not merely by resolving their complexes but by re-education along the lines suggested by their own attempts to solve the problems involved in their neuroses.

This is a new departure. Its affinity with Bergson's philosophy is obvious and has been effectively drawn out

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by Dr. William Brown. It opens the door again for a rational and credible metaphysic, with a place for freedom and a place for the ultimate reality whom we call God. It is true that Jung himself in his later work has branched off, somewhat unfortunately, into a study of mythology which, however learned, is more imaginative than scientific, and which, if accepted, would reduce Christianity entirely to the level of an erotic folk-lore. But this is only an aberration. He has been as unfortunate in his choice of Drews as a typical theologian as Haeckel was when he quoted 'Saladin,' a writer whose name few now remember at all. There are, after all, historical facts, as well as legends. Indeed, without facts legends would not exist. And, further, modern ethnology is rapidly accounting for the diffusion of typical myths on perfectly normal lines, through the migration and transference of culture.[1] The psycho-analytic study of folklore, as attempted both by Freud (in his *Totemism and Taboo*) and Jung, has much to teach us. But it has not yet taken account of all the facts, or of other theories which may more readily explain them.

But whatever criticism may be necessary in detail, this new departure is clearly of great importance. If Freud tries to explain flowers in terms of manure, Jung at least looks to the vital impulse of seed and root. He abandons the mechanistic view of life, and by admitting tendencies, directions, ends, makes possible an outlook which does not do violence to every higher impulse of which we are conscious.

It should be noted that Jung does not in any way abandon the analytic method. That remains, probably, as a permanent addition to our power of understanding the human mind. The extent to which it should and can be used is still a matter for investigation. We know at present little more than that it is a most powerful solvent of mental structure, often invaluable in cases of mental disturbance. Whether it is a safe plaything for the curious

[1] In the work of W. H. R. Rivers, G. Elliott Smith, and W. J. Perry. This is also largely in the experimental stage, but a psychology which ignores it will be merely fanciful.

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is another matter. It may well be that it is easier to reduce mental structure to its component parts than to rebuild what has been pulled down. It is not necessarily good for plants that the gardener should look at their roots. Healthy minds are best as they are.

The third main strand of the New Psychology is the more careful and critical analysis of the primary impulses or instincts.[1] This latter term has been so much abused that it is now becoming almost valueless except for popular use. It has succeeded to the rather disastrous heritage of the old faculty psychology. At first it served a useful purpose in co-ordinating human with animal mentality, but the old difficulty arose again that instincts of all kinds were far too easily invented. Religious and artistic instincts replaced the religious and artistic faculties. We were said to know things 'instinctively.' Any and every action or impulse that did not result from conscious volition was called instinctive.

Clearly the subject needed definition and a more exact survey of the field, and this has been undertaken especially by McDougall, Shand, and Rivers. The principle upon which their work has been based is that of *Biological Continuity*. It is, of course, now generally accepted that there is continuity of physical structure between the animals and man, and that many details of man's physical structure can be illuminated by the study of the parallel structure in animals. With all the obscurities and uncertainties which remain in the evolutionary hypothesis we can never go back behind the work of Darwin. Anatomical kinship of body is too obviously a reality, and it is not too much to say that it is now clear that a similar kinship exists in the sphere of mind. But the thorough-going application of this is something new.

Dr. McDougall defines an instinct as 'an innate specific tendency of the mind common to all the members of any one species,' and in his *Introduction to Social Psychology*

[1] I have used the term 'instinct' in the latter part of this article simply because it is the term in current use in the literature of this class. It is a dangerous word. 'Impulse' is usually preferable.

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he has attempted to make a complete survey of the instincts which are of importance in human life. He makes free use in illustration of material drawn from animal life, and his example has been freely followed by other writers, notably by W. Trotter in his *Instinct of the Herd in Peace and War*. McDougall's list is a short one and he is probably right in regarding the primary impulses of life as few in number, though his actual list will certainly call forth considerable criticism and revision. It is clear enough, to take a few of his most typical instincts, that Fear, Anger, Self-assertion, Self-abasement, Sex, Tender Emotion, and Nutrition, are not all upon the same level of complexity. The objects which arouse them are of widely different kinds, and their manifestations in behaviour are in some cases, as in the case of sex, constant in type; in some cases, as in that of anger, or self-assertion, exceedingly varied.

There is no doubt of the general instinctive character of the impulses included in Dr. McDougall's list. They are actually forces or tendencies of tremendous power in influencing conduct, and they provide the energy which makes conduct possible. But, in the first place, the list itself requires considerable modification. The work of criticism in this respect has been carried out very largely by Mr. A. F. Shand, whose book, *The Foundations of Character*, is one of the few books which stand out from the present psychological chaos as possessing not only a certain literary dignity but also a breadth of outlook and a sympathy of insight which are likely to make it a classic in this field. Mr. Shand not only alters the list of instincts, adding, *e.g.*, Joy and Sorrow, and removing McDougall's Tender Emotion, but he also sees the necessity of introducing a certain grading into the series. There are certain elementary impulses, such as those of rest and exercise, which presumably go back to the very beginnings of organic life. These impulses underlie both the great appetites, to use a distinguishing term for the impulses of nutrition and reproduction, and also the more complex impulses such as fear, anger, disgust. Shand's most important work has lain in his theory of sentiments, in which he shews how these

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various impulses of different grades are linked about definite objects into more or less permanent mental dispositions. This theory is now widely accepted, and we shall have to revert to it again.

In the second place the actual concept of an instinct needs considerable investigation. It is popularly supposed that we know just what we mean when we use the term, but, in spite of McDougall's careful definition, this is very far from being the case. Dr. Rivers has given considerable help in his book on *Instinct and the Unconscious*, but mainly on the biological side. The investigation of importance for theology and philosophy has yet to be made.

One or two considerations are very suggestive. We notice how very curiously the instincts, as described by McDougall and Shand, or again by Mr. Tansley in his convenient summary, are blended of the mental and the physical. Each has, on the one hand, its characteristic type of behaviour or conation, its specific physical activity, and, on the other, its equally characteristic feeling-tone or affect, which definitely pertains to consciousness or, at least, to the mental aspect of life. Further, the physical activity and the affect alike proceed from the apprehension of objects, and here we have the very singular fact that these objects may be, to all appearance, either purely external and physical, as in the case of the thunder-clap that excites fear, or purely mental, as in the case of some memory, recalled from the sub-conscious by association, and arousing either anger or disgust. And here we have a further complication, of the greatest practical importance, that often the object remains, for some reason, buried in the sub-conscious. The memory is not recalled, and yet the practical consequences, both affect and conation, follow. In many cases the buried stimulus can be recovered by analysis, which breaks down the barriers which prevented us from being aware of its presence, and thus the causes of conduct otherwise quite inexplicable may be revealed, usually with convincing force, to the person concerned. There is clearly a problem here for investigation. We need only note that analysis has not solved for

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us the problem of the emergence of consciousness. It is merely stating it in clearer terms for our solution. And it is not by psychology that it will be solved. It is indeed the ultimate problem of all, in one of its many forms, and probably in the end the most that we can ever ask is a reasonable hypothesis, leaving room for faith.

And this brings us to an aspect of this part of the New Psychology which has not been sufficiently emphasized. The mechanism of the instincts has been very fully studied, and may almost be said to be well known. From the point of view of metaphysics, or of theology, this knowledge leads us nowhere. But they have one special characteristic which is very suggestive. The instincts always have a forward reference. Their activity is aroused by particular occasions, but they always look beyond that occasion to some immediate object or purpose. The mechanism of instinct is not only living but progressive. The stimulus results not in a static condition but in a conation. Fear, for example, results in flight from something for the definite and positive end of self-preservation

> He who fights and runs away
> May live to fight another day.

Anger arises when any impulse is thwarted, and aims at the removal of the obstacle with a view to the satisfaction of that impulse.[1] And all the resulting complexities which appear in the developed human life, the repressions, compensation mechanisms, and the rest, have this same forward reference. Even apart from Jung's vitalistic conception of the *libido*, it is obvious from the simple study of instinctive behaviour itself that life looks forward and not backward. And thus we are driven at once to seek for a philosophy of the End which carries us far indeed from a great part of modern psychological thinking. Christianity has something to say here, philosophy much less, psychology nothing.

[1] It should be noted that this gives anger a secondary character in relation to the other great impulses. It is perhaps uncertain what position should be given to it in the list of instincts, especially as among some races of men it appears to be wholly undeveloped.

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A similar situation arises in connexion with Shand's theory of the sentiments, to which allusion has been made. It is now quite generally agreed that the development of conscious life as we know it depends very largely, if not entirely, upon the grouping of the impulses of life about certain particular objects. It is held that it is through the affective element that this grouping is carried out, though the proof of this seems at present rather uncertain. The question that the psychologists do not seem to have faced at all adequately is that of the real function and status of the object itself. To ask this question is to bring the whole metaphysical problem back again.

In the end there are only three ultimate groupings of the impulses of life which have real permanence. The lesser groupings (*e.g.* a photography-sentiment) only have meaning and importance in relation to one of these three. There is first the Ego, secondly other persons, one or more, and thirdly God. There can be no sentiment for things which does not rest ultimately upon one of these three. And these three themselves may not stand in isolation. This is obvious enough in the case of the Ego-sentiment. In isolation it becomes megalomania, a very 'sin unto death.' In the complete human development all three must take their place. And thus the function of religion can be given a neat psychological definition. Religion exists to foster the sentiment for God. If that sentiment is rightly formed the Ego-sentiment and the sentiment for the other or others (altruism, or love) will be rightly adjusted too.

The failure to achieve this right adjustment results in Conflict, which lies at the root of so many mental disorders. This should be solved by a harmonious integration, through sublimation and not through the suppression of any one element. If this process is not successfully achieved, whether through faulty education or through some failure of environment, various unfortunate results follow. We may, for example, have the formation of an anti-social type of life, either in the criminal or in the recluse, through a clash between the ego and the social

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impulse. Or, very commonly, we have the formation of complexes, which are sentiments of which the objects are refused by the main trend of the life of the individual, and which are therefore thrust not out of life but out of consciousness. In the sub-conscious region (Freud's secondary unconscious) they remain, only traceable in consciousness by their effects upon conduct, a mystery to their possessor, but often the source of the gravest mental and physical disorders.

To deal with the problems raised by this development of the New Psychology would demand an article in itself, These problems however may be left on one side in so far as they concern mainly the psycho-therapist. To their theoretical aspect we shall return at the end of this article.

The above sketch may serve as a general outline of the principles which underlie the New Psychology. On the whole it may fairly be said that it is new rather as a technique than as psychology. In some even of its most important developments it is, psychologically speaking, behind rather than before the times. We have already, in passing, had occasion to comment upon some of its aspects, but it may be convenient if we gather together in tabular form some of the more important points.

(1) It is significant that the New Psychology emphasizes human, and not merely anatomical or biological, values. It is definitely harnessed to the task of amending human life, whether in society or in the individual. And this is true, however inconsistently, even where it is most determinist in its outlook.

(2) The New Psychology is quite clearly a science and not a philosophy. It is thus descriptive rather than explanatory. It describes the mechanism of life on its mental side in great fulness. It analyzes its driving forces. But it adds nothing to our ability to explain their existence or their goal. And it has no right to intervene as an arbiter in the proper fields of philosophy or theology.

(3) On this descriptive side there is one new and important development. It is no longer possible to rest content with the assumption that there are no mental

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phenomena other than those of which we are aware. Mind and consciousness cannot, at any rate for the present, be treated as equivalent terms. We have, in fact, borderline phenomena at two points. There are the so-called instincts with their curious fusion of physical and psychical, and we have the apparent passage of ideas or memories out of and into consciousness, raising the question whether mind must not be given a place of its own, related indeed to consciousness, just as body is related to mind, but by no means identical with it. We seem, indeed, to be going back to something curiously like the Pauline trichotomy of body, natural or animal mind, and spirit. And it is with the third term of this trichotomy that psychology has yet to reckon. Some account has been given of the stages in the appearance of consciousness and self-consciousness, but no explanation whatever has been given of the motive forces by which this miracle has been wrought. On the descriptive side a most interesting account has been given of the formation of the 'Ego-Sentiment,' interesting but highly speculative, since none of us were psychologists when our own ego was making its appearance. But description is not explanation. We must not account for London by saying that many roads meet there. That would be the same logical inversion that we find in Behaviourism. It sounds more reasonable to say that London accounts for the roads.

(4) In general it may be said that the New Psychology has tried to take a mechanistic view of mental life and has failed. The failure appears even in Freud, who starts from this view, and is admitted more or less explicitly in more recent writers, who are largely under the influence of Bergson. Jung's concept of the *libido* gives us a life-energy with a definite direction, almost a purpose. Philosophers and theologians will probably soon have little cause to complain of psychology in this respect. Free-will and personal responsibility are not likely to yield ground to a purely mechanistic psycho-analysis.

(5) In this connexion great stress should be laid upon Mr. Shand's concept of the sentiments. Here it is of funda-

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mental importance that the grouping of impulses (through their affects), which constitutes a sentiment, can only take place about an object. The sentiment does not choose its object; the grouping of impulses does not create it; though it is true enough to say that the sentiment, when it is formed, determines our attitude towards the object at any given moment. It would be much more true, though only part of the truth, to say that the object creates the sentiment. A further consideration of the ultimate character of the object reveals the fact that it must consist in a personal relation (unless the ego is introverted upon itself and seeking to become its own sole object, which is spiritual death). No other object has the character of permanence under changing conditions which can make it, except in a secondary sense, the basis of sentiment formation. There is a mutual choosing and re-action between the Ego and the Other, whether that other be one, or many, or God. And it is that choosing and re-action that constitute the crisis and the freedom of personal life. Wherever the choice is made, a sentiment is born, and the grouping of the great primary impulses follows. Here indeed there is psychological law. The actual structure of the sentiment may be very little under our control in some of its features, just as the mechanism of our body, fortunately for us, regulates itself very largely apart from our volition. Nevertheless the direction of life is in our own hands. We are not at the mercy of the Unconscious. Despite psychology we are men and women still.

This in general is the answer to the familiar psychological process of explaining religion away. The so-called explanations may be quite excellent descriptions of processes, but they are nothing more. They do not and cannot account for that reality upon which the process rests.

(6) Closely connected with the above is the failure of psychology to give any useful account of absolute values. It simply is not enough to say that our sense of the absolute worth of Beauty, or Goodness, or Truth, or, supremely, of Personal Being, is implanted in us simply by the quasi-authority of the Herd-Sentiment. Psychology doubtless

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tells us, or can tell us, a great deal about our standards of value. But it must not attempt to reduce values to a series of emotional states. Worth is something other than feeling, for its essential character is that it has a status independent of the individual. Its existence therefore is closely linked with the existence of those objects about which sentiment-formation takes place. Where there is worth there must be personal being in relation to personal being in general. Wherever there is a sense of absolute value man reaches out towards God.

(7) One last point must be taken separately because of its immense practical importance, though it has already been discussed in principle. What, in view of the New Psychology, are we to say about sin? How far have we any right to speak of moral responsibility for individual acts, whatever we may say of more remote causes? Can we salve our bad consciences by speaking of complexes, and by throwing the responsibility for our lapses upon impulses operating in the dark regions of the Unconscious?

The New Psychology should teach us a great charity, if we have not already learned that lesson, and even more adequately, from the New Testament. The more we know of these hidden workings of the human mind the more chary shall we be of passing hasty judgement upon any act of any person save ourselves. But the problem of sin, which remains not merely a problem but a most terrible fact, is not a problem of individual acts. It is concerned rather with the general direction of the tendencies of life, with our attitude towards those ultimate personal relationships which are the core of reality. We have seen that psychology does not deal with this issue, and therefore it leaves the problem of moral responsibility untouched. Sin, and even original sin, is not a matter of the primitive impulses, as psychologically minded theologians are at present far too apt to say. God made those, and saw that they were good. We have no right to speak of 'depraved primary instincts,' except in so far as we ourselves have brought confusion into our lives by their misuse. It is in the purpose and not in the power of life that the sin

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lies. It is not in the engine-room of the factory, but at the directors' meeting that man wrongs his fellow-man.

When all is said, sin and the fact of personal responsibility remain a mystery ; but it is a mystery of which the meaning lies deep within the recesses of the inmost ego. It is concerned with ourselves, what we are, and what we should be, and only indirectly with the powers which are the means of our self-expression. Theology and philosophy may have their say here, incomplete though their solutions at the best must be, but the New Psychology has none. The New Psychologist, be he never so New, must accept the fact of moral responsibility as a simple and utterly fundamental fact, and if he ignores it, the worse for him.

L. W. GRENSTED.

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ART. VII.—SOME EARLY GOSPEL SOURCES.

1. *Oxford Studies in the Synoptic Problem.* Edited by W. SANDAY. (Clarendon Press. 1911.)
2. *Horae Synopticae.* By Sir JOHN C. HAWKINS. Second Edition. (Clarendon Press. 1909.)
3. *Introduction to the Books of the New Testament.* By W. C. ALLEN and L. W. GRENSTED. (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark. 1913.)
4. *The Sayings of Jesus.* By ADOLF HARNACK. Translated by J. R. WILKINSON. (London: Williams and Norgate. 1908.)
5. *Two Lectures on the Gospels.* By F. C. BURKITT. (London: Macmillan. 1901.)
6. *The Gospel History and its Transmission.* By F. C. BURKITT. Second Edition. (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark. 1907.)
7. *The Present Position of New Testament Studies.* By H. ST. J. THACKERAY. (Article in the 'Church Quarterly Review.' Oct. 1911.)
8. *The New Testament in the Twentieth Century.* By MAURICE JONES. (London: Macmillan. 1914.)
9. *The Study of the New Testament* 1883 *and* 1920. By CUTHBERT H. TURNER. (Clarendon Press. 1920.)
10. *Fresh Light on the Synoptic Problem.* By B. H. STREETER. (Article in the 'Hibbert Journal.' Oct. 1921.)

And many other Books and Articles.

'WHAT is the Synoptic Problem? And in what way can the study of this problem and of the suggested solutions aid the ordinary Bible-reader to see his Lord more clearly, to know God better, to live more faithfully as a member

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of Christ, and to act more loyally as a citizen of the Kingdom of Heaven?'

Of these questions, the former has been fully dealt with in many commentaries, ancient and modern; in special works, such as those cited above; and in popular lectures and accounts, among which reference may be made to the able summary which appeared in this REVIEW eleven years ago. The main landmarks have not greatly shifted in the last decade; and it is doubtful whether much can be usefully added to the thorough discussion which has been brought to bear upon the question.

But most of these publications were addressed mainly to the student, if not to the expert scholar. There is another class of Bible students. Articles in reviews that are to be seen on the tables of public libraries; brief summaries by experts published at low price in such collections as 'Everyman's Library' and the 'Unit Library'; harmonies of the Gospels that are valued for devotional purposes by all kinds of readers: these illustrate the study of the Gospel story for many who have no means of access to the more detailed works known to scholars. And such persons put their thoughts somewhat in the form of the second question. The CHURCH QUARTERLY REVIEW travels into many lands, and is read by many whose theological libraries are limited: and in the following pages an attempt has been made to remember the intellectual and spiritual demands of this latter class of Bible readers.

I

The problem which confronts us in the study of the Gospels is not peculiar to this subject, but is common to all historical inquiries. Every historian, finding an incident recounted in more than one of his original authorities, will ask 'What is the value of each of these authorities? Are they independent witnesses, or is one or more of the writers repeating what he has found in one of his predecessors or in some earlier work which is no longer in existence? And, consequently, what is the ultimate value

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of the evidence contained in each of the books before me? Is it the record of an eye-witness, or a copy of an older work? And is it throughout of equal historical value?'

It must be emphasized that this is not a question peculiar to Biblical scholarship: it is an elementary principle in all sound historical investigation. A historian who finds a statement in four mediaeval chronicles does not jump to the conclusion that he is dealing with four independent witnesses. This may be so; but it is also possible that two or more of the chroniclers are transcribing the record of a predecessor, or are copying an older record that is no longer extant. Again, if in one part of his work an author follows a certain document, he is not necessarily doing so throughout. Thus in the *Acts of Paul and Thecla* there is a considerable element of untrustworthy romance which points to a date at least two generations later than the lifetime of the Apostle; but the accuracy of the details of geography and history has led Sir William Ramsay to the conclusion (in which he is followed by many other scholars) that in part it must be nearly or quite contemporary with the visits of St. Paul to Iconium and Antioch.[1] It is therefore the first task of every student to endeavour to estimate the trustworthiness, in whole or in part, of the documents which he uses.

Just in the same way we examine the Gospels, regarded as historical documents. Leaving for the time the Fourth Gospel, which is clearly written later than the others and with some measure of reference to their contents, we observe that the first three Gospels are conceived on one plan and present one point of view: for this reason they are commonly styled the Synoptic Gospels. From the Preaching of the Baptist to the Last Week in Jerusalem, they cover the same ground and deal in the main with the same subjects. Are they three independent witnesses?

[1] It is in this early portion of the *Acts of Paul and Thecla* that we find the description of St. Paul's personal appearance which lies at the root of the traditional portrait—a man of small stature, bald-headed and bow-legged, of a healthy complexion, with eyebrows joined together and a somewhat aquiline nose.

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The most cursory examination of their contents shews that they are not. The coincidences of language, sometimes extending over several consecutive verses and including words which are by no means usual or obvious, make it unreasonable to suppose that three authors should have independently selected identical phrases. Take the story of the healing of the paralytic[1]:

St. Mark ii 8–11: 'Why *reason* ye *these things* in your hearts? Whether is easier, to say *to the paralysed*, Thy sins *are* forgiven; or to say, Arise, *and take up thy bed*, and walk? But that ye may know that the Son of man hath power on earth to forgive sins' (*he says* to the *paralysed*), '*I say unto thee*, Arise, *take up* thy *bed, and go* unto thy house.'

Now, with the exception of the words in italics, the whole of this passage is found in both St. Matt ix 4–6 and in St. Luke v 22–24[2]; and out of these, 'reason . . . are . . . he says . . . paralysed . . . I say unto thee . . . take up . . . and go' are preserved in one or other of the parallel narratives.

No one can fail to be struck by this coincidence, not only in the wording of a passage, but in an unusual wording. The insertion of the parenthesis '(he says to the paralysed)' is not a natural mode of narration; there are very few similar instances in the whole of the Gospel narrative: there is no exact parallel. Again, the word 'easier' occurs elsewhere only in the saying 'It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle' (St. Mk x 25, St. Mt xix 24, St. Lk xviii 25), and only in one other place in the

[1] In order to avoid complicating the inquiry by questions of authorship, the symbols Mt, Mk, Lk, Jn will be employed to denote the Gospels or their authors. The writers did not consider it important to affix their names to their books (though, from the dedication in the first three verses of the third Gospel, its authorship must have been an open secret to some readers); and for the present purpose we may, with them, relegate authorship to a place of minor importance.

[2] Two or three variations in the order of words or in grammatical forms, which do not affect the sense and cannot be well represented in English, have been neglected.

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New Testament (St. Luke xvi 17): it is only used twice in the Greek Old Testament (Septuagint), and appears not to be common elsewhere; in short it is by no means so obvious a word for 'easier' as the English translation might lead us to suppose.

Now these two features—agreement in the arrangement and phrasing of passages of considerable length, and coincidence in unusual words—are of frequent occurrence. For the full list reference must be made to the detailed investigations, and in particular to the studies of Sir John Hawkins, whose scrupulous fairness has won for his work a European reputation. But anyone who has only a New Testament at hand may observe such passages as the following:

St. Mk ii 23–26, St. Mt xii 1–4, St. Lk vi 1–4: the word 'corn-fields' is unusual (literally 'arable-land'); and 'pluck' is not the usual word for gathering flowers or fruit, but is almost always used for plucking out hair or plucking a fowl.

St. Mk i 40–44; St. Mt viii 2–4; St. Lk v 12–14.

St. Mk vi 35–44, St. Mt xiv 15–21, St. Lk. ix 12–17. 'Hour' is used for 'daytime' by Mk and Mt, but apparently nowhere else in the New Testament; and the word 'broke up' (the bread) in Mk and Lk is also unique. Nor would the Greek Old Testament suggest these peculiar usages.

Among a long list of uncommon words and phrases, we may mention that all three Synoptists have a peculiar word in 'the bridegroom shall be *taken away*' (St. Mk ii 20, St. Mt ix 15, St. Lk v 35) which occurs nowhere else in the New Testament and commonly is associated with carrying off booty or evacuating a military position: and in the next verse the word for a 'patch' of new cloth seems in all other writers to mean drapery employed as hangings or coverings of furniture. Again, the other two Gospels follow St. Mark xiv 43, 48 in the expression 'with swords and *timbers*,' instead of employing one of the ordinary words for 'staves.' And the English reader of the description of the demoniac 'sitting and clothed and in his

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right mind' (St. Mk v 15, St. Lk viii 35) would not guess that the word 'clothed' is as much a stranger to the dictionary as 'garmented' would be in English.[1]

Such coincidences are noteworthy. If we read in a modern English book 'The setting sun incarnadines the sea' or 'cannot stale her infinite variety,' we may be sure that the writer has not invented the phrase, but is consciously referring to well-known lines of Shakespeare. Similarly, when we find such agreements in arrangement and in phrase between the three Gospels, we conclude that the probability of their mutual dependence is so great that only very strong evidence can dissipate it.

There is then some connexion between the Synoptic Gospels. Either the story of the things that Jesus did and taught had become stereotyped by frequent repetition in sermons and in instructions to catechumens, so that, when it came to be written down, there was one form and one form only in which it could properly be expressed: or the three writers have had recourse to a written document. And, in the latter case, this document may have been one of the three existing Gospels, or some earlier book which has disappeared, like one of those partial records which 'many had undertaken to compile' (St. Lk i 1): or both these influences may have operated. Briefly, the Synoptic Gospels are derived from oral tradition exclusively, or from a common written record, or from a combination

[1] It ought to be added that we still know little of the *spoken* Greek of the time of Our Lord's Ministry, and must not hastily assume that it was exactly the same as that of literature. It is possible that 'garmented' may have forced its way into common use in Greek, despite the protests of purists, as bastards like 'talented,' 'gifted,' and 'reliable,' have crept into English. Even the knowledge which we have recently acquired of vernacular Greek is mostly derived from Egypt; if no example of peculiar usages could be found in Egypt, it does not follow that they were unknown in Palestine: advertisements which are well understood in a San Francisco newspaper would be barely intelligible on the banks of the Thames. Still, the presumption is that words which are almost unknown in extant writings were unusual words.

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of both. But it may be held to have been established that they have a common element.

Indeed, the connexion has hardly ever been denied. It might be believed that each of the Four Evangelists wrote in complete independence of the others; but the present writer is not aware of any commentator, ancient or modern, liberal or conservative, orthodox or unorthodox, who has adopted this view. In the almost complete lack of any primitive tradition as to the authorship and compilation of the Gospels,[1] every commentator must be a critic, *i.e.* he must form an opinion by judgement based upon the contents of the Gospels. The statement that Matthew was the first Evangelist, and that 'Mark followed in his footsteps and abbreviated his work,' is the statement of a critic, being based on the fact that the Second Gospel is shorter than the First: it is a piece of 'criticism,' notwithstanding the fact that it is propounded by no person with a Teutonic name, but by St. Augustine.[2]

Now it is manifest that every Gospel narrative depends ultimately upon oral tradition. For thirty years before any of the Four Gospels took their present shape, the story 'of Jesus and His glory, of Jesus and His love' was being declared by wandering apostles and evangelists, and repeated by the pastors and teachers of each local church in their instruction of catechumens and in the readings at the Eucharist. But in this connexion 'the oral theory' denotes the view which ascribes virtually the whole composition of the Gospels to oral tradition, and denies the use

[1] Reams of comment have been written on a couple of fragments quoted by Eusebius from Papias, who flourished between A.D. 100 and 150, and whose other literary remains justify Eusebius' statement that he was 'a man of decidedly limited intelligence.' The one thing that can be gathered from the sentence, 'Matthew wrote the oracles in Hebrew, and each one interpreted them as he could,' is that Papias' informant is not describing what we know as the Gospel according to St. Matthew. Hardly any other information has come down to us which can be traced to continuous tradition from the First century, as distinguished from more or less searching criticism.

[2] Aug., *De Consensu Evangelistarum*, i 2.

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of any common written source. In this extreme form, the oral theory has now scarcely any prominent supporters. For, if it were true, the agreement between the Gospels ought to be much closer than it actually is. A great deal has been claimed for 'the retentiveness of Oriental memories,' a matter in which assertion has somewhat outrun evidence: but it is not the case that we have a record stereotyped by Apostolic tradition and treasured in the loving hearts of disciples. Let the reader turn back to the passage, St. Mark ii 9–11 cited above. Side by side with the close agreement extending over three verses, we find that each Evangelist has a different word for 'bed' (corresponding roughly to 'mattress,' 'bed,' and 'couch'). Why does the tradition vary on this unimportant point, unless each writer exercized some judgement of his own? Or, as Prof. Burkitt has observed, what sort of a tradition can that be which is careful to preserve the distinction between the 'hampers' in the Feeding of the Five Thousand and the 'frails' in the Feeding of the Four Thousand, but varies in the wording of the title on the Cross and of the Words of Administration at the Last Supper?

Hence we are led to the conclusion that, whatever part may have been played by oral tradition in the gradual process of compilation, there is also a literary connexion. One or two of the three writers have used the work of the third, either in its present form or in some conjectured earlier edition. Priority has been claimed for each of the three[1]; and almost every possible order of composition has found advocates. But it may now be said that for some time there has been a steady increase of opinion, approaching to very general agreement, that the earliest

[1] It may be mentioned that the order in which the Gospels stand in our English Bibles is not intended as evidence of date. Several arrangements are found in early manuscripts; Matthew nearly always stands first, as bearing an Apostolic name; and for the same reason John usually comes second in early Western Bibles (*e.g.* Codex Bezae at Cambridge). But this does not imply that the Western Church believed that John was written before Luke, and Mark last of all.

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Gospel is the Second, and that it was used by both the other Synoptists, in a form *not substantially different* from that which we know. At a later stage we shall account for the qualification provisionally made in the last clause.

It will be best to state briefly the principal arguments which support this conclusion.

(1) Nearly the whole of Mk is reproduced in both Mt and Lk, and almost all the remainder in either one or other. To be precise, Mt has all the material contained in Mk, except seven short sections of four or five verses each; Lk omits one long section (St. Mk vi 45–viii 25, of which more hereafter) and about thirteen short sections containing about a hundred verses, and in several of these cases Lk has another narrative of similar import which he seems to have substituted for the section in Mk. Or, putting the matter differently, the only parts of Mk which are not represented in either Mt or Lk are ten brief passages of from two to five verses each (thirty verses in all) and a few scattered verses or sentences.

(2) Not only do the other two writers reproduce most of Mk's material, but they do so generally in the same order. If one departs from Mk's order (as Mt does somewhat often in St. Mt viii 1–xiii 58), the other adheres to it: and, when Mt and Lk suspend their following of Mk to insert special matter of their own, they nearly always take up Mk's narrative again at the place where they left off.

(3) Frequently there are close and remarkable agreements in unusual structure of sentences, or in unusual words, which are most naturally explained by the supposition that Mt and Lk are transcribing Mk's account, and are hardly to be explained in any other way. This argument has already been illustrated to some extent.

(4) Where the wording of Mt and Lk departs from that of Mk, in passages in which the matter is common to all three, their deviations can mostly be accounted for as ordinary editorial corrections of the artless style of Mk, while the contrary supposition is extremely improbable. This line of argument is of great weight, and must be elaborated at some length.

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While the aim and plan of the three Synoptic Gospels is the same, there is a subtle distinction in the manner and spirit of their composition, which distinguishes Mk from the two others. Speaking broadly, Mk reads like a spoken narrative; the others like literary compositions. Mk abounds in the graphic and picturesque touches of an eye-witness; the others recall the judicious balance of the historian. Mk preserves the sense of the open air and of the spoken word; the others shew that they were designed for the book-case. The style of Mk is natural and (in the best sense of the term) colloquial; the style of Mt and Lk is more artistic, selective, and literary.

These characteristics spring from the slightly different purposes of the three books. No one can read the Second Gospel without feeling that often he hears the spoken words of one of the Twelve; indeed, there are sentences, particularly those in which Peter is mentioned, which seem to be the actual reminiscences of the Apostle dictated by him and turned straight into the third person by an amanuensis, whom there is every reason to identify with 'Mark my son' (1 St. Peter v 13), stated by a tradition of considerable weight to have been the 'interpreter' and assistant catechist to the Apostle.

On the other hand, the other two Synoptists shew signs of being in the next stage of tradition. They are writing for the edification of converts, and are composing works which may be worthy of a place in the sacred library of Christian literature: they will therefore adhere more closely to literary models. Lk, writing for Gentile Christians, follows to some extent the style of classical history; Mt, addressing himself to Jewish congregations, observes some of the forms of Rabbinic treatises.[1] And both Evangelists are drawing upon a large amount of additional matter, consisting chiefly of records of the teaching of

[1] Mt prefers to group parables and sayings in sets of three, five, or seven; and possibly he intends to present the Teaching in five 'books,' corresponding to the five 'books' of the Psalms, each closed with a recapitulary formula (St. Mt vii 28, xi 1, xiii 53, xix 1, xxvi 1).

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the Master, in which Mk is curiously deficient.[1] Moreover they are limited in space: for there was a standard for books in those days,[2] just as now it is convenient to publish pamphlets in multiples of sixteen pages, which sometimes causes small books to be compressed or curtailed under pressure of this limitation.

For all these reasons the two later Evangelists will be desirous of pruning Mk's narrative of phrases or sentences which are redundant or are of minor value for the purpose of edification. And there are features in the Second Gospel which call for such treatment. Let us take the description of the storm on the Lake (St. Mark iv 35–41):

'And he says to them on that day, when evening had come,
Let us go across to the other side.
And, leaving the multitude, they take him with them,
as he was, in the boat: and other boats were with him.
And there arises a great storm of wind,
and the waves were beating into the boat,
so that the boat was already beginning to fill.
And he was in the stern, on the cushion, asleep:
and they awake him, and say unto him,
Teacher, carest thou not that we are perishing?
And he awoke and rebuked the wind,
and said to the sea, Peace, be still.
And the wind ceased, and there was a great calm.
And he said to them, Why are you fearful? have you not yet faith?
And they feared with great fear, and said to one another,
Who then is this, that even the wind and the sea obey him?'

Two features of style in this passage will be obvious at a glance. They are (*a*) the number of sentences beginning with 'and,' an idiom unsuitable in a Greek work, but

[1] Mk has only nine parables, of which four are proverbial sayings of one verse; and he has no long discourse except that in chap. xiii.

[2] It can hardly be accidental that the First and Third Gospels and the Acts of the Apostles are almost equal in length: the Third Gospel shews signs of compression towards the close.

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natural in the mouth of a speaker who thinks in a Hebrew dialect, as St. Peter probably did[1]; (*b*) the frequent use of the 'historic present tense' in narrative, graphic in one who sees the scene rise before the eyes of his mind, but again unsuitable in a history.[2] To change these idioms will therefore be no peculiarity of Mt or Lk: it would be the first thought of any writer who had any pretence to Greek style. Accordingly we find that the thirteen occurrences of 'and' at the beginning of a clause are reduced by Mt to five and by Lk to seven, either by the substitution of another conjunction or by changing the Hebrew usage of 'and' with a finite verb to the Greek participle; while all the five historic presents are altered by both to a past tense (though Mt changes Mk's 'said' in verse 40 to 'says').

In addition, Mk's account includes several graphic details, which proclaim the eye-witness and are of great value in the construction of the picture in meditation, but which have no direct devotional bearing. St. Peter recalls that Jesus was asleep 'in the stern, on the cushion,' because every detail is present to his mind as he tells the tale—it was the familiar cushion, stained by water and patched by Peter's wife: but, for the purpose of a book of Scripture to be read in the Church Services, these details did not seem to be of primary importance. Both Evangelists omit them, and also the clause 'and other boats were with him,' which adds nothing to the religious lesson of the miracle, while it might suggest the irrelevant question, 'How did the other boats weather the storm?' There are other slight changes—omission of the double mention of the boat in verse 37; alteration of the introductory

[1] An Irishman or a Highlander, when obliged to speak English, employs a large number of present tenses and other idioms which sound strange to the Saxon, but which are due to the fact that the Celt is translating literally out of the language in which he thinks.

[2] The English renderings 'he saith,' 'he taketh,' etc. give an archaic appearance to the Marcan narrative, as compared with 'he said,' 'he took.' This appearance is misleading, and therefore in these translations the ordinary forms of the present tense have been preferred to represent the Greek present tenses.

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sentence to connect with what precedes; the omission of 'carest thou not?' which needlessly stressed the misgivings of the disciples. But all of these are amply accounted for by the purpose of the Evangelists; they are such as would naturally occur to any writer in similar circumstances; and therefore, if two Evangelists agree in many of these points, this does not lead to the conclusion that one of them had seen the other's work. And not only in this passage, but throughout the extent of their use of Mk, the editorial changes introduced by the later Evangelists are for the most part just what we should expect from any author of a permanent work of edification.

At this stage, it may be objected that this detailed, almost microscopic investigation appears to be trifling and meticulous. But every scholar knows that the clearest signs of authorship are to be sought in just these small points of the use of words, especially of 'the tell-tale particles'; and, when once evidence of this nature has been indicated and verified, its significance will be readily apprehended. How many a young country-lover has marked the blossoms of the barren strawberry, expecting later to enjoy fruit, and has been disappointed. Yet, when he has been led to observe the difference between its notched petals with the sepals projecting between them, and the rounded petals of the wild strawberry with sepals only just glimpsed, he will never forget the distinction.[1]

II

Thus far, we have been examining the Second Gospel with those parts of the other two which contain corresponding matter. But these are only a portion of the longer works. Roughly, slightly less than half of Lk and slightly more than half of Mt contains matter derived from Mk; rather more than a third of Lk and rather more than a

[1] I think this illustration has been cited in print, by the Rev. F. H. Woods, if I recollect rightly. But to me it was long before associated with lessons learned in childhood from my first and best teacher alike in God's Book of Nature and God's Book of Scripture.

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quarter of Mt is peculiar to the Gospel in question; while nearly a fifth of Mt and Lk is common to them but unrepresented in Mk.[1] This last section must now be examined.

And the proofs which shew that Mt and Lk, in the parts which they have in common with Mk, are not wholly independent witnesses but are using the Second Gospel, lead us also to the conclusion that, in this portion where these two correspond, they are dependent upon some common source. Let the reader compare parallel passages, such as the Mission of the Baptist, St. Mt iii 7–12, St. Lk iii 7–9, 16, 17: the Temptation, St. Mt iv 3–11, St. Lk iv 3–13: the Centurion's Servant, St. Mt viii 8–10, St. Lk vii 6–9: Our Lord's Testimony to the Baptist, St. Mt xi 2–11, 16–19, St. Lk vii 18, 19, 22–28, 31–35: the Unclean Spirit, St. Mt xii 43–45, St. Lk xi 24–26: the Surprise Visits, St. Mt xxiv 43–51, St. Lk xii 39–46. By underlining the words which are identical in the two Gospels, often in the very same order, the reader will be able to form a better judgement than pages of statistics could furnish.

For it will be observed that the sections which have been instanced, out of a total of some seventy-four passages containing about 180 verses, are by no means confined to discourses of Our Lord. We might have expected that these would have been preserved with scrupulous care, if not in absolute agreement, though a study of the discourses recorded by all three Synoptists shews that they did not conceive it to be their duty to give a verbatim report. But, whatever ideas of reverence may be held to account for agreement in the Master's words, this would not operate in the case of the questions of the Baptist or of the Centurion,

[1] In this reckoning no account has been taken of the first two chapters in each Gospel, since the records of the Nativity and Childhood have of course no parallel in Mk, and virtually nothing common to one another. Apart from these chapters, there are 1017 verses in Lk and 1020 in Mt. Lk has 469 verses (46 per cent.) parallel to Mk, 367 (36 per cent.) peculiar to himself, and 181 (18 per cent.) parallel to Mt but not to Mk. Mt has 539 verses (53 per cent.) parallel to Mk, 290 (28 per cent.) peculiar, and 191 (19 per cent.) parallel to Lk but not to Mk.

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still less in the description of the circumstances surrounding them. We cannot escape from drawing the inference that we have come upon the traces of another source, known in some form to the authors of the First and Third Gospels, and *not necessarily unknown* to the author of the Second.

There is no need to feel alarm at this search for sources of Books of Holy Scripture. Several of the Books of the Old Testament are professedly composite in part: it is not irreverent to consider what may have been the nature and the contents of the Book of Jasher, the Book of the Wars of the Lord, or the earlier chronicles which were utilized by the authors of the canonical Books of Kings and Chronicles. So too in the New Testament. St. Luke tells us that he was aware of previous attempts to compile a record of the Ministry; presumably he had read some of them, since he implies that his own work will prove to be in some respects superior to its predecessors. And when careful study leads us to discern signs of an earlier lost work, we may patiently see what light is thus thrown on the records which the common consent of Christians selected to be the Four Gospels. Nor is the analysis which reveals a lost source of existing documents a futile quest: there are cases where it has been verified, as for example the early Franciscan work which M. Paul Sabatier discerned from comparison of extant Lives of the Saint, and which has recently been discovered in manuscript.[1]

To resume. If no copy of Mk had been preserved, we could be assured, by the comparison of Mt and Lk in

[1] The original records, besides the writings of the Saint, are the First Life of Thomas of Celano, and the traditions of Leo and the Three Companions (cited as 1 *Cel.* and 3 *Soc.*). Sabatier declared that 3 *Soc.* is not in its original form, since the contents do not correspond to the aim declared in the preface; and that some of the missing chapters could be traced in a later work, *Speculum Vitae.* Some years later he found at Paris a manuscript entitled 'Speculum perfectionis fratris minoris,' which contained as a consecutive whole the chapters which he had isolated from the composite *Speculum Vitae* and pronounced to embody the traditions of Leo used by the Three Companions. (*Oxf. Stud. in Syn. Prob.*, pp. 225, 226; Sabatier, *Life of St. Francis of Assisi*, Eng. trans., pp. 375–379.)

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the passages discussed in the first part of this article, that both Evangelists were working on the basis of a common framework and often copying a common narrative; and similarly, from the agreements of Mt and Lk with one another in places where they are not following the Marcan story, we can be hardly less confident that neither is copying the other but that both are making use of a common source. For the nature of the correspondence in this considerable section (more than a sixth of each Gospel) is very similar to the agreement in the use of Mk. We find whole verses or groups of verses in which scarcely a word differs, and also coincidence in the employment of unusual words and grammatical constructions.[1] When the great mass of these indications are collected, as is done in the books cited, by far the most reasonable explanation is that the sections marked by these likenesses and characterized by a similar tone, are derived from an earlier source of some kind. This conjecture will only be abandoned if very great objections can be advanced against it.

Assuming then for the time that Mt and Lk have a second authority, in addition to the Marcan narrative, we proceed to investigate it. It is convenient to employ a short name for 'the source which lies at the base of most of the matter which is common to Mk and Lk but unrepresented in the Second Gospel.' It is generally denoted by the symbol Q, from the German *Quelle* ('source'), a neutral term which is favoured as containing in itself no theory of the nature or composition of the source in question.[2] But emphasis must be laid on

[1] The student of the Greek Testament will note such unusual phrases as 'among them that are born of women' (St. Mt xi 11, St. Lk vii 28): 'swept,' a word almost unknown to Greek writers (St. Mt xii 44, St. Lk xi 25): 'worthy that,' 'roof,' 'speak with a word,' in the Centurion's speech (St. Mt viii 8, St. Lk vii 6, 7): 'holes . . . nests' (St. Mt viii 20, St. Lk ix 58), the latter word being literally 'quarters for troops.'

[2] Originally the name 'Logia' was used. It is now abandoned by most writers, because it appears to beg two questions: 'Is this what Papias means by "Matthew wrote the *oracles* (Logia) in

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the limitations contained in the definition which we have placed within marks of quotation. For it is easily seen that the extent and the exact form of Q cannot be determined with certainty, though few students doubt that they can be estimated with approximate accuracy. These limitations will be clearly understood by comparison with the use of Mk by the other two Synoptists.

1. If all copies of the Second Gospel had perished, we could recover a large part of its contents from the parallel passages in Mt and Lk. But we could never make even a guess at the few brief passages which are not repeated in either of the other two Gospels; and we could not be certain about the rather larger number which are preserved in one or other, but not in both.

2. Within the sections which could thus be identified as drawn from an author earlier than Mt and Lk, the actual language could to some extent be reconstructed, but with less certainty: and of many shorter touches we could discern no hint at all. From the two longer accounts of the Temptation, we should not know that, in the score of words which contain all that Mk tells, there occurred 'He was with the wild beasts': nor could 'in the stern, on the cushion' be recovered from Mt and Lk.

3. The actual expressions of Mk could be partly restored, but again with less precision. For example, it could be seen that Mk contained many instances of the 'historic present' and of 'he says'; but it would be impossible to be sure that these were so numerous as they actually are, since in most cases they have been editorially worked over by the other Evangelists.

Similarly with the passages common to Mt and Lk.

First, we can be tolerably sure that all or nearly all of the 180 verses or thereabouts which are closely parallel in these two Gospels are derived from that common source which we denote by Q. Almost certainly it contained more,

Hebrew" ?', 'Does *oracles* mean discourses as contrasted with narrative?' Neither of these questions can be confidently answered in the affirmative.

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for it is most improbable that both writers incorporated the whole source, and we see that each omits some parts of Mk. Some parts of Q may therefore be preserved in either Mt or Lk; but the only criterion is similarity of character and outlook to the parts already recognized; and this is a point on which the 'personal equation' of every student varies, and which therefore cannot be determined beyond dispute.[1] And quite probably parts of Q may have been taken up into none of our Gospels, and therefore have left no trace at all (a caution which may be borne in mind when arguments are based on 'Q does not contain . . .').

Secondly, Mk contains many idioms and phrases of a Galilean type, derived ultimately from St. Peter through his 'interpreter,' and these required, as we have seen, some editorial revision. On the other hand, Q consists almost entirely of speeches, and largely of the Lord's words; here there would be much less need and desire for alteration. We should therefore expect that both Evangelists would follow their source very closely: and the fact corresponds. For the agreement between Mt and Lk in these passages is very great, especially in reports of the Lord's words. In this respect Q can be reconstructed with approximate certainty.

Thirdly, the agreement in words is not so close as

[1] Stress is sometimes laid on the difference between the estimates of Q offered by different scholars, through misconception on this point. It is always necessary to observe how much a scholar includes in *what he calls* 'Q.' Harnack's and Hawkins' lists of passages are not quite identical; Dr. W. C. Allen prefers to include 'the material common to Mt and Lk, and also most of the discourse-material peculiar to Mt,' and thus builds up 'a source with several very marked features'—features, it may be said, which are remarkably eschewed by Lk, and a 'source' which leaves hardly anything to be supplied by the final compiler (*Introduction*, pp. 6, 29–33). Others, on the contrary, add to Q much of the material peculiar to Lk. But there is virtual agreement that *at least* nearly all the 180 verses belong to this source; and in this article the symbol Q is used in this sense only, without denying that it must have contained more.

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might be anticipated by those who start with modern notions of reporting. We have observed that, in their use of the Second Gospel, the other Synoptists felt at liberty to employ considerable editorial freedom in respect of the narrative portion, and a smaller but distinct measure of freedom in the discourses. And in the case of their other source, which consists very largely of discourses, they retained the same liberty to present the teaching in the order and form which they believed to be profitable for the instruction of the Christians for whom they were writing.

The strictly verbal variations between Mt and Lk are comparatively slight; but they are not negligible. Some may be explained as being reports not of the same saying but of similar sayings spoken on different occasions; for it must always be borne in mind (the caution is not unnecessary) that any great teacher does not repeat himself word for word, but adapts his speech to the audience he is addressing. Thus it is not surprising that Our Lord's teaching on Christian marriage, when delivered to the Apostles as potential leaders of the Christian Church, is not identical with His answer to Rabbis on a case of Jewish law.[1] And the Parable of the Talents in St. Matthew may well have been delivered on another occasion in the form of the Parable of the Pounds in St. Luke.

But this explanation does not cover all the facts. There are passages, clearly intended to refer to the same occasion, in which words are differently reported by different Evangelists. In the case of inquiries by Pharisees or other opponents, this is of minor importance for the purpose of devotional edification, though the differences are not devoid of force, as Dr. Chase has shewn in the matter of divorce cited in the last paragraph. But in the words of Our Lord the devotional student will seek for certainty. Did He say 'Wisdom is justified by all her children' (St. Lk vii 35), or 'Wisdom is justified by her works' (St. Mt

[1] Compare St. Mk x 11, 12 with St. Mt xix 7–9, referring to the scholarly examination by Dr. Chase, *What did Christ teach about Divorce?* (S.P.C.K.)

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xi 19)?[1] Both expressions convey a profound truth; both may on different occasions have been uttered by Him; possibly He used an Aramaic phrase which one Evangelist believed to be better translated by 'children' and the other by 'works.' Still, the fact that emerges is that the standard of fidelity which the Evangelists observed in their Greek compositions is not that of a modern reporter, and that the tradition of 'the sanctity of inverted commas' must not be applied in all cases to the Gospel narrative. This is by no means the same thing as supposing that their standard of accuracy was lower than that of a modern biographer: their Master sought the spirit of the Old Testament Scriptures beneath the letter in which it was expressed, and our understanding of His Mind would be not enlarged but impoverished if we had only a phonographic record of His words. It is, however, needful to avoid transferring ideas of shorthand reporting to our conceptions of the work of an Evangelist.

Plainly the instances already quoted do not stand alone. To mention familiar examples only, there are the different forms of the Beatitudes and of the whole Sermon on the Mount. These may be intended to refer to separate occasions. But this cannot apply to the Words of Administration used by Our Lord at the Last Supper, which are not quite identical in Mt and Mk, and are recorded in another form by Lk; while St. Paul hands down to his disciples a tradition to which that of Lk approaches most nearly, though with some variation. We note these facts as illustrating the aims which the Evangelists set before them when they took in hand their pens and their paper.

What sort of a book was this second source? It did not answer to our idea of a Gospel. It was almost entirely composed of sayings, with very little narrative and only

[1] There is some variation in the text of St. Matthew, but it can hardly be doubted that 'works' is the true reading; for, apart from other considerations, it could not have been invented by a copyist, while it would be natural to transcribe the verse in St. Matthew in the form familiar from St. Luke's Gospel.

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slight traces of connecting links.[1] If these were arranged in order, either of date or of subject, this order seemed to be of so small importance that one or other Evangelist frequently disregarded it; for only a few sayings occur in corresponding positions in both Gospels. And, if it ever contained an account of the Passion and the Resurrection, this section was not utilized by Mt, who here follows Mk almost exclusively.[2] By what processes may such a collection of sayings be supposed to have taken shape?

An Elder of the Church of Ephesus, wearied by the long walk to Miletus, sits on the shore at the feet of St. Paul and listens to the pastoral charge of the teacher whose face he expects to see no more upon earth. A sentence falls upon his ear: 'Remember the words of the Lord Jesus, how he said, *It is more blessed to give than to receive*' (Acts xx 35). He makes a note in the tablets hanging at his girdle, and on his return to his home transcribes them on a slip of parchment or a fragment of pottery; and from time to time he adds other like words warranted by the authority of those who companied with the Twelve. Business takes him to Laodicea and to Troas, where he compares notes with the brethren, lending them his memoranda and copying any records of theirs which are new to him. Perhaps in time this collection is written out on a new piece of parchment, and is laid up in the library of the Church of Ephesus with the originals or copies of some of the letters of St. Paul, and is read by the elder or bishop who presides at the Eucharist.[3]

[1] The chief narratives that can be traced are the Mission of the Baptist, the Temptation, the Centurion's Servant, and the answer to John's disciples. In the Third Gospel some discourses are provided with brief introductions, which appear to have been prefixed by the Evangelist.

[2] The Passion of St. Luke has a minimum of correspondence with that of St. Matthew, and cannot be definitely ascribed to their common source.

[3] It is not meant that this process began only at this date: the instance has been chosen of a saying which has not found its way into any of the four canonical Gospels. Collections of sayings may have been made in several countries; that which has been used by the First and Third Evangelists probably took shape in Palestine.

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This imaginary sketch is not entirely without basis. In some such way it is probable that records of the Teaching of the Master would have coalesced into documents, independently of the more formal and chronological works which about the same time were being compiled from 'the memoirs of the apostles,' as Justin Martyr often calls them.

Thus there would grow up collections, of the nature of the quotation albums or the selections from favourite authors with which we are familiar. Gradually these would be grouped according to subject, like the Offertory Sentences and the Comfortable Words of the English Communion Service: there are traces in the Third Gospel of arrangement under such heads as sayings spoken when sitting at meat, about riches and poverty, about repentance and forgiveness. This order would not be regarded as authoritative; the First Evangelist prefers to mass together sayings which appear to have been delivered at different dates.[1] And by this means the Christian Church would possess, in several forms, a collection of 'Sayings of Jesus' prefaced by brief introductory formulas. An early stage in this process may be seen in the discovery in Egypt of a tattered sheet of papyrus, on which some Christian has copied a few utterances, each about as long as one of our Bible verses, introduced only by the words 'Jesus saith . . . Jesus saith . . .' More than a century after the Ascension, Justin's regular formula of quotation is 'Thus Christ said.'

III

It is time to take stock. Assuming that the results described can be considered as in any degree probable, on the basis of the arguments which have been indicated rather than expounded, what doth it profit?

'What profit have we of all this labour, this analysis

[1] It is not probable that the greatest of all teachers would have blurred the impression of the Kingdom by telling *at the same time* seven parables which illustrate different aspects of the idea. Other groups of discourses in the First Gospel shew signs of arrangement by topic rather than by chronological order.

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and dissection, these conjectures and hypotheses? How do they help me to know God better and to love Him more?' Such may be the reflexion of the reader who opens his Bible for his daily chapter, of the preacher in his study, of the invalid on her couch, of the beginner in the difficult art of meditation. And it is a question that deserves an answer.

In the first place, the issue is raised by the very nature of the Gospel narratives. If we had but one Gospel, and if its text had been transmitted with accuracy, the problem would be comparatively simple. But it has not been the will of the Holy Spirit that this should be the case. We have several narratives which are not expressed in identical terms. Discourses are placed in different connexions and recorded in varying forms; incidents are omitted, transferred, or combined; words are sometimes attributed to different speakers. And, further, the exact text has not been preserved beyond doubt: in particular, scribes have consciously or unconsciously assimilated the text of one Gospel to the form familiar in another. And therefore every careful reader must use the Lower Criticism as he asks 'What is the true text, when some ancient authorities differ from others, as the margin of the Revised Version declares?' And he must also use the Higher Criticism as he asks 'What were the actual words and acts of the Lord Jesus?' He may follow Jerome and Augustine, or Isaac Williams, or Alford, or Harnack; but he cannot avoid forming conclusions 'On the Agreement of the Evangelists.' From Tatian to Sir William Herschel, the devout reader has required a 'Harmony of the Gospels.'

Next, analysis, even dissection, has a value. The analysis of the biologist and the dissection of the anatomist furnish knowledge that is useful in varying degree to the physician, the surgeon, the nurse, and the Girl Guide. The merest tyro in botany who pulls a flower to pieces will learn more of the wonderful devices that secure pollination and prevent self-fertilization, and more of the marvels of Creation and of the love of the Creator, than he could acquire from a hundred diagrams. So the analysis of the

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Gospels, when used for devotional purposes, will prove to be far from a barren pursuit.

What have we learned already by discovering, behind our existing Gospels, two earlier documents—one very nearly if not quite identical with the Second Gospel; the other, the collection of teaching whose nature has been outlined? In the Second Gospel we recognize something at once more and less than a 'Life of Christ.' It is an unstudied tale, redolent of the open air, wafted direct from the hills of Galilee and the Lake of Gennesaret, often echoing the very tones of the Master and His hearers. It is the story as St. Peter loved to tell it, not 'sparing the Twelve' and least of all himself; often, it would seem, his actual words have only been changed from the first person to the third.[1] This artless story with its entirely natural repetitions was pruned and condensed when incorporated into the more literary biographies of the two other Evangelists; but in the process some of the vivid originality of colloquial speech was sacrificed.[2] We can well understand that, when the fourfold Gospel was becoming the possession of every Church, the Second fell into comparative neglect, as appearing to contain little which was not found in one of the others. Few catechists used it for instruction; few Fathers commented upon it; very few of the Eucharistic Gospel Lessons are drawn from it. It has been thought that, at one stage in the process of transcribing, the only available

[1] Take such a sentence as 'They (*i.e.* Jesus, Simon, Andrew, James and John) entered into the house of Simon and Andrew, with James and John' (St. Mk i 29), an awkward expression which runs perfectly clearly if turned back into St. Peter's dictation, 'He entered with us into our house, with James and John.' And 'they take him . . . in the boat' seems to represent 'We took him in our boat' (St. Mk iv 36).

[2] 'Colloquial' must not be understood as 'marked by vulgarisms.' There is in all languages a direct forcible speech which differs from the studied form of the orator and the writer. The Second Gospel bears to the First and Third somewhat of the relation which Boswell's *Life of Johnson* bears to Leslie Stephen's; but not the relation between Johnson as he spoke and Johnson when he 'translated himself out of English into Johnsonese' (Macaulay's *Essays*).

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manuscript was a frayed copy that had already lost its last column.[1] We may be devoutly thankful that, under the guidance of Him Who would have nothing be lost, this earlier portrait of the Lord was not permitted to perish. Had this happened, there would be very few sayings or deeds which we should not have still read in the other Gospels; but many a vivid touch which brings a whole scene before our eyes would have been lost, and the pictures of William Hole and of Tissot would be more imaginary and less imaginative than they are. In a meditation, if St. Matthew and St. Luke exercise the will and St. John most ardently kindles the affections, it is in the earlier stage of the picture formed by imagination that we turn to St. Mark.

The growth of the other source has been already suggested. In it we seem to see the devout believer, won to the new life in Christ and to the Light that dispelled darkness and fears, possessing in these early days no written Gospel and therefore eagerly collecting and noting down all that he can learn. Among these treasured reminiscences, he sets special store by the words that to him are spirit and are life, caring little for the circumstances or the questions that called them forth: just 'Jesus said' or 'Thus Christ said' is all the connexion he needs.

Such records must have been made in many places besides Egypt, where the sands and the dry atmosphere have preserved the potsherd and the papyrus which have perished elsewhere. The body of teaching which in one form we distinguish as Q must never be thought of as a single book, published at a definite date: rather it was a stream that was constantly growing in volume by the influx of many tributaries. May we picture a tableland saturated with inexhaustible life-giving water, as a symbol of the fountain-head of the Teaching of the Lord Jesus? From this origin many rills of water trickle down the slope.

[1] Our copies of the Second Gospel appear to be derived from one which broke off abruptly in xvi 8 at 'for they were afraid of . . .' More than one conclusion was appended to complete the story, the twelve verses which stand in our Bibles being largely a summary of the last chapter of St. Luke.

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One of these at an early stage becomes a distinct stream of considerable volume: this represents the Petrine narrative which somewhat later will be known as the Gospel of St. Mark. Beside this are independent channels of smaller capacity, the recollections of other eye-witnesses and hearers, several of which will afterwards be sought out and laid under contribution by St. Luke.[1] And again there are minor runlets which very gradually coalesce into larger streams, and which lower down will fall into a distinct reservoir which we denote by Q. This has been drawn upon by Mt and Lk, perhaps by one or both of them at a point slightly before the augmented stream enters the reservoir.[2] And very probably a few of the runlets which ultimately form Q have been tapped by Mk, in addition to his main source of the large river which represents the Petrine reminiscences. Finally, not long after Mk has thus taken its approximately final form, large quantities of its waters have been drawn off by Mt and Lk (again not necessarily at precisely the same point) and combined with what each has received from Q and from other special sources into our First and Third Gospels. This is an imperfect model, and in minor details is subject to doubt; but it may serve to exhibit the process of compilation on which the agreement of many scholars is steadily converging.

[1] It seems clear that in Acts St. Luke refers to authorities, such as 'Conversations with Philip' (for chap. viii, *see* Acts xxi 8–10), 'Conv. with Mnason' (for chap. i–v), 'Conv. with Rhoda' (for chap. xii), 'Conv. with Paul' (for the story of Stephen, *see* viii 1). It is also probable that for his Gospel he is indebted to one of the women of St. Lk viii 2, 3; to Manaen or some other frequenter of Herod's court; and for chap. i, ii to an intimate companion of the Blessed Virgin, or rather to the Mother-Maid herself.

[2] Several students agree in the belief that Lk combined his Q material with that derived from his special sources of information before he united it to the information drawn from Mk. Canon Streeter has further shewn that there are strong reasons for believing that Lk regarded the former record (Q and his special sources) as his primary authority, treating it as the framework of his Gospel and incorporating into it such sections of the Marcan narrative as were not already included in it.

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IV

For it ought not to be needful to repeat that every careful inquirer knows well that the facts at our disposal do not provide an unquestionable solution. The element of conjecture must always remain, and is to be remembered, even if 'probably' and 'apparently' are not repeated in every sentence. They labour under a serious delusion who imagine that all the facts are intended to be explained by what is known as 'the Two-document Hypothesis,' or for that matter by any other hypothesis. The most that any reasonable student would venture to say is 'We have examined all the facts, laying aside preconceived conclusions so far as the human mind can do; we have collected thousands of details; we have arranged, classified, compared. Slowly a partial explanation of the perplexing complexities has emerged. We have tested this theory in every light; we have listened to those who do not agree with us; we have enlarged, or modified, or braced the original construction as cracks have disclosed themselves or as lateral stresses have demanded re-inforcement. For the present our work is done. We place before you a solution which in our judgement accounts for 80 or 90 per cent. of the phenomena, and are humble enough to leave the remainder to any light which may hereafter be thrown upon them.' Yet it is not likely that Dr. Sanday or Sir John Hawkins would have allowed the last sentence to pass without a liberal besprinkling with notes of interrogation in brackets or in the margin. And Dr. Streeter has argued strongly for the view that Lk treats the non-Marcan matter (including both Q and his special sources of information) as the framework of his Gospel, fitting into it such sections of Mk as were not already represented: whereas Mt obviously makes Mk the framework of his Book.

Among the outstanding lesser problems, which in the space at our disposal can be only briefly stated, mention may be made of the following.

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(1) *Minor agreements of Mt and Lk* in sections where they are following Mk. The number and weight of these has been greatly exaggerated [1] by some writers who have failed to observe or to state that the vast majority are mere editorial corrections, which would be made by any author whose literary taste eschewed the characteristic simplicity of Mk, and who desired to compress the Marcan redundances: they therefore do not involve the hypothesis that either Mt or Lk had seen the other's work. Any author would reduce Mk's excessive fondness for the historic present (especially 'he says' and 'he comes') and for the conjunction 'and'; any compiler of a book that might take rank as Scripture would soften phrases that might be misrepresented in a sense derogatory to Christ or that seemed to cast reflexions on the Twelve; any writer who had to compress the Marcan story in order to make space for much fresh matter would omit repetitions, duplicate expressions, and details which were picturesque rather than devotionally important.

By far the greater number of the alleged agreements of Mt and Lk against Mk fall under these heads; and the remainder are not sufficient to subvert the overwhelming evidence of the priority of Mk. Some further considerations will suggest possible explanations of this residue. First, it is more than likely that parts of Q or other non-Marcan matter traversed the same ground as some sections of Mk; and agreements of Mt and Lk may only indicate that two sources are being combined.[2] Secondly,

[1] It ought to be unnecessary to observe that the alteration of 'they take him with them' into 'he entered' involves the consequent change of 'in the boat' to 'into'; and St. Luke was capable of writing 'a boat' for 'the boat' without having to look over St. Matthew's shoulder. The formidable list of six or seven hundred 'agreements of Mt and Lk against Mk' is swelled by reckoning several changes which are consequential upon one previous change.

[2] It is in the highest degree improbable that some non-Marcan matter did not overlap Mk. In the Parable of the Mustard-seed, Lk appears to be following a non-Marcan source, while Mt combines this with Mk's version. The question 'Did Mk use Q?' appears

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the text of the Gospels as read by Westcott and Hort or by the Revisers does not claim to be more than a Second-century text: in the next 200 years there was a tendency to assimilate the texts of Mt and Lk, and it is very probable that this process began earlier, so that if we could recover the original autographs we might find the agreements somewhat diminished. Thirdly, the text of Mk as we read it may also differ slightly from the original: this may account for some of the few places in which the present text of Mk appears to be distinctly secondary to that disclosed by the agreement of the other two Synoptists.

(2) *Minor divergences of Mt and Lk* in non-Marcan contexts. These may be capable of similar explanations. There is also some possibility of different translations of an Aramaic original.

(3) *Similar phrases placed in different connexions.*—In St. Mk xi 3 'and straightway he sends it back hither' appears to be spoken by the disciples and means 'the Master will send it back as soon as he has done with it': in St. Mt xxi 3 the almost identical words 'and straightway he will send them' are placed in Our Lord's mouth and mean 'and the owner will at once despatch the animals.' Again, the words 'for a testimony unto (them)' bear three different meanings in St. Mk xiii 9, St. Mt xxiv 14, St. Lk xxi 13. There are a good many cases of this sort, which look like different understandings of words dictated or verbally uttered.

(4) *The disuse by Lk of St. Mk vi 45–viii 26.*—The facts are these. In general Lk follows the order of Mk with few omissions, and where he inserts material he takes up the Marcan story at the point where he left off. But St. Lk ix 17 follows Mk in the Feeding of the Five Thousand at or near Bethsaida down to St. Mk vi 45; then seventy-four verses of Mk are passed over, and the next verse in Lk takes up St. Mk viii 27 (is it to

to view Q as a book published at a definite date and previously non-existent; it ought to be expressed in the form 'Did Mk know of any material that was also incorporated in Q?'

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be noted that the previous paragraph in Mk is also placed at Bethsaida ?). The obvious suggestion that this section was added to the Second Gospel after Lk used it is not borne out by any evidence of style or subject.[1] A more substantial clue is afforded by the observation that most of the incidents in this section of Mk deal with questions which have been illustrated elsewhere, and that therefore Lk may have thought that these might be passed over in order to leave room for his large store of additional matter, in accordance with his habitual (not invariable) custom of avoiding duplicates and closely similar incidents.

(5) *The section St. Lk ix* 51–*xviii* 14 appears upon examination not to be derived from Mk. Parts of it present parallels with passages in Mt, while other parts (such as the parables in chapter xv) are of another type. It is uncertain whether this section comes from a single source or from several; and whether it is intended to be read in chronological order (the 'Perean journey'), or to be taken as additional matter placed as an appendix to the Ministry before the Last Journey to Jerusalem.

(6) *The variations in order* between St. Mt viii 1–xiii 58 and St. Mk i 29–vi 13.—These are numerous and perplexing, since from xiv 1 Mt follows Mk's order. On any theory, a satisfactory explanation is not likely to be found. But the order in the First Gospel is not convincing.

There are other subsidiary problems. But it must be repeated that they are subsidiary. The main solution stands upon its two foundation-pillars—the use by Mt and Lk of the Second Gospel in some form not substantially different from that which we know; and the further use by the same two Evangelists of the source

[1] The suggestion that the Second Gospel appeared in two or three forms of different length is supported only by the problems of the section mentioned above and of the eschatological discourse in chap. xiii, and by some slight verbal indications, which are of very small bulk in comparison. These are not sufficient to establish a complex theory, which seems decidedly alien to the unstudied nature of the presumed final form. The writer who 'had no design of giving a connected account of the Lord's words' is not easily conceived as issuing three editions.

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denoted by Q, containing at least nearly all of the discourse matter common to the two books. This hypothesis satisfies a very large number of the indications of composition which appear upon examination: and no other theory satisfies anything like so large a proportion of the facts. It does not explain all the facts. That may be reckoned as a merit. For a view which professed to explain every phenomenon would be rightly liable to suspicion. There are some scholars, British and Continental, whose ingenuity will inform us exactly why one Evangelist omits an incident, why another gives a different shape to a saying, why a third transfers a paragraph. Such completeness of opinion undermines itself: for it reduces the work of an Evangelist to little more than the employment of scissors and paste, and it assumes that a modern student can successfully reconstruct the mental and psychological equipment of a First-century writer: which is impossible. The reader will feel far more confidence in following men such as Dr. Sanday and Sir John Hawkins, who (like Dr. Driver on the Old Testament) will state a problem with exhaustive thoroughness, and will often be satisfied to give the answer that 'We do not, at present, attempt to decide,' or to return the Scottish verdict 'Not proven.'

V

This very imperfect summary may be closed with some general observations.

No attempt has here been made to give an account of the Synoptic Problem or of any suggested solution of it. It may safely be wagered that, if any dozen scholars were asked to execute such a task within the limits of an article in this REVIEW, they would one and all decline. They know too much. And the present writer is at least conscious of the fact that the task cannot be accomplished and ought not to be attempted. What has been attempted is to indicate some of the lines on which study may profitably be conducted by those who (like the writer) are only learners, 'pickers-up of learning's crumbs,' and to illustrate some

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of the points which a student may investigate with the aid of the New Testament and a concordance. If any reader is disposed to follow up the inquiry for himself, let him begin by underlining in red ink the words or parts of words[1] in the three Gospels which are found in Mk, and in black ink those which are common to Mt and Lk but are not represented in Mk. He will have gained more insight into the question than he could derive from the whole of this article. And then he will be in a position to compare the spiritual truths which emerge from this study of the original authorities.[2]

Moreover it must be emphasized that the passages which have been quoted are only specimens out of scores or hundreds, not all equally striking but significant through the cumulative evidence of many small points. When Westcott and Hort published their *Introduction to the New Testament*, they gave eight instances of a particular feature in the textual problem. Some controversialists imagined that, by explaining these eight cases to their own satisfaction in another sense, they had demolished the theory of the editors: for they were not aware that these eight had been selected out of some hundreds that had been studied in the notebooks of the two professors. And similarly, should any reader feel that some passage here cited is capable of a different explanation, he may be advised to turn to the full discussion of the point in the works cited at the head of these pages.

Finally, may it be said that unfamiliar, even disturbing, conclusions are best considered with patience and charity: the abrupt dismissal of volumes of evidence is apt to recoil like a boomerang. Anyone can see that a dead-nettle is very like a stinging-nettle: a slight knowledge of botany

[1] In the cases where the same verb or noun is used, but in a different tense or case.

[2] Among the numerous cases where critical study leads to theological significance, we may instance the message of the Baptist, the teaching on marriage and divorce, the setting of 'O Jerusalem, Jerusalem,' the eschatological attitude, the different kinds of parables, etc.

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shews that they are fundamentally different. The man in the street will tell you that the nettle and the fig-tree are as different as chalk and cheese: the botanist can understand that they are closely allied. Superficial judgements are seldom helpful, and not always correct.

But careful patient study of the conclusions of experts will always yield devotional value. The laborious toil of anatomy and physiology may appear arduous to the student who is burning with desire to relieve human and animal suffering: but a healer who is ignorant of what can be learned from these branches of science is not likely to do much good, and is certain to cause unwittingly a great deal of harm. And in this respect theology does not differ from its sister or daughter sciences.

A. Bevil Browne.

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A Thirteenth-Century Coronation Rubric.

Brit. Mus. Addit. MS. 8167,[1] written in various hands of the second half of the Thirteenth century, is a manuscript once belonging to Westminster Abbey which missed the attention of Dr. James when he compiled the list of the extant remains of the monastic library printed in the catalogue of the manuscripts now at the abbey (compiled by himself and Dr. J. A. Robinson).[2] The Addit. MS. came to the attention of Dr. Robinson after the appearance of the catalogue, and in answer to inquiries from me he very kindly shewed me a brief note which he had made on its contents.

A rubric on the first page of the manuscript states that the volume belonged to the abbey 'by the procuration of Brother William de Hasele, and it was reserved for the use of the same brother during his life-time.' This note is of special interest because Hasele, as we are told by Flete, the Fifteenth-century prior of Westminster,[3] was the compiler (about 1266) of the *Customary* of the abbey brought out by Abbot Ware.[4] The colophon of the unique manuscript of that work is now almost illegible through fire, but what remains is sufficient to confirm the accuracy of the text of it given in Smith's catalogue of the Cotton library, made before the fire: this shews that Hasele's name was given in the colophon, and that he was there designated as 'Supprior and Master of the novices.'[5] A document cited by Dr. Pearce[6] asks prayers for Hasele's soul in 1283, so that he was certainly dead by that date.

[1] A note on the inside of the cover states that this was No. 679 in John Topham's Sale Catalogue. The hand writing this note is apparently that which also writes 'Tho. Bryan Richards, Feb. 9, 1804.' Dr. Robinson also notes the signature of 'John Bulkley,' whom he believes to be probably a relative of Edward Bulkley, prebendary of Westminster, 1583–1620. Henry Petrie gave the book to the Museum, 1820.

[2] Published Cambridge, 1909, p. 22f.

[3] See Dr. Robinson's edition of his *History of Westminster Abbey* (Cambridge University Press, 1909), p. 116.

[4] Edited by Sir E. Maunde Thompson for the Henry Bradshaw Society, 1904.

[5] See Thompson, introd.

[6] *The Monks of Westminster* (Cambridge University Press, 1916), p. 56.

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The importance of Hasele's work on the *Customary* makes specially interesting the contents of a book which he owned. The only extant manuscript of that work belongs to the late Fourteenth century, contains only the fourth part, and is much damaged by fire. The present volume is nearly a century and a half earlier, and it is therefore all the more interesting that it contains some material of the sort which Hasele may have collected for his labour of compiling the *Customary*. Since we have no complete manuscript of that work, we cannot be sure whether he included any of the articles found in the present book; they do not appear in the extant portion. Various documents here given are such as would be collected by any person interested in formulating usages. Several documents would be useful to a notary; such are various formularies for letters, charters, briefs, etc., treatises on the Art of Letter-Writing, Metre, Grammar, a 'Summa Prosaici dictaminis Magistri Guidonis' (with forms), etc. Probably Hasele used some of these works in his duties as Master of the Novices. Documents more directly bearing on his interest as a compiler of ecclesiastical usage are statutes for Kilburn Priory, which I hope to print in a later paper, the piece about to be printed, and some 'Formae Chartarum et Brevium in electione Abbatis' (ff. 197–9).[1] The latter are apparently real documents; the first eight all concern the election of William de Colern, Abbot of Malmesbury, whose abbacy is dated by Dugdale at 1260–96, but the first charter seems to be dated by the king in his 41st regnal year (1256); a note then follows (underlined in red) pointing out that the elections in question were to 'exempt' abbacies; after this a letter of the king follows concerning the election of Master Walter Gifford to the bishopric of Bath and Wells (dated by the *D.N.B.* at 1265). This refers to a dispute and is dated the 55th year of Henry III (1270). An article which occurs f. 134 gives a letter addressed to the Pope by the Abbots and Priors of the Province of Canterbury, and one which concludes the manuscript describes the arrangement at Reading Abbey for the commemoration of the founder, King Henry I, both on his anniversary and for the whole year.

The Addit. MS. was written in several hands, almost contemporary, and some items seem to have been added after the book

[1] Similar forms regarding the election of an abbot of Christ Church, Canterbury, make the first part of the *Customary* of that house, which is in general founded on that of Westminster (see edition for the Bradshaw Society, printed with the latter, Vol. I).

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as a whole was written. Several dated notes appear: on the first page a short memorandum seems to prove that the volume was at Westminster by 1250. It mentions the discussion and dissension in 'our chapter' in 1250, when the 'statuta capituli generalis' were read by Abbot Richard de Crokesleye and finally adopted.[1] These were probably the Benedictine statutes of 1238[2]; later Benedictine statutes (since they mention the legate Otthobon of 1266–9) follow (pp. 389–433) the *Customary* of Christ Church, Canterbury, which may here have followed the precedent of that of Westminster, which was in general its original. On the first page of the Addit. MS. is also (in another hand) a note which mentions the death of Abbot Crokesleye in 1258. On f. 199*b* are two legal forms (without names of persons or places) dated 1281; these were perhaps copied into a blank *verso*.

The general interest of the Addit. MS. and the method of its compilation, as indicated by the facts just enumerated, are of importance when we consider the item to be quoted in the present note. This is a short article copied on the back of the first page in an informal manner—probably after the book as a whole was written, which means probably at Westminster. Mr. J. A. Herbert, of the Museum, who kindly examined it for my purposes, dated it at the 'middle of the Thirteenth century,' and believed the hand to be 'contemporary and perhaps the same' as that writing (at Westminster) the note dated 1250; whether it or any of the other hands occurring in the book are Hasele's, we have no means of knowing. The article in question describes part of the procedure at the coronation of the king; though it is written in black ink it is here called a rubric because all the material which it contains occurs in rubrics attached to the Coronation Office. It has been thought to be of enough importance to justify publication even though it contains no new

[1] This note is as follows: 'Nota quod anno m°cc°l° statuta capituli generalis ab abbate Ricardo de crokele in capitulo nostro, inuito conuentu, lecta fuerunt. Et tandem post multas dissensiones et altercacionum discrimina a conuentu sunt admissa atque ad eadem obseruandum eidem abbati in crastino depositionis sancti edwardi scriptum obligatorium factum est ad instanciam abbatis de sancto edmundo, communi sigillo capituli roboratum.' A note follows about the capture of Fr. Richard de Slowtre. It may be noted that Flete (p. 109) mentions that Abbot Crokesleye was involved in a controversy with his convent in the fifth year of his rule (he acceded 1246). It should be noted that the spelling 'Crokele' found in the Addit. MS. is that used in the *Customary* (see p. 234).

[2] See Matthew Paris, Rolls Series 44, *sub anno* 1238.

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material, because it arranges the material in a new order, and considering the early date of the manuscript it may represent an earlier form. The ownership of the book also gives special importance to the article, for it would appear that it described the order of the coronation known to Hasele. It may even be an item which he incorporated in the lost parts of the *Customary* of the abbey. In any case it would be of special significance as emanating from Westminster. The late Fourteenth-century *Liber Regalis* containing the Coronation Office is still in possession of the Dean and Chapter of Westminster, and we have evidence that the abbey was well known to possess authoritative forms of the office. Maskell[1] quotes the Brit. Mus. Harl. MS. 561: 'Hic est ordo secundum quem rex debet coronari, pariter et inungi, secundum cronicas et registra in abbatia Westmonasterii inventa'; and he also quotes the following, from the Fifteenth-century Exeter Pontifical: 'Coronatio regis secundum consuetudinem ecclesiae Westmonasteriensis.' Maskell calls 'the title' here used 'somewhat singular,' but the word which has probably suggested this comment is 'consuetudinem': the abbey's *Customary* is probably in question.[2]

The piece which it is convenient to call a 'Coronation Rubric' is as follows:

'In regis coronacione: Pannum de serico quadratum purpureum quatuor hastis deargentatis sustentatum cum quatuor campanellis argenteis deauratis ultra regem incedentem quocunque ierit: gestabunt barones de quinque portibus ad quamlibet hastam quatuor assignati pro diversitate portuum ne uideatur portus portui preferri. Et similiter ab eisdem baronibus portabitur pannus de serico ultra reginam post regem incedentem. Quos pannos suo iure optinebunt. Cancellarius, si episcopus fuerit, cum calice lapideo qui est de regalibus, pontificalibus indutus, regem est precessurus, quem thesaurarius cum patena precedet, indutus dalmatica, atque tres comites tres gladios gestantes induti serico regem antecedent. Comes cestrie qui primatum sibi uendicat deferendi portabit gladium qui appellatur curtana, et alium portabit comes huntedonie, tercium uero portabit comes de Warwih. Duo sceptra regia regem precedencia portabunt duo comites quibus rex illud officium committere uoluerit. Pannum enim uirgulatum uel burellum prosternendum sub pedibus regis incedentis ab aula uel camera sua[3] ubi sumit regalia, usque in pulpitum ecclesie Westmonasterii prostrari faciet dominus N. de

[1] *Monumenta Ritualia*, Oxford, 1882, II. p. 4.

[2] The Coronation Office is of course included in the *Missal* of Westminster Abbey (edited by Dr. Legg for the Bradshaw Society, 1897).

[3] Both the longer and shorter forms of the rubric printed by Dr. Legg here give 'a palacio' (*Missal*, cc. 678, 1517).

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bello campo bedefordie, qui habet officium elemosinarie a ueteri. Pars autem panni illius que est in ecclesia cedet semper in usus sacriste loci, et reliqua pars tota que est extra ecclesiam distribuetur pauperibus per manus supradicti N. elemosinarii. Seruiet ea die de senescallia comes leicestrie, licet comes northfolchie illud sibi uendicauerit obsequium. De mapparia seruiet N. de hastings, qui extractas post prandium mappas tanquam suas recipiet. Salarium et cultellos apponet N. de bello campo de aumeleye [*sic*],[1] cuius est officium panetarie. De officio pincarnarie seruiet comes de arundell.'

Dr. Wickham Legg[2] describes the four classes of English Coronation Orders extant, and the three recensions of the rubric found with the fourth (of which the *Liber Regalis* is the most important example). Of the three forms found of the rubric, one is printed by Dr. Maskell (*op. cit.*), and the other two by Dr. Legg, in his edition of the *Missal* of Westminster Abbey (as copied under Abbot Lytlington at the end of the Fourteenth century.) Most of the present article is found in the form of the rubric given by the *Liber Regalis*, but all that is found there is also found in the shorter form printed by Dr. Legg (*Missal, cc.* 1517–8), together with a short sentence ('Duo sceptra . . . uoluerit') which is not found in the longer. Dr. Legg remarks that the shorter version is 'either the first stage of the longer rubric or an epitome of it.' The fact that it agrees with the present article more closely than the longer text would suggest that it was a first stage rather than an epitome, since the present article was written about the middle of the Thirteenth century. The shorter rubric accounts for the whole text up to 'indutus

[1] As will be noted, this section is found only in a note printed by Dr. Maskell (p. 49 *n.*), and he gives the form of this name as 'Dumely.' A Fifteenth-century document printed in *English Coronation Records* (*v. infra*) gives the same name 'Duneleus,' but other signs shew that we have to deal with a very poor scribe. The same volume quotes the *Red Book of the Exchequer* for this name as 'Haumeleg' (p. 60), but the edition of that work in the Rolls Series (No. 99, p. 758) gives 'Haumlega.' The office of panneter is now extinct, and in connection with a claim to revive it, its history was given in a document printed by John Nichols, *History and Antiquities of the County of Leicester*, London, 1798, vol. II, pt. II, p. 645. This shews that the office went with the manor of Kibworth-Beauchamp in Leicestershire, and was first exercised at the coronation of Queen Eleanor. The *Red Book of the Exchequer* is here quoted as giving the name as 'Elmey,' and 'a Cotton MS.' as giving it as 'Amely.' John Leland, in a note on the descent of the Beauchamps, gives the name as 'Elemeleye' (*Collectanea*, Oxford, 1715, IV, 57); the title 'Viscount Elmley' is still borne by the family of the Earl Beauchamp.

[2] *Three Coronation Orders*, Henry Bradshaw Society, 1900, preface.

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dalmatica,' and the rest of the piece is found in a note added at the end of the *Liber Regalis* and the Cambridge Pontifical.[1] The whole order of the piece is shuffled about, and the change of order may have involved change of procedure. In any case we apparently have here a fourth rubric, longer than the shortest of the three rubrics cited by Dr. Legg, but shorter than the two longer ones.

The *English Coronation Records*, printed chronologically by Mr. L. G. Wickham Legg in his book of that title,[2] make clear that the coronation of Queen Eleanor, wife of Henry III, in 1236 must have been one of the most precedent-making of English coronations. Her husband had been crowned as a child, and it had been many years since an adult sovereign had been crowned; it was perhaps in consequence that special arrangements had to be made to conciliate the rival claims to coronation duties made at the coronation of the Queen—from which has descended 'the Court of Claims' on the occasion of the Coronation of a Sovereign. It was perhaps a result of the dissension that took place in 1236 that, as we see from the account given in the *Red Book of the Exchequer* (which is printed by Mr. Legg), so many incidents of the ceremony first appear on this occasion. The sword 'Curtana,'[3] the chalice and paten of St. Edward, the barons of the Five (Cinque) Ports, all appear here for the first time, and all appear in the record just printed (though the name of St. Edward does not accompany the reference to the 'stone chalice,' which, in the light of the other rubrics, is sufficiently explicit). In some ways the procedure of the present article follows precedent used at the coronation of Queen Eleanor which was soon to be discarded; at her coronation and in the present description the treasurer is to be dressed in a dalmatic, but Mr. Legg points out (p. lxix) that in the *Liber Regalis* he wears pontificals. Mr. Legg also points out that at the coronations of Richard I and of Queen Eleanor the sceptre and rod are carried separately and not with the crown, as in the *Liber Regalis*. In this case also the procedure of the present piece

[1] Maskell, *op. cit.* II, p. 49 *n.*

[2] Published London (Constable), 1901.

[3] In an article on 'Tristram and the House of Anjou' (*Modern Language Review*, Jan. 1922, p. 29) by R. S. Loomis, the information is given (as supplied by Professor W. R. Lethaby) that in 1207 a patent roll shews King John acknowledging among his regalia 'the sword of Tristram.' Evidence drawn from French sources seems to prove that after this time this sword appears under the title 'Curtana.'

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follows the older custom, as does the shorter rubric printed by Dr. Legg. Mr. Legg (p. xix) states that the fourth recension was 'introduced in all likelihood in 1307, but the long rubrics do not appear much earlier than 1377.' The discovery of the present item shews that much of their material was in existence more than a hundred years before 1377.

The Thirteenth century was one of long reigns, and, considering the date of the handwriting here in question, it can only describe the precedent established by the coronation of Queen Eleanor. The observations already made will have shewn that it follows closely the records of the coronation of 1236, and no detail has been observed which departs from the usage of that event. It has already been noted[1] that the phraseology of the account in the *Red Book of the Exchequer* often resembles that of the rubrics, and it is even possible that the present form of the rubric may have been composed immediately after the coronation of 1236. For that of Edward I (1274) we have no records, and we have therefore no means of knowing whether the present description would suit that occasion.

Though, as has already been stated, Flete assigned the date 1266 to the writing of the *Westminster Customary*—which would make Queen Eleanor's coronation the precedent then to be followed—the date of that work is not so simple as appears; Dr. Robinson has pointed out[2] that some parts of the *Customary* must date from after the accession of Edward I (1272). His coronation may therefore have furnished the precedent embodied in that work, if the coronation—as seems likely—was there treated. If this was the case, however, the present article may still have found a place there, if not in its present form, at least in an expanded one; the fact that authoritative records still extant shew its phraseology intact through two expansions —one of which is found in the official *Liber Regalis* of more than a hundred years later—would seem to suggest that it had an authoritative origin of some sort. Its survival, in other words, would prove its importance, even though in the present instance it appears only as a casual memorandum, copied into a book on second thoughts.

HOPE EMILY ALLEN.

[1] L. G. Wickham Legg, *op. cit.* p. 57.
[2] *Archaeologia*, vol. 62, pt. I, p. 88.

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Thomas Hardy and the Poetic Mind.

The Poetic Mind. By Frederick Clarke Prescott, Cornell University. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1922.) 9*s.* net.

Late Lyrics and Earlier. By Thomas Hardy. (London: Macmillan. 1922.) 7*s.* 6*d.* net.

The poets of the early Nineteenth century were much preoccupied with their own development. Wordsworth told the story of his soul in *The Prelude*, Shelley in *Alastor*, and even Keats in *Endymion*. Coleridge wrote a *Biographia Literaria*, and Byron's lack of reticence is even now astonishing. This interest in self-analysis and introspection derived, we are told, from Rousseau; it flourished abundantly in Germany, and something of its German vigour was caught and amplified by Carlyle. Even Elia's charming familiarities and stammering confessions are in the spirit of the age. Much that these revelations tell us of poetry and inspiration had the sanction of tradition, much was new and ingenuously sincere, but their egoism, however important, reveals rather the egoists and their age than the poetic mind of every age. And whilst no student of the art of Poetry would speak lightly of the critical work of Wordsworth, Coleridge, Shelley and Keats, none would claim that it was free from the peculiar excitement, spiritual and political, of the age to which these writers belong.

In Mr. F. C. Prescott's book on *The Poetic Mind*, one feels that this general consideration has been overlooked. His study aims at the elucidation of the operations of the poet's mind in the light of recent psychological theory; and in this light he examines the statements made about their own mental processes and poetical experiences by poets themselves. These he finds principally in the period we have referred to, and his task has been to explain in some of the ways familiar to the amateur in modern psychology what Wordsworth, Coleridge, Shelley, Carlyle, Emerson and Poe have left on record as to the working of the poetical mind. It follows from this that Mr. Prescott's attention is mainly directed to the visionary or symbolical, the mystical or transcendental in poetry, and that Shelley is cited more than twenty times, whilst Chaucer and

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Herrick appear once each, and Browning not at all. He is, in fact, dealing not with the poetic mind, but with certain poetic moods or experiences which are variously described in such terms as inspiration, vision, madness, or ecstasy, and he extends his rational explanation of these to poetic imagination, poetic creation, and the prophetic nature and function of poetry. But it is only 'pure poetry,' 'essential' or 'primary' poetry that he concerns himself with, and, as we have indicated, his facts are taken from the writers who have talked about themselves.

Pure, essential or primary poetry presumably we know as we know a 'yorker,' when we meet it. Mr. Prescott finds it ultimately to be akin to vision, reverie, day-dreaming and trance. He describes the mind as acting in two ways, in attentive thought, a fatiguing process, and in visionary or phantastic thought, an effortless or restful process. Poetry has its origin in the effortless. The imaginative quality of this effortless visionary thought is strong in childhood and in primitive peoples; hence the Bible and Homer 'are the despair of the moderns.' The subjects of 'essential' poetry lie on the horizon of knowledge; they are the mysteries of religion, the meaning of life, beauty, love, death and immortality, matters of which the 'unconscious' mind has an apprehension beyond the reach of the attentive mind. It follows that poetry is free from the usual limitations of the conscious thinking of men of affairs; it transcends time and space and takes on a character of universality.

Poetry has, moreover, a natural cause or impulse. It is 'written always in a mood of dissatisfaction' and springs from the desires. These are the motive force and stand at the beginning of the poetic process. The desires are thwarted, and this thwarting begets emotions which are the ferment without which creation is impossible. The emotions find satisfaction in a poetical conception according with the desires. In this way the poet creates a fictitious world of desirables or idealizations, the product of thought which differs from our ordinary thought in being free, spontaneous, effortless and dreamlike.

Such in outline is Mr. Prescott's argument. Its novelty lies in its application to poetry of the theory of thwarted desires, familiar to those interested in modern hypotheses of dream-psychology. Its chief merit lies in the courageous ingenuity with which he bends much intractable material into his pattern.

Mr. Prescott does not impress one as having undergone the

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discipline of a rigorous philosophical or psychological training. He has read much and has ingenuity, but our confidence in his literary training is shaken when we find his argument supported by the reflexion that '*musing* doubtless means turning to the Muses.' We learn from Skeat that the Old French word *muser* meant 'to snuff the air when the scent is lost.'

Nothing in Mr. Prescott's book suggests that there may be poetry in Thomas Hardy's line:

'And drops on gate-bars hang in a row.'

Yet it is by the common touch that the poet of this line makes contact with his kind. Mr. Prescott nowhere mentions Benedetto Croce's *Aesthetic*, and it is not easy to see how his conception of the poetic mind can take its place in any coherent *Aesthetic* that could meet Croce's criticism. Croce's theory of Art explains why the writer of Hardy's line is to be classed with the poets and in what sense we too who read it have the poetic mind. The writers whom Mr. Prescott treats as the poets *par excellence* have no exclusive rights in the field of poetical expression, nor is there any such thing as a class of poetical subjects. Poetry is what the poet makes of his subject; it is his expression; and it is great just in so far as he brings greatness to it.

It is interesting to turn from Mr. Prescott's somewhat audacious essay to the modest volume of *Late Lyrics and Earlier* by Mr. Thomas Hardy. This is a singularly courageous publication. It includes the residual verse of his active days, verse which, whether overlooked or rejected, was not included in the *Collected Poems*; yet more than half of its contents is the work of the last three years. To this, his latest volume, Mr. Hardy prefaces a remarkable apology, in which he states that the position he defended more than twenty years ago in *In Tenebris* is the position he still holds. Then he looked, as the Psalmist says, to his right hand, and saw that there was no man that would know him; no man cared for his soul.

'The stout upstanders say All's well with us; ruers have nought to rue!
And what the potent say so oft, can it fail to be somewhat true?
Breezily go they, breezily come; their dust smokes around their career,
Till I think I am one born out of due time, who has no calling here.'

This position he resents to hear described as pessimism; rather it is the condition indispensable to amendment.

'If a way to a Better there be, it exacts a full look at the Worst.'

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Nor is he saying a pernicious new thing; he finds this thought underlying the Christian idea. Hardy has refused to close his eyes to the presence of evil, and particularly to a form of evil that has always touched in him the spirit of pity, 'the incongruity of penalising the irresponsible.' It may be difficult to capture the secret of the courage that impresses so greatly the reader of this last volume, but we come near to it if we think of Hardy as after all an optimist, but without illusion; and it is an interesting reflexion that in the present circumstances of European experience and thought an attitude of 'optimism without illusion' is almost as much as even the 'stout upstanders' can look for.

Religion and poetry, he tells us, are often but different names for the same thing, and in this indication of his view of pure literature we come near to the key to one of his positions. Religion, pure literature and poetry, he says, must, like all other things, keep moving, becoming. He looks round to see in what quarter such a movement is discernible, and finds signs of it 'perhaps in the homely quarter where advance might have been the very least expected a few years back—the English Church—if one reads it rightly as showing evidence of removing those things that are shaken.' This hope, it is worth noting, finds some support in his sense of the dignity and standing of the English Church, the strength of old association and architectural spell, qualities that some consider rather static than kinetic; but the creator of the overworld of *The Dynasts* has seen his vision of movement through the eyes of the *Ancient Spirit of the Years*. Static may be to him a term without meaning.

It will probably be found that *Late Lyrics and Earlier* admits us to a greater familiarity with Hardy than anything he has hitherto published. Many of the lyrics resemble the sketch-book notes of an artist's impressions: trifles, but often more intimately indicative of the man than his more elaborated work. We see the sort of thing that takes his eye, and what at once he makes of it. We discover the constant habit or practice of rapidly registering in verse whatever has point or irony, quaintness or sentiment, emotional appeal or deeper significance. We see, in fact, the poet's mind at work, alert for stimulus and reacting to it at once. One has the impression of forthright, rapid work. Words are pressed and tormented, abbreviated or coined, to serve the immediate need. The form of the poems has the like appearance of rough handling, and

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the measures are seldom familiar. One cannot hold up a lyric of Hardy's and look at it from all sides, as one may look at a delicate piece of ware, in entire admiration; but would *The Dynasts* have ever been written by a worker in porcelain? Yet almost all the lyrics in the collection shew vigorous and definite thought on 'subjects' that only the practitioner in poetic wit and sentiment discovers.

Hardy, the architect of the Wessex novels, of *The Dynasts*, and the tales, now shews himself to us as the detective of the thing to put into words, the serious and habitual anecdoter. Many of his lyrics might have been worked out as novels—*Rake-Hell Muses* and *The Seven Times*, for example—and there are few of them that have not the salt of irony. His flair is for the detection of ironical circumstance, the rough, ruthless irony of the workaday life. There is nothing fine and pointed in it, and we regret this at times. Delicacy and point in irony, we who love *A Shropshire Lad* have come to look upon as one of the fruits of classical rearing, or, maybe, of Celtic soil, and Hardy is a Saxon, not a Celt, Gothic not classical. Mr. Housman's 'Along the field as we came by' is more subtle in its irony, as it is also more simple and perfect in form and movement than any lyric of Hardy's. Hardy's lyrics take the weather, Housman's are of the sanctum.

It is as a narrative poet that Hardy is best, in spite of his interest in song; and the best things in the present collection are the longer pieces. There is grim old English comedy in *Voices from Things growing in a Churchyard*:

> 'I, these berries of juice and gloss,
> Sir or Madam,
> Am clean forgotten as Thomas Voss;
> Thin-urned, I have burrowed away from the moss
> That covers my sod, and have entered this yew,
> And turned to clusters ruddy of view,
> All day cheerily,
> All night eerily!'

And so in turn we meet poor Fanny Hurd, Squire Audeley Grey, and the rest, rustling and swaying all night eerily. This is plainly an old churchyard. That most interesting of the seven deadly sins, Accidia, has seldom been more happily suggested than in the quaint holiday verses:

> 'Where shall I go to,
> Go to, go to?
> Can I say No to
> Lyonesse-way?'

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The *Chapel Organist* is a powerful and successful tale in verse. The Magdalen who finds in her organ-playing something greater than the world offered her will win the pity of many readers.

No attempt at arrangement is discernible in the sequence of the poems, but the volume closes with a group of altogether surprising pieces. *The Inscription*, one of the best tales Hardy has ever made, is as powerful and arresting as anything we know in modern verse. The impressionists have nothing better to shew than *A Woman Driving*. His irony is tragic and great in *Intra Sepulchrum*—perhaps the best thing in the book; it is surprisingly interesting in *The Whitewashed Wall*, whilst all the old courage rises to greet us in the gallant address of *An Ancient to Ancients*. More than half of the collection is, as we have said, recent work; we venture to assert that the vigour and interest of these last poems of the book are not to be claimed by youth, but belong to the declining years of this most courageous old singer. Our most respectful good wishes to him for the coming year.

A. W. Reed.

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SHORT NOTICES.

I. Biblical Studies.

St. Mark's Life of Jesus. By Theodore H. Robinson, M.A., D.D. (Student Christian Movement: 32 Russell Square, London, W.C. 1. 1922.) 4*s.* net. (In paper covers 2*s.* 6*d.*)

This is a book that it would be difficult to overpraise. It is clear; it is admirably written; it is modern in the best sense; and it is most reverent. Best of all, it allows St. Mark to speak for himself, while giving just the amount of explanation that is needed. Where the deeper questions arise, which lie beyond the scope of the book, Dr. Robinson indicates them, without pressing any solution of his own. Once or twice, as in the remarks about fasting and those about our Lord's claim to forgive sin, Dr. Robinson's own outlook for a moment appears. But as a rule the treatment is entirely objective, and men of varying convictions may recommend the book with equal confidence. That is where it differs widely from such a book as Dr. Glover's *The Jesus of History*. Attractive and stimulating as that book is, it is not quite what is needed by a beginner in the study of the Life of Christ. Dr. Robinson's book is exactly what is needed, and we have had nothing quite like it before. There is only one criticism to offer, and that relates to the title. St. Mark's Gospel is not a 'Life of Jesus'; and, if we so regard it, we may be seriously misled. It is concerned with His death far more than with His life, and it very largely neglects His teaching. St. Mark was a disciple of St. Peter and St. Paul, and probably he wrote for those who had heard and accepted their preaching of Jesus as the Christ, who gave His life a ransom for many. His book gives the answer to the two questions which they would most desire to have answered. The first is, How did men come to believe that Jesus was the Christ? The second is, How did the Jews come to crucify Him? St. Mark probably says little about the Lord's moral teaching because those for whom he wrote possessed it already. We do not think that Dr. Robinson is right in distinguishing between what the Lord was and what He taught; St. Mark himself makes it clear that it was in the authority of the Lord's teaching that what He was very largely

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appeared. It is important that the student of the Lord's life should recognize St. Mark's limitations here as in other things; otherwise he may erect his Gospel into a standard by which all later Gospels must be judged. But this blemish, if such it be, is but a small one in a book for which we may be profoundly grateful, and which we hope will be very widely used.

The Solution of the Synoptic Problem. By ROBINSON SMITH. Second edition, rewritten. (Watts and Co. 1922.) 10*s.* net.

THE following are some of the propositions proved to his own satisfaction by the author of this surprising book. (1) The earliest known gospel is the 'Gospel according to the Hebrews,' which was written about 80 A.D., and was a source of the canonical gospels. (2) The order of the composition of the canonical gospels is Mark, Matthew, John, Luke, and their respective dates 'about 105 A.D.,' 'about 120 A.D.,' 'about 140 A.D.,' 'about 145 A.D.' (3) The earliest Epistles bear the order Galatians, Romans, Corinthians, Thessalonians, Colossians, Ephesians, James, and were written in the last two decades of the First century. (4) Luke followed on after Matthew, and used him as a source, even as Matthew followed on after Mark and used him as a source. (5) Luke is entirely untrustworthy as a historian. Many of the incidents, speeches, sermons, letters in his Gospel and in Acts are but patchwork. He knew very little of what he was writing about, committing blunder after blunder, and thus discredits the Christian message as a whole. He quarried continuously in Josephus. (6) Nineteen of the twenty-eight Parables are all or in part derived, and nearly every saying and incident of the harmonized Crucifixion narrative was borrowed from some external source or did not occur at all.

These 'Argumenta' are here quoted as nearly as possible in the author's words from the list at the beginning of the book, and there are twenty or more others of the same kind. It will thus be seen that the title of the work, which at first might seem somewhat comprehensive for a book of 300 pages, is in fact too modest. 'Solutions of all the problems of early Christian literature, including the New Testament' would more nearly do justice to the wide range of the material handled. It is, consequently, impossible in a short review to deal adequately with all the problems raised. However, some specimens of the author's method may be given. 'Nine lines of proof' are brought forward to shew that Luke used Matthew as a source. Of these

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the majority really depend on the hypothesis which they are invoked to prove, as for example the fourth, which 'is made up of those cases where Luke has chosen a detail from Mark and a detail from Matthew, sometimes the one almost contradicting the other, to piece out his narrative.' One, however, might carry some weight (in fact the author says that is 'sufficient in itself' to prove his point), that drawn from the phenomenon of 'doublets,' but for the fact that only one part of the evidence is given. The Lukan doublets which have one parallel in Matthew and the other in Mark are alone dealt with; they are regarded as shewing that Matthew first took the incident from Mark, while Luke copied it in two places, once from Mark and once from Matthew. But, as is well known to all scholars, the phenomena of 'doublets' are not nearly so simple as this. There are, for example, the doublets in Matthew which have one parallel in Mark and one in Luke; these, on our author's principle, should be used to prove that Matthew wrote after Luke, and derived some of his matter from Mark and the rest from Luke. Also there are doublets in Matthew which have parallels in both places in Luke; and again, doublets in one or two cases in Mark. All this information is contained in Dr. Stanton's *Gospels as Historical Documents*, on pages adjacent to those from which the author quotes the Lukan doublets, yet he makes no reference to it whatever. Then we may take an instance of the kind of evidence relied on to prove that Luke made use of Josephus and other sources.

'The trial before Herod is . . . merely Lukan patchwork. The mock crowning and the introduction of Barabbas would appear to come from Philo, "Against Flaccus," 6; "There was a certain madman named Karabas. . . . They, driving the poor wretch as far as the public gymnasium and setting him up there on high that he might be seen of everybody, flattened out a leaf of papyrus and put it on his head instead of a diadem . . . and when he had been adorned and dressed as a king . . . then others came up, some as if to salute him. . . . Then from the multitude of those who were standing around arose a wonderful shout of men calling out Maris; and this is the name by which it is said they call the kings among the Syrians."'

The author then goes on to refer to 'the likeness of the two accounts.' Personally, we see no likeness. Lastly, we note that peculiarly mechanical style of literary criticism which regards the occurrence of the same word or phrase in two authors as proof of literary dependence. Thus it is argued that the parable of the Prodigal Son was mainly derived by Luke from

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the Book of Tobit; the evidence being that, according to the Hebrew version, Anna saw her son 'afar off' and 'ran and fell on his neck'!

A considerable amount of work is represented in this book, and a number of interesting points are referred to, but the method of arguing illustrated above, taken in conjunction with the author's little prefatory sermon on scholarly and unscholarly types of mind and the proper use of evidence, and having added to it frequent uglinesses of style and a number of misprints, makes it one of the least pleasant books to read that we have ever seen.

New Testament History. By G. W. WADE, D.D., with a contribution by J. H. WADE, M.A. (London: Methuen and Co. 1922.) 18*s.* net.

IT is increasingly felt that the best preparation for study of the New Testament is a thorough knowledge of the Old, and readers of Dr. Wade's *Old Testament History* will welcome his new contribution to Biblical learning. The present volume is much larger and more comprehensive than its predecessor, and forms a very wide introduction to the various departments of New Testament scholarship. It is no small feat to have compressed such a large quantity of information into a single volume, and Dr. Wade has succeeded in achieving it without sacrificing lucidity, so that the book though technical remains readable throughout.

It is divided into three parts. Part I contains a sketch of the geography of Palestine, the political and religious history of the Jews after the Exile, conditions in the Roman empire, Jewish institutions, and the methods of Jewish historians. Part II deals with Textual and Documentary Criticism. All this is admirably done: a temperate statement of all the chief problems is given, and the references and footnotes are nicely calculated to enable the student to pursue any particular point as much further as desired. It is no doubt from Part III that the book takes its title, and it is here that opinions will vary as to the value of the work. It consists of a description of the life and teaching of Our Lord 'according to the earliest sources,' with a note on the account given by the Fourth Gospel; the History of the Church in the Apostolic Age; and a chapter on 'Theological Development in the New Testament.' It is obvious that here the fundamental problems of Christian origins are raised, and the verdict passed on Dr. Wade's interpretation of the

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New Testament story will depend on the reader's conceptions of the nature of Our Lord's Messianic consciousness and the method and meaning of the Incarnation. Naturally, no full discussion is attempted of these difficult subjects, but in the closing chapter Dr. Wade indicates his own outlook, which regards Our Lord's belief in His Messiahship as a gradual development. In relating the Gospel story, a brave attempt is made to explain the miracles on modern psychological lines, but it cannot be said that the results are very encouraging. Some of the cases of healing no doubt yield fairly easily to such treatment, but the barren fig-tree, the Gadarene swine, and the feeding of the multitudes, to take only three examples, remain as difficult as ever. Still less satisfactory is the treatment of the Resurrection Appearances.

In any case, however, the running commentary which accompanies the history in Part III provides a storehouse of valuable and suggestive information, and the book as a whole will be useful as a manual of New Testament interpretation and illustration. Unfortunately, its value as a book of reference is much diminished by the inadequacy of the index. We have noticed only one misprint, Julius for Junias, on page 284.

Lectures on the Apocalypse. By R. H. CHARLES, D.Litt., D.D. The Schweich Lectures for 1919. (London: Published for the British Academy; Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press. 1922.) 6s. net.

STUDENTS of the Apocalypse have much reason to be grateful to Dr. Charles for these three lectures. His great Commentary is a long book, and necessarily an expensive one. But in these Lectures the chief problems are indicated and Dr. Charles' main conclusions clearly given; and, though they whet our appetite for more, they will be most useful to those who have not time for full study of the larger book.

The first Lecture deals with the various methods of interpretation which have prevailed, and the reasons for their failure. Interpreters in the past have had little knowledge of the Jewish Apocalyptic writings, and have failed to recognize the peculiarities of the author's style. But Dr. Charles recognizes the value of the revival by the Jesuits of the Contemporary-Historical method of interpretation, and the good work done on the Protestant side in philology and critical analysis. It is in this Lecture that we have the firstfruits of Dr. Charles' own study

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in his very attractive rearrangement of chaps. xx–xxii. He thinks that we must recognize here the hand of an unintelligent editor, putting together fragments which he has failed to understand. The result of Dr. Charles' rearrangement is that the vision of the glory of Christ's millennial reign is distinguished from that of the glory of the final consummation. We may think that he is over-confident as to the soundness of his conclusions; but the difficulties of the ordinary text are real, and Dr. Charles' rearrangement gets rid of them.

In the second Lecture he deals with other hurtful alterations made by the uncritical editor. All the suggestions made are interesting, and one, we think, quite convincing—the excision in xiv 4 of the words 'These are they who have not defiled themselves with women, for they are virgins.' But the great subject of this Lecture is the grammar of the Apocalypse. It is here, we think, that Dr. Charles has laid us under the greatest obligation to him, and has made the most permanent contribution to the study of the book. Not only does he carry us with him everywhere, but he shews that in the case of this book the study of the grammar possesses peculiar importance. Not only do we sometimes obtain the right translation for the first time, but we have valuable evidence for the unity of the book as a whole, and a criterion for detecting interpolations.

The third Lecture is perhaps of less importance than the other two, but here too there is much that is valuable. Dr. Charles' special studies throw much light about the value of the different authorities for the text, and upon the sources of which the writer seems to have made use. There are also valuable remarks as to the nature of prophecy, and the author of the book.

We have only two criticisms to urge; and it is quite possible that study of the Commentary might shew them to be baseless. The first is that Dr. Charles seems at times too certain as to the conclusions which he reaches. He is not, like some critics, given to baseless conjecture; there is hardly a case in which he does not support his conclusions by solid arguments. But he is not always equally convincing; and the air of level certainty with which he writes may lead readers who in some cases remain unconvinced to discount in others arguments which ought to convince them. The second is this: we think that Dr. Charles, while rightly condemning the spiritualizing methods of many expositors, fails to take account of the possible influence of Our Lord's teaching upon the writer's mind. Ideas found in the Jewish Apocalyptic had a real place in Our Lord's teaching, but

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they were blended with much that was of a different character. He adopted those ideas in a sense of His own, and transformed what He used. Now the author of the Apocalypse was a Christian who was familiar with much of Our Lord's teaching. Thus it is not certain that, when he reproduced old Apocalyptic language, he always reproduced it in its original sense. To take but one example, there is a striking parallel between Rev. xx 4, 5 and St. Jn. v 25–29. In the latter case there are two resurrections, one spiritual and one material. Is it quite certain that it is not so in the former case also? The Church as a whole came to reject the 'Jewish dotage' of a millennial reign before the final resurrection; it was no part of her Master's teaching, or, we think, of that of any of the Apostles. It is quite possible that the author of the Apocalypse, like many of the early Christians, was of a different mind, but Dr. Charles does not in these Lectures convince us that he was so.

Sir Isaac Newton's Daniel and the Apocalypse. With an Introductory study of the nature and the cause of unbelief, of miracles and prophecy. By Sir WILLIAM WHITLA, M.P., M.D., D.Sc., LL.D. (John Murray. 1922.) 15*s.* net.

THIS is not a book that it is a pleasure to review. Sir William Whitla is a distinguished man of science; and, like Sir Isaac Newton himself, one with a deep and practical interest in religion. But Sir Isaac Newton has not permanently increased his reputation by the books which are here reprinted, and his editor will not, we fear, be more fortunate. So much light has been thrown both upon Daniel and upon the Apocalypse since Sir Isaac Newton's day, that his work has little beyond a historical interest. It was hardly worth reprinting, unless his editor was prepared to justify in view of modern knowledge the methods of interpretation employed. Sir William Whitla is not lacking in courage. He holds, *e.g.*, that the prophets were 'mere mouthpieces' of God's revelation, and assures us that in the Book of Daniel, the Divine Sacrifice of the Lord is predicted 'to the very day and hour.' 'Every argument and assumption' hostile to the authority of the book 'has been fairly and unanswerably met.' But his conception of a complete answer to a difficulty is one peculiarly his own. We will take the most familiar instance. Who is 'Darius the Mede,' who 'receives the kingdom' after the death of Belshazzar? It was Cyrus who overthrew the

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Babylonian Empire; the kings who bore the name of Darius belonged to a later time. Sir William Whitla's answer is to identify the Darius of Daniel with Gobryas, whom Cyrus made governor of Babylon. It would, we think, be true to say that no one unaware of the difficulty has ever read, or ever will read, the book without seeing that 'Darius the Mede' is represented not as a 'governor,' but as an absolute ruler; the year is dated by the years of his reign in ix 1, just as elsewhere by those of the reigns of Nebuchadnezzar and of Cyrus himself; and the whole story implies this absolute rule. But our chief quarrel is with the whole tone in which Sir William writes, and with the language which he employs in speaking of scholars who differ from him. No doubt there have been 'critical' writers in Germany and elsewhere, in whose case some of his strictures are well founded; but there are many who are profoundly religious men. If they assign a late date to the Book of Daniel, it is because, as they think, overwhelming arguments compel them to do so. When Sir William Whitla, in speaking of Dr. Cheyne, speaks of 'the deadly nature of his poisonous stuff,' and says that Dr. Driver 'stultifies himself in his feeble attempts to reconcile the views of the unbeliever with those of the true Christian,' he returns to methods of controversy which we had hoped were dead. By all means let him reopen the question of the date of Daniel if he so desires; but let him use the customary language of Christian courtesy.

II. Philosophy of Religion.

The Life of the Spirit and the Life of To-day. By Evelyn Underhill. (London: Methuen. 1922.) *7s. 6d.* net.

Since this book not only pleads that modern psychology, in spite of its present somewhat unstably hypothetical condition, offers momentous information to the religious world, but also represents a strong movement of current thought, it deserves a better fate than dismissal in a few lines of easy appreciation or blame.

Miss Underhill proposes to deal with the fundamental spiritual experiences which she finds incidental to all forms of religion, and with 'the light cast on spiritual problems by mental analysis'; with questions of institutional and individual spirituality, with educational possibilities, and finally with the function

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of spiritual life in the social order. As she says, an adequate treatment of all this would demand volumes, some of which she hopes to furnish later. This book therefore is of the nature of Prolegomena to a future synthesis of religious experience and the results of recent psychological research.

Many have attempted to define the human 'self.' Miss Underhill offers us 'a conception of the psyche as the living force within us, a storehouse of ancient memories and animal tendencies, yet plastic, adaptable, ever pressing on and ever craving for more life and more love.'

'Sin,' for this psyche, she describes 'as primarily a fall-back to past levels of conduct, a defeat of the spirit of the future in its conflict with the undying past.' This 'spirit of the future' as well as 'the emerging soul,' which she presently mentions, seem to spring rather fortuitously into her scheme.

Her remark that 'the maximum of man's strength is not reached until all the self's powers, the instinctive and the rational, are united and set on one objective,' provokes a protest: reason and instinct do not cover 'all the self's powers,' room is needed for all which Kant for example included in the term morality, for reason and instinct cannot unite and set on one objective without Will. Though it is essential to investigation and discussion to separate psychology from mental and moral philosophy, these last still exist, and in the interests of the whole truth the three must presently be re-united. No one can read Miss Underhill's book without perceiving that she desires such a synthesis: but, partly because the time is not yet ripe, partly because she accepts too optimistically Psychology's promise to make all things new, and partly because she imperfectly realizes that new terminology does not always mean discovery of new Truth, she tends, if not to contradict herself outright, at least to oscillate between disparate views.

Since the moment when 'philosophy was born in wonder,' one fact has remained patent and constant, that the human self is a complex; though that particular term is modern. Investigation of any complex demands its analysis into parts: but the nature of the parts is not changed by the different names given to them in the course of ages. Once, they were called faculties; then will, thought, feeling; now, disguised primitive cravings, instinctive uprushes, egoistic ambitions, or floatings-up into the conscious field of deep germinal life. Miss Underhill seems not to realize this, nor to perceive that when she writes 'this urgent craving life is the dominant character-

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istic of the psyche,' she is presenting not a new but the old fact that, as a rule, desire precedes thought: a fact which must have been known equally to Confucius, Moses or Socrates, as to any ordinarily observant person in any age. Again, 'sublimation of crude instinct' seems rather a clumsy periphrasis for self-control, that idea so familiar to us all, however we fail in its practice. These new terms and phrases carry us no nearer to Truth. It is this imperfect distinction of new discovery from fresh terminology which seems to betray her into contradiction sometimes: yet elsewhere she falls into real confusion of thought. For example, having quoted from Thomas à Kempis and Boehme's 'Scholar,' she observes:—'No psychologist has come nearer to a statement of the human situation, than have these old specialists in the spiritual life.' Elsewhere, she administers a still severer rebuke to extreme modern pretensions when she declares that 'real spiritual teachers . . . are usually some generations in advance of the psychologists.' And yet, in the same chapter she can assure us that 'we are learning to give a new content' to St. Paul's account of the duality of human nature.

Will she seriously maintain that her summary of this 'new content,'—'the sophisticated surface-mind which alone we usually recognize is the smallest, the least developed and in some respects still the least important part of the real self, that whole man of impulse, thought and desire . . . an animal spirit, a living, growing, plastic unit moving towards a racial future yet unperceived by us, and carrying with him a racial past which conditions at every moment his choices, impulses and acts,'—really improves on St. Paul's poignant laying bare of our human plight, in the seventh chapter of the Epistle to the Romans?

A still clearer instance of such contradiction occurs in the second chapter. There, Miss Underhill declares that 'the full living of the spiritual life' implies 'at least three characters,' and immediately continues:

> 'We will look at one concrete example which illustrates all these points . . . that of St. Benedict and the Order which he founded. . . . It was framed, of course, for a celibate community, but it has many permanent features which are unaffected by this limitation. It offers balanced opportunities of development to the body, the mind, and the Spirit; laying great emphasis on hard work, study and prayer. It aims at a complete robustness.'

If this be even approximately true of the early Seventh

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century, what meaning can attach to Miss Underhill's claim, seven pages further on, that,

'if it is to give an account of all the facts, psychology must also point out and find place for the last-comer in the evolutionary series, the rare and still rudimentary achievement of the spiritual consciousness, bearing witness that we are the children of God'?

When did this last comer arrive, before or after St. Benedict?

Such confusions in a serious, and often deeply suggestive book, force the question of our wisdom in having, of recent years, in our Universities and elsewhere, separated so widely the study of psychology from that of logic and ethics. It seems to have engendered forgetfulness of the facts that things exist before they have names, that Plato, Plotinus, St. Benedict, Ruysbroeck—to choose a few out of many—were at least as truly psychologists as John Locke, who after all thought he was a metaphysician, as Freud, or Jung or Varendonck. Miss Underhill's chapter on Contemplation and Suggestion in relation to the 'new psychology,' with its particularly lucid exposition of the function of the 'fore-consciousness' in religious life, is freer from such confusion; though even here some passages only convey to us, in impressive words, the simple truth we learned from our nurses, that we can, to a great extent, make ourselves believe what we choose. It is strange that Miss Underhill's insight shewn here in genuine recognition of mystical reality did not restrain her from declaring on a previous page that 'Pure immediacy, as such, is almost ungraspable by us.' That is precisely what it was not, to Richard Rolle, for example, to St. Teresa, to Ruysbroeck. Possibly Miss Underhill's true meaning was stated by St. Teresa, when she confessed her inability to express what she had seen, by St. Paul when he spoke of things 'unlawful to utter.' The mystics 'see' more than they can or ought to put into words.

The practical side of this book may prove more solid than the psychological. Certainly those who have heedlessly rejected religion, and its observances, could profit by Miss Underhill's plain and trenchant exposition of the scope and function of Institutional Religion, as Baron von Hügel taught us to call it. For the instructed, this chapter may contain nothing new; indeed they may urge that it gravely understates the essential value of symbolism and cultus, as 'reason' is ever apt to do; but it offers substantial matter for thought to any who have followed like sheep the contemptuous abandonment of religion which has been rather frequent lately. In the two closing

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paragraphs Miss Underhill has presented succinctly the pressing and difficult problem, which in an age of wide differences of development must confront the Catholic Church.

Upon educational means and aims she writes with the air of a spectator, never more obviously so than when having said 'Only those who have become real can communicate the knowledge of reality . . . . The artist shows us beauty, the saint shows us God,' she adds 'It should therefore be the business of those in authority to search out and give scope to those who possess and are able to impart this triumphing, spiritual life.'

Her own earnestness and the vital importance of the subject preclude any possibilities of irony here: the only conclusion then is that she is unaware that 'those in authority' spend all their diligence on securing teachers whom they call 'safe.' The artist and the saint do not come into that category. Probably, the most fruitful chapters will be the second, the fourth and the sixth, of which the last, if not the most original, is the most informed with the essential spirit, most lit with the unearthly radiance of genuine mysticism. Casting behind her all but love and prayer, the author reminds us of the saints' age-long conviction:—'The spiritual life is not lived upon the heavenly hearth-rug, within safe distance from the Fire of Love.' Fervently, she declares 'It is not from real men and women of the Spirit that we hear soft things about the comfort of faith. For the true life of faith gives everything worth having and takes everything worth offering: with unrelenting blows it welds the self into the stuff of the universe, subduing it to the universal purpose, doing away with the flame of separation.' With the exception of half a dozen words this passage is nearer to the psychology of the saints than to that current to-day.

It is greatly to be hoped that Miss Underhill's concluding chapter with its recognition of the importance of 'social service,' together with its insistence that such service, however vital and proper to the awakened 'herd-conscience,' is not and cannot be the same thing as, or a substitute for, individual search after and response to God, may convince the younger generation. Probably, however, the swing of that pendulum has not yet reached its utmost limit, so that not all will perceive at present the cogency of her declaration, 'When a great truth becomes exaggerated to this extent, and is held to the exclusion of its compensating opposite, it is in a fair way to become a lie.'

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The Divine Initiative. By Professor H. R. MACKINTOSH, D.D. (Student Christian Movement. 1922.) 3*s.* 6*d.* net.

IT needs a master hand to write a small book well. The one before us displays all that delicacy of touch, reverent spirit and mastery of the subject which we have learned to associate with Dr. Mackintosh's work. He writes for the benefit of those in Universities and Colleges who 'amidst modern conditions desire to come to a personal understanding with Christianity.' There are chapters on the need for God, the Divine Initiative, the Response of man, and Christianity as a Corporate Life. The book forms a valuable addition to the series now being published by the S.C.M. The reading of it leaves us with a hope that some day Professor Mackintosh will supply what is perhaps our greatest need, namely a comprehensive treatment of the Christian doctrine of Divine Revelation written by one who is in sympathy with modern speculative philosophy and at the same time is a sharer in the distinctive Christian experience of God in Christ Jesus.

Altar, Cross, and Community. By W. F. LOFTHOUSE, M.A. Being the Fernley Lecture, 1920. (The Epworth Press. 1922.) 4*s.* net.

ATTENTION has often been drawn to the fact that each age has endeavoured to interpret the doctrine of the Atonement in terms of its own felt ethical and religious needs. One of the great needs of the modern world is summed up under the conception of unity and reconcilation. Our author, whilst not claiming for his work the dignity of a treatise on the Atonement, has, nevertheless, contrived to give us in some 300 closely packed pages a really able treatment of one aspect of the doctrine, centering in the conception of reconciliation and linking sacrifice and atonement, altar and cross. His thesis is that just as the family, at its best, furnishes the type of moral intercourse between persons, so sacrifice, rightly understood, furnishes the type of the reconciliation by which these relations are made possible: a reconciliation which is the same in principle when both parties are human and when one is Divine.

We cannot attempt to summarize the steps in Mr. Lofthouse's argument, though we can heartily commend him as a guide, especially in his earlier chapters amidst the intricacies of the sacrifice-concept in its varied forms. The book is not written

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merely for academic purposes, but through it there runs a real message which the author feels this age should grasp afresh. There is, he believes, a real and close connexion between the aims of sacrifice and of reconciliation. The two sundered parties, he tells us, have to be brought together; the barrier between them has somehow to be removed. We have agreed that the victim on the altar was felt, more or less inadequately, to accomplish this; and that Christ really did so. How was the result brought about? If we could answer this question, we might possibly make a further discovery. For if Christ provides the explanation of all sacrificial rites by being the world's offering, it is not, perhaps, too bold to suppose that as the world's reconciliation He may lay bare to us the law of reconciliation. And in a world of suspicion, enmity, and hate, where men turn their backs and harden their hearts as resolutely and bitterly against God as against each other, this would be no small thing. So Mr. Lofthouse labours to demonstrate the true inwardness of Christ's work of reconciliation and he goes on to shew that the work of Christ is the norm of all reconciliation, and if reconciliation with God is more than a transaction performed for us, it means that we unite ourselves, when reconciled, with God's purpose and mind and will. Being is here impossible without doing. But reconciliation with God's mind and purpose is meaningless apart from reconciliation to a life of reconciling. For, asks Mr. Lofthouse, how do we know God's mind save through Christ? And when we look at Christ to discover this, what do we find in Him but the reconciler? Hence the proper function of the Christian, who is himself reconciled to God in Christ, must be the reconciling of opposing and sundered parties. For such a work the world, in these distracted days after the war, is calling out piteously.

In this gospel of reconciliation Mr. Lofthouse bids us perceive the task that is set before us as Christians, and it is his hope that his book may help many to work more whole-heartedly in ministering to a world that is calling out for reconciliation and needing so much the Christian response to that call. 'To-day,' he says, 'the whole world is calling out for reconciliation. A new paganism of lust and greed (only another form of self-seeking) and of hatred is overflowing human society. The religion that cannot stay its advance is doomed. The religion that can defeat it has overcome the world. We talk vaguely about Christianity as the life of love—so vaguely that our half-hearted attempts at goodwill often evaporate and disappear

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in the mist. In the light of the Atonement, love means reconciliation, the ending of quarrels through Him who has brought us into fellowship or partnership with God, the creation of an atmosphere in which hostility and self-seeking wither and die. "Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God." With their sacrifices God is well pleased.'

In these days of dear books we congratulate the Epworth Press on the production of so good a volume for so moderate a price, and we hope it may have a wide circulation.

The Divine Invasion. By HAROLD SHEPHEARD. (London: Dent and Sons Ltd. 1922.) 4*s.* 6*d.* net.

THE title of this book is unusually accurate, and gives an exact indication of the theme.

Mr. Shepheard begins by considering individual life. It is little and transient, and seems to exist not so much for itself as for the great Life stream. Individuals are the members, the eyes, ears, hands, and feet, as it were, of this greater Life.

But what is the character of Life? It is cruel, relentless, horrible. At what is it aiming? It is striving, cleverly and forcefully, to evolve—the Brute. Yet there are obstacles in its way. The moral virtues—Love, Kindness, Pity—cause men here and there to turn against the 'natural' forces and tendencies. These virtues are clearly 'alien' to Life, and cannot have arisen out of it, seeing they are actually hostile to it.

Whence then come these virtues? The answer is that they are the Divine Invasion. The Word of God 'once possessed himself wholly of a man Jesus . . . he besieges the soul . . . and makes man a rebel against the natural life.' A very real conflict is taking place, and it is the duty of every soul to ally itself to the Divine Invader.

But are we to rest content with such a dualism? The author, to meet this, suggests a 'Background of Existence.' And he calls upon the ancient Greeks and a modern novelist to testify to its existence. The book closes with some interesting discussion on ultimate being and a description of the 'new Life.' It will be seen that Mr. Shepheard describes the moral struggle in a novel way as something very real, and, as William James said, not as a set of private theatricals. And there are many good passages: for example, in the chapter on 'Alien

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Virtues,' the modern theory that virtues are simply old instincts converted is well criticized.

It will be gathered that the author's views on Cosmology and Christology are of the most liberal description. The very word Invader suggests that God is an intruder (however welcome) in what we always supposed was His own universe. And if a Divine Invasion, why not a Diabolic Invasion? But that is an old idea.

Christ and Caesar. By N. MICKLEM and H. MORGAN. (The Swarthmore Press, Ltd. 1921.) 6*s.* 6*d.* net.

'THE Christian Revolution Series' is the title of the group of studies to which this book belongs. This fact aroused a secret hope in us that the authors 'wanted to make our flesh creep,' but the anticipation was doomed to disappointment. The *Christian Revolution* seems to be much less exciting than the usual kinds. No doubt the word 'revolution' requires further definition, but in the meantime we cannot help feeling that its use in this connexion is not altogether conducive to clearness of thought.

The first part of the book consists of brief summaries and criticisms of *The Way of the Social Revolutionaries*, represented by Marx, Sorel, and Joseph Dietzgen, and *The Way of the Ecclesiastics*, represented by the Bishop of Manchester. The second part consists of essays developing the authors' own point of view. In the course of the discussion it becomes clear that the authors themselves occupy a fairly definite ecclesiastical position, so that their own propositions are quite as much open to the label, 'Way of the Ecclesiastics,' as those of Dr. Temple. And they are at least equally open to criticism. Thus, for example, on page 185 and elsewhere, Dr. Temple and 'Catholicism generally' are taken to task for embracing the conception of a real Church, one, holy, and Catholic, which is only imperfectly embodied in existing organizations. But if this is 'a pure abstraction,' what can be said of the solution to problems of conduct propounded on pp. 215 and 216, where Law (*νόμος* as distinct from *οἱ νόμοι*) is set up over all existing codes as a sovereign principle? This is but one example to indicate that the authors' criticism is more effective than their constructive efforts.

The discussion covers a wide range of problems, but one point seems to exercise the minds of the authors more than any other, for they recur to it in several connexions. Is war in any way legitimate for Christians, and ought a Christian who disbelieves

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in war to be compelled to fight for his country? The authors believe strongly in the authority of the 'Inward Light,' and the right of conscientious objection. We think that if they had devoted themselves entirely to the thorough consideration of this particular problem, a better book might have been the result. In spite of such criticisms, we welcome this book as a courageous effort to consider the application of Christianity to modern social problems, and believe that anyone who reads it will at least be stimulated to thought and study.

The Kingdom of Heaven. (Fernley Lecture, 1922.) By H. MALDWYN HUGHES, B.A., D.D. (London: The Epworth Press. J. Alfred Sharp. 1922.) 3*s.* 6*d.* net.

THE purpose of this book is 'to help some of those who are engaged in the practical work of preaching and teaching to a better understanding of the actual message of our Lord's ministry.' It is excellently adapted to that purpose. If the writer has not much that is new to tell us, he is well acquainted with the literature of his subject, and takes for himself a sensible and well-balanced view. The best part of the book is that which deals with the teaching of the Synoptic Gospels. Here, though the critical standpoint is adopted, there is no merely subjective criticism, or slurring over of evidence unfavourable to the writer's own views: indeed we do not know any better account of the teaching contained in the Synoptists as to the Kingdom of God. Both the 'evolutionary' and the 'catastrophic' views receive due attention, and the harmony of the two is very well brought out. The later chapters, though containing much useful material, are less satisfactory. Dr. Hughes is not so much at home with St. Paul as with the Synoptists. Too little attention is given to the doctrine of the Holy Spirit as the 'earnest' of the Kingdom, and to the Church as—ideally though never completely in fact—its present embodiment. This weakness especially appears in Chapter IX, 'The Cross and the Kingdom.' The appeal of the Cross is weakened, since Dr. Hughes fails to bring out its connexion with the gift of the Spirit to the Church. But even here what he says is good, so far as it goes. We should like to make one suggestion. A hand-book such as this needs an Index of the texts quoted. The exegesis is so good that it would be a convenience to be able easily to refer to it.

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III. Moslem Thought.

Les Penseurs de l'Islam. Tome Premier, *Les Souverains, l'Histoire et la Philosophie Politique.* Tome Deuxième, *Les Géographes, les Sciences Mathématiques et Naturelles.* Par Baron Carra de Vaux. (Paris: Librairie Paul Geuthner. 1921.)

Baron Carra de Vaux has begun in these two volumes the difficult task of presenting within the narrow limits of five books the essential outlines of Mohammedan thought in all its various branches whether religious or secular, from the earliest days of the development of Islam. This first part of the survey touches briefly on some of the great monarchs of the Mohammedan world, the chief Arabian, Persian and Turkish historians and political philosophers, the literature of proverb and fable, and the most prominent writers on geography, mathematics, astronomy, medicine, natural history, mineralogy, and alchemy.

His aim is not to produce a catalogue of writers and their works, but 'de mettre en relief les figures principales, de faire connaître les œuvres maîtresses, de donner le sentiment de quelques idées essentielles, la vue de certains sommets.' Perhaps the limits thus imposed upon the work account for the omission from the chapter on medicine of such a scholar as Ali ibn Rabban, the teacher of the famous Rhazes, whom we should have thought worthy of notice—especially as on other subjects, such as geography, the desire to select rather than catalogue does not prevent sketchy references, for on three pages (vol. ii pp. 7–9) no less than seven writers are referred to.

It is manifestly clear, however, that a vast theme has been handled in a masterly way, chiefly by reference to, quotation from, and criticism on, original documents. Where deemed necessary the author steps beyond the limits of Islam, and shews an intimate acquaintance with the Hindu Greek or Christian world, in order to emphasize the relationship of Mohammedan to outside thought. The observations on the genealogy of the numerals or the value of π are good examples of the width of knowledge displayed on the mathematical side.

With regard to the Arabic numerals Baron Carra de Vaux traces their origin to the ancient neo-Platonic or Pythagorean schools of Persia. Lack of definite evidence, however, forbids

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dogmatism. If neo-Platonic doctrines found their way into Persia early in the Christian era, from the time of Asoka onwards India influenced Persia, and, when to such evidence as the Indian Cave Inscriptions and later Indian writers acquainted with a system of figuring implying value by position analogous to decimal notation, is added a definite tradition, there is a great deal to be said for an Indian origin ulterior to the Persian schools.

Perhaps the position might have been stated a little more clearly as to certain documents of doubtful authorship. Baron Carra de Vaux for instance accepts the *Memoirs of Timur* as genuine with the statement that 'on en admet généralement l'authenticité,' in spite of the fact that strong reasons against their authenticity have been brought forward by foremost scholarship (*vide* Rieu, *Persian Manuscripts in the British Museum*; Browne, *Persian Literature under Tartar Rule*). The *Geometria* of Boethius is also referred to in the passage on numerals, but no mention is made of the fact that distinguished scholars (Professor Rand, G. Ernst, and A. P. McKinlay) regard this work as unauthentic.

One cannot, however, praise these two volumes too highly for their width of scholarship and sound judgement. The author seems to be quite at home in the most diverse subjects, discussing intricate trigonometrical and algebraic formulae with quite as much facility as the culture of silkworms or the stories of the *Arabian Nights*, and he succeeds in producing on the mind of the reader the conviction that Mohammedan scholarship has had a real contribution to make to the advancement of learning, though we are not quite clear how far the early Khalifs or such men as Timur were sincere in the patronage of men who sung their praises or were useful because of their knowledge.

Baron Carra de Vaux often sums up his remarks in terse phrases which seem to possess a peculiar charm. For example, he writes, 'Makrîzi n'est peut-être qu'un collectionneur; mais c'est un collectionneur heureux et très intelligent'; or with reference to Firdousi he states, 'sa poésie donne souvent l'impression des meilleures œuvres de la miniature et de la céramique persanes.'

We look forward to the volumes yet to appear, and trust that an index, so indispensable to books of this kind, will be added to the final volume.

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IV. Criminology.

The Psychology of the Criminal. By M. Hamblin Smith, M.A., M.D. (London: Methuen. 1922.) 6s. net.

A duel between the Judges and the Doctors is, we fear, no unlikely thing. But this apprehension is not due to anything in this book. Indeed, Dr. Hamblin Smith seems to have been in complete accord with the legal authorities at Birmingham. But this has not been so in several of the criminal cases in London in recent years. In many of these we have noticed that different views were taken by the judge on the one hand and by the mental experts on the other; in fact, views so different as to make all the difference between acquittal and conviction. The judges clearly hold strongly to the doctrine of Free Will. The experts incline to Determinism. From which it follows that the former regard the misconduct as a delinquency, the latter as a disease. True, this divergence of view is what we should expect. The law must be drawn up and administered 'as if' men were free, science must proceed 'as if' human actions were determined. Further, the judges are concerned more with the nature of the crime than with the nature of the criminal. The experts, on the contrary, are more interested in what a man is, than in what he has done. There is a corresponding tendency for the legal view of punishment to be chiefly penal, and the medical view to be chiefly remedial.

We have ventured to point this contrast even at the risk of overemphasizing the divergence, as we perceive two distinct tendencies to-day. We look forward to the time when judges will be psychologists, and psychologists judges. Till then a new definition of the legal view of insanity will be of great value.

When we turned to this book by Dr. Hamblin Smith, we found that he is frankly deterministic in his whole outlook, though he has some remarks on responsibility which should be read before any hasty deductions are made as to his position. And we are bound to say we find it a little difficult to harmonize this rigid determinism with the statement on page 174, that 'there is in every man a creative impulse, which can only be exercised by the man himself, along the paths of possible self-expression.' Apart from this, everything in the book is entirely consistent with strict determinism. The book is an excellent exposition of the psychology of the criminal, though as we shall

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see, when Dr. Hamblin Smith has done with him, he proves not to be a criminal at all in the ordinary sense of that word, but rather a patient in need of treatment than an offender deserving of punishment, whose symbol should be the red cross rather than the broad arrow.

The earlier part of the work deals with the offender's conscious mind. And a lucid and complete description is given of the various 'tests' in general use for discovering the 'mental age' of an individual. Here the author is fortunate in being able to include tests used by the United States Army in the Great War for classifying its recruits according to their mental capacity.

The following chapters, and those the most important and interesting, deal with the offender's unconscious mind.

Here, again, the author is quite frank with us and confesses himself a thorough-going Freudian. And perhaps it is still necessary to say to those who would condemn Freud unheard that sex in his works is a word having a much wider significance than it has in ordinary use. As this book says, 'Freud includes under this heading, authority, attraction, friendliness, modesty, shame, and disgust.'

This part of the subject is treated with admirable clearness, and can be quite well understood by anyone who has no previous knowledge of the New Psychology. A criminal act is regarded as a symptom of some mental disorder, which disorder generally lies buried deep in the subconscious mind of the offender. If this be so, it is clear that it is futile merely to deal with the symptom as was done by the old-fashioned legal methods. It is necessary to get right down to the root cause. It is for the process of psycho-analysis to bring the 'repressed complex' into consciousness, and this, in itself, very often effects the cure without more ado. 'The truth shall make you free.' An important point to notice is that the real cause of some criminal act is often due to a factor so strangely different from it in character that it could never have been brought to light by any other method. For instance, we may quote a case from page 100.

'A repressed complex in a man originated from his family looking down upon his wife on account of her having been immoral before marriage. The resulting delinquency took the form of larceny, the unconscious desire being to put himself on a level with his wife in the eyes of his family by the commission of an offence.'

Of course, not all cases are capable of being successfully

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treated by psycho-analysis, but there is no doubt at all that a very large number could and should be so dealt with.

It is perhaps interesting to notice a few of the similarities between sacramental confession and psycho-analysis. For instance, it is a well-known fact that an analyst to be successful must first have been analyzed himself. Otherwise failure, and perhaps even harm, will follow, for 'he does not wish to see those elements in the other's mind which have been repressed into his own unconscious.' Or in other words, 'First cast out the beam out of thine own eye. . . .' Another point of resemblance is the seal. It is clearly of the utmost importance to the success of the psycho-analytic method, or any kindred investigation, that deals with the most intimate concerns of the individual life, that the expert or examiner should have the complete confidence of the patient. And this is possible only if the latter be assured that his secret revelations will never be publicly disclosed. We are glad to learn that Dr. Hamblin Smith has had no difficulty on this score, and we hope this will be the case with those who follow. As regards sacramental confession the logic of the seal is, of course, perfectly simple. The privilege belongs to the penitent and not to the priest. No question therefore can arise as to whether a priest should give away any information received in such a way—it is not his to give. The only possible case when it is allowable is when permission to do so has been given by the penitent himself. As regards the relation of this ecclesiastical regulation with the law of the land the simplest thing to say is that it is a privilege of ancient standing, which must still stand because it has never been taken away.

But to return to the book under consideration and to its last chapter. Here we read 'This book will have been written in vain if the author has not impressed on his readers this one moral—not punishment but treatment.' Such a statement is the necessary corollary of a firm belief in Determinism. Those who hold to a belief in Free Will in some shape or form will probably say that there should be both punishment and treatment.

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V. Marriage Problems.

Conception-Control and its Effect on the Individual and the Nation. By Lady Barrett, C.B.E., M.D., M.S., B.Sc., Consulting Obstetric and Gynaecological Surgeon to the Royal Free Hospital, President of the Federation of Medical Women. With a Foreword by His Grace the Archbishop of Canterbury. (London: John Murray. 1922.) 2*s*.

These 'clear and cogent chapters' have not been issued a moment too soon if the following incident has its counterpart in other towns. Not many months ago, a meeting was held in an important country town at which the address was given by an ardent advocate on the subject of Birth-Control. The audience was composed of the cream of the working-class women of the locality. As the lecturer proceeded, one mother after another rose and declared with bitter emphasis that, had she known of the existence of the contraceptives recommended by the speaker, she would never have had any child. A member of the local Mothers' Union, who had brought up a large family admirably, announced that, if she could have begun her married life over again, only two of her nine children should have come into existence. The national tendency to consider all questions from the merely individual point of view obliterated from the minds of these women the recollection of other issues involved. All maternal love among them seemed annihilated in a revolt against the burden and suffering of child-bearing. The wide-spread existence of this state of mind came as a painful revelation to some of the audience.

Lady Barrett's little book should help its readers to see the subject in a truer light. She speaks of conception-control as requiring to be carefully considered 'from the point of view of the individual, of public morality, and of national welfare.' She disputes 'the claim made to-day, that contraceptives are both necessary and harmless and that public propaganda on the subject is desirable,' using arguments based on moral principle and on wide professional knowledge.

The restrained tone, the wise advice and warnings to married couples, the sympathetic understanding of the difficulties of working-class mothers, commend the book to the leaders of the Mothers' Union, to the clergy, and to all who are awaking to the urgency of the question as it affects the homes of England.

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The author does not exaggerate its menace when she states that 'If the production of all capable workers, whether mental or manual, is to be curtailed, and the number of the population maintained in greater proportion from the mentally deficient or criminal classes, the result must be national disaster.' Her conclusion is that, 'To counteract this tendency, every encouragement should be given to the intelligent and efficient classes of the community to bear healthy children.'

Her book should certainly exercize an influence in this direction.

VI. History and Antiquities.

The Renaissance of Roman Architecture. By Sir Thomas Graham Jackson. Part II. *England.* (Cambridge University Press. 1922.) 42*s.* net.

Sir Thomas Jackson has followed his volume on Italian Renaissance architecture with that before us on the work of the English architects, from the still Gothic Layer Marney Tower and Hampton Court to Bath and to Somerset House, when the old lady, whom we may call Palladia, gathered her skirts around her and died with the utmost dignity. We do not know whether Sir Thomas has any more delightful volumes in store for us, or whether he intends to leave the Renaissance architecture of France—not to mention Germany, Spain, the Netherlands, and the two Americas—to other and less worthy hands. We hope not; for in his two volumes on Byzantine and Romanesque, his two volumes on Gothic, and now his two on Renaissance architecture, he has given us what we can pronounce without any hesitation to be the best history of the architecture of Christendom in any language. The beauty of his illustrations, the print and paper—with its wide margins so convenient for the student, his practical knowledge as a master-builder, and his wide aesthetic appreciation, combine with the fact that he is a scholar as well as an artist to make these six volumes unapproachable.

England was conservative in her architecture; or perhaps it was that she had too much common-sense, and artistic sense, as well as too much sturdy individuality to follow quickly with the crowd that barked at the heels of Palladio. In fact she never quite ceased to be Gothic—until the Gothic revival. Till then she retained some freedom, at best in her less pretentious buildings; and we must always remember that Sir Christopher Wren was a Gothic architect, the designer of exquisite steeples, and of

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St. Paul's, a Gothic Church with Renaissance detail and its flying buttresses concealed by a wall. We are glad, by the way, that Sir Thomas Jackson cries out at the horrible attempts to gothicize the City churches, and especially at the stained glass which is nearly without exception so atrocious as to destroy their beauty almost entirely.

But there was little church-building after the Fifteenth century until the Fire of London and more modern times. English Renaissance was the architecture of mansions and palaces and of those colleges which were not still built in the Perpendicular style—(and of these too Sir Thomas has something to say—indeed there is a good deal of Gothic in the book). Magnificent and very beautiful were the great houses raised before, during, and after the life of Inigo Jones, which are both illustrated and described in this admirable volume.

What will happen next? The architectural schools are giving up Gothic, but they are relapsing into the wearisome 'orders' again; and our architects, though they improve, are still weak and uninspired. As Sir Thomas Jackson says, there are only two styles of architecture, the bond and the free. When shall we be free again? Our small country houses are admirable nowadays, but our churches, palaces, shops, and streets still wait for a deliverer.

Monastic Life in the Middle Ages. With a Note on Great Britain and the Holy See, 1792–1806. By CARDINAL GASQUET. (G. Bell and Sons Ltd. 1922.) 8s. 6*d*. net.

THE thirteen studies reprinted in this volume are the *parerga* of a literary activity which has extended over more than 40 years—papers read before learned societies or called forth by special occasions, articles in reviews or brochures long since out of print. Brought together they may be allowed to suggest the reflexion that those who first heard them or read them must have spent some very pleasant and by no means unprofitable hours, for the author has the gift of awakening and maintaining interest and of making others, especially but not simply where they disagree with him, desire to pursue the subject further. And whether present readers agree or disagree with conclusions, they will admit that most of the studies still repay consideration. Perhaps the one most commonly sought after is the 'Sketch of Monastic Constitutional History,' as prefixed to the English reprint of Montalembert's *Monks of the West* in

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1895, and the best known the account of Abbot Wallingford of St. Albans, whose character is defended against the strictures of Dr. James Gairdner and others. In regard to this, since it is not possible to re-examine the evidence in a short notice, the reviewer must content himself with the opinion that the truth does not lie with either side and that many of Dr. Gasquet's objections are valid. He sometimes gives points away unnecessarily, as when he says of Henry VI's 'pardon' in 1455, that 'no one will seriously maintain that these terrible crimes thus forgiven by the King, and to which, by the fact that this pardon was sued for, the Abbot and his brethren had *tacitly at least pleaded guilty*, were in fact committed'; for as a matter of fact there was not, and could not be supposed to be, any such implication. As the royal clemency came to be extended to a person by every designation usually or likely to be applied to him, so it was extended, if granted, to every offence that the person in question might conceivably have committed, including many of which he could not have dreamed, much in the same way as in the case of a royal presentation to a living of which the Crown is not normally patron the cause of vacancy is either stated particularly or indefinitely, or generally by an enumeration of every possible cause from which a vacancy might have arisen. The Household Account Book of Nicholas Litlington, Abbot of Westminster, and a too short paper on 'Books and Bookmaking' are used to throw light on domestic administration and the expenses of books as well as their composition; and, though they need correction and supplementing, they are delightful to read. In the sketches of Abbot Vokes, of St. Augustine's, Canterbury, and of the action of Adrian IV with regard to Ireland in the time of Henry II, the writer presents a case, not always quite a good case, for some revision of historical judgements; and there are many interesting things in the account of Roger Bacon's work on the Vulgate and of the published and manuscript forms of Polydore Vergil's *History*, as well as in the longer lecture on the English Premonstratensians.

The last sixty pages or so of the book have a different interest and belong to a later age. They contain a sketch printed in Rome in 1919, but hitherto little known in England, of the contents of some packets of diplomatic papers to which Cardinal Gasquet directed his attention when he became head of the Vatican Library. If this is, as one passage seems to suggest, merely a *vindemiatio prima*, it may well excite the eager curiosity

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as well as the interest of students, for the range of unexplored material in the Vatican is wide, and the enlightened policy which has made more of it available is one for which scholars have had increasing cause for gratitude. The study of the diplomatic relations of Great Britain and the Papacy in the early years of the last century yields a good many new facts and makes the reader wish that space could have been found for a reproduction of documents on a more extensive scale.

History of the People of England. By ALICE DRAYTON GREENWOOD. Vol. I. (London: S.P.C.K. 1921.) 8*s.* 6*d.* net.

THIS is a really living and interesting school-book, on a somewhat ample scale, written by a lady who has an enviably wide acquaintance with the aspects of national life. Whatever the predilection of her readers, they will find information of the kind they desire, and will be stimulated to seek more. The book is also admirable in spirit; the preface of the editor of the series to which it belongs, Miss H. L. Powell, throws down her gauntlet to Macaulay, and promises that the Church shall receive due and loyal attention throughout. In the present volume, though this promise is fulfilled in the temper which animates it, perhaps the economic side is more successfully treated than the ecclesiastical. A writer who laudably tries to cover a wide field and to draw attention to many sides of her subject that are neglected in ordinary handbooks runs the double risk of omitting points of interest and of being so concise as to occasion misunderstanding. Miss Greenwood tells us when tame ducks began to be kept in England; she does not tell us when rabbits came. Yet near many a Norman castle-mound a 'coneygarth' may be found on the Ordnance Map. There is no reason to think that rabbits were in England before the Conquest, and we may wonder whether it was English Crusaders who brought them from their native Spain, and how long, or how short, was the time before they escaped from the warren and made themselves at home. There are certain details in which Miss Greenwood has failed to use the best information. Several years have passed since Mr. W. H. Stevenson exploded the old *Trinoda necessitas* by shewing that it is an error for *trimoda*. But Miss Greenwood may plead that a writer in the latest volume of the *Cambridge Medieval History* has overlooked the same illumination. We are not sure that the old confusion between the customs of Breteuil and those of Bristol is quite avoided. The Statute of

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Mortmain is not explained. Miss Greenwood says, like many before her, that its object was to check the passage of lands into hands which never died and therefore failed to contribute their proper share to the national revenue. In fact it was designed to secure that such conveyance should only take place when a sufficient sum was paid to the Crown to compensate for the loss of contingent profits. There are many known instances in which land was seized into the King's hands because a religious body had accepted it without first paying for permission to do so. But does Miss Greenwood know of a case in which the permission was refused when the Crown had been approached with an adequate offer? She is not quite happy in her generalization about agricultural change in the Fourteenth century. She fails to mention that the extension of pasturage was limited to the soils that would grow good grass, and that the whole region of the chalk from Norfolk to Dorset retained its immemorial open fields till the Eighteenth, and in places the Nineteenth century. These are not the only criticisms we might make, but they are in matters of detail and do not lessen the value or the interest of the book as a whole. We hope it will be widely used.

A Short History of the Jews in England. By H. P. STOKES, LL.D. (London: S.P.C.K. 1921.) 5*s.* 6*d.* net.

Dr. STOKES has written an admirable book: we can only complain that it is too brief. He has not always allowed himself space in which to explain technicalities of early law and business, and we must regret that there is one important topic which he avoids altogether. But the main course of the history of the Jews in England down to the expulsion of 1290 is excellently and picturesquely told, though we wish that he had explained that triumphant rivalry of Italian financiers which was certainly the chief cause of the disappearance of the Jews from England. The evidence, scanty though continuous, for the existence of Jews, as tolerated physicians or pensioned converts, in our country almost to the time of Cromwell's toleration is stated well, and the later history of the Jewish people as a religious body is excellently sketched. But we must complain that it is only as a religious body they are considered. Israel as a tribe, rather than as a creed, is ignored. Now this, in a book which aims at exciting interest in the conversion of Jews, is hardly fair. The dark side of the shield should have been exposed to view. In long and miscellaneous lists of adherents to Christianity

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who had been born as Jews occur names such as Heine and Disraeli side by side with those of devout converts such as Dr. Edersheim. Heine has told the world what Christianity meant to him, and the motives of the utilitarian or indifferent friends who took the young Disraeli to the font at St. Andrew's, Holborn, were purely those of social advantage for the boy. Mr. Steed in his *Hapsburg Monarchy* has given a pungent description of the aims and procedure of converts in recent years at Vienna. We have a right to know how strong is this tide on which in many lands Jews are drifting into a nominal Christianity from an equally nominal Judaism. There is no gain to the Christian faith in the acquisition of such adherents, and it must harden the hearts of convinced Jews when they see such names counted among the trophies of Christianity. Yet if, as we are told, Judaism for many of its adherents is tribal and not religious—we are credibly informed that only a small minority of the great Jewish population of New York belongs to a synagogue—it is inevitable that they will drift into a Christianity more or less nominal, for tribal feeling is feeble in comparison with national. This is a side of the problem which needs to be frankly, if tactfully, stated, and the intermarriage with Gentiles, to which Dr. Stokes just alludes, deserves to be dwelt upon. But we thank him heartily for a most instructive book, written in an admirable spirit.

The Albigensian Heresy. By H. J. WARNER, M.A. 'Studies in Church History.' (London: S.P.C.K. 1922.) 3*s.* 6*d.* net.

THIS little volume of 92 pages of text with 2 pages of a very inadequate Index represents an attempt to deal with an interesting and in justice to the writer it should be added a very perplexing subject. The Albigensis and Waldenses have been the theme of many studies and not a little controversy, and no one acquainted with the literature, whether in the Middle Ages or later, would feel able to say that the primary motive has been the establishment of historical truth on a basis of ascertained facts. There was an opportunity for a statement of the problems involved and a careful summary of the materials available for the formation of a judgement, and an author who undertook to do this for English students would render a considerable service.

The main criticism suggested by a careful study of Mr. Warner's thesis for the degree of Bachelor of Divinity at Cambridge is that he has attempted to give more than was possible

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in the space which he allowed himself. For anyone who does not embark upon the subject at least with the equipment with which the writer has ended the reading of the book will be a little bewildering. The citation of printed authorities is made in a form which will give him much unnecessary labour, and there is no bibliography to assist him; while the account of the materials in manuscript is even less satisfactory. And there are other matters in regard to which the criticism of a candid friend would have been of service. 'Alanus de Insulis' has been a source of trouble to many besides Mr. Warner and his history will repay further investigation, but whichever bearer of that name is selected at any rate it cannot be right to call him 'Bishop of Antissiodorensis' (p. 48) or to speak of an 'Abbot of Urspurgensis.' Sometimes the author allows himself to write what he does not mean. He would of course reject the idea that 'the unworthiness of ministers' is one of the 'marks' of a Church, but that is what he says (p. 11). Again Paulician never was, nor ever could have been, 'corrupted into poplican, publican etc.,' a title as to the origin of which he makes an interesting suggestion. On p. 70 'P.N.' should be explained, and if 'erronei' on p. 41 is to be translated 'wayfarers' some comment might be expected.

In regard to the general treatment of the subject we can say little, except that we hope that Mr. Warner may be able to make it the basis of a study on a larger scale with a fuller examination of the evidence upon which his conclusions rest than is possible in the present book. He will find it worth while to discuss how far the 'system' of which he gives an account in Chapter IV was really in operation in its entirety at any time, and in what precise areas.

France and England: their Relations in the Middle Ages and Now. By T. F. Tout, D.Litt., F.B.A. (Manchester University Press.) 7*s.* 6*d.* net.

These four lectures on 'Cosmopolitanism and Feudalism,' 'Anglo-French Civilization under Normans, Angevins, and Capetians,' 'Attraction and Repulsion. The Beginnings of Nationality,' 'The Hundred Years' War and Afterwards,' represent the Creighton Lectures of 1920 expanded for delivery before the University of Rennes in 1921. It is impossible to resist speculating with some amusement as to the varying feelings with which they were listened to by audiences in London,

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Manchester, Newcastle-on-Tyne and Rennes. Professor Tout has a knack of crystallizing in a sentence observations which whether accepted or not are inductions from a wide field. 'Whatever "nation" meant to the mediaeval mind, it at least never meant anything that in any wise corresponded to the modern national state.' 'There was plenty of warfare in the Middle Ages, but it is only at the very end of that period that we can imagine these wars as the result of national sentiment.' 'There is even now more liberty in England than in France: but there is certainly more equality in France than in England.' 'The only surviving Celtic speech in France—the Celtic of *la Bretagne bretonnante*—is an importation from Cornwall and Wales, not a survival of the tongue of old Gaul, which has passed away so completely that its nature can only be deduced from the evidence of place-names and a few inscriptions.' 'The church, no less than the baron, was the natural enemy of the king.' 'In the long run . . . the great forces which made for nationality came not from the people but from the kings.' Here is food for reflexion and it may be for argumentation; and at any rate we have said enough, we hope, to make readers desire to study the book for themselves.

VII. The Lectionary.

The Lessons for Mattins and Evensong throughout the Year according to the Revised Lectionary of 1922. (Cambridge University Press. [1922.]) 10*s.* 6*d.* net.

Much has been and will probably continue to be written about the merits and demerits of the New Lectionary now authorized for use. No one can study the scheme without recognizing the care and thought which it represents, even if some of its details seem strange and, it may be, a little arbitrary, if not perverse. But the only fair test of a Lectionary is a practical trial of it extending over a considerable period; and since it is provided that when the Lessons 'have once been adopted in any Church or Chapel, they shall there be continuously followed at least until the end of the ecclesiastical year,' it may be assumed that this test will normally be secured. Some natural hesitation at least ought to be removed by the study of the volume before us, which has been issued with highly commendable promptitude by the University Presses of Oxford and Cambridge and the King's Printers. The whole of the Lessons throughout the ecclesiastical year are here printed in full, so that it is possible

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for those who are making or thinking of making the experiment to see at once what portions of Scripture will be read during a given period. This part of the book comprises 1129 pages printed in double column in a beautifully clear type; while at the end is added the summary Tables of Lessons in their new form. The whole is a most attractive volume which in spite of its price will probably do much to commend the Lectionary itself.

VIII. General Literature.

Storm and Sunshine in South Africa, with some Personal and Historical Reminiscences. By A. Theodore Wirgman, D.D., D.C.L. With Foreword by the Bishop of Grahamstown, and a Biographical Sketch. (Longmans. 1922.) *7s. 6d.* net.

The late Archdeacon of Port Elizabeth lived a long and strenuous life of service, which is not inappropriately described by the title which he himself gave to this volume. It is a work of an engaging simplicity which disarms criticism, and few of those who take it up will be disposed to lay it aside before they have finished it. Dr. Wirgman's many-sided activities, his strongly expressed opinions on many subjects, his keen interest in South African and Imperial problems in their political as well as in their ecclesiastical aspects, all find expression. Nor are there wanting *obiter dicta* scarcely free from prejudice in regard to persons still living. But it is as impossible to doubt the sincerity of the desire which he expressed to be fair in his judgements as his earnestness and devotion to the work to which he set his hand. He was a controversialist because in his view great issues were involved, and in that view he was often right; though he was sometimes over-confident as to his knowledge both of the real facts of a situation and of the history and principles of canon law. Yet to read the book is to understand many things better in relation to the Church of South Africa, as well as to gain many curious sidelights upon men and matters at home.

Yorkshire Reminiscences (with Others). By the Rev. M. C. F. Morris, B.C.L., M.A., sometime Rector of Nunburnholme, Yorkshire. (Milford. 1922.) *12s. 6d.* net.

The modesty of the author confines him to the hope that his work may prove 'a means for beguiling a few winter evenings

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or summer holiday hours' and the declaration that it is 'not intended for serious reading.' It is in fact one of the best volumes of reminiscences of a non-political kind which have appeared in the last thirty years. Mr. Morris was at Bradfield in the days of its founder, at New College, Oxford, in the early days of reform, at St. Michael's College, Tenbury, in charge of the school under Ouseley, a Diocesan Inspector, a Yorkshireman whose memory carries him back to 'the days of turnpikes, flails, lucifer matches and ramrods,' a Yorkshire incumbent, a fisherman, an enthusiast for folk-lore and dialect; and he seems to retain the enthusiasm and keenness of youth. It is not surprising that the book is as full of good stories and of interesting facts as it is of comparisons between the old and the new. And the result is entirely delightful.

PERIODICALS.

The Journal of Theological Studies (Vol. XXIV. No. 93. October 1922. Milford). Claude Jenkins: 'Bishop Barlow's Consecration and Archbishop Parker's Register, with some New Documents.' Dom J. Chapman: 'St. Jerome and the Vulgate New Testament,' I. J. H. Michael: 'The Text and Context of St. John x 29.' St. J. D. Seymour: 'Irish Versions of the Vision of St. Paul.' H. N. Bate: 'Some Technical Terms of Greek Exegesis.' C. H. Turner: (1) 'On the Punctuation of St. John vii 37, 38'; (2) 'On MS Veron. LI (49) of the Works of Maxim[in]us.' C. F. Burney: 'The Aramaic Equivalent of *Ek tes Koilias* in Jn vii 38.' H. L. Jackson: 'Loisy *Le Quatrième Évangile, 2me édition refondue, Les épitres dites de Jean*' (8 pp.). A. Nairne: 'St. John Thackeray *The Septuagint and Jewish Worship*'; 'Eisler *Orpheus—the Fisher*'; 'Winslow (and others) *The Eucharist in India*.' A. E. Brooke: 'Abbott-Smith *A Manual Greek Lexicon of the N.T.*' F. R. Tennant: 'Beibitz *Belief, Faith, and Proof*.' L. E. Binns: 'Allen *Opus Epistolarum Des. Erasmi Roterodami*, IV.' G. H. Box: 'Halper *Post-Biblical Hebrew Literature. An Anthology*, I–II'; 'Cohen *Tractate Berâkot*.' W. E. Barnes: 'Mowinckel *Psalmenstudien*, I.'

The Pilgrim (Vol. III. No. 1. October 1922. Longmans). R. Muir: 'The Moral Basis of Liberalism.' G. E. Newsom: 'The Church and the Town.' D. C. Somervell: 'Art, Ritual, and Religion.' J. R. Darbyshire: 'St. Paul and the Eucharist.' O. C. Quick: 'The Resurrection and Christian Faith.' T. J. Hardy: 'Quest and Creed.' Bishop of Manchester: 'Coué and St. Paul.' 'Gentile *The Theory of Mind as Pure Act*.' 'Unamuno *The Tragic Sense of Life*.' 'Nolloth (ed.) *The Christian Faith*.' 'Moxon *The Doctrine of Sin*.' 'N. L. Robinson *Christian Justice*.' 'Burney *The Aramaic Origin of the Fourth Gospel*.' 'Hobhouse *The Elements of Social Justice*.' 'J. W. Graham *Conscription and Conscience*.' 'Webb *English Prisons under Local Government*.' 'Hobhouse and Brockway *English Prisons To-day*.'

The Jewish Quarterly Review (Vol. XIII. No. 1. July 1922. Macmillan). H. Hirschfeld: 'An unknown Grammatical Work by Abul-Faraj Harun.' B. Halper: 'Descriptive Catalogue of Genizah Fragments

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in Philadelphia,' II. H. Brody: 'A Manuscript Miscellany.' A. J. Brawer: 'A Posthumous Change of Name (Birkenthal, not Bolechower).' J. Leveen: 'Note on some Names in a MS in the British Museum' (MS Add. 26984). H. Malter: 'The Gaonic Commentary to Tekarot.' S. S. Cohen: 'Sanitation in Palestine.' I. Husik: 'Uccello *Philosophia scholastica ad mentem Sci Thomae*.' A. A. Neuman: 'Krauss *Die Wiener Geserah vom Jahre* 1421.'

The Journal of Religion (Vol. II. No. 6. November 1922. Chicago University Press). C. W. Emmet: 'The Modernist Movement in the Church of England.' A. E. Haydon: 'From Comparative Religion to History of Religions.' A. Cronbach: 'Psychoanalysis and Religion.' S. F. MacLennan: 'Religion and Anthropology.' W. H. Leach: 'The Weakness of Protestantism in American Cities.' G. B. Smith: 'The Spirit of Evangelical Christianity.' J. A. Montgomery: 'Sellin *Das Zwölfprophetenbuch*.' E. F. Scott: 'Bundy *The Psychic Health of Jesus*'; 'Hefferns *Apology and Polemic in the N.T.*' (very favourable). C. C. McCown: 'Vedder *The Fundamentals of Christianity*.' C. R. Bowen: 'Harrison *The Problem of the Pastoral Epistles*'; 'Goguel *Introduction an N.T.*' J. M. P. Smith: 'St. John Thackeray *The Septuagint and Jewish Worship*.'

The Princeton Theological Review (Vol. XX. No. 4. October 1922. Princeton University Press). W. B. Greene jr: 'Yet Another Criticism of the Theory of Evolution.' W. H. Johnson: 'Is God Almighty?' G. McC. Price: 'The Fossils as Age-Markers in Geology.' B. F. Paist jr: 'Peter Martyr and the Colloquy of Poissy' (*contd.*). W. M. Clow: 'The Justification of Capitalism.' C. M. Mackay: 'Ezekiel's Sanctuary and Wellhausen's Theory.' D. S. Gage: 'De Wulf *Philosophy and Civilization in the Middle Ages*' (critical). O. T. Allis: 'Buttenwieser *The Book of Job*'; 'Eckenstein *History of Sinai*'; 'Bertholet *Kulturgeschichte Israels*' (3 pp.); 'Staerk *Lyrik*'; 'Volz *Hiob und Weisheit*.' J. K. van Baalen: 'Schumacher *Die Selbstoffenbarung Jesu bei Matt.* 11, 27 (*Luc.* 10, 22) and *Christus in seiner Präexistenz u. Kenose nach Phil.* 2, 5–8.'

Theology (Vol. V. Nos. 28–30. October–December 1922. S.P.C.K.). J. Lebreton: 'Le Problème christologique d'après le Rev. Dr. H. M. Relton.' H. N. Bate: 'The Critical Work of Johannes Weiss,' I (II. Nov.). N. Glubokovsky: 'The Russian Church under the Bolsheviks.' G. A. Cooke: 'Ball *Book of Job*'; 'Devine *The Story of Job*.' R. L. Langford-James: 'Slater *The Inner Meaning of the Four Gospels*'; 'Henslow *Proofs of the Truths of Spiritualism*, 2nd edit.' '*The Control of Parenthood*.' W. K. L. Clarke: 'G. W. Wade *N.T. History*' (critical). November. E. G. Selwyn: 'Halifax *A Call to Reunion*.' E. C. Hoskyns: 'Catholicism in Germany.' T. A. Lacey: 'Barlow Once More' (reviews Mgr. Barnes). Right Rev. G. White (Bishop of Wllochra): 'Australia and Reunion.' W. K. L. Clarke: 'Moulton *Modern Reader's Bible for Schools*.' H. M. Relton: 'Walston *Harmonism and Conscious Evolution*.' Right Rev. A. J. Maclean (Bishop of Moray): 'Reichel *Canon Law of Church Institutions*, I.' J. Plowden-Wardlaw: 'Bull *Lectures on Preaching*.' J. H. Baxter: 'Williams *St. Bernard, Concerning Grace and Free-will*.' Right Rev. H. Lowther Clarke: 'Rawlinson *Studies in Historical Christianity*.' December. N. G. Lawson: 'The Early Chapters of Genesis.' T. A. Lacey: 'Human Nature and the Fall. A Note.' E. G. Selwyn: 'St. Stephen's Place in Christian Origins.' R. H. Thouless: 'God as Psychological Reality.' W. H. G. Holmes: 'The Doctrine of Sacrifice in Indian Religious Literature.' T. V. Evans: 'An English "Congregation of Rites."' A. C. Bouquet: 'Butler *Can we dispense with Christianity?*' 'MacMunn *Neglected Galilee*.' F. J. Foakes Jackson: 'Legge *Hippolytus, Philosophumena*.' T. W. Little: 'Symes *Evolution of the N.T.*' Right Rev. E. H. Pearce (Bishop of Worcester): 'Walpole *The Cathedral*.' (The late) W. H. Westall: 'Yelverton *The*

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Swedish Rite.' F. H. Smith: '*Gordon Asian Cristology and the Mahayana.*' J. H. Baxter: '*C. H. Robinson Life of Otto, Apostle of Pomerania.*' A. W. Robinson: '*Allnatt Studies in Soul Training.*' W. K. L. Clarke: '*Ragg St. Luke.*'

The Modern Churchman (Vol. XII. Nos. 8–9. November-December 1922. Oxford: Blackwell). H. D. A. Major: 'The Appeal to Caesar.' 'What is and what might be.' Very Rev. H. Rashdall (Dean of Carlisle): 'The Present Value of the Creeds.' A. R. Watson: 'Glimpses of Swedish Church Life.' F. G. Given-Wilson: 'Albert Schweitzer.' C. C. J. Webb: 'A Century of Anglican Theology in Relation to the General Movement of European Thought,' I (II. Dec.) W. Pryke: 'Dougall and Emmet, *The Lord of Thought*' (5 pp.). December. H. D. A. Major: 'If and Peradventure.' R. Meiklejohn: 'The Prophetic Ministry of the New Reformation.' 'The Advent Hope.' H. G. Mulliner: 'Some Reflections on English Poetry and the War.' W. E. Soothill. 'Genesis and the Chinese.' P. Gardner: 'Jackson and Lake, *Beginnings of Christianity*, I.–II.' W. M. P[ryke]: 'Skrine *The Gospel of the Manhood.*' J. C. H[ardwick]: '*The Return of Christendom*'; 'Somervell *A Short History of Our Religion*'; 'Simons *Christianity To-day.*'

The English Historical Review (Vol. XXXVII. No. 148. October 1922. Longmans). R. Stewart-Brown: 'The "Domesday" Roll of Chester.' C. K. Brampton: 'Marsiglio of Padua. Part I. Life.' A. F. Pollard: 'Council, Star Chamber, and Privy Council under the Tudors. II. The Star Chamber.' L. Thorndike: 'Daniel of Morley.' C. L. Kingsford: 'The Earl of Warwick at Calais in 1460.' E. F. Rogers: 'A Calendar of the Correspondence of Sir Thomas More.' A. P. Newton: 'An Early Grant to Sebastian Cabot' (Exch. K.R. Memoranda Roll 20 Hen. VII. Rot. 6 dors.). P. S. Allen: 'The Birth of Thomas North' (28 May 1535. From the Wroxton Library). C. S. B. Buckland: 'Some Early Foreign Office Registers at the Public Record Office.' H. S. Jones: 'Heitland *Agricola. A Study of Agriculture and Rustic Life in the Graeco-Roman World.*' F. M. Powicke: '*Testa de Nevill*, new edit.' J. Tait: 'Cam *Studies in the Hundred Rolls*' and 'Ehrlich *Proceedings against the Crown* (1216–1377).' C. Johnson: 'Stengel *Nova Alamanniae, Urkunden, Briefe . . . des 14. Jahrhunderts*, I.' E. C. Lodge: 'Bridge *History of France from the Death of Louis XI*, I (1483–93)' ('A great service to English readers'). W. D. Green: 'Parisot *Histoire de Lorraine*,' II (1552–1789). G. Unwin: 'Posthumus *Bronnen tot de Geschiedenis van de Leidsche Textielnijverheid*, IV–VI (1611–1795)' (important for gild organization etc.). Sir Richard Lodge: 'Waddington *Histoire de Prusse*, II (1688–1740).' P. E. Roberts: 'Thakore *Indian Administration*, 1765–1920' ('vigorous, interesting and original'). W. H. Frere: 'R. M. Jones *The Later Periods of Quakerism.*' H. Bradley: 'Ekwall *Place-Names of Lancashire.*' A. L. P[oole]: 'Foakes Jackson *Introduction to the History of Christianity*, A.D. 590–1314' (critical). R. L. P[oole]: '*Collected Papers of Sir Francis Palgrave*, VIII—X'; 'Gasquet *Monastic Life in the Middle Ages*' (critical). H. E. E[gerton]: 'Insh *Scottish Colonial Schemes*, 1620–86.' G. N. C[lark]: 'F. Taylor *Wars of Marlborough.*' G. H. O[rpen]: 'Hayden and Moonan *Short History of the Irish People.*' 'Govau *Histoire Religieuse de la Nation Française.*' 'Lilley and Everitt *History of Portsmouth Parish Church.*' 'J. G. Edwards *Flint Pleas*, 1283–5.' E. A. L[owe]: 'Traube *Kleine Schriften.*'

History (N.S. Vol. VII. No. 27. October 1922. Macmillan). A. F. Pollard: 'An Apology for Historical Research.' N. Rodolico: 'The Struggle for the Right of Association in Fourteenth-century Florence.' J. A. Williamson: 'The Pilgrim Fathers.' G. M. Trevelyan: 'The Number of Casualties at Peterloo.' N. H. Baynes: 'Livingstone (ed.) *The Legacy of Greece*'; 'James *Our Hellenic Heritage*, I–II.' F. M. Powicke: '*Cambridge Medieval History*, III.' C. G. Crump: 'Tout

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The Quarterly Review (No. 473. October 1922. John Murray). 'Sir George Prothero, K.B.E., Litt.D.' S. Leslie: 'Ulysses.' W. H. Triggs: 'Samoa under New Zealand.' A. E. J. Legge: 'Mental Healing.' D. Gordon: 'Reynard the Fox.' A. Cecil: 'Mr. Lloyd George. A Page of History.' Sir Home Gordon, Bt.: 'Post-war English Cricket.' Very Rev. W. H. Hutton: 'The Collected Papers of A. W. Ward.' B. Clayton: 'What Labour Wants.' Sir W. Ridgeway: 'Cambridge and the Royal Commission.' A. Shadwell: 'Prisons and Imprisonment.' 'Ireland: Hopes and Fears.' 'The Political Situation.'

Analecta Bollandiana (Vol. XL. 3–4. November 1922. Brussels: 24 Boulevard Saint-Michel). P. Peeters: 'Traductions et Traducteurs dans l'Hagiographie orientale à l'Époque byzantine.' H. Delehaye: 'Les Martyrs d'Égypte. III. Les Passions des Martyrs d'Égypte. 3. De quelques Passions en particulier. Appendice I. La Passion de S. Paphnuce. II. La Passion de S. Psotius. III. La Passion de S. Dioscore.' E. Jordan: 'La Date de Naissance de Ste. Catherine de Sienne' (*c.* 1347). H. D[elehaye]: 'Gerould *Saints Legends*'; 'Feder *Lehrbuch der historischen Methodik*, 2ª Aufl.'; 'M. R. James *Descriptive Catalogue of Latin MSS in John Rylands Library at Manchester*'; 'Guppy *The John Rylands Library.*' M. Coens: 'Wahlberg *Thomas Becket.*' R. L[echat]: 'Fitzmaurice and Little *The Franciscan Province of Ireland*, 1230–1450.' P. Grosjean: 'Pearce *Walter de Wenlok.*' B. de Gaiffier: 'Pastor *Geschichte der Päpste*, VII–VIII (1559–72).' R. L[echat]: 'Braunsberger *Petrus Canisius.*'

Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique (Vol. XVIII. No. 4. October 1922. Louvain: 40 Rue de Namur). J. B. Bord: 'L'Autorité de S. Cyprien dans la Controverse baptismale jugée d'après S. Augustin.' Dom J. Chapman: 'Pélage et le Texte de S. Paul.' J. de Ghellinck, S.J.: 'Un Évêque bibliophile au XIVe Siècle, Richard Aungerville de Bury (1345). Contribution à l'Histoire de la Littérature et des Bibliothèques mediévales' (*suite*). J. Coppens: 'Heinrici *Die Hermes-Mystik und das N.T.*' J. Lebon: 'De Labriolle *Histoire de la Littérature Latine chrétienne*' (laudatory). Dom A. Jamet: 'Lake *The Apostolic Fathers*'; 'Butterworth *Clement of Alexandria, Exhortation to the Greeks* etc.'; 'Mayor and Souter *Tertulliani Apologeticus*' (5 pp.). R. Devreesse: 'Cagin *L'Anaphore apostolique et ses Temoins.*' J. Flamion: 'Guillaud *L'Ame de S. Augustin.*' P. de Puniet: 'Baumstark *Nichtevangelische syrische Perikopenordnungen des ersten Jahrtausends*' ('un excellent ouvrage'). J. Zeiller: 'Gagliardi *Geschichte der Schweiz* I. *Bis zum* 1516.' Dom C. Mohlberg: 'Dewick and Frere *The Leofric Collectar*, I–II.' R. Maere: 'Leurs *Les Origines du Style gothique en Brabant*, I–II.' Dom D. Guilloreau: 'Maire *Les Cisterciens en France.*' E. Jordan: 'Schöpp *Papst Hadrian V.*' G. Mollat: 'Parisot *Histoire de Lorraine*, II, 1552–1789.' L. Willaert, S.J.: 'Henderson *Religion in Scotland, its Influence on National Life and Character.*' L. van Eynde: 'Duhr *Geschichte der Jesuiten in den Ländern deutscher Zunge*, II. 2.' E. de Moreau, S.J.: 'Sanders *Bossuet*'; 'Gasquet *Great Britain and the Holy See*, 1792–1806.' J. Sobry: 'Dudon *Michel Molinos*' (5 pp.). C. Terlinden: 'Guglia *Maria-Theresa*'; 'Goyau *Papauté et Chrétienté sous*

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Benoît XV.' A. Monin: 'Koerperich *Les Lois sur la Mainmorte dans les Pays-Bas catholiques.*' P. Richard: '*Mourret Histoire générale de l'Église*, VIII–IX (1825–1903)' (6 pp.). J. Forget: '*Mourret Le Concile du Vatican d'après des Documents inédits*' (10 pp.). R. Draguet: '*Loofs Die "Ketzerei" Justinians*' (in the 'Harnack-Ehrung'). J. Lebon: '*Haase Koptische Quellen zum Konzil von Nicaea*'; '*Harden The Ethiopic Didascalia.*'

Revue Biblique (Vol. XXXI. No. 4. October 1922. Paris: Lecoffre-Gabalda). G. Lefebvre: 'Égyptiens et Hébreux.' P. Dhorme: 'L'Emploi métaphorique des Noms de Parties du Corps en Hébreu et en Akkadien,' VI. A. Royet: 'Un MS palimpseste de la Vulgate hiéronymienne des Évangiles' (Autun, Bibl. Municipale, MS 21, and MS Paris Bibl. Nat. Nouv. Acq. Lat. 1628). M. J. Lagrange: 'Le Prétendu Messianisme de Virgile.' E. B. Allo: 'A propos d'Apocalypse xi-xii.' L. H. Vincent: 'Un Type de Baptistère byzantin' (Illustrated). F. M. Abel: 'Quelques Monuments mégalithiques de Palestine' (Illustrated). E. B. Allo: '*Keulers Die Eschatologische Lehre des vierten Esrabuches*' (4½ pp.). G. Bardy: '*Harnack Der Kirchengeschichtliche Ertrag der exegetischen Arbeiten des Origenes*, II.' '*Fillion Vie de N.S. Jésus-Christ.*' '*Appel Einleitung in das N.T.*' '*Wikenhauser Die Apostelgeschichte u. ihr Geschichtswert.*' '*Burney Aramaic Origin of the Fourth Gospel.*' '*Buzy S. Jean-Baptiste*' (4½ pp.) '*Causse Les "Pauvres" d'Israel.*' '*Messel Der Menschensohn in den Bilderreden des Henoch.*' '*Bundy The Psychic Health of Jesus.*' '*Duval Histoire de la Littérature syriaque.*' '*Mallon Les Hébreux en Égypte.*'

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The East and the West (Vol. XX. No. 80. October 1922. S.P.G.). Right Rev. T. A. Scott (Bishop in Shantung): 'A Bishop's Tour in a

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Wheelbarrow.' F. W. C. Kennedy: 'Immigration. A Canadian Problem.' E. F. Brown: 'Pandita Ramabai and her Work for Indian Women.' E. H. Whitley: 'Chota Nagpur. A Retrospect and Prospect.' R. P. Wilder: 'Where East meets West.' Ven. C. C. Watts (Archdeacon of Swaziland): 'Coloured Races in S. Africa.' W. C. B. Purser: 'A Mission to the Blind of Burma.' A. J. C. Allen: 'Jesuit Missions.' 'Rivers (ed.) *Essays on the Depopulation of Melanesia*'; 'W. A. Young *Christianity and Civilisation in the South Pacific.*' 'Seth-Smith *The Firebrand of the Indies. A Romance of Francis Xavier.*' 'Mackintosh *The New Zambesi Trail.*' 'D. Crane *The Boy's Book of Canada.*' 'Index to Vols. I–XX.'

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The more important will be noticed in Articles and Short Notices as space permits.

Biblical Studies.

Büchler, Adolph.—*Types of Jewish-Palestinian Piety from 70 B.C.E. to 70 C.E. The Ancient Pious Men.* Jews' College Publications No. 8. Pp. 264. (Jews' College, London.)

Cannon, W. W.—*The 68th Psalm.* Comprising Introduction, Revised Translation, and Critical Notes. Pp. viii + 60. (Cambridge University Press.) 8*s.* 6*d.* net.

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Politeyan, J.—*Biblical Discoveries in Egypt, Palestine and Mesopotamia.* With Foreword by the Rev. Canon R. B. Girdlestone, M.A. Third edition. Pp. x + 194. (Elliot Stock.) 4*s.* 6*d.* net.

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The Coptic Version of the New Testament in the Southern Dialect, otherwise called Sahidic and Thebaic. With Critical Apparatus, Literal English Translation, and Register and Notes of Fragments. Vol. VI. *The Acts of the Apostles.* Pp. iv + 672. (Clarendon Press.) 42*s.* net.

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Frazer, Sir J. G.—*The Belief in Immortality and the Worship of the Dead.* Vol. II. *The Belief among the Polynesians.* Pp. x + 448. (Macmillan.) 18*s.* net.

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Dibble, C. L.—*A Grammar of Belief: A Revaluation of the Bases of Christian Belief in the Light of Modern Science and Philosophy.* Pp. x + 208. (Mowbray.) 6*s.* 6*s.* net.

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HALL, F. J.—*Eschatology Indexes.* The concluding volume of the series 'Dogmatic Theology.' Pp. xiv + 320. (Longmans.) 9*s.* net.

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ROBINSON, A. W.—*The Trend of Thought in Contemporary Philosophy.* 'Liverpool Diocesan Board of Divinity Publications,' XXV. Pp. 30. (Longmans.) 1*s.* net.

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Powicke, F. M.—*Ailred of Rievaulx and his Biographer Walter Daniel.* Reprinted from 'The Bulletin of the John Rylands Library,' Vol. VI, Nos. 3 and 4. July 1921–January 1922. Pp. viii + 112. (Manchester: University Press.) 3*s.* net.

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Christianity and the Colleges. Being the Report of the General Committee of the Student Christian Movement of Great Britain and Ireland for the College Year 1921–22. Pp. 100. (Student Christian Movement.) 6*d.* net.

Mowbray's Annual. The Churchman's Year Book and Encyclopaedia. A.D. 1923. Fifteenth year of issue. Section I. *Biographies.* Section II. *General Information.* Pp. 416. (Mowbray.) 3*s.* 6*d.* net.

Quis Judicabit? A Report on the Reform of the Ecclesiastical Courts. Pp. 20. (Oxford: Blackwell.) 6*d.* net.

The Church and the Drink Evil. A Challenge to Christian Citizenship. Lectures delivered at the High Ashurst Summer School, 1922. Edited by Henry Carter. With a Foreword by the Bishop of Croydon. Pp. viii + 108. (The Temperance Council of the Christian Churches of England and Wales.) Cloth, 1*s.* 6*d.* net; paper, 6*d.* net.

The Subject Index to Periodicals, 1920. A. 'Theology and Philosophy (Including Folk-Lore).' Issued by the Library Association. Pp. 99. (The Library Association, Stapley House, Bloomsbury Square, W.C. 1.) 6*s.* net. A valuable and very useful summary.

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INDEX TO VOL. XCV.

ALLEN, Miss H. E., 'A 13th-Century Coronation Rubric,' 335

BARRETT, LADY, *Conception Control*, 370
BIGG, C., *Doctrine of the Twelve Apostles*, 176
BOSANQUET, BERNARD, *Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy*, 160
BOX, G. H., and C. GORE, *Divorce in the N.T.*, 174

CALDECOTT, A., 'A New Inquiry into the Belief in God and Immortality,' 166
CATHOLICISM OF THE FUTURE [by the Bishop of Peterborough], pp. 141 *sqq.*: varying phases of the Reunion movement, 141; the deeper motive of our own day emphasized at the Lambeth Joint Conference, 142; effect of the Great War and its aftermath, 142–3; the new internationalism, 143–4; the Reformation a drastic measure for preserving Christianity intact, 144–5; disunion sometimes a sign of life, 145; present widespread desire for a larger and truer Catholicism, 146; views of younger Nonconformists, 147; attitude towards 'treasures of faith and order,' 148; the 'autonomy of local congregations' doubtful, 149; the foundations of separation undermined, 150; the 'Community Church' in U.S.A., 151; striking statements by Nonconformists at the Lambeth Joint Conference, 152–4; the other side of the shield, 155; organic union the goal to look to, 156–7; sane and spiritual Catholicism has power to capture the future, 157–8; a peculiar opportunity opening before Anglo-Catholicism, 159
CHARLES, R. H., *Lectures on the Apocalypse*, 352
CHASE, F. H., *What did Christ teach about Divorce?* 174
CHRISTIAN BELIEF IN GOD [by the Rev. Dr. Headlam], 1 *sqq.*: F. D. Maurice's *Doctrine of Sacrifice* quoted, 1; restoration of belief in God, the fundamental need of the time, 2; Dr. Gore's influence as a teacher limited in two directions: (1) failure to follow his intellect, 3; (2) mistaken sense of duty to party, 4; summary of his book, *Belief in God*, 4–5; some defects in it, 5; Dr. Gore's threefold arguments from Natural Religion for the Belief in God, 6 ff.; St. Anselm's ontological argument quoted, 7; stated in another form by Descartes, 8; his criticism of modern metaphysical conceptions, 9 ff.; his analysis of the God of Religion, 11; the increasing difficulty of belief in God as love, 12–13

DE VAUX, Baron CARRA, *Penseurs d'Islam*, 365

EARLY (SOME) GOSPEL SOURCES [by the Rev. A. Bevil Browne], pp. 302 *sqq.*: introductory remarks, 302–3; (I) the problem common to all historical inquiries, 303—4; the three Gospels not independent witnesses, 304; instances of noteworthy coincidences in uncommon words and phrases, 305–7; the Synoptic Gospels have a common element, 307; the part played by oral tradition, 308–9; the literary connexion, 309; principal arguments that the Second Gospel is the earliest, 310; some literary considerations, 311–312; the Storm on the Lake a typical instance, 312–14;

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(II) examination of the sections of Matthew and Luke unrepresented in Mark, 315 *sqq.*; traces of a lost source, 316; parallel furnished by lives of St. Francis, *ib.*; investigation of 'Q,' 317–23; imaginary sketch of its formation, 322; (III) results of the inquiry, 323–7; the value of criticism and analysis, 324: the earlier portrait of our Lord in the Second Gospel, 325–6; 'Q' a stream fed by many tributaries, 326–7; (IV) no unquestionable solution found, 328; some outstanding lesser problems, 329–32; (V) summing up of the article, 332–4

ESCHATOLOGY, SOME MORALS OF [by the Rev. N. E. Egerton Swann], 237 *sqq.*: Schweitzer's work as critic, 237; momentous significance of our Lord's outlook as regards eschatology, 238; three ways of meeting the challenge, 239; was our Lord the victim of a delusion in this matter? *ib.*; exaggerations of the 'consequent' school, 240–1; Bishop Gore's treatment of the question, 241–2; the deeper sense in which our Lord was right, 242; the first Christians' conviction of the nearness of the Parousia, 244; eschatology's challenge to the modern idea of 'progress,' 244–6; the Church's present task—to christianize the collective life of society, 246–7; Professor Morgan quoted, 247–8; warning against over-secularization of outlook, 248-9

GAIRDNER, W. H. T., *Four Biblical Plays*, 189

GASQUET, CARDINAL, *Monastic Life in the Middle Ages*, 372

GORE, C., and G. H. BOX, *Divorce in the N.T.*, 174

GRAHAM, STEPHEN, *Tramping with a Poet in the Rockies*, 189

GREENWOOD, A. D., *History of the People of England*, 374

HARDY (THOMAS) AND THE POETIC MIND [by A. W. Reed], 342–7

HARRISON, P. N., *Problem of the Pastoral Epistles*, 172

HOGG, A. G., *Redemption from this World*, 180

HOOKE, S. H., *Christ and the Kingdom of God*, 181

HUGHES, H. MALDWYN, *The Kingdom of Heaven*, 364

JACKSON, Sir T. G., *Renaissance of Roman Architecture*, 371

JAMES, H. R., *Our Hellenic Heritage*, 182

JUDAISM AND HELLENISM [by the Rev. G. H. Box, D.D.], pp. 104 *sqq.*: the controversy between Jew and Greek not yet decided, 105; protest against the present tendency to depreciate the Hebrew factor, 105–6; Christianity is Judaism transformed into a world-religion, 106; Dean Inge (*The Legacy of Greece*) quoted, 106–7; his obvious eagerness to eliminate Judaism from Christian tradition, 107; Mr. Edwyn Bevan quoted, 108; Dr. Sanday on the three main elements in Christianity, 109; (I) Judaism developed along two main lines, 109–10; Hellenistic Jews, 110–11; zeal shewn by Diaspora Jews in propagating the faith, 111; the Sibylline Oracles quoted, 112–3; (II) causes of the success fundamentally moral, 114–5; Dean Inge on the 'liberal' elements in the Jewish Diaspora, 115–6; charges of antinomianism unconfirmed, 116; Philo's thought and ethical standpoint, 117; Reinach on the position of Judaism in the

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Graeco-Roman world, 118; (III) the distinctive and inalienable character of Judaism, 119; Dr. Krauss on the Jewish Sibylline Oracles, 120; Dean Inge's view of post-Exilic Judaism criticized. 120–2; Dr. Matthews' Boyle Lectures quoted, 122–3; (IV) Dean Inge's large claims for Hellenism, 123–4; Christ's teaching fundamentally Jewish, 124; the Greek of the Gospels saturated with Semitic thought, 124–5; Dr. Burney on the 'Koiné' language, 126; Jewish scholars impressed by the Jewish character of early Christian writings, 127; Dean Inge on St. Paul's Greek, 128; plausible conjectures regarding St. Paul's early life and training, 128–30; extraordinary contrast between St. Paul and Philo, 130; the idea of the 'archetypal' or 'cosmic' man, 131; Dean Inge on St. Paul's development, *ib.*; influence of mystery religions doubtful, 132–3; Pauline theology partially rediscovered by St. Augustine and the Reformers, 133; (V) claims for Stoicism made by Mr. Edwyn Bevan, 134; and by Dean Inge, 135; Bishop Lightfoot on its Eastern affinities, 135–6; Stoicism a real preparation for Christianity, 136–8; Mr. Bevan quoted on the contending Hebraic and Hellenistic elements in historic Christianity, 139; summing-up of the article, 140

Lectionary, The Revised, 378

LEUBA, J. H., *Belief in God and Immortality*, 166

LOFTHOUSE, W. F., *Altar, Cross, and Community*, 360

MACLEAN, A. J. (ed.), *Doctrine of the Twelve Apostles*, 176

MARMION, D. C., *Christ the Life of the Soul*, 177

MICKLEM, N., and H. MORGAN, *Christ and Caesar*, 363

MINIMUM CONDITIONS OF INTERCOMMUNION [by Canon Lacey], pp. 219 *sqq.*: obvious connexion between Christian unity and common participation of the Lord's Table, 219; in St. Cyprian's words the episcopate is the *sacramentum unitatis*, *ib.*; some Eucharistic material essentials — bread, wine, and a benediction, 220–22; variations in the liturgical framework permissible, 222–23; by whom must the Eucharist be celebrated? 223–25; the subject of episcopal ordination, 225–6

MINIMUM CONDITIONS OF INTERCOMMUNION: SOME COMMENTS ON CANON LACEY'S ARTICLE [by Dr. Vernon Bartlet], 227 *sqq.*: the one faith in the one Lord all-important, 227; the Eucharist, rather than the Episcopate, the 'sacrament of unity,' 228; the essentials of a valid Eucharist discussed, 229–32; the question of the Minister, 232–34; and of episcopal ordination, 235–6; according to the mind of Christ, nothing is 'of strict obligation,' 236

MODERN CRITICISM AND THE PROPHETIC LITERATURE OF THE OLD TESTAMENT [by Rev. T. H. Robinson], pp. 250 *sqq.*: attention paid to the Hexateuch by 19th-century students, 250–51; present-day study of the prophetic literature, 251; work done by earlier critics, 251–2; Lowth's massive learning, 252; his recognition of parallelism and of the poetical form of the prophetic books, 252–3; Köster's discovery of the strophe, 253–4; Müller's three

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principles, 254; recognition of a real metre within the line itself, 255; Buchanan Gray's *Forms of Hebrew Poetry*, 255-6; attacks on the 'integrity' of the Prophets, 257; considerable agreement as to general results, 258; Melville Scott's work on Hosea, 259; the views of Ewald and Duhm, 260; the 19th-century student's view of the prophetic books, 261; change produced by the advance in archaeology and comparative religion, *ib.*; Hölscher's *Die Propheten*, 262; importance of prophets and prophecy in Jewish history, *ib.*; 'schools of the Prophets,' *ib.*; ecstatic prophecy, 263 *sqq.*; the 'Nebi'im,' 264–5; A. B. Davidson's views, 265; difficulty of attributing these experiences to the Canonical Prophets, 266; different opinions of Biblical scholars, 267; three main types of view now current, 268; exegesis affected by recognition of the ecstatic element, 269; the existence of collections of short poetic Oracles admitted, 270; Prof. W. B. Stevenson's views, 271; the criteria 'Thus saith the Lord' and 'saith the Lord,' *ib.*; illustrative analyses of Is. i and Jer. iv 5–31, 272–5; more study of the compilers' methods needed, 275; grouping together of oracles about foreign peoples, *ib.*; and of those employing a common 'link-word,' 276; the 'Servant Songs' of Isaiah, *ib.*; the subject of so-called 'interpolations,' 277–9; summing-up, 279–80

MORRIS. M. C. F., *Yorkshire Reminiscences*, 379

MYERS. F. W. H., *Collected Poems*, 184

NATURAL VOICE, THE [by the Rev. C. F. Rogers], pp. 201 *sqq.*: present-day faults in Church music, 202–7; popular dissatisfaction with 'intoning,' 202; Puritan objections at the Savoy Conference, 203; the demand for more use of 'the natural voice' a bad remedy, 204; Mr. Louis Calvert quoted, 204–5; speech and song should both be natural, 205; Jeremy Taylor on Church music, 206; the prime remedy, to make common speech musical, 207; hints to the clergy, 208; training the congregation, 209 *sqq.*; Sir Edward Tylor quoted, 211–12; bad traditions of singers, 213; and of choirs and organists, 214; congregational practice advocated, 214–6; the organist's part, 216–7; summing-up, 218

PAGET, STEPHEN, *I have reason to believe*, 188

PERIODICALS, 190, 380

PHILOSOPHY OF REDEMPTIVE POWER IN CHRISTIAN WORSHIP [by the Rev. Richard de Bary], 60 *sqq.*: general but vague desire for the Kingdom of God 60–1; the real meaning of Christian Redemption grasped by very few, 62; the philosophy of the Christian Hope enshrined in Christian worship and sacrifice, 63; liberal and modernist hindrances from 'lifting up' Christ, 64; man's spiritual nature has its own innate desires, 65; religion not a mere manifestation of the 'herd' instinct, 66; fruitfulness of Christian religious fellowship adumbrated in paganism, 67–9; the 'Resurrection element' and the 'Forgiveness element' the two principal components of religion, 70;

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difference between the Catholic and the Reformation presentation of religion, 71; a mission of worship advocated, 72; the idea of the Body Mystical and Christ its living Head must be grasped, 73–4

PSYCHOLOGY (THE NEW) AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE [by the Rev. L. W. Grensted], pp. 281 *sqq.*: the debate between 'science' and 'religion' now in its third, and perhaps final, phase, 282; the older psychology identified the contents of mind with those of consciousness, 283; and concerned itself solely with the normal mind, 284; the New Psychology derives from Galton and William James, 285; the catholicity of its range, the key to the present interest in it, 286; Behaviourism, 287; 'psychical determinism,' *ib.*; Myers' hypothesis of the subliminal self, 288; Freud's theory of the *libido* and his scheme, *ib.*; criticized for its emphasis upon sex impulse, 289; and for disproportionate excessive detail, 290; challenged by Jung and the Zurich school, *ib.*; Jung abandons the mechanistic view of life, 291; analysis of primary instincts a main strand of the New Psychology, 292; McDougall's work based on the principle of 'biological continuity,' *ib.*; criticized in Shand's *Foundations of Character*, 293; the actual concept of an instinct needs investigation, 294; the instincts always have a forward reference, 295; Shand's theory of the sentiments, 296; only three ultimate groupings of life-impulses have real permanence, *ib.*; some of the most important aspects of the New Psychology tabulated, 297–300; summing-up, 300–1

REED, A. W., 'Thomas Hardy and the Poetic Mind,' 342

ROBINSON, T. H., *St. Mark's Life of Jesus*, 348

SHEPHEARD, HAROLD, *The Divine Invasion*, 362

SKRINE, Rev. J. H., *Gospel of the Manhood*, 178

SMITH, M. HAMBLIN, *Psychology of the Criminal*, 367

SMITH, ROBINSON, *Solution of the Synoptic Problem*, 349

STOKES, Dr. H. P., *Short History of the Jews in England*, 375

SYMES, J. E., *Evolution of the New Testament*, 172

TAGORE, RABINDRANATH, *The Fugitive* and *Creative Unity*, 185

THIRTEENTH-CENTURY CORONATION RUBRIC (A) [by Miss H. E. Allen], 335–41

THREE FRENCH BOOKS, 50 *sqq.*: Fabre and Huysmans the outstanding exponents of religious fiction in pre-war days, 50–1; effects of the war, 51; Ernest Psichari's *Le Voyage du Centurion*, 52–4; Georges Duhamel's *Entretiens dans le tumulte*, 54–6; Camille Mayran's *L'Epreuve du Fils*, 56–9

TOUT, T. F., *France and England*, 377

TRINITIES OF NON-CHRISTIAN RELIGIONS [by Rev. F. Harold Smith], pp. 75 *sqq.*: the twofold attitude of religion—the practical and the reflective, 76; the triads of non-Christian religions represent attempts to find unity within the manifold of the Divine Idea, *ib.*; early missionaries misled by the Tao of Lao-tze, 77; examples of the universal tendency to form triads, 78; the Babylonian Anu-Bel-Ea triad, 79–81; contrasted with the Christian Trinity, 81–2; triads numerous in India, 82; the

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Trimurti, 83–5; Kalidasa quoted, 85; the Trikona, *ib.*; Vishnu and the *Bhagavad-Gita*, 85–6; the *guna* doctrine of the Trimurti, 87; threefold designation of Brahman in the *Vedanta* philosophy, 88; the trinity of catholic Buddhism, 88–90; the Trikaya compared with the Christian Trinity, 90–1; the Buddhist Triratna, 91; Taoist triads, 92; Egyptian triads, 92–4; the Osiris-Isis-Horus triad, 95; the doctrine of the Ka, 95–6; problem of Christian indebtedness to Egyptian trinities, 96–7; Hermes Thrice-Greatest, 98; the trinities of Philo, 99; Plato's *Timaeus*, 99–100; Neo-Platonic views, 100–1; *résumé* of the article, 101–3

UNDERHILL, EVELYN, *The Life of the Spirit and the Life of To-day*, 355

UNION, INTERCOMMUNION AND THE LAMBETH CONFERENCE [by Prof. Nicholas Glubokovsky], pp. 14 *sqq*: (I) the 'sinful darkness' of Bolshevist Russia, 14–6; inter-Church communion a pressing demand of the times, 17; (II) the Lambeth Resolutions lacking in clearness on the constitution of the 'One Church,' 18–20; (III) Catholic Church union postulates a complete and living reality, 21–5; (IV) the Christian life must be drawn from Christ the fountain-head, 26–9; (V) the Conference guarantees neither ecclesiastical union nor its stability, 29–35; (VI) sacramental intercommunion is inadmissible while the sacraments are insecure, 36–40; (VII) reasons for the extreme vagueness of language, 41; expediency of concentrating on the union of great historic Churches, 42; Dr. Headlam's views and concrete proposals concerning the Orthodox Church, 43–5; necessity of definite Christian dogmatics, 46; the charge of Eastern intolerance, 47; a disproportionate burden placed on the Orthodox Church as regards sacrifices demanded of her, 48; summing-up of the article, 49

WADE, G. W., *New Testament History*, 351

WARNER, H. J., *The Albigensian Heresy*, 376

WEBB, C. C. J., 'Mr. Bosanquet on Contemporary Philosophy,' 160

WHITLA, Sir W., *Newton's Daniel and the Apocalypse*, 354

WIRGMAN, A. T., *Storm and Sunshine in South Africa*, 379

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

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